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
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
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THE
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hospitable globe, we usually require some personal experience of the strenuous, never-ending fight, to bring home its existence to our self. As they say there are people in the south of France who are ready to deny that the Prussian hordes ever really swept away the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine, and marched triumphant through the Barrière de l'Étoile, turning its sculptured victories into bitter derision, and the Elysian fields into a national purgatory, so many of us must have felt that the events of the last four years were needed to convince us with intimate sense that the Church and the world are *hic et nunc* internecine foes, and that we must in our place and measure take our side and abide by it. Yet, as in the former instance so in the latter also, the battle was always waged, and the combatants, if not engaged hand to hand, yet arrayed in opposite ranks, and variously conscious of the presence of the enemy. It may be, perhaps, interesting if in the following remarks we endeavour not so much to contribute anything to a knowledge of the facts of the struggle now engaged between the Prussian Imperial Chancellor's government and the Church, as to indicate some of its antecedents, and trace them to their present issue, and thus show that the unexpectedness to us of Prince Bismark's attack is not so much an objective phenomenon as a revelation of our own personal ignorance of what has been kept from our knowledge, less by the guile of conspirators in high places than by our own incuria. Not wishing to repudiate the truth conveyed in the homely maxim of "minding your own business," one yet cannot but regret that we too often practically apply it in a wrong direction, when we allow the events which affect the Church at large to pass unnoticed, because they do not *immediately* touch our small share in the inheritance of God and of His kingdom. We are not alarmists, nor would we hold up the fear of what *may* one day happen to us as a motive for more active sympathy with other parts of the great body to which we belong, but still it is lawful to say "*tua res agitur dum proximus ardet, Ucalegon*," and to fall back on the less good motive where superior ones seem to have no effect. It is from this point of view, of the real solidarity, as they say, of all Catholic interests, that the late visit of two English noblewomen, not less distinguished for their manifold virtues and talents and their devotion to the cause of God, than for their high rank and social position, to their sisters the noble ladies of Catholic Westphalia at Münster, is so admirable. Not deterred by the inclemency of the season, or the still more sensible frigidity of the world's comments, they went to Prussia to present to those ladies, who had had the courage to visit and condole with their Bishop under the pains and penalties of Prince Bismark's new Church Laws, an address from the Catholic ladies of England, full of respect and sympathy. Made the objects of public demonstrations

of due regard by the chief nobility of the province, even the Prussian police did not venture to interfere, and they have returned with one more title to the respect of all their countrymen, and of the whole Catholic world.

More than sixty years ago the Prussian monarchy, wounded to the quick by the events of the early years of this century, and naturally desirous by all means to repair the injuries inflicted on it in the wars of the first French Empire, had, with a foresight which is one of the indications of a providential part to be played by any State in the great drama of the world's history, laid down a scheme of action which the last fifty years have gone far to realize. In 1814 the military system of Scharnhorst, which had been in secret operation ever since the great national misfortunes of 1806, manifested first-fruits in the successive overthrows of Napoleon the First, while the result of the war of 1870 was its full harvest. The compulsory education of the people was another step in the same direction, for it added to the material drill which makes every Prussian a soldier, an intellectual training destined to make every soldier an intelligent instrument in the hands of the great military monarchy. From regulating the intellectual training of a people there is but one step, and that a very short one, to regulating their religion; and this step Frederick William III. also made, or attempted to make. Himself a Calvinist, it was to him no difficulty to accept the already dilapidated and declining orthodoxy of the Lutheran Church, and in October, 1817, the great majority of these two "persuasions," with a due sense of the king's authority in matters of faith, agreed to an official amalgamation, which, though proclaimed as quite spontaneous, led to some trifling difficulties on the part of the few concerned who indulged in what has been called "the expensive luxury of a conscience." The king, as *Summus Episcopus*, issued a book of prayer, which was to be common to all in the new State, or Evangelic Church, as it is called. Strict Lutherans refused to use it, and were accordingly subjected to imprisonment, and other pains and penalties in that case made and provided. No liberal statesman, with a taste for Church questions, was in opposition at the moment, we must suppose, and so the poor Lutheran Prussians who (so un-Prussian-like) presumed to "call their souls their own," have faded into oblivion:

"illacrimabiles

Urgentur, ignotique longa

Nocte, carent quia vate sacro." *

* We rejoice, however, to see in the *Kreuz Zeitung* that some of the Lutheran clergy are now resisting the new Falk marriage law, which gives to the State only the power of contracting the marriage, and leaves to the

But while the bulk of the Prussian nation thus fully merited the encomium lately passed on all but the Roman Catholics by a distinguished expostulator, of "never being in perilous collision with the State,"* the king's Catholic subjects proved less plastic, and absolutely refused to perform the goose-step to the royal tune. The king had raised his diplomatic agent in Rome to the rank of a regularly accredited minister, with the consent of Pius VII., of sacred memory, in the year 1805; a measure rendered necessary by the great increase of Catholic Prussian subjects since the cession of the grand duchy of Posen and of Prussian Silesia. In 1809 he had published his resolve, that, considering the marked loyalty and devotion to his cause shown by his Catholic subjects during the preceding years of sore national trial, they should henceforth be placed on a footing of entire civil equality with their Protestant fellow-subjects. In 1815 the treaty of Paris secured to Prussia its fairest province, that of the Lower Rhine, with its time-honoured metropolis of Cologne and teeming Catholic population; but it was not till 1821 that the Concordat, elaborated for years by Niebühr, minister of Prussia in Rome, was signed and ratified to the satisfaction of both the high contracting powers. Scarcely, however, had the provisions of the Concordat taken full effect, when the king's government and the Holy See joined issue on a question of the greatest moment, viz. that of mixed marriages.

If there is a prescription in all the force of the term in the universal discipline of the Church, it is that whereby when Catholics, by special dispensation of the Holy See, and only for special reasons, are allowed to marry non-Catholics, the condition is always to be exacted that the offspring of such marriages are to be brought up in the Catholic faith: to suppose that the Catholic Church could act otherwise is to suppose that it is not the Catholic Church; for it is well known to friend and foe alike, that the Catholic Church recognizes no other way of salvation than herself, and therefore she cannot hand over souls unborn to be brought up out of her pale. The habit of being obeyed in all things, naturally leads absolute kings (and arbitrary liberals especially, but far less excusably) to suppose that the laws of the Church are to bend, like all other laws, to their will. Frederick the Great, when he

clergy only the office of blessing it afterwards. This resistance seems to go only the safe length of a protest, which is based on the fact that the new law has greatly increased the number of marriages made only by the civil power. Here again, the tendency is manifestly to eliminate religion from the life of the people. If they need not be baptized, and need not be married—if they are taught infidelity and die, as they live, without prayer or sacrament,—they will be, perhaps, model Prussians, but certainly not model Christians.

* Mr. Gladstone's "Vatican Decrees, &c.," p. 5.

acquired his Polish provinces, had laid down a rule that the male and female children born of mixed marriages should follow the religion of their parents according to sex. (One wonders that the great drill-sergeant did not try to regulate their religion by their stature). And Frederick William III. prescribed in 1803 that all the children should follow the religion of the father. He extended this law to the Rhine provinces in 1825. Not content, however, with these measures, the king went the length of prohibiting the Catholic clergy from advising or exacting any agreement on the part of the non-Catholic party in derogation of this law, and enacted, moreover, that any such agreement should be null and of no effect in law. The prescriptions of the Church and those of the State being thus at variance, the Catholics of the Rhine province had recourse to their bishops, who in their turn applied to Rome for guidance in this conjuncture. Pius VIII., in answer to their question, directed a brief, which was compiled by Cardinal Cappellari, his successor in the chair of Peter, to the two Prussian Archbishops of Cologne and of Posen, and to their suffragans; and here we may remark that this brief, "*Litteris altero*," and the allocution "*Officii memores*," of the succeeding Pontificate, contain an adequate exposition of the mind of the Holy See on mixed marriages and their results and consequences, admirable at once for the prudence of its reservations, and for the charity of its condescension. Supported by the Apostolic firmness, the Archbishops of Cologne and of Posen, Mgr. Droste von Vischering and Dunin, names ever to be had in veneration in the Church of God, resisted all the arguments used to induce them to give way to the new laws. Things came to an issue at Cologne very soon: the Archbishop's predecessor had unhappily signed a convention, which was certainly beyond his competency, with the Government, in June, 1834, the evident scope of which was to propagate Protestantism by means of mixed marriages, under the conditions already named; and Mgr. Droste von Vischering absolutely refused to be bound by it. The first great Prussian argument was then brought to bear on him; his revenue was stopped, and he was desired to resign his archbishopric. Still resisting, the stronger reasoning of imprisonment was tried, and he was shut up for four years in the fortress of Minden to weigh and appreciate its full force. Mgr. Dunin underwent the same course of dialectics. The Minister of Worship (we do not remember the name of this village Falk) gave his orders to the Catholic clergy of the archdiocese, that they were to publish the banns and give the Church's blessing to mixed marriages, and by no means to exact any promise, or even to suggest it, that the children of such marriages should be brought up in the faith. In vain the Archbishop set forth in a letter to the king that the brief "*Magna*" of Bene-

dict XIV. on mixed marriages had always been in vigour in the diocese; that its provisions were identical with those of the synods of Posen in 1720, of Ermeland in 1726, of Culm in 1745, and of the brief of Pius VIII.; and that the kings of Prussia had repeatedly guaranteed the immunity of the Polish Catholic provinces from legislation in derogation of these provisions: the argument of fine and imprisonment was the only answer. Mgr. Dunin was condemned to six months' imprisonment at Colberg, and was pronounced incapable of any office or charge in the kingdom of Prussia, and deposed from his archbishopric. The Papal allocution of July, 1839, recites and deplores these violations of all law, declares the two Archbishops to be the only true and legitimate pastors of their respective dioceses, and demands their restoration to liberty, and the freedom of the churches under their jurisdiction.

The next year King Frederick William III. was gathered to his fathers, and the late king, Frederick William IV., succeeded. One of his first cares was to relax the bands of what the French call "*une situation très-tendue*." He set the Archbishops at liberty, and next year an agreement was come to in concert with the Archbishop of Cologne himself, whereby he was allowed to exercise his jurisdiction by means of a coadjutor with succession, the late Cardinal v. Geissel. His years of imprisonment were occupied chiefly in wise provisions for the defence of Catholic education, perpetually menaced by the interference of the State, and after a visit to Rome, where that magnanimous and learned Pontiff Gregory XVI. of happy memory, received him with special marks of favour and respect, he drooped, sickened, and speedily went to receive the reward of his Apostolic and pastoral labours and sufferings. The immediate fruit of the heroic resistance of these prelates to the aggressions of the king was an improved, though not normal state of things, regarding mixed marriages, which the Church has tolerated up to the present time; viz., that the blessing of the Church is given only when the non-Catholic party agrees to bring up all the children of such marriage in the faith, and, consequently, that the clergy are free to urge that condition.

The character and conduct of Frederick William IV. warrant us in assigning his policy towards the Church fully as much to his native sense of justice as to any other motive; but however this may be, it is certain that the menacing attitude of German democracy in the years preceding 1848 rendered that policy of conciliation to which he had reverted both wise and necessary. We all probably remember how the king's efforts to parry the revolution of that year by successive modifications of the Prussian constitution in a liberal or constitutional sense, were not altogether

successful. What concerns us to notice here is, that the letters-patent of 1847, and the constitutions of the 5th of December, 1848, and of 1850, all recite and confirm the liberties of the Catholic Church, putting her on a perfect equality with the other religious body recognized by the State, and especially providing, by the twelfth article of the Constitution, that the Roman Catholic Church, like the other religious bodies, shall regulate and administer by itself its own affairs; keep possession of its own revenues, endowments, and establishments, whether devoted to worship, education, or beneficence; and moreover freely communicate with its head the Pope. In his speech in the Prussian Upper House, March 10th, 1873, on the question of altering the paragraphs 15 to 18 inclusive of the Constitution of 1850, the Chancellor, Bismark, asserted "that they were introduced at a time when the State required, or thought it required, help, and believed that it would find this help by leaning on the Catholic Church. It was probably led to this belief by the fact that in the National Assembly of 1848 all the electoral districts with a preponderant Catholic population returned—I will not say Royalist representatives, but certainly men who were the friends of order, *which was not the case in the Protestant districts.*" Is it possible that we English Catholics are accused, not of "dividing" our allegiance between Pope and Queen, but of not giving enough of it to the Liberal party?

Such, then, were the dispositions of the Prussian monarchy when it was sick: liberty of worship and of religious association is guaranteed, all citizens are equal before the law, and without distinction of creed eligible for every civil privilege, and no ecclesiastical appointments are to be made by the State. Not in one jot or tittle does it appear that Prussia receded from these principles and laws down to the recent legislation on ecclesiastical matters. The events of 1866, telling and advantageous as they were for the Prussian monarchy, brought no immediate alteration in its ecclesiastical policy. During the brief campaign which culminated on the disastrous field of Sadowa, and gave Bismark and his sovereign an acquittance in full of all demands, whether for money or men or plighted word of king and minister, written in Austrian blood on Napoleonic foolscap, the King of Prussia paraded his sympathy with Catholics, and dragged sixty carriages full of priests and Sisters of Charity about with his head-quarters, and no doubt many remember how, as late as the opening of the Vatican Council, the popular voice at any rate was full of Prussian civilities to the Holy Father. A story of a very fine carpet for the Council Hall, said to have been presented by the king to His Holiness, but which had no objective existence whatever, as those who were there can attest, was paraded with such "damnable iteration" in the Liberal papers as to give

rise to some suspicion that the Palazzo Caffarelli (the Prussian Embassy) was not averse to this method of bringing Prussian friendship to the Holy See on the *tapis* (as one might say) at that critical moment. But however that may be, it is certain that the Prussian eagle had not, up to that time, plumed its sable wings for the imperial flight of the next year. Bismark's violent infringements of the Constitution in the past had been indeed tacitly condoned by his old supporters, but the great venture was still to be made, and not till the moment (as well as the man) was come, were the last rags of the old traditions of the Prussian crown to be relinquished, and the support of German Liberalism to be purchased by sacrificing to it the Church of God, and the honour of the king, so far as any was left to him.

A late writer in "Macmillan's Magazine" to the contrary notwithstanding, we maintain, securely and sincerely too, that the attitude of the Prussian monarchy towards the Church was one usually of respect, often of cordiality, and exceptionally only of hostility. On the whole, too, this latter phase had not proved a success. Priests and bishops had suffered, but they had carried their point, at least in a measure, and the State had given way, even when it seemed to overcome by force. All such struggles between mind and matter ever have eventuated in the ultimate triumph of the former.

Now let us proceed to trace to its causes the marked and even sudden change of the Prussian policy towards the Church which, in one sense, we all deplore; in the sense, viz., of regret for the suffering inflicted so cruelly on so many innocent and holy people by the violence and injustice of that Government.

These causes are twofold. First, the existence of a most powerful and extreme "Liberal" party in Germany; and secondly, the ambition of the House of Hohenzollern to occupy and consolidate the new Germanic Imperial throne.

We have no reason to suppose otherwise hitherto, and therefore we may safely assume, that Prince Bismark is animated as a public man by the desire for the aggrandizement of his country and its sovereign. Now a public man of the present day has only one course open to him if he wishes to succeed in such a career. He must, and it will probably be no effort to him, such are the effects of education and habit and "surroundings," shrink from *no means* whatever to secure his end. That must be his principle; and his modes of thought will no doubt give him an immense advantage in putting it into action. All ideas of a fixed standard of right and wrong are to be deemed out of place in the sphere of public affairs. "No one," with the trifling exceptions of the Almighty and His Vicar and the Church, can for a moment allow a doctrine which is so incompatible with the progress of human

society. Thus, I contrive and plot, I bribe and lie, I suborn the subjects and confidential servants of a neighbouring sovereign with whom I am at peace. I thus create "public opinion," and public opinion creates a revolution or sedition within his realm. I make a coup d'état; I slay, and I take possession. Possession is fait accompli, and fait accompli is right. How can one wonder that when a question of right arises, such as that of the supreme right over Christian society, the opponents of the Church do not seem even to comprehend what is meant by the term, but go off into historical questions about alleged abuses, or metaphysical difficulties based on hypotheses which beg the whole question at issue. The very idea of right as distinct from, and often, therefore, opposed to, might, seems to have faded out of the world's philosophy of social and political things. Count Arnim, the Prussian ambassador to the Pope, in full uniform, mounted on the charger of a Piedmontese officer, and entering Rome through the breach at Porta Pia,* should be immortalized, and go down to the latest posterity as the type of the chivalry of progress and cynosure of all successful scoundrelism till the end of time.

Right, then, means *power* and shrewdness to use it in obedience to the supreme law of expediency, the "haute raison d'état." Hence public virtue is the not being found out; public treaties and promises are so much paper currency, ready for repudiation when it can be done without loss of credit; which credit, again, is but another name for fear, and fear is paid as a tribute to power, which is thus the beginning and the end of all, "hoc est omnis homo." Thus the hypothesis being that all things and men are purchasable, the only practical question for the statesman is to know (1) what people want, (2) what their support is worth, and when and how to buy them. No one probably knows better than Prince Bismark, who, if we mistake not, was at Frankfort in 1848, what the great Liberal party in Germany want. They may be divided into three classes,—those who are rich, those who wish to be rich, and those who wish for the riches of others, whose maxim is "ôte-toi que je m'y mette," as they say in French. The first want a strong government capable of imposing on all a firm yoke in every direction except that in which lies the development of their already colossal fortunes, in peace and comfort and security: such are the great Jewish financiers, whether Hebrew or Christian. The second desire the same, because their end is the same, only they have a more active animosity to religion, because it is apt to interfere with those grand operations on change or mart, and that life of unrestrained self-indulgence which characterize many men becoming rapidly rich.

* See D'Ideville, "Rome and its Captors," p. 145.

The third class of liberals are those who want to upset society in order to divide its spoils, and who regard a strong, centralized, irresponsible power as a necessary prelude to their utopia and a probable stepping-stone towards its final establishment. If Prince Bismark wished only for the support of one of these sections, his task would have been easy, but, like the man in the fable, he had to convey his cabbage, his goose, and his fox across the ferry in one boat, with the additional circumstance that his fox is quite ready to eat up the cabbage as well as the goose. The desideratum then was to find some *quartum quid* which would satisfy the desires, or at any rate not disturb the digestion, of all three. High finance and vested interests, commerce and trade on the one hand, and red republicanism on the other, manifestly have no very intimate positive bond of union; but at any rate they have a negative one; each in its way has a great objection to the supernatural order, its sanctions, its inhibitions, its menaces and its truths, its "justice and chastity, and judgment to come." And lo you! in the thicket a ram caught by the horns—not its own horns indeed, but the horns of Prince Bismark's dilemma, the Falk laws, which in effect say to the Catholic conscience, from that of the Pope in his captivity to the simple believer who is as yet free to walk the streets of Berlin, "either give to Cæsar the things that are God's, or know that, aided by my liberal friends here, I will fine and imprison and exile you off the face of my Prussian creation. Cheer up, oh my fox; my goose thou canst not have as yet; and thou goose, refrain thyself from cabbage for a season; but meanwhile we will all dine together on tender consciences of Bishop and priest and people, a diet congenial to us all, and none to interfere." But to drop metaphor, and come to fact more in detail.

We have seen that the Prussian monarchs' later policy had tended, wisely as well as rightly, we believe, to give or preserve freedom to the Church. The result of their legislation in this direction had therefore been to discourage and thwart the Liberal party, who, like all true liberals, cannot tolerate liberty for any but themselves. They therefore turned their attention to the Catholic Church in the smaller German states, and especially in the grand duchy of Baden: in that of Hesse Darmstadt the sense of justice of the Grand Duke gave them no hope of success, but elsewhere they were more successful. Opponents, on this very ground, of the constitutional liberties guaranteed to Catholics as well as others by the constitutions of 1847, 1848, and 1850 in Prussia, but unable to secure their end directly, they have for thirty-four years been at work to prepare for the present reaction throughout Germany. Professor Friedberg, professor of law in the University of Leipzig, in Saxony, and notoriously a chosen adviser of the Ministry of Worship at Berlin, reveals in his work called "The German Empire

and the Catholic Church," the plan of action laid down by the Liberal party. The truth is, that that party,—at any rate the more sagacious among them, both in Germany and elsewhere, have for many years past recognized the existence of a phenomenon which even to us in our own country has still the charm of a surprise. Up to the end of the last century the union between Church and State in Catholic countries, and especially in Germany, where three of the seven electors and some fifty bishops and abbots, were ecclesiastical sovereign princes, and the whole civil order of the Empire was interpenetrated by the ecclesiastical element, lacerated though it had been by Luther's and Calvin's rebellion, had been the great object of the hatred of all the infidel and liberal party, and for this reason : not recognizing the supernatural order at all, these men of course could only attribute the power of the Church to its wealth and influence in the State. They consequently argued that if wealth and State protection were withdrawn, the power of the Church would be certain to collapse, and cease in time to exist. No one will say that the liberals did not carry out their views. Everywhere the doctrinaires prevailed and the severance of Church and State, the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church in every land, became an accomplished fact. But strange to say (or rather to us most intelligible), the expected result has not ensued, and on the contrary, the energetic life and development of the Church has been precisely most manifest there where she has most completely been left to herself by the State, as for instance in Belgium, in England and Ireland, and our colonies, and, above all, in the United States of America, where in 1790 there were one Catholic Bishop and twenty-one Catholic priests, and there are now sixty Catholic dioceses and vicariates, and 5,000 clergy, and where, while the whole population has increased in the ratio of 1,430 per cent., the number of Catholics has increased in that of 2,500 per cent.* It is thus reduced to a demonstration that the amalgam of freedom and the Catholic Church, instead of producing a diminution of Catholics, has the directly opposite result ; a strange comment, by the way, on the recent, but by no means new, assertion, that obedience to the Pope is mental and moral captivity.

It was in view of such facts, and to meet this new peril, that the astutest of liberals (for such we take liberal German professors to be) laid down a new system of strategy and a new plan of campaign. The *mot d'ordre* was no longer to be the "free Church in the free State," except in countries like Italy, where that earlier cry of the Revolution had never yet found a full echo, and the cataclysm of French infidelity had not settled down long enough

* These statistics are Dr. Friedberg's own.

to ruin all fertility, and bury all fruits under the pestilent alluvium of its material philosophy. Henceforth the cry was to be, that the sacred supremacy of the civil order was being invaded, and that in mere self-defence Governments must contrive laws and enact penalties to restrain the insolence and punish the aggressions of the Ultramontanes. Need it be said that this new-born zeal for the authority of the State is not the real motive of the Liberal party. They know that the only secure foundation of the State lies in the sanction of that very authority of the Church which they are moving every power to undermine and destroy; and it is because they hate the authority of the civil ruler only less than that of the Church that they would thus urge on him to destroy her, if that were possible, but, at any rate, to enslave and corrupt her by legalized and administrative tyranny, and so deprive her of her protectorate over the consciences of her people. The Swiss *loi d'organisation* of the 23rd of March, 1873, has the same end in view. It inserts between the seeming liberality of other provisions such laws as would place the whole discipline and government of the Catholics in the hands of the laity; and what sort of laity it will be who would accept this legislation we need not point out. Similarly, an essay in the new German paper the "*Italia*,"* which devotes itself entirely and exclusively to Italian affairs, institutes a comparison between the new Church legislation of the two countries, and arrives at the conclusion that the true solution of the whole question lies in handing over Church matters to the exclusive control of the laity. This essay is by Signor Borghi. It is indeed a battle for souls on a great scale which is now being waged, and in such a strife even men like Bismark shrink into comparative insignificance. It may be that even such as he has not much more perception of the full bearings of the fight than many a subaltern in the Prussian army had of Moltke's plan of the campaign of 1870. The aim of Liberalism being then nothing more or less than the rending of all men's souls from out the hands of the Church, it remains to be seen what are the means now used to produce this result. These means are described in a few words; viz., the destruction of the Church by means of the legislation of the State. Professor Friedberg distinctly states this in the following sentence: "If the Government were to adhere to the plan of a total separation of Church and State, what would be the consequence? Would the Bishops entirely lose their authority because the State refused to acknowledge it? Would the parochial system be dissolved because the State was no longer behind it? In other words, would the Church really lose any of her power? It would show an infinite want of perception, and an absolute ignorance of Catholic history,

* *Italia*—Hillebrand. Leipzig: Hartung. London: Williams & Norgate.

make such an assertion. The stream which has flowed for centuries in its own bed does not dry up immediately because its course is obstructed. It only overflows and inundates the country. To continue the metaphor, we must first attempt to draw the waters carefully away, letting them flow into other channels, and conducting them into pools and reservoirs; what remains will then readily evaporate."

Under the hypocritical plea then of reform, and restraint of overbearing Ultramontane claims, the Catholic Church is to be stifled in the close embrace of State legalism, like little Red Riding Hood in the arms of her sham grandmama. In the mind of German Liberals, she is a department of civil power which, by a long abusive employment of State support, has obtained that dominion over souls and consciences which must interfere with allegiance to the State; if totally severed from the State, she will only achieve again by other means the same *imperium in imperio*, and the last state will be worse than the first. No; she must be tightly bound in every limb to the civil power, not for her good, but for the advantage of the State; and when she has thus been tamed and reduced to dance like a led bear to the music of drums and pipes, and the tune of Fichte's Philosophy, what remains then will "readily evaporate," that is, her own children will learn to despise her, and she will expire in the coma of creeping paralysis, unwept and unmourned, unless by some occasional bureaucratic Geheimer Rath, standing at stony gaze, and watching for the moment of the expected Euthanasia, perhaps hastening it, as Mrs. Gamp did, by a dexterous manipulation of the poor patient's pillow. But to turn from this allegory, Professor Friedberg broadly states that in his programme "the State shall consider the Church as a historically established institution, which may be very useful to the State by fulfilling her accessory and peculiar mission for the civilization of the German people, but which, on the other hand, has become dangerous, and may become more so, to the State. For the first reason the Church shall not only be tolerated, but also be authorized by the State. For the second reason, she is to be rendered harmless." These phrases are to a casual observer not at all ugly. Most simple-hearted, easy-going people, even among Catholics, would think them rather sensible, straightforward utterance, and worthy of all regard; but viewed in the light of the Professor's stream-metaphor, what do they mean but radical destruction of the Catholic Church in all its distinctive character and life; slavery for herself and the handing over of her children to slavery also. The full programme of laws by which every vital power of the Church is to be eradicated is perhaps nowhere more plainly given than by this same writer. The list includes:—Introduction of obligatory civil marriage; civil registration; abolition of baptism, as a con-

dition for civil rights of any kind; secularization of all schools; and of all relief to the poor. There follow penal laws to prevent the freedom of the pulpit.

1. No person hostile to the State (the State being the judge of this) will be allowed to preach. Next, to secure the clergy from such hostility, comes,

2. State supervision of the education of the clergy, who, though deprived of the legal care of the schools, still are to remain in the essential sense of the word the teachers of the people.

3. State examination of ecclesiastical students.

4. Prohibition of all Church appointments of persons who give cause of offence in reference to civil or political matters.

5. State control of the administration of Church property.

6. Prevention of Church censures affecting either municipal or state laws, and especially of their use in any way leading to conflict with state officials.

7. Every ordinance of the Church to be made known to the State.

8. Suppression of the order of the Jesuits.

9. And of every order not approved by the State.

10. Jurisdiction of the State in regard to the abuse of the clerical office, which prevents every transgression of limit on the part of the Church, first by imposition of fines, and in case of a second offence by removal from the clerical office.

11. Finally, the State shall never place its power at the disposal of the Church, nor withdraw clerics from office who have opposed their superiors, nor give civil effect to Church censures, nor enforce dues, nor the observance of holy days, nor the attendance of witnesses in causes concerning Church jurisdiction.

Let us remark in passing how well worthy of Mr. Gladstone's attention (if indeed it has not already engaged it) is this whole armoury, but especially the provision for State support of clerics who set their superiors at defiance. If we remember right, it was Mrs. Chick who asked, when Paul Dombey's infant life was at stake through his mother's premature demise, whether "something temporary could not be done with a teapot" to feed the child. What if the great "Expostulator" were to come to the aid, say, of the Ritualist clergy, who seem to answer so well to the description, and do "something temporary" for them by a partial application of the Prussian teapot, by way of mitigating the rigour of the Church Discipline Act. It will of course surprise no Catholic to hear that the writer of the above programme deprecates the separation of the Protestant Church from the State on the self-same ground of hostility to the Catholic Church. Who, he says, "doubts that the Protestant Church is an essentially political institution solely by virtue of its opposition to Catholicism? And

again, that the absence of internal unity in the Protestant Church would not issue in her entire breaking up the moment that she was set free from the connection with the State? And further, that the result of this break-up would be large secessions to the Catholic Church?"

From these premises may also be inferred the importance in the eyes of the Liberal party of the Döllinger schism. Nothing but its hopeless insignificance prevents them from using it now, and when the new laws have had their effect, no doubt it may yet come to be used as an instrument against the Catholic Church, and especially against its Head. Apostasies are inevitably Erastian; they quit indeed the yoke of Christ, but it is always to place their neck beneath that of the other master; for no man *can* serve both, but every man *must* serve one.

But we proceed to consider briefly the question of how far Prussian legislation in the present and last two years has carried out, and is likely in the future to carry out, the above Liberal programme.

As to its general scope and tendency, there can be no question that the Falk legislation is identical with Professor Friedberg's liberal plan. The complete control over the education, training, and nomination of the clergy, and the exclusion of the Pope from all possible action within the Prussian dominions, are enough, without another word, to stamp their true character on these laws; they aim simply at the gradual but complete extinction of the Catholic Church, as such, within those limits. The Catholic Church has its doctrines, and among them is that of the Papal supremacy, and necessity of communion with the Pope as the fountain of *jurisdiction*. This the Prussian State declares it will not tolerate: in other words, the Catholic Church in Prussia is to cease to exist. And here we must remark on an evidence of design and concert on the part of the whole Liberal interest at home and abroad, which is both curious and instructive. As has been repeated over and over again, there is no necessary connection between the doctrine of Papal infallibility and that of the essential organization of the Church. Yet with one accord, the whole band of the enemy agree in putting the definition of the Pope's infallibility forward as the *casus belli*. Whence this accord? No one can doubt that if the Falk laws had been passed ten years ago instead of two, the Pope would have vindicated his jurisdiction and the Church's independence of the State as he always had done before, and as he does now, with Apostolic firmness and decision; but the difference would have been, that the issue of Pope versus Council would have still been a possible one, and the State would have moved all the powers, except that which is from on high, to have based on that contingency the long wished-for reality of a

national schism. "*Hinc illæ lachrymæ.*" Hence, too, the unallayed bitterness and violence of language common in the mouths and under the pens of all apostates, and their aiders and abettors, when they speak and write of this doctrine. In Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, the Liberal papers seem to lose all self-respect in the vehemence of their wrath, and conjointly produce an inharmonious shriek most like that of a steam-whistle or a thirsty hyæna, or

Si quid adhuc est
Quod fremat in terris violentius.

From their point of view they do well to be bitter, for, so far as human eye can detect, nothing but that definition coming when and as it did, could have saved the Church from woes unutterable, and the world from new scandals and causes of unbelief. The Synod of Ems and the Conciliabulum of Pistoja might, as they may suppose, have perhaps found a parallel on a larger scale in the present century at Berlin, and modern thought and ancient history have met together to raise a German Gelehrter or a Prussian serene highness to the honours of an anti-Papal chair.

The acute and stalwart Bishop of Mainz has traced out in his recent pamphlet on the Prussian Church laws agreement in various details with this Liberal programme. The upshot of all their action may be categorized in the two results aimed at, under the name of "inward" and "outward" emancipation of the Catholic clergy from the control of Church authorities. The theory of Dr. Falk cannot be more accurately described than in the following words of Dr. Friedberg:—"It is essential to break the power of the Church over the people and to transfer this power to the State": this is to be done, according to the minister, through action on the clergy. As regards their relation to the Church, by substituting for that relation a similar one towards the State. The whole apparatus described in these laws, for educating the clergy in anti-Catholic rationalistic and naturalistic principles, is the mechanism by which Dr. Falk proposes to confer the benefit of "emancipation" on the inner form of mind and conscience on the future clergy of the realm. Independence is to be secured for them by an education thoroughly "national" in Dr. Falk's sense of that term; that is thoroughly anti-Catholic. This inner emancipation is to be secured by the cogent argument which lies in the enactment that no priest can be appointed even as a temporary assistant without having fulfilled the conditions dictated by the State; viz., to have passed an examination in a German State College, and studied "theology" (save the mark!) in a German State University, and finally passed a scientific State examination. In places where there is no university existing, seminaries may supply its place, but

only those recognized by the minister and where the method of teaching has been approved by him. In a word, this system is simply the striking out of the word "Bishop" everywhere on the whole field of clerical education, and substituting the word "Minister of Public Worship," be he Jew, Turk, infidel, or heretic. Dr. Falk, when the Catholic Bishops and party resist this monstrous law, asks with an air of injured innocence and enlightened pity for the Catholic obscurantism which must underlie their resistance, "Surely, gentlemen, you do not think that a priest will do his spiritual work less well because he is a man of science and of cultivation?"* Hardly less offensive is the tone which he adopts regarding the education in Catholic schools generally. The words "national" and "patriotic" are used by him to designate a doctrine like that of Mr. Gladstone, viz., that no Catholic can be a loyal subject of the civil power. He would have the whole education of the Catholic body under his thumb, and what the pressure is likely to be no one who can read, and who chooses to read the avowed condition of Prussian religious thought, can for a moment doubt. "A few days ago," says Bishop v. Ketteler, "one of the most famous preachers of progress and science declared that the present civilized world no longer needed to be Christian. A former minister of public worship introduced Hegel's philosophy into all the Prussian universities, and at this moment the greater part of the professors in those universities are still further removed from Christianity than Hegel." What this further remove from Christianity is, we may, let us say in passing, practically estimate by the reflection, that moderate Hegelianism is best represented by that very remarkable doctor in divinity and precursor of Renan, Strauss, the author of the "Leben Jesu." "What we may expect from Dr. Falk," says the Bishop of Mainz, "has already been shown by the appointment of Dr. Schulte at Bonn. By pursuing this course we should soon be in the condition in which Catholics were in the grand duchy of Baden forty years ago, where the State appointed as teachers of theology, priests who were completely deficient in faith and in morals. We need only mention Dr. Schreiber, professor at Freiburg, who in his mock moral theology went so far as to represent to the theological students that celibacy was unnatural, illegal, immoral, and unchristian. We may also mention Reichlin-Meldegg, who as professor of ecclesiastical history, habitually ridiculed the Church and all that she holds sacred and venerable, and Dr. Amanr, who in his lectures on canon law sought to instil into his auditors contempt for the Church, and to degrade the authority of the Pope. Archbishop Boll died of grief in his 80th year, on account of these odious proceedings, which he could not

* Dr. Falk's Speech of January 17, 1874.

hinder, notwithstanding his unanswerable petition to the Grand Duke in July, 1830."

The clergy, thus deprived of their faith by a systematic and obligatory infidel education, are however still not sufficiently "national" for Dr. Falk. They are to be further "emancipated" in regard to all outer, or extra-national, control of superiors in the Church. It would seem at first sight that this involves only the renunciation of papal authority, but on inspection, we find that the terms of the new laws include *all* independent Episcopal or Church control whatever, under the name of "extra-national." They contain provisions for an entirely new system of installation or appointment, and deposition of the clergy; and also a whole series of penal enactments for the enforcement of these laws, and the appointment of a supreme appellate and ordinary Royal court of justice for all clerical affairs. Thus the State invades and nullifies all Episcopal jurisdiction in its most essential point; and this in a very insidious way, because it leaves the right of nomination to ~~ours~~ nominally to the Bishop, but checkmates him under pains and penalties for disobedience, by giving the State an absolute *veto* on all such appointments. This absolute veto, therefore, constitutes an unlimited right of patronage on the part of the State. These laws had already placed the nomination of Bishops to ~~sees~~ under the absolute control of the State, and that right (or wrong) is now extended to all ecclesiastical offices whatever. The roof and crown of this unstable heap of legal abominations is the Royal Court for Ecclesiastical affairs, which *alone* has the power of removing any and every ecclesiastic, Bishop, priest, or minister, from his office, "when his presence shall have become incompatible with public order." Here, of course, comes in the prospective use of Dr. Dollinger's sect. In the sense specified in Article 24, the Pope is not allowed to suspend Bishops or priests, who have openly rebelled against the Church. She would thus have to tolerate any worthless heretical and schismatical member, and see her faithful Bishops and pastors fined, imprisoned, and exiled, at the will of the State.

Bishop von Ketteler justly reduces the consequences of these laws to five heads:

1. Separation of the Church from Rome, i.e. schism.
2. Annihilation of all episcopal power.
3. The break-up and dissolution of *all* authority in the Church.
4. Full and absolute sway of the State over the clergy.
5. An incalculable corruption and degradation of the whole Church in Prussia, and throughout the German Empire.

And now let us conclude with some reflections, more or less practical, which seem to flow from what is attempted by the Prussian Church laws at the present time.

I. We would say that the magnitude of the plot is an evidence of the extent and vitality of the power against which it is directed. Men do not break flies on wheels, or marshal armies to subdue the republic of San Marino. An obliging writer on the subject* not only tells us that Christianity is spontaneously disintegrating and vanishing away, but he also supplies us with a religion of the future, which is to take its place. Perhaps Herr v. Hartmann's appreciation of Christianity is not known to the Liberal party at large. At any rate their estimate of the resistance likely to be afforded by it seems higher, though in theory they probably agree with him,—a phenomenon not rare, and exemplified by that well-known tale of the prophet who foretold the end of the world within ten years, and at the same time renewed the lease of his house in Bloomsbury for a far longer period, for fear of accidents.

II. In pointing out the animus of these laws, we are not including all who promote or sympathize with them under the head of *conscious* enemies to the Church. Speaking of our own country, we should say that there is no doubt a great number of very good people who are quite at sea on the whole question. The jargon of the newspaper and other writers, especially Mr. Gladstone, about Ultramontane aggression quite misleads them. Educational and sentimental prejudice also comes in ; and, to be honest, one must also confess that there is a great deal to lament in the mistakes and inadequacies of those who represent the right side. The question at home is perhaps too burning to touch it more in detail. We will but illustrate our meaning from beyond seas, by recalling the convention of 1834 between the Archbishop of Cologne, predecessor of the illustrious Clement Augustus Droste v. Vischering, and the Prussian Government. His concession of the condition for mixed marriages laid down in that document was clearly beyond his competency ; but what a mass of scandal, embarrassment, and suffering did he not thus entail on the Church and on his successor, whose conscientious and necessary re-assertion of true principle and practice in this matter, thus had the appearance of a new claim, and an aggression on the State. But besides these causes there is one which greatly tends to prevent English people from recognizing the true character of the struggle between Church and State. Accustomed as they are to the existing settlement of the relations between what they believe to be the Church and the State, which once for all gave the plenitude of ecclesiastical as well as civil power to the Crown, secured also to a very great extent from any stringent use of this prerogative by the long course of restrictions which have so effectually fettered its exercise in that,

* "Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft. Von E. V. Hartmann. Berlin, Dunker.

as well as in every other direction, the whole practical inconvenience, and great part of the moral turpitude of an utter dependence of religion on the civil power have gradually disappeared from men's minds. Short of blasphemy and Atheism, there is no shade of opinion which the clergy of the Church established by law need refrain from holding, or even from expressing, with a moral certainty that the Crown's correctional police will leave both their opinion and themselves in quiet possession of benefice or cure. And this condition of things, in itself the most complete condemnation of the Establishment which we can formulate, is also the very means of hiding the moral degradation of such a situation from the eyes of the clergy. All who have positive convictions can boast that they freely hold and set them forth, but this very freedom, they forget, is purchased by an equal immunity to others to hold doctrines diametrically opposed and destructive of all belief. Such a chaotic state never before, so far as history tells, passed by the name of a "religion," and its very excesses seem now to provoke a further interference, which can but augment the evil, if (which seems doubtful) it has any effect at all.

If, however, new legislation, on the accession to power of a strong Liberal party administration, should recall the active and coercive measures of police which are so much admired by some of our papers when wielded by a Bismark against Papists, many would be led to take a new view of their position, and question the absolute truth of their first principles. In view of such a contingency, it may not have been an unwise contrivance on the part of those who would deprecate this result, to fly an expostulatory kite in some other direction than that of the dovecotes of national establishments, and see whether the lightning which is in the air may not thus be diverted from many a peaceful hearth to fall with due force upon the heads of those, at once domestic and foreign, owners of a "divided allegiance," who have been, it should seem, hitherto loved not altogether wisely but too well by the great educators of the Liberal party. Whether such a future party is to make its running in the race for governance by an onslaught on the principle and fact of establishment of religion by the State, or by a modification of it in the sense indicated by the German Liberals, it is clear that Catholics can have no sympathy with it. That excess of disappointed affection which seems to have prompted Mr. Gladstone's late utterance, reminds one rather of a jingle in an old play, where some one remonstrates on such a course, saying :

'Twas all very well to dissemble your love,
But why did you kick us down stairs ?

If it has no other result, it will still do good, should it convince Catholics at large how unnaturally and ephemerally they have

been "unequally yoked together with the workers of" *Liberalism*. An alliance with politicians not Catholic, but who hold the same premises as we do on such vital points as the necessity of the State being Christian, and of Christian education, may be sometimes difficult, because the conclusions drawn by such persons will probably often differ from our own, but there is still not that great gulf fixed between us and them which divides us from those who would actively unchristianize the School and the State. From the former we are divided more on questions of degree and of fact than of principle, for no possible leaders of the Conservative interest can at this time of day revive or create anew among their supporters the idea of the absolute power and right of the State to rule in the sphere of beliefs of conscience which underlies the liberalism of this age. When exorcised, it speaks plain, and the plain speech is the old one, "*écrasons l'infâme !*"

III. This leads us to a third reflection, which we have already somewhat anticipated when we said that our enemies, one and all, blame the Vatican definition as the cause of their new manœuvres. We would say, then, to those among us who are not quite so sure as they might be what to think of the "opportune"-ness of this definition, what is the reason for the persistent bitterness with which it is and has been denounced by all the enemies of the Church ever since it became an article of faith? They one and all would allow that they *are* enemies of the Roman Church, or of the Pope, or of "those behind his throne," or of "the myrmidons of the Apostolic Chamber," or of "the Jesuits," or of "the monsignori," as they variously phrase it. Mr. Gladstone, especially, a master of diction if ever man was so, gives us several choice phrases of this kind. He is, however, nowhere happier than in the "myrmidons of the Apostolic Chamber." "Myrmidon" is good, as Polonius says of "mobled Queen"; myrmidon is very good, and we think for the same reason, viz., because no one has an exact idea (unless Mr. Gladstone himself has) of what myrmidon means. It is a sort of word that makes one uncomfortable, because you feel you may perhaps be a myrmidon (as M. Jourdan had always talked prose) without knowing it; and, clearly, to be a myrmidon is not the right thing, for it is never used in a good sense. "Apostolic Chamber" is equally good, or even better. Apostolic by itself is indeed not yet a term of positive opprobrium, but then "Chamber" is distinctly *maled sonans*. Star Chamber and Chamber of Horrors are redolent of thumbscrews, and Pryune's ears, and arbitrary power, to say nothing of scaffolds and guillotines and lettres de cachet. "Apostolic Chamber," therefore, is a Popish chamber of horrors, secret and most likely murderous, at least in regard to its myrmidons. As a fact, the Apostolic Chamber was a tribunal of the fisc, which had none but

temporal affairs of the Pope's treasury to deal with, and consisted of some eight or nine laymen, though bearing the title of *monsignori*, consistorial advocates, and the like. Myrmidons if you like, but just as much and as little as, say, the Lords of the Treasury are myrmidons of the Right Hon. Benjamin Disraeli, M.P., or the proctors in Doctors' Commons are myrmidons of Archbishop Tait.

Our enemies, then, should welcome with joy any thing, any act, or policy, or course, which would tend to break up the baleful influence of this great mystery of iniquity, the old Papal conspiracy against the intellectual and moral independence and dignity of man. Nay, it would seem that Papal tyranny so vexes their righteous souls, that persons otherwise utterly objectionable and distasteful to them, priests and bishops of the Church, now become the objects of their tenderest solicitude, and no crocodile that ever shed a tear in the valley of Egypt, could be more affecting than the laments of the "Pall Mall" and "Saturday Review" over the misconduct of those erring bishops who basely surrendered the personal and official dignity of the Catholic Episcopate, for which these newspapers are so edifyingly zealous, to the insane requirements of Rome at the Vatican Council. Well then, if it is true, as these amiable persons allege, that Rome never made a greater blunder, never committed herself to a more hopeless contradiction of all her antecedents, or made a more complete breach with ancient history and modern thought, or reduced even her most abject clients to greater straits for any conceivable argument to justify her proceedings, than when she defined the personal infallibility of the Pope,—surely this moment should be one of supreme and calm enjoyment and happiness on the part of her enemies. How far they are from such a condition we need go no further than the next railway newspaper-stall to ascertain. When S. Paul "by persuasion had drawn away a great multitude, not only of Ephesus, but almost of all Asia, saying, they are not Gods which are made by hands," Demetrius the silversmith, who thus spoke, drew the legitimate inference when he said, "not only this our craft is in danger to be set at nought, but also the temple of great Diana shall be reputed for nothing; yea, and her majesty shall begin to be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth." Upon this we read, "Having heard these things, they were full of anger, and cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians"; and again, "some cried one thing and some another, for the assembly was confused, and the greater part knew not for what cause they had come together." The climax, however, was reached when Alexander addressed them, and "as soon as they perceived him to be a Jew, all, with one voice, for the space of about two hours, cried out Great is Diana of the Ephesians."

Our antagonists, no doubt, have their views about Scripture.

We submit our own on this passage, which is, that the Ephesians cried out the same thing over and over again for two hours, not because S. Paul's preaching had been a failure, but, on the contrary, because it had been a success; and we leave the application to our critics, especially to the "craftsmen" of Ephesus and elsewhere, whom, to judge by the persistence of their iteration and unanimity of their utterances, it most grieved to hear the Pope and Council define his infallibility in faith and morals.

IV. Lastly, we draw from these considerations one more inference. There is a virtue which seems peculiarly congenial to the English: this is a natural disinclination to push things to their legitimate consequences. We are all saturated with this tendency to compromise and mezzo-termines. Our constitution, bodily, political, social, and religious, our climate, soil, and habits, have it in them, and many of our most ordinary proverbial sayings, such as "Live and let live," "Let us agree to differ," "Six on one side and half a dozen on the other," and many others, bear witness to this habit of thought. Perhaps an instance from the writings, as we are assured, of one of our great Catholic religious writers of the last century may be considered extreme, but is certainly to the point. The good Bishop, it is said, desires his devout reader not to give way to "*too much* despair"; whence it would follow that a little despair would be a very nice thing, the only caution necessary in its use being the national moderation. Moderation is no doubt an excellent quality; but we confess we are sometimes tempted to paraphrase a well-known dictum, and exclaim, "O moderation, how many crimes are committed in thy name!" We will not pretend to define either the real or the false variety of that much-praised virtue. We think, however, one may know them by their fruits. True moderation produces the unexaggerated holding and statement of the truth with due regard to time and place; false moderation conceals or explains away what will perhaps give offence. True moderation is the appanage of conscious rectitude and the index of rightful power; sham moderation is the expression of conscious or unconscious error, and the refuge of weakness and incompetency, such as that of the writer and politician who pushed his moderation so far, "*qu'à force d'en mettre partout il finissait en en mettant même dans sa sincérité.*" Indeed no one seems more hopelessly lost to all appeal than the man whose whole claim to regard is based on the prominence of his "moderation." In his mind not only does all truth and virtue lie in the mean, but every mean is truth and virtue, so that if you convince him that the mean between believing an article of faith and rejecting it lies in intelligently doubting it, he holds doubt to be the only true and virtuous attitude of mind. Such were the minds of the Semi-Arians of the fourth century and of the Galli-

cans of the seventeenth, such the *Via-media* school of Anglicans. Often amiable, always obstinate, and usually imbecile, they produce the same effect on one that a man would who, seeing that some people believed that two and two make four, and others that they make five, should resolutely maintain that they made four and a half, because that is the mean between four and five.

If there are two utterances of the Holy See in these later times which pre-eminently bear the stamp of real moderation they are those which define the Church's belief on the Immaculate Conception and on the Papal Infallibility. The former is as follows:—
 “*Declaramus, pronuntiamus, et definimus: Doctrinam quæ tenet Beatissimam Virginem Mariam in primo instanti suæ conceptionis fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpæ labe præservatam immunem, esse a Deo revelatam, atque ideo ab omnibus fidelibus firmiter constanterque credendum.*”
 That is, “We declare, pronounce, and define, that the doctrine which holds that the most B.V. Mary was, in the first instant of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in virtue of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Saviour of the human race, preserved free from all stain of original sin, is revealed by God, and on that account is to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful.” It would seem to any competent person that to call this utterance “extreme” or wanting in “moderation” is simply an unintelligible use (or abuse) of language, unless by it is meant what we all hold, that the mode of redemption and sanctification here predicated of our Lord is the most complete possible. Similarly, as regards the doctrine of Papal infallibility, how can the following definition be called extreme, except in the sense that it is an act of extreme condescension of the Almighty to impart any supernatural knowledge of revealed truth to any child of man? In which sense the condescension of the Creation itself, and still more the condescension of the Incarnation, is decidedly extreme, and Calvary most extreme of all—“*sic Deus dilexit mundum.*” The Constitution says, “*Nos traditioni a fidei Christianæ exordio præceptæ inhærendo—sacro approbante Concilio, docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus; Romanum Pontificem, cum ex cathedra loquitur, id est, cum omnium Christianorum Pastoris et Doctoris munere fungens, pro suprema sua Apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa Ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in Beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilitate pollere, qua divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit.*” That is, “Faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith—the Sacred Council approving—we teach and define, that it is a dogma divinely revealed that the

Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals.” On one single person at a time is this gift bestowed, and for one sole object, viz., as the dogmatic Constitution says, for the preservation of the old, not for the publication of new doctrine; “for the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter, that by His *revelation* they might make known new doctrine, but that by His *assistance* they might *inviolably keep* and *faithfully expound* the revelation or deposit of faith delivered through the Apostles.” And again, not for any superfluous use, but for one vital to the existence of revealed truth here on earth. Nor even dependent on the sanctity of life of the subject as a condition, but altogether official and divine, is this gift of special illumination to him who sits for the time being in the chair and holds the dignity of Peter, “*quæ etiam in indigno hærede,*” as the great Leo says with sublime humility, “*non deficit.*” In one sense, no result of the Incarnation can be called extreme, because no effect can be excessive if it be proportioned to its cause, and where the cause is superhuman and ineffable and astounding, it would be strange and unaccountable if the results were (as some believe) as human and intelligible and ordinary as the Code Napoleon or Tupper’s “Proverbial Philosophy.” Suppose sinlessness and infallibility respectively given at all to any child of Adam, what can be less extreme than the Catholic doctrine which limits the one to the single Mother of God made Man—

“Our tainted nature’s solitary boast”—

And the other to him, the “*Maggior Piero,*” on whom, as on the Rock which He thus made him, Christ caused to rest the ark of our salvation. We must, then, look for another reason why our Ephesians have been chanting their oft-repeated cantilena so persistently and long. The reason is indeed obvious, but it has nothing to do with want of moderation, it is because the admission of the one singular prerogative and exception which is affirmed of Mary only, is the exclusion of all others from the gift of sinlessness—in other words, the world hates the definition of the Immaculate Conception because it is the implicit condemnation of that rampant naturalism which underlies the whole social philosophy of the age. When the definition was mentioned in our House of Commons, the leading statesman on the Liberal side said, in his jaunty way, “Immaculate conception! why, we are all immaculate when we come into the world, and we only want good education to

keep us so." And similarly when the Church defines the Papal infallibility as part of the Divine revelation, the world, which never had a moment's doubt on the subject, cries out with one consent, "Papal infallibility! why, we are *all* infallible; and not only in faith and morals, and inferior matters of that kind, but what is far more important, in art and science, education and politics, in all that constitutes and promotes the advance and the ultimate perfection by its own forces of human society." What? say they, are we to be taught who know all things? Are *we* to be set by an old priest who knows less of the world than our very street-boys, *we* to learn truth and be made the slaves of dogma, who never were in slavery to any one? Let the Pope reconcile himself to modern civilization—that is to us, for we are the source of truth and of life. So we will build more palaces of glass (at least if the present one begins to pay), and familiarize the public mind with the sacredness of human progress, and "bend the knee to protoplast in philosophic awe." "Great," once more we repeat it, "great is Diana of the Ephesians!" But here steps in our moderate man, and gravely separates the extremes. Know, Roman Pontiff and Vatican Council, and you also learned professors, cultivated lords, and potent princes, that you are both extreme. After all, none of you are infallible, for truth lies in the mean, and I am in the mean, therefore I am truth itself, and truth is infallible. Draw your conclusion, and hold your peace. Meanwhile the shout for Diana goes on, and where the enemy is strongest there the din is greatest. The religious orders, especially the illustrious Society of Jesus, faithful priests and Apostolic bishops are fined, imprisoned, and exiled in the name of liberty wherever Liberals reign and rule unchecked; or else, where, as here, real liberty still exists, a paper war is carried on hour by hour, and much inky wrath is poured out upon us in hundreds of thousands of expostulations. But chief of all the storm rages round that sacred venerable Head, ever triply crowned with authority, and wisdom, and virtue, whose word first raised and whose constancy will here at least conjure it; for, if we are not altogether besotted by "nationalism"—no doubt too often the last refuge of self-love, as "patriotism" is proverbially that of disappointed scoundrels—it still seems to us that courage, and honesty, and truth are among our English virtues, and that there are yet true hearts and sturdy heads in this dear land of ours who can appreciate, and one day will learn to love them, even in a Pope, an' though he be infallible.

O for the day when all the good
Shall only war on evil,
And on each other none!

ART. II.—BISHOP PECOCK, HIS CHARACTER AND FORTUNES.

The Repressor of over-much Blaming of the Clergy. By REGINALD PECOCK. Edited, with Introduction and Glossary, by CHURCHILL BABINGTON, B.D., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, 1860.

THERE is, perhaps, no period of English history more fascinating to the Catholic student than that of the century immediately preceding the Reformation. We have a natural longing to know how things looked just before the ruin fell, and a still more intelligent interest in scrutinizing as closely as may be all the conditions of which we may believe the Reformation to have been the natural outcome. We may gain no inconsiderable insight into the genius of a time or country by acquainting ourselves with the character and history of such of its personages as the conflicting parties of the day have combined to misunderstand. These are representative men, representative of their age at least in this, that they gauge the force of prevailing opinion by their more or less successful resistance to its current. Under this aspect, anyhow, some account of the life and writings of Reginald Pecock should be interesting. He was an English bishop of the fifteenth century, who was imprisoned and nearly burnt for defending the Church by methods which, though popular enough in the next century, his contemporaries did not like, for wishing to substitute "syllogisme" for "sword and hangment," as an instrument of religious persuasion, and for appealing from fanatical interpretations of Scripture texts to common sense. Nor is Pecock interesting in his representative character only; he is an extremely remarkable person in every way, surpassing in learning, literary ability, and mastery of the English tongue, all his contemporaries. Of these qualities proof will be given when we come to examine the work which stands at the head of our article.

We must confess to a strong desire to do what we can towards vindicating the character of a man who, whatever his faults, has indubitably met with consistent misconstruction, and whose least deniable merits have been treated as though they belonged to that growth of the house-top of which the Psalmist says, that it fills neither the reaper's hand nor the gleaner's bosom. During his lifetime, Pecock was persecuted at once by the Catholics, whom he wished to defend, and by the heretics whom

he wished to convert. After his death, Protestants, half persuaded by the acrimony of his Catholic assailants, have outraged him by their patronage. Foxe inserts him in his *Martyrology* for February 11, as a Protestant confessor; and Fr. Parsons wishes Foxe joy of a denier of three articles of the Creed ("Three Conversions of England," part iii.). Harpsfeld (*Hist. Wicliff*, cap. xvi.) calls him a Wicliffite, and that nothing might be wanting to his infamy, the Spanish Index Expurgatorius, of 1667, grotesquely describes him as "pseudo-bishop, and Lutheran Professor of Oxford." It will be something if we are able, in the nineteenth century, to bestow Christian, we mean Catholic, burial, for Pecock would appreciate no other, upon one whose own century has cast him out.

PECOCK'S BIOGRAPHY.

Reginald Pecock was born in North Wales, at the close of the fourteenth century. The first point in his life to which an exact date can be assigned is his election to a fellowship at Oriel College, Oxford, October 30, 1417; and on the 8th of March, 1421, he was ordained priest. Even his enemies, and, unfortunately, almost all our information about Pecock is derived from hostile sources, admit that in these early days the fame of his proficiency, both in sacred and profane learning, was spread far and wide. Having incepted in divinity in 1425, he was shortly after summoned to Court, where, through the influence, it is generally supposed, of Duke Humphrey, at that time protector, he obtained in 1431 the Mastership of Whittington College, to which the rectorship of St. Michael, in Riola, was attached. It was whilst occupying this position that Pecock first began to give his attention to the Lollard controversy. This sect had, during the sixty years of its existence, spread widely throughout the land, but nowhere had it struck deeper root than amongst the wealthy citizens of London, with whom Pecock's new duties naturally threw him into frequent intercourse. It is highly significant of the extent to which the country had become infected with Lollardy, that Pecock habitually refers to the Lollards in his writings as the "lay parti," or "laife." Their growth does not seem to have been materially checked by the severe, though partial, efforts at repression made from time to time by Church and State.

During the thirteen years of his mastership, it is reasonable to suppose that Pecock wrote many of the numerous controversial works to which he refers in his "Repressor." In 1444, he was raised to the See of St. Asaph, thus becoming the bishop of the country of his birth. Pope Eugenius IV. conferred this

see upon him by a bull of provision, at the instance of Duke Humphrey; an example of what was common enough in those days, a technically illegal act—for provisory bulls were forbidden by Parliament—gratefully accepted by Government, when exercised on behalf of its protégé. Such proceedings are curiously illustrative of the relations existing between Church and State; both in the abstract reserved their incompatible rights, whilst in the concrete they consented to give and take.

Simultaneously with his elevation to the episcopate, Pecock was admitted to the degree of Doctor of Divinity, without keeping any exercise or act. Upon the omission of this formality, his great enemy, Gascoigne, who had himself more than once been Chancellor of Oxford, lays the greatest stress. Mr. Babington thinks that Gascoigne's sense of propriety was outraged; perhaps he was morbidly anxious to show that Oxford could not fairly be held responsible for Pecock.

We have no record of the first three years of Pecock's episcopate, but in 1447 we find that he gave great and general offence by a sermon preached at St. Paul's Cross, in which he attempted to justify the Bishops' neglect of preaching, for some time a common charge made against them by Catholics as well as by Lollards. He seems to have particularly irritated people by a sort of rude appeal to common sense, which was thought, on such a topic, to savour of irreverence. The bishops, he urged, had more important business to attend to, and could not be expected to preach. It was not that Pecock himself had the slightest inclination to palter with his sacred duties. On the contrary, it is admitted on all hands that his life was irreproachable, and his zeal untiring. He certainly was no example of a non-preaching bishop, but he was intensely eager to defend his brethren, and keenly alive to the illogical exaggerations of their opponents. In the same sermon, he justifies non-residence for special reasons, and the papal bull of provision, by which a man might be appointed to a piece of preferment before it was vacant, as well as the payment of "annates," or first year's income of a bishopric to the Pope. If Pecock's enemies had written the sermon for him, it could hardly have been more ingeniously contrived to offend everybody. Even the bishops, in whose behalf it was delivered, disliked it as calculated to increase the odium with which they were regarded. Pecock was denounced at both the universities, and Millington, the Provost of King's College, Cambridge, in a sermon preached at St. Paul's, declared that England would never suffer those who patronized Pecock to prosper. This denunciation has a peculiar significance, when we learn that Pecock's great friends at this time were Walter Hart, Queen Margaret's confessor, and

the Duke of Suffolk, of whom the former was soon after banished, whilst the latter perished miserably at the hands of self-constituted executioners.

It is exceedingly difficult to assign with any precision the date to Pecock's various treatises. From the way in which they appeal to one another, it is pretty clear that he was in the habit of keeping several on the stocks at once, sometimes turning out last the one first undertaken. In 1450, having already written his "Repressor," he was promoted to the see of Chichester, most unfortunately for him through the patronage of William De la Pole, Duke of Suffolk, who was perhaps at that time the most unpopular man in England, and whose unpopularity was shared in a greater or less degree by all whom he was known to befriend. For six years, however, after the assassination of Suffolk in 1450, Pecock does not seem to have been seriously molested, but in 1456 he published his "Book of Faith," the last, so far as we know, of his works. It was written, as so many of the others, for the conversion of the Lollards; it tended directly to his own destruction, for it considerably aggravated the disgust with which his fellow-countrymen regarded him, and this at a time when the fall of his friends at court had left him open to the attacks of his enemies. He was detested by the common people as the friend of Suffolk, the representative in their minds of anti-English interests; the pious but narrow-minded Henry very naturally shrank from Pecock as from a rough-and-ready Catholic who was forsaking the old paths, and the sturdiest adherent of the Red or White Rose shuddered in his battered mail at the audacious profanity of one of whom it was whispered that he had positively refused the blessed apostles the authorship of their own creed. The clergy could not bear to be told ("Book of Faith") that they "shall be condemned at the last day, if by clear wit they draw not men into consent of true faith otherwise than by fire, sword, and hangment," even with the important qualification, "although I will not deny these second means to be lawful, provided the former be first used." Neither do the Lollards seem to have been particularly grateful; perhaps because "fire, sword, and hangment" were but occasional inflictions, which they could generally avoid, and not unfrequently retaliate, whereas Pecock's alternative, the "syllogisme in the modir tongue," produced a running sore, and its infliction was a speciality of Pecock's.

Just at this time the Duke of York, as Protector, was doing his utmost to recommend himself to the people as the reformer of abuses and as the avenger of the "Good Duke Humphrey," whom the party of Suffolk was accused of having assassinated.

Pecock was naturally marked out as the man of few friends and many enemies, who was to be cast out of the ship. There never was a person with less of the politician than Pecock. He saw that men should live and conduct their affairs according to the "doom of clearly-disposed reason," but how things were actually going he seems never to have had the least idea. Dr. Hook, in his "*Life of Archbishop Bourchier*," tries to ground a charge of political apostacy against Pecock, upon the fact that, having been originally patronized by the Duke of Gloucester, the leader of the national party, he was subsequently taken up by the court leader, Suffolk. The charge is at best gratuitous; no party can afford wholly to dispense with the credit of disinterested patronage, and Pecock's literary reputation and freedom from political partisanship rendered him a natural object for its exercise.

It was in the council held at the close of 1457, by King Henry at Westminster, that the hatred long entertained against Pecock burst out with irrepressible fury, the temporal lords with one accord refusing to take any part in the proceedings as long as Pecock was present. A citation was then and there served upon him to appear for trial before the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth, on November 11th, and, in the meanwhile, his books were intrusted for examination to a commission of theologians. The report of the commission was unfavourable, and, after repeated examinations, on the 28th of November, 1457, in the presence of various ecclesiastical and secular lords, Archbishop Bourchier solemnly pronounced sentence in this wise:—"Dear brother, Master Reginald: Since all heretics are blinded by the light of their own understandings, and will not own the perverse obstinacy of their own conclusions, we shall not dispute with you in many words (for we see you abound more in talk than in reasoning), but briefly show you that you have manifestly presumed to contravene the sayings of the more authentic doctors." After quoting sundry of the errors charged against him, amongst others the denial of the necessity of believing in the descent into hell, and the authority of the Church, he offers him the alternative of a complete public abjuration, or degradation and death by fire. He concludes with these significant words:—"Choose one of these two, for the alternative is immediate in the coercion of heretics."

Pecock seems to have been simply overwhelmed. So far as we can gather from his words as reported by his biographers, dread of the fire and horror at finding himself in direct antagonism with those authorities which it had been the great object of his life to sustain, were the predominant feelings.

He probably was not constitutionally a brave man, but surely never was a call for fortitude made under less favourable conditions. Here was the support neither of faith nor of fanaticism. He was a Catholic; he had never held three parts of the opinions imputed to him, and had been the victim of gross misinterpretation throughout. If he had erred at all, it was by an extravagant use of a controversial method of which he was unduly proud. No doubt it is a degrading thing to be bullied, and, above all, to have a confession of faults, of which you are really innocent, forced upon you, but when the alternative is to be incontinently burnt alive, we submit that there are extenuating circumstances. Pecock's worthy biographer of the last century, Lewis, is ingenuously surprised "that he had not courage and resolution enough to hazard the poor remainder of a life almost worn out already and come to an end." Dr. Hook's commentary is more sententious and a great deal more unkind. "A bully in prosperity is generally a coward in adversity." It is easy enough to make light of the fag end of another man's life, and as to the charge of bullying, we admit that Pecock may sometimes have bored and irritated, but we are sure he never bullied. The truth is Dr. Hook hates him, later on we shall see why. Anyhow, Pecock's enemies had their will with him. They made him recant, as though he had held, seven errors, embracing amongst them a denial of three articles of the Creed. These charges we shall examine separately when considering the question of Pecock's orthodoxy. The recantation was made publicly at St. Paul's Cross, where, after abjuring the special heresies with which he was charged, together with "all other spieces of heresy," he was required himself to deliver his works—three folios and eleven quartos—into the hands of the public executioner, who cast them into the fire. The poor man is said to have exclaimed aloud, as the leaves of his cherished manuscripts curled and shrivelled under his eyes, "My pride and presumption have brought upon me these troubles and reproaches." Persons will interpret this diversely; to us it reads like the effort of a good man to justify heaven's chastisement.

It is hardly necessary to remark that Pecock's trial, and still more the violent course taken with him, was altogether contrary to the canons. The law of the Church for centuries had established that bishops could not be tried without the authority of the Holy See. Even the Court of the Inquisition acknowledged the exemption of bishops, and the Inquisition never was in active force in England. The Archbishop's Court had simply no ground in canon law for its proceedings against Pecock. In proposing its dreadful alternative, it no doubt

really took its stand upon a law of Henry IV. enabling the bishops to deal summarily with the Lollards, and, upon conviction, to burn them off-hand with the assistance of a local magistrate. In applying these measures to a bishop, Pecock's judges indubitably laid themselves open to the gravest ecclesiastical penalties. It is indeed difficult to believe that had Pecock remained firm his judges would have ventured to proceed to the unprecedented extremities which they threatened. At the same time, it is quite possible that Pecock rightly estimated the gravity of the danger. There can be no doubt that the confession which he allowed them to force upon him ultimately proved a fatal bar to his reinstatement; it was at once his own condemnation and his enemies' defence.

As soon as the strain of immediate danger was removed, and Pecock could collect his thoughts, he seems to have appealed to Rome, and thither he managed to convey a statement of his case, from the prison in which he was confined. The Pope at once sent bulls of restitution, which were tantamount, of course, to a condemnation of the proceedings at Lambeth. We have Archbishop Bouchier's declaration that the bulls were sent, but so far from acting upon them, he actually makes them in his letter to the king a ground of fresh accusation against Pecock, in that he has obtained them "contrary to the laws and statutes provisors, and to the great contempt and derogation of his Majesty's prerogative and estate royal."

On the 17th of September, 1458, the king is advised by a commission of divines, who had been appointed to report on the theological bearings of the case, to send an ambassador to Rome in order to obtain a revocation of the bulls of restitution, and in the meanwhile he promises Pecock a pension if he will resign his bishopric of his own accord, at the same time threatening that if he is forced to write letters to the Pope, he will write for the full severity of the law to be inflicted upon him. Pecock's ill fortune clung to him throughout. Callixtus III., who had warmly taken up his cause, died, and Henry's ambassador found a new Pope, Pius II., upon the pontifical throne.* It is hardly to be wondered at that the new Pope should have shrunk from taking up so unpromising a cause as Pecock's; and with that damning confession in his hand, he may well have thought himself justified in assuming Pecock's guilt without any further cognizance of the cause, and in thinking that nothing could be said for one who could say so little for himself. Still, it remains sufficiently remarkable that Pius should have so completely ignored the ecclesiastical action of

* Pius II. was enthroned August 27, 1458.

his predecessor. But so it was. On the 24th of March, 1459, in a brief addressed to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of London and Winchester, the Pope gives a final blow to Pecock's hopes. This brief may be seen in the collected works of Pius II., from which it has found its way into the Annals of Rinaldus, tom. x. p. 191. Oddly enough it has hitherto, so far as we can make out, entirely escaped the notice of Pecock's biographers. Even Mr. Babington, from whose very complete and interesting "Introduction" we have taken by far the greater part of our biographical details, knows nothing of it. The following account of the brief may be regarded, so far as it goes, as a distinct contribution to the life of Pecock.

The Pope takes Pecock's own confession as an accurate representation of his case, and then without a word as to his predecessor's bull of restitution, goes on to speak of Pecock's relapse, or rather of the grounds for supposing his repentance feigned, which grounds resolve themselves into the statement that he was found to have concealed certain manuscripts of some of his works. The Pope expresses a hope that "our venerable brother Franciscus Episcopus Interamnensis," that is, his legate Coppini, Bishop of Terni, may arrive in time to take part in the new trial; and then, on the supposition that the culprit is convicted, he thus ordains: "Ye shall, if he can conveniently be sent, send him to us and the Roman Curia, under good and sufficient escort, to be punished and corrected according to his deserts"; but if this cannot be done, he continues, "Ye are, in an assembly of your brother bishops, to strip him of his pontifical insignia, and to degrade and depose him from his episcopal, sacerdotal, and other ecclesiastical orders; and ye are to make such other decrees and enactments concerning him as shall be in accordance with the sacred canons." The brief concludes with the most rigorous injunctions to punish as suspect of heresy all who may be found in possession of Pecock's works.

The question now remains as to the use made of this brief. It was never published, or it would have been known to Pecock's English contemporaries. Still more certainly, the degradation never took place, for such a ceremony, in the presence of the assembled episcopate, could never have passed without record. We may suppose, then, either that this document was never used except *in terrorem*, in order to make Pecock submit patiently to his confinement, or that Pecock was actually exported "under good and sufficient escort," and dealt with in Rome. In default of any Roman document, it is perhaps more reasonable to adopt the former supposition.

It is noticeable that the Pope speaks of Pecock's having "sponte et libere" resigned his see. He had been so informed, and it is not unlikely that Pecock may have executed some deed of resignation. As Pecock is designated "*olim reputatus Episcopus Cicestrensis*," it would also seem that the Pope had received notice of the report of the commission of divines of September 17, 1458, which threw doubts upon the validity of Pecock's consecration upon the score of antecedent heresy.

The king's physician, John Arundel, Archdeacon of Richmond, was appointed in Pecock's stead, and was put into possession of the temporalities of Chichester on the 26th of March, 1459, which was before the Pope's brief could possibly have been received. Pecock's recent biographers have generally supposed, and with reason, that he finished his days in confinement in Thorney Abbey, in Cambridgeshire. Their ground is the following document, entitled "Instructions given by Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, with the advice of our brethren of this land, to the Abbot of Thorney, how Reginald Pecock, whom we have sent unto him, shall be treated in the monastery aforesaid. First,—It is thought convenable that the said Reginald shall have a secret closed chamber, having a chimney and an house of easement, within the abbey abovesaid, where he may have sight of some altar to hear a masse; and that he pass not the said chamber. Item, the said Reginald to have but one personne that is sad and well-disposed to make his bedde and to make him fyr, as hit shall nede. Item, that the said Reginald shall have no book to look on, but only a Portuos* and a Masse Book, a Saulter, a Legend, and a Bible. Item, that he have nothing to write with, no stuff to write upon. Item, that the said Reginald have competent fuel according as his age and his necessity shall require. Item, that the said Reginald be found with mete and drink as a brother of the same abbey is served when he is excused from the freytour,† and somewhat better, as his disposition and reasonable appetite shall desire conveniently, after the discretion of the Abbot aforesaid."‡ "Forty pounds" were assigned "to the abbey for his finding." According to another copy, it is prescribed "that no one else (*i.e.* except his bed-maker) shall speak to him without leave, and in the presense of the Abbot, unless the King or Archbishop send to the abbey any man with writing specially on that behalf." There is, however, no proof that this instrument was ever acted upon, that it was not superseded when the Pope's brief was received. Of

* Breviary. † Meals in the refectory.

‡ See Willis's *St. Asaph*, vol. i. p. 82.

the early reports concerning his end, one says that he died in Newgate, another in an abbey, another in his "owne house." Altogether there is something mysterious in the way in which the poor bishop silently ceases. The Pope's letter, which was meant to quiet him, may have done so in the most effectual way, by killing him.

PECOCK'S "REPRESSOR."

We will now endeavour to give as full and fair an idea of the substance and style of the "Repressor" as our space will permit. It is at present the only work of Pecock printed, except the incomplete edition of the "Book of Faith," by H. Wharton, which Mr. Babington describes as a very rare book extant in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. But first, a word by way of preface as to Pecock's language. Hallam ("Literary History," vol. i. part i. chap. iv. note) observes that Pecock's language is more obsolete than that of any of his contemporaries, "he was apparently studious of a sort of archaism. He preserves the old terminations, which were going into disuse, perhaps from the tenaciousness of purity in language, which we often find in literary men." It is impossible not to be struck with the contrast between the obsolescence of the terms and the precocity of the style, which last at times has something of the ring of the great Elizabethan writers.

In a note to the "Middle Ages," chap. ix. part ii. Mr. Hallam refers to the "Repressor" as containing passages "well worthy of Hooker, both for weight of matter and dignity of style." As to his spelling, Pecock is clearly experimentalizing. In the same page, the same word occurs spelt in three or four different ways. We have preferred to give our quotations in their original form, without attempting to modernize; although Mr. Hallam warns us that Pecock needs a glossary. We think that any one who has had any experience in the practice of elementary education, or in the correspondence of the poor, will have little difficulty in seeing what Pecock would be at, if only they will just recollect that "z" may stand for "g" or "gh" or "y," and that in words beginning with "th" the "t" is often omitted.

Bishop Pecock adopts as the motto of his "Repressor" the verse 2 Tim., chap. iv., "Undernyme thou, biseche thou, and blame thou, in al pacience and doctrine." In his prologue he reminds his readers that these words were addressed by the apostles to a bishop whose very office it is to rebuke; and if it behoves such an one to be discreet and patient, how much more unofficial blamers; "with doctrine," be sure they know what they are talking about; "with patience," if they wish to be listened to, let them beware of exaggeration.

He promises to defend eleven ordinances of the clergy which are unjustly condemned by the common people. 1. The use of images. 2. The going on pilgrimage. 3. The holding of landed possessions by the clergy. 4. The various ranks of the hierarchy. 5. The framing of ecclesiastical laws by papal and episcopal authority. 6. The institution of religious orders. 7. The invocation of saints and priestly intercession. 8. The costliness of ecclesiastical decorations. 9. The ceremonies of the mass and the sacraments generally. 10. The taking of oaths. 11. The maintaining war and capital punishment to be lawful. The first six only are treated. For the last five, Pecock refers his readers to other works of his, either already published or to be published. The first part of the work is taken up with showing that the Lollard question, "Where groundist thou it in Holi Scripture?" is unfair when used to test the legitimacy of an ordinance; 2. That it is a mistake to imagine that every humble Christian needs must arrive at the true sense of Scripture; 3. That it is a mistake to think that when once the natural sense of Scripture has been arrived at, all human arguments which oppose that sense are to be discarded.

In order not to misunderstand Pecock's position, we must recollect that there is no sort of dispute between him and his opponents, whether Catholic or Lollard, as to the office of Scripture at least to ground all articles of faith. The common doctrine amongst Catholics was that the Church could find authority for all her articles of faith in Scripture, whilst the individual inquirer could not. If Pecock differed at all on this point from his fellow-Catholics, it was in attributing a narrower office to Scripture than they did.

He begins by earnestly inviting the Lollards to the use of the syllogism "mad of twey proposicions dryvving out of hem the thridde proposicion." He suggests that if they will so practise, "thanne thei schulden not be so blunt and so ruyde and unformal and boistose in resonyng, and that bothe in her arguyng and in her answering as thei now ben; and thanne schulden thei not be so obstinat azens clerkis and azens her prelatys as summe of hem now ben, for defaut of percevving whanne an argument procedith into his conclusion needis, and whanne he not so dooth but semeth oonli so do."

He proceeds to show that the greatest and most important part of God's law to man is grounded (i. e. originally delivered) in the natural reason and conscience, and not in revelation (p. 35). "The hool office and werk unto which God ordeyned Holi Scripture is forto grounde articlis of feith, and forto reherce and wisse moral trouthis of law of kind groundid

in doom of resoun," which last indeed is God's word also, "writen depe in that solempest inward book of mannis soul" lying there (p. 31) "with the prent and image of God." It prevailed before Holy Scripture was written, and "passes all outwarde bookis in profite to men to serve God." He curiously applies to his purpose the text, Matt. iv. 4, "Not in bread alone shall man live," not only by that bread of the Scripture, with the sweetness whereof he does not marvel that the Lollards are so ravished, "but in every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God." He bids them "wite weel that God is neither preised, neither worschipped, neither plesid by untrouthe or by lesing. If any man make of Holi Scripture and apprise it as treuth, and no more than truthe is, God is therein plesid; and if any man wole make of Holi Scripture or of eny creature in hevene or in erthe more than treuthe is that he be maad of and be apprized, God is therein displeid." He supports his thesis as to the respective positions of Scripture and reason by the following arguments. 1. No truth of God's moral law is fully taught by Scripture only, which presupposes always a knowledge of moral truth, though (p. 231) "Alle truthis and ordinances of the moral law peraventure ben witnessed afer and in general bi Holi Scripture." 2. Before Abraham, men lived without the light of Holy Scripture, yet were they bound to observe the same moral precepts that we are. He urges, as well may you say that Christ and His apostles created the fish which they drew from the Lake of Gennezareth, as that Scripture grounds the truths of the natural law to which it appeals. And again (p. 28), "Seie to me, good sire, and answer hereto, whanne men of the cuntre uplond bringen into Londoun in mydsomer eve (into remembraunce of Seint Johun Baptist, and of this that it was prophecied that manye schulden joie in his birthe) braunchis of trees fro Bischopis wode and flouris fro the field, and bitaken tho to citiseins of Londoun forto therewith arraie her housis, schulen men of Londoun receiving and taking tho branchis and flouris, seie and holde that tho braunchis grewen out of the cartis, which broughten hem to Londoun, and that tho cartis or the hondis of the bringers weren groundis and fundamentis of tho braunchis and flouris, Goddis forbode so litil witt be in her hedis" (p. 25). "If eny seming descorde be betwene the wordis writen in the outward book of Holi Scripture, and the doom of resoun writen in mannis soule and herte, the wordis so written withoutforth ouzten be expowned, and be interpretid and brouzt forto accorde with the doom of resoun in thilk mater; and the doom of resoun ouzt not forto be expowned glosed, interpreted and brouzte forto accorde with the seid outward writing in

Holi Scripture of the Bible, or ouzwhere ellis out of the Bible."

This notion of bringing Scripture into accord with reason excited the liveliest indignation amongst Catholics as well as Lollards. But after all Pecock would seem to be merely contending for the necessity of theological interpretation. He demands that the clergy should be theologians, and that the laity should admit the necessity of theology; but theology is nothing less than the subjection of the letter of Scripture to the doom of reason. He feels that we are nothing if not reasonable (p. 472): "For if it mighte be allowid us to bere us unresonable, Iy woot not what lawe shulde lette us fro eny synne."

Henry of Ghent, one of the most celebrated of the early scholastics (Sum. Theol., art. x. qu. 2, fol. 74) vindicates the supremacy of the doom of reason over the letter of Scripture in language quite consonant with that of Pecock; "which (reason) if the letter of Scripture seem to gainsay, this is only because it is not rightly understood, and then we must trust rather to the natural reason than to the authority of Scripture as regards that sense which the letter pretendeth contrary to reason, and we must look for some other sense until one be found which agrees with reason."

Pecock exhorts his readers (p. 88) to attend to theological expounders rather than to popular preachers; not to pin their faith upon "men with piliouns on their hedes,* and greet and thikke ratelers out of textis."

Whilst insisting that "mekeness" or moral virtue is not sufficient, without theological training, for the understanding of Scripture, he takes the opportunity of speaking of the unkind judgment passed upon himself and the other prelates, and compares those who appeal to ancient practice against modern usage to critics on the ground who should venture to instruct a climber where to plant his feet. He thus denounces the obstinate refusal of the Lollards to submit their interpretations to argument (99), "Certis if eny man dare not in the now seid casis suffre his feith and his othere opiniouns to be brought into lizt and fier of argumentis to be at uttrist examyned, he ouste be trowid that in that he hath untrewed chaffar and untrewed gold, which may not abide lizt and fier." This Lollard practice, he says, "is lijk to the lawe of Macomet and of Saracenis in thilk point in which her lawe is moost unresonable."

The eleven matters objected to, he says, are anyhow pre-

* Doctors' caps, the universities were full of Lollardy.

scribed in Scripture in the sense that they are the best means for attaining to the end prescribed by Scripture. He slyly asks where in Scripture the Lollards get their express authorization for drinking beer and reading the Bible in English.

The Second Part is taken up with a vindication of images and pilgrimages, and follows the ordinary form of Catholic controversy, explaining the Scripture texts which present a *prima facie* difficulty, and insisting that the utility of the practice more than counterbalances its occasional abuse. He thus sharply and characteristically disposes of the charge that to attribute miraculous effects to an image is idolatrous (p. 153): "A godli vertu (i.e. a miracle) is such a vertu which is causid of God into a creature above the worching of kinde, and in manner not woned miche to be doon coursli." To attribute this action to one creature, an image, is no more idolatrous than to attribute it to another creature, an apostle (p. 155). Even though there be a certain accretion of innocent superstition, i.e. such as does not make a man the worse morally, image-worship is not therefore to be discountenanced. As examples of innocent superstition, he mentions "this opinioun that a man which stale sum tyme a birthan of thornis was sett into the moone, there forto abide for evere, and this opinioun that Seint Michaelis bonys resten in the Mount Michael; and this opinioun that iii sistres (which ben spiritis) comen to the cradilis of infantis, forto sett to the babe what schal befall to him, and such other manye."

He enters at great length into a defence of the adoration of the cross, and the language of the "Vexilla Regis" and other parts of the Holy Week service. It is the legitimate expression, he says, of the fervid imagination of the men of "eelde daies," who saw Christ in His image whilst they "trowid" He was not there. He regrets that while "this devout practik of creping and kissing the cross abidith yet in al the West Chirche a this side Greek Lond . . . the inward ymaginatiif deed . . . abidith litil or nouzt."

To the Lollard objection that anyhow images are superfluous, since God is far more nobly represented by an actual man than by an image, he answers by asking how the Crucifixion can be brought home to us except by an image (p. 221): "Except whanne a quyk man is sett in a pley to be hangid nakid on a cros, and to be in semyng woundid and scourgid, and this bifalleth ful seelde and in few placis and cuntris."

When the Lollards try to argue from the common language of the faithful that they really hold the images to be what they represent, Pecock thus takes them up: "Whanne y come to thee in thi parisch chirche thou wolt peraventure seie to me

thus: Lo here lieth my fadir, and there lieth my grauntfadir, and in the other side lieth my wyf; and zit thei ligen not there, but oonli her boonys ligen there. If y come to thee into thin halle or chaumbir thou wolt peraventure seie to me in descryvyng the storie peinted or wouen in thin halle or chaumbir, 'Here ridith King Arthir, and here fytith Julius Cesar, and here Hector of Troie throwith down a knyht,' and so forth. For thouz thou thus seie, thou wolte not holde thee for to seie amys. Schal I therfore bere thee hoond that thou trowist thi fadir, and thi grauntfadir, and thi wyf for to lyve and dwelle in her sepulchris, or schal I bere thee an hond that thou trowist Artur and Julius Cesar and Hector to be quyk in thi clooth, or that thou were double in thin so reuling of speche?"

When Lollards fell back upon the position, "Images are a mistake, for the word of God in a sermon is so much better," he answers, It may be that the word of God is better, but people must be enabled and attracted to feed their own devotion (219). "For even as a nurisch or a modir is not bounde forto alwey and forevere fede her children and putte meete in her mouthis, but sche must teche hem that thei fede hemself (and in lijk maner doun foulis to her briddis), so a curat mai not ouzte forto alwey ryngge at the eeris of his suggesttis, but he mai so begynne, and afterward he ouzte teche hem that thei leerne bi hemself, and practize meenis into leernynge of good lyvyng bi hemself, and ellis we schal make hem to be ever truauntis in the scole of God, and lital good forto perfilti kunne and lital good for to perfilti wirche."

To blame the Church because she does not confine her energies to what is abstractedly the highest work, is as foolish as to blame a "huswijfe" who "now doith oon werk, now an othir werk, as thei comen to hond; and now sche brewith, and now sche bakith, now sche sethith, now sche roostith, nowsche weeschith disches, now sche berith aishes out, now sche strewith risches in the halle; and thouz these werkis be not like gode and like worthi into the service of hir husbonde, zit sche ouzte do the oon with the othir as thei comen forth to be doon in dyverse whilis, and ellis if sche schuld seie to herself, 'I wole not do this, peraventure y schal fynde a better werk,' sche schulde make bad huswijfschip."

The Third Part is a vindication of the holding of church lands. The most notable point in it is whimsically enough a critical refutation of the Donation of Constantine. This enters into Pecock's scheme, inasmuch as he wishes to throw complete discredit upon the common story that when Constantine dowered the Church, the voice of an angel was heard crying, "In this dai venom is hild out into the Chirche." After sug-

gesting that, according to the more correct version, it was the "old enemy," and not an angel who made the remark, and therefore that it was of no weight, he proceeds to show how completely the story of the Baptism and the Donation of Constantine is refuted by the histories of Eusebius, Theodoret, Socrates, and Sozomen, pointing out, too, that the style of the pretended Donation presents a marked contrast to that of Constantine's letters.*

He argues that the principle of ecclesiastical endowment has been recognized from the first both in the Jewish and Christian Churches, and that in its working it secures more good and bars more evil than would its abandonment. As to the attempt to ground a charge upon the fact that Church discipline has decayed ever since the Church was endowed, he answers (p. 330):—"Alwey and ever sithen the brigg of Londoun was endewid of temporal rentis, the same brigg hath be febler and febler, and ever schal so be into time be he at his last cast, what followeth hereof?" Like London bridge, if the Church crumbles it is because it is growing old. Some of the Lollards, whilst admitting the lawfulness of ecclesiastical endowment, contended that if the clergy do not fulfil their duty, the laity may take away their endowments, which are the meed or reward of their labour. Pecock answers by distinguishing between a meed and what he calls a "finding." The meed or reward of the clergy, is the kingdom of heaven, the evangelical penny, according to the form used in giving the first tonsure, "The Lord is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup," and this will be given or withheld as they shall have done or neglected to do their work. The endowments are no meed or reward for work done, but are a finding or provision of means, the right to which does not depend upon the work done, but upon the office of doing the work, and as the Lollards did not claim the right of suspending from the priestly office they had no right to withhold the finding.

Again, say what they might against the clergy, the Lollards could not deny that the clergy were out-and-out the best landlords, spending little upon themselves compared with what they spent upon respectable dependents and in alms (p. 371):—"Where azenward if al this same receit schulde come into the hondis of grete lordis or of knyztis it schulde not be

* This is precocious criticism, and, doubtless, first hand, although, as Mr. Babington observes, Laurentius Valla had already published his "*De Ementita Donazione*" (circa 1440), nine years before the "*Repressor*." We may add, that as early as 1431, Cardinal de Cusa impugned the Donation as well as several of the false decretals in his "*De Concordia*," upon critical grounds.

weel spend, but it schulde be spend in werre, or fixting, or in reveling, as sopers at nyctis in tavernes and in costiose horsis, and in wantoune and nyse disgizings of arraies (and so forth of manye othere staryng governaunces, semyug summe wijlde woode) as othere men therto taking heed mowen weel enouz aspie."

The Fourth Part vindicates the variety of ranks and ordinances amongst the clergy; also the lawfulness of statutes and canons made by Papal and episcopal authority.

Commenting on the passage, Matt. xvi., "And Iy seie to thee thou art Petir, and upon this stoon Iy schal bilde my chirche, and the gatis of helle schulen not have the maistrie azens hir," he insists that by the "stone" the person of Peter is to be understood rather than the person of Christ, or anything else, otherwise the clause would have an unnatural and parenthetical character, being disconnected with what goes before and what comes after. "Confirmacioun into this same is this; if y were to seie to my felawe, that I wolde do eny thing to myn own persoon; (as that I wolde drinke or dyne or slepe) whereto schulde y seie next bifore to him thus: 'Thou art in this place or thou art there, or thou art Johun or William y schal do this thing or that thing, as that y schal dyne or drinke or slepe.'"

The Fifth Part contains the vindication of the religious orders. Pecock shows that there is nothing either unscriptural or unreasonable in the idea of the religious life. He concludes his defence with an appeal to his adversaries whether, at the worst, the religious life has not made many men better or less bad than they would otherwise have been. Anyhow, he urges (p. 516) by becoming religious have they not escaped being "gileful artificers, or unpitiful questmongers and forsworn jurors, or sowdiers wagid into Fraunce for to make miche morthor of blood, zhe and of soulis, bothe in her owne side and in the Frensch side?" He defends the variety of religious orders by the homely simile of the many taverns on the London road which correspond with the various tastes of travellers.

Amongst various points of the Franciscan rule, he defends the prohibition to touch money with the naked hand, which issued in the practice of counting it with a stick. We are surprised that Dr. Waterland and Mr. Babington are unable to see anything more in this than a sophistical defence of a hypocritical usage. We venture most emphatically to differ from them. We can quite understand people smiling at Pecock's language about the danger of fondling gold, lest you fall in love with it, or, as though it were subject to the law of con-

tagion. But when he goes on to speak of the importance of which this usage may be, as a continual reminder of the obligation of detachment, an obligation which in itself it does nothing to satisfy, he puts forward a justification which appeals to common sense. This is the interpretation of the usage he puts into the mouth of his imaginary Franciscan: "So we have take up on us for to forbere greet love to money, and in token and in signifying thereof, we have bounde us silf forto nevere touche neither bere money; lete us therefore (as thus remembrid) make oure deede accorde with oure bond, that we trespase not azens oure bond." Official or class ceremonial may easily be regarded as hypocritical, if we choose to consider it as the expression of individual sentiment, and not of an ideal standard to the realization of which the individual would wish to approach. If, under pain of hypocrisy, the outward act must express, not the aspirations, but the actual state of the person's soul, what judge would venture to wear the ermine?

As the "Repressor" abounds in quotations from Scripture in the vernacular, it is interesting to consider what version Pecock is using. He is accredited by very ancient authority with having made a version of his own. However, we cannot but agree with Mr. Babington, that, considering the sort of way in which Pecock is always appealing to himself, it is impossible that he should not have spoken of *his* version, had he made one.

We know that in the fourteenth century several English versions of portions of the Scriptures appeared, besides the two which go under the name of Wiclif. One at least referred to by Waterland as the Bene't MS., is proved by its glosses to be Catholic, and probably originally embraced the whole of the New Testament, though the Gospels of St. Mark, and St. Luke, and the Epistles of St. Paul are all that remain. Waterland pronounces it to be of decidedly earlier date than Wiclif's. It would be most interesting to compare Pecock's quotations with this MS. Of versions previous to the fourteenth century, no trace is known to remain, although Sir Thomas More, "*Dial.*," book iii. c. xiv. and Archbishop Cranmer, Strype's "*Cranmer*," app. 242, testify to such having been made.*

Wiclif's version of the New Testament was first put out in 1382. It was the first English version of the New Testament published, i.e., indiscriminately diffused without note or comment. In 1388 appeared (according to Waterland), the second Wiclifite version of the New Testament, together with a version of the Old Testament clearly by the same hand; this Waterland and others attribute to Wiclif's disciple Pervie. It is accounted

* See Lingard, vol. iv. chap. iii. note.

another version, though evidently formed upon Wiclif's. One of its distinguishing characteristics is its extravagant use of the word "forsothe," by which it invariably translates "autem," "vero," and "enim." In Pecock's New Testament quotations we have not noticed the "forsothe," in those from the Old Testament it is very frequent. In most respects, however, Mr. Babington considers that Pecock approaches more closely to the second than to the first of the Wiclif versions.

There can be little doubt, we think, that Pecock is not translating off-hand, and that his quotations, as they stand, are sufficiently distinct from either of the Wiclif versions. Take, for instance, the text from the Epistle to Timothy with which he heads his "Repressor," the remarkable word "undernyne" has not been discovered in any extant version. Curiously enough, however, precisely Pecock's rendering of the entire text, Waterland tells us, may be found in a sermon preached by Dr. Wimbleton at St. Paul's Cross in 1388. No doubt a version of a great deal of Scripture had become traditional in Catholic pulpits, and it is possible that the Wiclifites purposely took this as the basis of their translation. But however this may be, it is hardly wonderful that these early translations should closely resemble each other, when we recollect that they were made simply from the Vulgate, and into a language which at that time had little variety of expression.

Pecock very possibly was quoting a Catholic version unpublished as a whole, but still in great measure rendered familiar to the people by the use of the pulpit. One point we may be pretty sure of, and that is, that he would not have quoted as Scripture, the version of one whom he speaks of as "oon clerk, but verili to sieie oon heretik." Nor, if he had so ventured, would his enemies have failed to make it matter of accusation against him, invoking, as they might, Archbishop Arundel's prohibitory constitution of 1408.

PECOCK'S ORTHODOXY.

We must now consider more precisely the various charges brought against Pecock's orthodoxy. The first part of the "Repressor" was fiercely assailed, within a few years of its publication, by John Bury, an Augustinian monk, in a considerable Latin volume, copious extracts from which Mr. Babington appends to his edition of the "Repressor." The work is entitled "Gladius Salomonis," as who should say "the sword which vindicates for holy writ, the progeny of moral truths, which Pecock has falsely attributed to reason and the natural law." The book is keen and vigorous enough, but its polemic exceedingly unfair. The greater part of Bury's

eloquent panegyric upon Holy Scripture, we might have gratefully accepted if he had brought it out as the complement of Pecock's theory, as the presentation of that aspect of the subject to which the exigencies of controversy had prevented the Bishop of Chichester from doing justice, or even as the corrective of certain exaggerations. But he becomes simply intolerable when he insists upon gibbeting his adversary as the intentional enemy of Holy Scripture, beside whom "Arius, Sabellius," &c., are comparatively harmless; whose hatred of the spirit of truth can only be satiated by putting his axe to the root of the tree of all moral truth, the Scriptures, thus proving himself to be nothing less than the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the prophet. If people's distrust and horror of Pecock had not been so widespread and so genuine, one should be inclined to regard John Bury as the theological basin in which Pecock's judges washed their hands "coram populo." There is some comfort in finding that this ruthless writer stands at least as much in need of indulgent interpretation as does his victim. For our part we cannot pretend to reconcile with orthodoxy such statements as this, that the natural law, containing the first principles of right and wrong, is a positive law, "*ex solâ liberalitate Dei concessa*," or this, that the question, "Where groundest thou it in Scripture?" supplies a fair criterion of moral law. In what light would such admissions have been regarded by Catholic controversialists a century later?*

We will now take the different charges in the order in which they appear in Pecock's enforced confession. The first count accuses him of saying that it is not "*de necessitate salutis*" to believe in the "Descent into Hell." We must remember that in Pecock's time it was generally believed that the Apostles' Creed had been composed by the Apostles exactly as we have it now; each of the twelve Apostles having composed one of the twelve articles. Pecock had perceived the fact, now universally acknowledged, that the earliest copies of the Creed differ from one another, not merely in language, but by the addition or subtraction of certain clauses; so that whilst we are assured that the doctrines of our Creed are substantially what must have been symbolized by the Apostles, we have abandoned the notion of verbal, or even of perfect, organic identity. Pecock

* Another of the most active of Pecock's antagonists, John Milverton, the provincial of the Carmelites, who had been employed to draw up an official account of the proceedings against him, was, seven years after, condemned in Rome for teaching the Wiclifite doctrine Pecock had so strenuously opposed, that the clergy might not possess property.—See Harpsfeld, *Hist. Wicliff*, cap. xvi. p. 720.

had no doubt noticed that the ancient Roman form of the Apostles' Creed, which is acknowledged both by Natalis Alexander and by Vossius, to be the most ancient of all, did not contain the clause, "He descended into hell"; and so he considered that it was no necessary article; and consequently it does not find a place in his explanatory paraphrases of the Creed in the "Donet" and the "Book of Faith."

The question is, did Pecock either reject the doctrine of the "Descent into Hell," or speak of it as a point which the faithful were at liberty either to accept or reject? In either case it must be admitted that he fell into grave error. It is extremely difficult to make out precisely his meaning from the fragmentary passages which have come down to us,* but it is at least certain that he could never have understood himself to be refusing to follow "a determination of the Church in matter of faith," for his very contention in his "Book of Faith" is that such refusal involves pain of damnation.

In Pecock's excuse it must be remembered that a scholastic of great name, Durandus a Porciano (lib. iii. dist. xxii. qu. 3), had ventured thus completely to explain away the article in question. "For the very reason that by the Passion of Christ we have been delivered from sin and its penalty, Christ is said to have descended into hell, because by the merit of His Passion some were delivered from the pains of hell. This descent is not in virtue of a local motion having a subjective existence in the soul, but in virtue of the effect upon those who were to be saved." Again, the popular mediæval shape which this clause had assumed, the "Harrowing of Hell," in which hell was supposed to be, not the place of the departed just, but the realm of devils, may have tended to obscure in Pecock's mind the just claims of the doctrine. We admit that such suggestions afford no real justification, but at most account for, and in some part excuse, confusion of mind on the subject. We have made them in deference to Mr. Babington's opinion, that Pecock really did hold in respect to this clause what was put into his mouth—viz., that belief in it was left to the discretion of the faithful. For our own part we cannot help thinking that on this point, as upon so many others, Pecock has been simply misunderstood. His expressions, as to what this clause is not, are, "a faith," "an article of necessary faith." Now, it is quite certain that the term, "article of faith," was used in a

* Dr. Waterland tells us that the only known MS. of the "Book of Faith," that in Trinity College, Cambridge, library, "begins the subject of the article of the Creed (Christ's descent into hell) as having been anciently wanting, and then breaks off abruptly."

much narrower sense than "definition or determination of faith." It designated exclusively such original germinal truths as had been delivered from the beginning in their present form, and were in no sense the offspring of development. These truths were supposed to be contained in the Apostles' Creed, and in certain plain statements of Holy Scripture. These were articles of necessary faith, not all necessary, of course, "*de necessitate medii*," i.e., as a means *in se* necessary for the salvation of everybody, but necessary "*de necessitate præcepti*," i.e., necessary according to the original institution of Christianity for the explicit belief of every adult Christian. Tournely (de Fide, cap. i. art. 1, § 2), says, with respect to the descent of Christ into hell, "as to the necessity of which faith theologians are divided, to us it seems safer and more certain to hold that ignorance of it is a grave sin, which is the opinion of Bañes, Medina, and the Salmansicenses." Whilst Suarez (de Incarn. pars ii. disp. 43, qu. 52, § 2) says of the same article, "If by the term article we understand a truth which all the faithful are bound explicitly to know and believe, then I do not think it necessary to reckon this among the articles of faith." If this is Pecock's meaning, he is not only completely justified from the charge of heresy, but finds himself in exceedingly good company.

Pecock is next charged with denying that it is necessary to believe in the Holy Ghost. This charge, so far as can be made out, is without even the shadow of a pretext. In many copies of the confession it is altogether wanting.

In the next two counts, which may be considered together, as they are in fact one, he is charged with denying the necessity of believing in the "Holy Catholic Church," and in "the Communion of Saints." This was occasioned by Pecock's having maintained, with perfect justice, that in these clauses we profess our belief in neither more nor less than the existence of the Holy Catholic Church and the Communion of Saints, as realities, without any reference to the authority or subject-matter of the Church's teaching. Arriaga (de Fide, disp. ii. § 4), says that this article does not run "'Credo in sanctam ecclesiam,' but 'Credo sanctam ecclesiam,' which means nothing else but this,—that one of the articles believed is the Catholic Church, just as Baptism, the Resurrection of the Flesh, and the rest are said to be there believed."

The fifth and sixth counts charge him with holding that the whole of the Church can err in matters of faith, and that it is not necessary to hold, that what a General Council of the Universal Church has approved or condemned, "*in favorem fidei et ad salutem animarum*" is to be accepted by the faithful as rightfully so approved or condemned.

This is a manifest calumny. The reference is to a passage in the "Book of Faith," in which Pecock abandons the infallibility of the Church as a *basis of argument* with Lollards, and endeavours to show that the burden of proof is anyhow in the Church's favour until they can prove her wrong, which Pecock defies them to do. He is particularly careful here to guard against misconstruction. He states, as one special ground of his quarrel with the Lollards, that they "followe not the determynacions and the holdyngis of the Chirche in mater of feith"; and he insists that it follows from nothing he has granted "that the Chirche in erthe errith or may erre in mater of feith, no more than followith, of my graunt, that the Chirche now in hevne errith, or may erre, in feith." (See Waterland, vol. x. "Letters to Lewis," No. iv.) Whatever may be thought of the discretion of this polemic, only prejudice or spite could attain it of heresy.

The seventh count, which is wanting in most copies of the confession, accuses him of saying that no one is bound to attend to other senses, besides the literal one, of Scripture. This is clearly, we think, a form of the accusation of contempt for the holy doctors referred to in Bourchier's address. There is no proof that Pecock ever belied the protestation made in one of his early works. (See Babington, Introduction, p. xl. note.) "God forbede that Iy or eny other man schulde feelee that writyngis of doctouris weren to be dispisid, or were to be sett at nouzt, or to be sett litil bi; for tho writyngis ben ful profitable, namelieh if thei be take into use bi a good discrecioun." But when passages from the Fathers had been urged against him, indiscreetly, as he would say, in the fashion of the day, as though a patristic authority must needs settle a question, Pecock had been so forsaken, according to Gascoigne, as to have answered "Tuch" (Tush). His brusque treatment of Aristotle was probably held as only a little less intolerable, of whom he had said that "he was not other than an encercher forto fynde out trouthis as othere men weren in his daies, and now after his daies zit hiderto ben. And he failide in ful manye pointis bothe in natural philosophie and in moral philosophie." (Babington, p. xxxvii. note.)

Pecock has been accused of holding un-Catholic doctrine on the Eucharist, and Henry Wharton gives an excerpt from a work of Pecock's entitled "Poore Mennis Myrrour," which insists much upon the virtue of the Holy Eucharist as a record and a sign, as implying that Pecock held it to be nothing more. The following passage from the "Repressor" may be considered a sufficient answer (p. 563):—"The hizest and worthiest signe and sacrament of alle othere (is) the sacra-

ment of the auter, the preciose bodi and blood of Christ for us hangid on the Cros, and for us outhed."

We think enough has been said to show that the charges against Pecock, even so far as material heresy is concerned, are false, or, to say the least, not proved. Although we have comparatively very little of what he has written before us, we may fairly urge that the unmistakable animus of his accusers, their numerous palpable misconstructions, and, we will venture to say, the evidence of an orthodox instinct and intent prevailing throughout the one work of his, which we have an opportunity of criticising, create the strongest presumption in his favour. As to the pertinacity which is necessary to the character of a heretic, poor Pecock's faults lay quite in another direction. There can be little doubt of the sincerity of his protest that if through "eny unadvisidness, hastyness, or ignoraunce" he should write any conclusion against the faith or the law of God, he would be ready "to leve it, forsake and retere mekely and devoutly at the assignementis of myn ordinaries fadris of the Chirche."

Whilst defending Pecock's substantial orthodoxy, we fully admit that he is sometimes ill-advised in his expressions and the kind of relief which he gives to some of his opinions. But if he was right in considering that it was well to substitute popular controversy for "fire, sword, and hangment," he may surely ground a claim to generous construction upon the extreme difficulty of mediating between the scholastic and the popular mind. Pecock's real fault, the one to which his mind naturally recurred in his affliction, was his vanity. He had been very vain, not of his learning but of his logical dexterity and the success of his popular controversial method, the "goostlie triacle" which he had applied to the disease of Lollardy. It is impossible to resist a smile at the way in which he refers his readers to this or that treatise of his own, if they wish to see the subject "smertli and quykli" dealt with. Sometimes he adds, with a naïveté that must have made his enemies grind their teeth, that, after reading Pecock on this or that, they will no longer be in a condition to talk the particular piece of nonsense in question. For all this, we defy any one to read Pecock without very hearty liking as well as admiration. Vanity, if only skin-deep, is not necessarily unamiable, and in those days literary vanity was, we take it, of a simpler and more superficial character than it is now—more like the vanity of manual dexterity, and less akin to personal pride. But if Pecock may be so fairly justified, what, it may be urged, can have been the cause of the widespread movement against him? What was it that induced

court and commons, clergy and laity, to join their forces for his discomfiture? Dean Hook, in his "Life of Archbishop Bourchier," thinks he has found the true solution. After mildly rebuking the Puritan Foxe for supposing that what Pecock was condemned for was his Protestantism, he proceeds confidently to affirm that the change of religion aimed at by Pecock, for which the church and realm of England combined to cast him forth, "was not a change from Romanism to Protestantism, but, using modern terms, from Catholicism to Popery.* Oh excellent metamorphosis! No Protestant, but an Ultramontane; "no waiter, but a Knight Templar." It were well if we might use so fair a cloak for all poor Pecock's failings in the eyes of our fellow-Catholics! Pecock was aiming, forsooth, at a change of religion. A letter, says Dean Hook, "from the bishop (Pecock) to Sir Thomas Channing, the Mayor of London, *was produced before the Council*. From this letter it was inferred that the bishop designed to excite the people of England to a change of faith, and even to an insurrection." First, I observe that the statement I have italicised, that this letter was produced before the Council, is untrue. It was never produced: it never was more than a mysterious document which the king had shown to somebody containing "no ambiguous signs," &c. (See Babington, p. xxxvii.) Dean Hook speaks as if the letter had been verified in court. In order to bear out his theory the Dean makes two other very reckless assertions. He says, first, that Pecock, in his "Repressor," denies the Divine institution of bishops, contending that they were not the creation of Christ or His Apostles, but of the Pope; second, that he merely pooh-poohed the Fathers when they were quoted against the papacy. Now, as to the first, it must be remembered that in the part of the "Repressor" referred to, Pecock is contending against the Lollards for the Divine institution of the hierarchy. He gains his point if he can show the Divine institution of the head, the germ of the hierarchical idea; and, fortunately for this, there is the plain scripture warranty that the Lollards require. There is clearly some confusion in the Dean's mind between the questions of the Divine institution of bishops, and of their independent jurisdiction. So far is Pecock from asserting that the bishops are the mere creation of the Pope, that he expressly says that the Apostles were bishops, or rather archbishops, and that St. Paul consecrated Titus and Timothy. As to the second, if true, it would no doubt be highly curious and significant, but until Dean Hook produces some sort of evidence

* *Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury*, vol. v. p. 300.

for its truth, we may fairly decline to accept it. Pecock pooh-poohed certain quotations from the Fathers, but where does Dean Hook learn that these had been urged against the Papacy?

The truth is, the Dean has fallen into the very common mistake of throwing into unnatural relief an historical point in order to suit a preconceived theory. He sees that Pecock, in his efforts to justify the existing state of things, had used stronger language about Papal "dominium" than was pleasing to sundry of his contemporaries; and, as an Anglican, he is charmed to believe that this was the secret of Pecock's unpopularity; that the Church of England, true to her principle of resistance to Rome, had turned with instinctive loathing upon the advocate of Papal claims, whilst the other charges put forward were a mere cloak to conceal the true issue. Now we do not deny that Pecock's view regarding the absolute "dominium" of the Pope over all ecclesiastical property was calculated, had it been brought out prominently in detail, to make him unpopular. But it was not an opinion to which he had ever given any great prominence. It does not occur in the "Repressor"; he uses it once and once only in his sermon at St. Paul's Cross, as a ground for exempting the "annates" from the charge of simony; neither was it ever urged by his enemies against him. As an abstract principle, it had been frequently assumed by the canonists of the day, whilst its legitimate exercise had been variously limited by theologians. It could make no appreciable difference to the interests of the State whether the Pope was called "dominus" of ecclesiastical property, or whether, to use the words of John of Paris,* "the Church alone is mistress and proprietary, and the Pope is not master, but is universal dispenser and disposer of ecclesiastical property, and moreover takes for himself from the common stock, according to the requirements of his state, fatter fruits than inferior prelates."

The delicate relations between Church and State in the matter of ecclesiastical property, were not carried out upon an agreement as to abstract principles. The State seems, on the whole, to have left that domain in the hands of theologians, and, until the Reformation, at least, never ventured to erect the opposite principle that the State was the "dominus" of ecclesiastical property. Church and State, as we have before observed, practically followed a system of give and take, in which differences were for the most part settled by a sort of rule of thumb.

* He died in 1306.

The Council of Constance, whilst completely effectual in meeting the particular emergency which called it together, failed to stamp an anti-papal character upon the policy of the Church, not so much in consequence of the diplomatic action of the Papacy, upon which Dr. Hook lays so much stress, as because this council was no protest against anything that could be called "a change from Catholicism to Popery." It contented itself of set purpose with checking practical abuses without defining abstract rights. It was pledged to this course by its very programme, so often insisted on, "*Non via facti sed via cessionis*," when, refusing to examine the claims of previous councils and rival pontiffs, it insisted upon the imperious necessity of a new election. The only plausible exception to this course was what has been called the definition of the subjection of the Pope to General Councils. Whatever may be the true interpretation of this famous clause, it at any rate carefully avoids trenching upon the subject of ecclesiastical property. Dr. Hook's notion that the idea of the Pope's position prevailing at the Council of Constance was simply that he was "*primus inter pares*," is preposterous. The whole action of the council with regard to the Papacy is an implicit assertion of the necessity of Papal government. Had Western Christendom merely recognized in the Holy See a primacy of dignity, it might have contentedly let itself drift in the wake of the Eastern Churches, nor would there have been any solid reason why the faithful should have shrunk from Wiclif's suggestion, that in future they should do without the Pope "*more Græcorum*."

Another extravagant assertion of Dr. Hook's is, that the notion of the Pope as the source of jurisdiction, or, in other words, as the ordinary of ordinaries, was a novelty of the fifteenth century introduced by Martin V., and was, therefore, well calculated to startle the English people under the aspect of a change of faith. It may be to the purpose to quote a writer of the beginning of the fourteenth century, Noel Hervey, Master-General of the Dominicans. His words have at least the merit of precision. "The Pope is the ordinary of every person whatsoever in the Church, and in every cause whatsoever." We have met no such strong statement in Pecock, but supposing him to have so spoken he would have startled no one. Dr. Hook would fain see in the history of every royal exaction upon Church lands a protest on the part of the English Church against Romish aggression. Can he really suppose that the supreme authority of the Holy See and its identification in the main with the best interests of the Church, cannot have presented itself as a novel idea in a country whose mos

popular cultus was that of one of the most prominent and aggressive of Papal champions?

If we turn to the "Doctrinale" of the Carmelite Thomas of Walden, Henry V.'s confessor, who had himself been present at the Council of Constance, and who may serve better perhaps than any other writer as the representative of the English version of its theology, we shall find him using language concerning the Pope's powers and rights not a whit less strong than Pecock's, and which is certainly inconsistent with Dr. Hook's notion of the then Anglican theology.

Lib. ii. art. ii. cap. 5. "No partial, but full master (magister) of the Church is holy Peter . . . in all causes master. . . . To Peter hath Christ given this threefold masterdom (potentiam magisterialem) over the apostles and the whole Church, of teaching, punishing, and dispensing." Art. iii. cap. 29. "What a great privilege is that conferred upon Peter by the ordinance of Christ, that he still preserves his power in all who succeed him in his see, Peter who himself bears the whole body of the Church. . . . In Christ's body Peter is the member upon which all the other members hang, according to the words of the apostle, 1 Cor. xii., 'Ye are the body of Christ, and members of his member.' If you, that is to say, all the faithful are the body of Christ, how are you members, and of what member, if it be not in dependence, through your bishops, upon the first member, Peter? And ye are all together the one body of Christ." Cap. xxxii. "The estate of the High Pontiff is the result of the promise of Christ, and therefore he reigns over all prelates throughout the world, and with the dreadful splendour of his decrees smites all lips into silence."

Dr. Hook interprets the positions as to the fallibility of the Church and General Councils, which appear in Pecock's confession, in the sense of a degradation of the Church, in order to the elevation of the Pope. An untenable view, for these two reasons. First, because Pecock's controversial scope, the justification that he himself pleaded for relinquishing the ground of the Church's infallibility as an argumentative basis, was the impossibility of putting it in a plausible light to the Lollards; but this difficulty would only have been increased by falling back upon the infallibility of the Pope. Secondly. One of the positions he is accused of abandoning is this, that the whole Church cannot err in matters of faith, but the fallibility of the whole Church necessarily involves the fallibility of the Pope.

We think we are justified in putting aside Dr. Hook's theory as only less extravagant than Foxe's. Of course neither lacks its grain of truth. Pecock's liberalism was one very real cause of his unpopularity, and his Ultramontanism, such as it was, was at

least a protest against popular Erastianism. It is impossible to assign any one cause for Pecock's unpopularity. He was unpopular precisely because he was the man he was, and had the misfortune to be born in a century with which he was out of sympathy. It was the peculiarity of his position that, belonging to no party, he yet managed to give offence to all. Whilst boldly criticising the procedure of both Church and State, he was the very type of unarmed neutrality, at once irritating and defenceless. His virtues, as well as his defects, contributed to bring about his ruin. The Bible-men, whether Catholic or Lollard, were shocked at what they considered his rationalistic treatment of Holy Writ, and old-fashioned Catholics distrusted one who opposed the orthodox "sword and hangment," and demurred at allowing a quotation from the Fathers to put a question out of court. Farsighted politic prelates, who realized the critical position in which they stood, were vexed and alarmed that one of their number should so defy popular opinion, as to plead a logical basis for practices which, right or wrong, policy demanded should be at least kept in the background. Lastly, the sensitive patriotism of both Court and Commons was offended by Pecock's condemnation of the French war. As to the cruel injustice of the treatment which Pecock received, there can be but one opinion. For our part we know of no more piteous figure in the whole of ecclesiastical history, than that of this virtuous and learned man, whom his enemies forced to be the murderer of his own reputation, and then handed down to posterity as a suicide. He appealed to Rome, but that fatal confession was a bar to any earthly restoration. It remained for him to put in practice his own advice ("Repressor," p. 382): "And if he there at the presence of the hizest judge suffre wrong, take he it aworth in patience as a thing irremediable bi man, and God schal therefore him quyte."

ART. III.—GNOSTICISM AND THE RULE OF FAITH IN S. IRENÆUS.

[We have to ask our readers' indulgence for the length of this article. The subject of which it treats bears directly on the historical claims of Christianity, and of Catholicity as its one legitimate form. Believing that our contributor has reached decisive conclusions on a subject of capital importance, we are unwilling to omit any illustration or proof which materially assists the argument.]

Sancti Irenæi Episcopi Lugdunensis quæ supersunt omnia. Accedit apparatus continens ex iis, quæ ab aliis editoribus aut de Irenæo ipso aut de Scriptis ejus sunt disputata, meliora et iteratione haud indigna. Edidit ADOLPHUS STIEREN, in Universitate Ienensi antehac Theol. Professor, &c. &c. Lipsiæ, 1853.

Sancti Irenæi Episcopi Lugdunensis Libros quinque adversus Hæreses. Edidit W. WIGAN HARVEY, S.T.B., Collegii Regalis olim Socius. Cantabrigiæ, 1857.

Die Christliche Kirche an der Schwelle des Irenäischen Zeitalters (The Christian Church on the Threshold of the Age of Irenæus). Von K. GRAUL, D. Th. Leipzig, 1860.

Irenæus der Bischof von Lyon : ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der altkatholischen Kirche (Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons : a Contribution to the History of the Rise of the ancient Catholic Church). Von H. ZIEGLER. Berlin, 1871.

Sancti Irenæi de Ecclesiæ Romanæ Principatu Testimonium commentatum et defensum, a GERARDO SCHNEEMANN, S. J., Presbytero. Friburgi, 1870.

SOME time back in the pages of this Review, we examined the doctrine of the Ignatian Epistles, and tried to point out the importance of the data which they furnish for determining the doctrine of the Christian Church in the age immediately subsequent to the Apostles. The importance of the Epistle lies in this: that whereas the writings of the other Apostolic Fathers are hortatory, rather than doctrinal in character, S. Ignatius was led by special circumstances to dwell upon certain points in the teaching and constitution of the Church. It is true, S. Ignatius wrote letters and not treatises: he made no formal exposition of doctrine, he speaks on most of the doctrines which he touches, by the way, on all without method or completeness; still, if we weigh his words, we find that he

has said enough to decide many of the questions which are agitated just now on the history of dogma. It is to the Gnostics that we owe our acquaintance with the doctrine of S. Ignatius. In opposition to that heresy, he spoke out on the Trinity and the Incarnation; on the Church and the Sacraments. Gnosticism was then in its infancy. By the latter half of the second century it had reached its full development. Celebrated teachers had helped to carry it over the Roman world. It counted numerous adherents, as far east as Edessa, as far west as Gaul. It had its champions in the imperial city: on the one hand it called forth enthusiasm and ability in its defence; on the other it roused the whole energy of the Catholic Church. It did its utmost to overthrow the foundations of Christian belief. In ever-varying forms it perverted or denied every article of the Church's creed, and thus it forced the Catholic doctors to lay down the formal principles of faith, and to make expositions of doctrine systematic to a degree unknown before. For this reason it marks an epoch which is among the greatest in the whole history of the Church. The age of the Apostles had passed away. The age of Apostolic men who had done much and written little, passed away too. Then came a brief space in which Christian literature tried its strength in explaining the claims of Christianity to Jews and heathen. At last, towards the close of the second century, we reach the age of the Fathers in the proper sense of the word, the age of S. Irenæus, of Clement of Alexandria, of Tertullian. It was their special work not merely to exhort Christians to piety, or to urge the claims of Christianity in a general way, but to tell the world what the Christian doctrine was. They were engaged with domestic foes, and they set themselves to establish the criterion between true and false Christianity, to distinguish, in other words, between Catholicism and heresy. What we have said, explains the fact that with the Fathers in conflict with Gnosticism, we reach more sure and certain ground for the history of dogma. We must add that those Fathers are the first among Christian writers, or the first with one exception, who have left us works of any considerable extent. Besides, when their work began, it was possible, as it had scarcely been before, to set forth the character and the principles of the Christian Church in all their clearness. They themselves could remember a time when the Church was as yet not wholly separate from the observances of the Synagogue. For long, converts from Judaism were still suffered to preserve their nationality, and the toleration of Jewish rites was a matter of expediency. But when, under Hadrian, Jerusalem ceased to be a Jewish city, and gave place to *Ælia Capitolina*, the Judaizing

party in the Church received a blow from which it never recovered. S. Justin is the last Christian writer who looks upon the partial observance of the Jewish law as a thing permissible to Christians.* The Church was freed from this element of weakness, and the war with Gnosticism was one of principle, into which considerations of expediency could not enter. Moreover, the principles at issue had to be put in the most complete form. Against a heresy organized and widely spread, which did not manifest itself as a mere revolt against the bishop in this or that diocese, something more was needed than admonitions like those of S. Ignatius to obey the bishop. It was necessary to insist on the place which the bishop held in the universal Church, to urge the authority, not of the particular bishop, but of the Catholic hierarchy; of the bishops collectively as the rulers of the Church, as the successors of the Apostles, as the infallible guardians of the truth. Again, the generation which had seen and conversed with the Apostles had disappeared: they could be appealed to no longer, for the facts of Christ's life, or the teaching of His Apostles, and therefore there was more need to assert the Divine authority of the New Testament records. Lastly, when the grounds of faith, i. e. Scripture and tradition, with the body of bishops as the authoritative interpreter of the one and of the other, had been securely fixed, the matter of faith had to be stated at length and set against the Gnostic errors.

We should expect as a consequence of all this to find modern writers on the history of dogma more at one with regard to the age of anti-Gnostic Fathers, than in treating of the preceding periods. The fragmentary statements of the Apostolic Fathers leave wider room for theory, and the license of theorizing is increased by the questions of authenticity, which have been so fiercely agitated about the writings of the Apostles, and their first disciples. And as a matter of fact there is comparative harmony among men of competent learning, as to the state and character of the Christian Church towards the end of the second century. During the last twenty or thirty years, Protestant writers of different schools have described the epoch with which we are concerned, as the "Rise of the Catholic Church." They would not, of course, admit an entire agreement between the Catholic Church in the last years of the second century, and the Catholic Church of to-day. Still they

* Dial. c. Tryph., 47. Maranus, in his edition of Justin, præf. ii. 8, considers that Origen regarded the Jewish law from the same point of view as Justin, but the passages which Maranus quotes do not seem to be conclusive.

use the word "Catholic" of set purpose, and with a definite meaning. They intend by it to point out that in the strife with Gnosticism, the Church grew into shape, and became, what in its essential features, it has continued ever since. It came forth as the Catholic Church, separated by its essential unity from the heretical sects. It secured this unity by means of an organized hierarchy, before which the individual reason had to bow. It claimed to be the depository of tradition, and to possess Scripture of the New Testament equal in authority to those of the Old. It proclaimed the efficacy of Sacraments as the channels of grace. It regarded Christ as the author of a new law, and taught salvation, not by mere faith and confidence in Him, but by faith and works.

It is easy to see the importance of this turning-point in the history of the Church. Historians of the most sceptical tendencies are one with us at least as to those striking features in the Church of the second century which we have just named. But the question remains, Did the Church then actually become catholic, did she form herself into corporate unity and erect new principles of faith in the exigencies of her strife with Gnosticism, or did the Church simply state, and apply, and develop to their legitimate consequences principles present with her from the first? To answer this question we must know accurately and in detail the period in question, and compare it with the fragmentary notices still left to us of the preceding age. The history of the Church at the end of the second century has a special interest from another point of view; for it teems with evidence which has proved the discomfiture of the older and more orthodox Protestantism. Nothing is more certain than this, that the keen investigation which has been brought to bear of late years in Germany on the early history of Christianity has been enough in itself to sweep away the very semblance of a rational basis for the religion of "the Bible and the Bible only." The time is past when Protestants can turn for support to S. Irenæus and Tertullian. The time is past in which they could represent the age of these Fathers as one of incipient corruption, and appeal to an earlier age when Scripture was everything and tradition or the authority of the Church nothing. The very reverse of this is true. In the first century and a half the difficulty is to find clear recognition of New Testament scriptures at all, to obtain not perhaps evidence for the authenticity of our four Gospels, but a clear line of demarcation between the authority of the Gospel narrative and that of traditions about our Lord handed down from mouth to mouth or consigned to uncanonical books. The same Fathers who witness to the authority of the New Testa-

ment, nay the same Fathers who are our chief witnesses for the authenticity of most books in the New Testament, witness to the authority of an hierarchical church as well. It is one part of the tradition which they profess to have received from the Apostles, that S. John wrote the Fourth Gospel, and another that the Church is governed by bishops, and that these bishops are guided by the Holy Ghost. If Protestants are determined to represent these Fathers not as witnesses to the faith which came down to them, but as creators of a new theology, as men who poisoned Christianity by the infusion of a legal and Judaizing spirit, then the foremost innovation will be this, that they limited the free spirit of Christianity by imposing a number of sacred books, and making them a standard of Christian doctrine.

So much by way of preface on the period of which we are to treat. A few words will suffice to explain the reasons which make S. Irenæus the most fitting representative of the Catholic Church in that age, and add weight to his evidence. He is the first in date of the three great Fathers who have bequeathed to us writings against the Gnostics. We cannot fix the precise year in which he composed his five books for the "Refutation and overthrow of Gnosticism falsely so-called," but we know for certain that the greater part of the work was completed not earlier than 184 and not later than 192.* But this slight priority of date is the least of his titles to speak with authority. Inaugurating as he does a new era in theology, still he, and he alone, among the Fathers of his day is "rightly included in what may be called the Apostolic family."† He was the disciple of S. Polycarp, who was in turn the disciple of S. John. He protested that in his attack upon heresy he did no more than contend for the tradition of the Apostles which S. Polycarp had taught him; and in language most affecting in its simplicity and pathos, he reminds a former friend of the teaching which both of them had heard from the aged saint. "I saw you," he says to this friend, Florinus, "I saw you in Lower Asia with Polycarp while I was still a boy, and you were distinguishing yourself in the imperial court, and trying to win Polycarp's good opinion. I remember those times better than the things of to-day (since the instruction we get

* The third book was finished after 184, for Theodotion's version of the Old Testament, published in that year, is mentioned c. xxi. 1, and not after 190; for Eleutherus, who died in 190, is named, c. iii. 3, as the actual bishop of Rome. For the date of Theodotion see Massuet, *diss.* ii. § 47. Jaffé, *Regesta Pontif.*, places the pontificate of Eleutherus between 177 and 190 (?).

† Newinan, *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical*, p. 200.

in youth grows with the soul, and becomes one with it), so that I could tell the place where the blessed Polycarp used to sit and talk, his goings out and comings in, the character of his life, the look he wore, the discourses he made to the people, how he used to relate his converse with John and with the rest who had seen the Lord, and to repeat their sayings. I remember, too, how it was his wont to repeat the things he had heard from these men about the Lord, and His works of wonder, and his teaching; for he had received those things from men who had seen with their own eyes the life of the Word, and all he told us was in harmony with the Scriptures. Then, by God's mercy, I listened to his words with all the zeal I could, noting them down, not on paper, but on my heart, and ever, by God's grace, keep them in their purity and meditate upon them." *

Moreover, while S. Irenæus was bound so closely to the Apostolic age, he sums up, in his single person, the tradition of the Church at his own day. He speaks for the East and for the West, for he had spent his youth in Asia Minor, he was for many years bishop of Lyons, twice at least he came into close relations with Rome, and made a visit to the church of that city just before he entered on his pontificate. He took part in the three chief controversies of his age,—on Gnosticism, on the Montanist prophecies, and on the celebration of the Paschal feast. We might be sure, from the character of his writings, if we had nothing else to guide us, that he displayed the practical and moderate temper which fits a man to preserve and to defend, instead of exaggerating and compromising, the tradition which he has inherited; and, independently of this, Eusebius notes that love of peace which made his name a true description of his character. Indeed, even the negative qualities of his mind add, from our point of view, to the value of his writings. He had not the fiery originality of Tertullian, the varied learning and the speculative bias which are associated with Clement of Alexandria. He did not strike out new paths or bring philosophy into the service of Christianity. It was his mission to state the doctrine of the Church in its purity and in its fulness, and this he continued to do till in the year 202 † his labours were crowned with martyrdom. Of his writings one alone remains entire, viz., his five books against the Gnostics. Even that exists, for the most part only, in a

* Iren. ad Florin., apud Euseb., v. 20.

† Euseb. v., 3 et 4, v. 24. Hieron. in cap. 64 Esa. See Massuet, Diss. ii. § 30, seq.; Ziegler, p. 30. We do not enter on the controversies as to the dates and facts of the life, except when they have some bearing on doctrine.

Latin translation from the original Greek text. However, of this version it may be affirmed with great probability that it dates back as far almost as the lifetime of S. Irenæus himself. In any case, we know, by comparing it with the large fragments of the Greek text which remain, that it is close and literal even to barbarism. We have further security for the fidelity of the ancient Latin version in fragments of a Syriac translation made from the Greek of Irenæus, which have lately come to light. Indeed there is no occasion to dwell on this point, for no one doubts that the Latin text enables us to ascertain the true sense of Irenæus.*

It is then to this work we must go for the doctrine of the saint. But if we wish to convey to others an idea of that doctrine, something more is needed than a series of extracts. We must do what we can to exhibit his teaching in its connection as a whole. We must remember, too, that S. Irenæus did not write a scholastic dissertation: he was defending the faith against the Gnostics. Hence, to understand him, we must know what Gnosticism means, and the nature of his opposition to it. He differed from the Gnostics on principle, i. e. his belief rested on a different basis; and again he differed from them as to the particular doctrines which he held. In this article we propose to explain the origin and sketch the history of the Gnostic sects, and to give some account of the rule of faith with which S. Irenæus confronted them. In a later number of the DUBLIN REVIEW we hope to treat of the doctrines which S. Irenæus derived from this rule of faith. At present we can let these doctrines alone, just as we can discuss the controversy between Catholics and Protestants on the authority of tradition and the Church, without concerning ourselves about the particular dogmas, e. g. on the sacrifice of the mass or the invocation of saints which the Catholic professes to draw from these sources.

It seems best to begin our accounts of Gnosticism by ascertaining the exact force of the word *γνῶσις*, or Gnosticism, and

* Massuet, Diss. ii. § 53, seq., endeavours to show that the Latin version of Irenæus was known to Tertullian. Lachmann, N. T. Græce et Latine, Berolin., præf. p. x, and Westcott, N. T. Canon., p. 280, consider that he has established this point, although Massuet's conclusions were contested during the last century by Sabbatier, *Vetus Italica*, vol. i. præf. n. 93, and by the Benedictine authors of the *Histoire Littéraire de France*, vol. i. S. Irénée, §. ii. Of the Syriac Fragments, first published by him in 1857, Harvey says that there is an almost universal agreement between them and the Latin text, adding that "this unexpected testimony to the genuineness of the Latin version would be greater if a doubtful cause needed support."—Harvey's Irenæus, vol. ii. p. 431.

its derivative *γνωστικός*, or Gnostic.* There is the more need to do so, for the words, even in their technical application, bore a good as well as a bad sense. Clement of Alexandria, in numberless passages, calls his ideal Christian "the Gnostic," and Irenæus was alluding no doubt to this double meaning when he entitled his book the "Refutation of the Spurious Gnosticism." Moreover, to grasp the meaning of the word Gnosticism is the best preparation for understanding the principle which S. Irenæus opposed to it.

In itself, of course, the word *γνώσις*, or Gnosticism, means no more than knowledge. Yet, even in the epistles of S. Paul, it begins to put on a technical significance. The faith which S. Paul preached was of course always the same. He had not one doctrine for the learned, another for the simple and ignorant. But it was possible to apprehend the truth with more or less penetration. "To one indeed," the Apostle says, "is given through the spirit the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge" (*λόγος γνώσεως*, 1 Cor. xii. 8). And again: "What shall I profit you, unless I speak to you either in revelation or in knowledge?" (*ἐν γνώσει*, *ibid.* xiv. 6). Here *γνώσις* implies a peculiar insight into the depths of Christian doctrine. The gift S. Paul speaks of is supernatural, perhaps miraculous, but plainly there is an insight into the connection of Christian truths and the sense of Scripture, over and above the mere profession of the faith, which may be gained by natural industry and intelligence. It was in the very nature of a divine revelation to act as a stimulus to thought, and to awaken every faculty of the mind. "For many purposes," Clement of Alexandria tells us, "the Scriptures conceal their meaning; first, that they may excite in us a spirit of inquiry.† Thus S. Clement of Rome, the "epistle of Barnabas," and S. Justin,‡ use *γνώσις* to describe the gift of understanding the Old Testament typology, and of these the epistle of Barnabas expressly distinguishes between faith and *γνώσις*. It is the object of the letter to assist Christians in adding to "faith perfect knowledge (*γνώσιν*)."[§] Throughout, the author shows that by this *γνώσις* he understands chiefly the allegorical inter-

* The account of Gnosticism which follows has been made with some care from the sources, chiefly S. Irenæus and the *Philosophumena*. But we are also largely indebted to Massuet's *Dissertationes de Gnosticorum Rebus*; to Neander, in the last edition of his *Church History*; to Möhler, *Essays* collected by Döllinger, 1839; to Baur, *Christliche Gnosis*, 1835; and *Kirchengeschichte der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 3rd ed., 1863; and to Lipsius, *Gnosticismus*, 1860.

† Clem. Al., *Strom.* vi. p. 803, ed. Potter.

‡ Clem. Rom., 1 Ep. 36 et 40; Justin, *Dial.* c. Tryph., c. 112; Ep. Barnab., c. 2.

§ Ep. Barnab., ad init.

pretation of the Old Testament; of the sense in which Clement of Alexandria constantly uses the same term, *γνώσις*, we shall have more to say further on.

So far, the esteem for superior knowledge is consistent with a loyal adherence to Christianity: it was the fruit of reason exercising itself on the things of faith, and it grew as a matter of course with the growth and progress of the Church. But this holds good only of the knowledge which starts with the acceptance of revelation. The spirit of inquiry may strike into another path. Reason may set itself above faith: it may criticise and alter the contents of revelation, till it comes to look on faith as a gift for the simple with which the man of cultivated mind may dispense. This was the line which heathen philosophers had taken with their own mythology; they were far from denying that it contained some measure of truth; nay, they thought it necessary for the multitude, who were unable to receive truth in its pure and philosophic form. Now the allegorical method of interpretation which was associated to some extent with this superior knowledge among Christians, and which has indeed a Divine sanction on its side, was very liable to be perverted till it led the way to a false and heretical assumption of knowledge. It was by this very method that the philosophers had spiritualized and refined the popular religion of heathenism. Philo, at the beginning of the Christian era, had betaken himself to the same expedient for adapting Judaism to the heathen philosophy. Even in the "Epistle of Barnabas" we may discover the germ of this dangerous tendency, for the author, not content with giving a typical sense to the ceremonial precepts of the old law, denies that they ever bound in their literal meaning at all.*

Only one step was wanting in order to turn this "higher knowledge" into the formal principle of heresy. Let this allegorical interpretation be applied to the New Testament, and let its literal sense be set aside as false or worthless, and then, under the plea of higher knowledge, Christianity might be altered at will. A man had but to suppose himself possessed of this higher gift, and then, on the allegorizing system, he might explain away every fact and every doctrine in the traditional belief. Nor need he even trouble himself, when once he had lost his respect for the Christian revelation, about explaining it away. He might, in the confidence of his insight into higher truth, distinguish between elements of truth and falsehood in the received doctrine; he might mutilate the text of the Gospels; he might mix tenets borrowed from the

* Vid. e. g. cc. 4, 9, 10.

heathen philosophy or religions with Christianity; he might end by treating the moral law as he had treated revelation, and invent a new code of ethics. All this he might do, and all this the Gnostics actually did. In fact, when the way was once laid open, the motives for pressing into it were strong enough. The age of the Gnostics was eager for novelties in religion, and addicted to fantastic superstitions. It was the fashion of the time to mingle philosophy, mythology, and magic. There was the more inducement to amend Christianity by the addition of foreign elements, because, while it showed a life and a power to which neither philosophy nor heathenism could pretend, its teaching on creation out of nothing, on the resurrection of the body, on salvation through the sufferings and death of Christ the Son of God, ran counter to every prejudice of the heathen world. There was not a sect among all the countless sects of Gnosticism which did not deny every one of these doctrines. Above all, the central idea of Gnosticism made it welcome to many who were half-converted from heathenism. It was a knowledge superior to and independent of faith. Faith was for the multitude, knowledge for the few. The aristocratic instinct, which was the very soul of Greek and Roman culture, revolted at the authority of a Church which imposed the same belief upon all, and exacted the same submission from the philosopher and the barbarian slave. In a system of compromise like Gnosticism it escaped from this ignominy.

Such, then, was the nature of Gnosticism. It was a false knowledge which threw off the trammels of faith, and of external authority. It subjected everything, as S. Irenæus declares, to the caprice of the individual, and made any fixed principle of doctrine impossible.* It "abandoned the faith which the Church proclaimed, and cavilled at the simplicity of the holy presbyters."† It destroyed, as Clement puts it, the efficacy of baptism,‡ that is, it set at naught faith, the gift conferred in that Sacrament. The Gnostic professed to communicate a knowledge "greater and deeper"§ than the ordinary doctrine of Christians, a knowledge which forgot the limits of human intelligence, and scorned to believe what it could not understand.||

* "Sic enim apud nullum erit regula veritatis sed quanti fuerint qui absolverent parabolas, tantæ videbuntur veritates pugnantes semet invicem et contraria sibi met dogmata statuentes sicut et gentilium philosophorum quæstiones."—Iren., ii. 27, 1. He is referring directly to the Valentinian interpretations of the parables in the New Testament.

† Iren., v. 20, 2.

‡ *ὥστε οὐδὲ βάπτισμα ἔτι εὐλογον, οὐδὲ μακαρία σφραγίς.*—Strom. ii. 3, pp. 433-4. Clement is discussing the tenets of the Basilidians and Valentinians.

§ Iren., i. 31, 3.

|| Iren., ii. 28, 2.

This knowledge, to those who were capable of it, was the means of redemption; indeed in most of the Gnostic systems it was the one and sufficient passport to perfect bliss.* It is, however, important to observe that Gnosticism was not a philosophy. True, it was as unfettered and unstable as heathen philosophy could be, and it addressed itself to the same kind of questions. But it kept the semblance of Christianity, for, in nearly all the Gnostic systems Christ still occupied a central place, and it answered the questions which it raised, not in the abstract language of metaphysics, but by the invention of an elaborate mythology. Without its Christian elements it could not have entered into such close conflict with the Church; without its mythological garb it would at that time have missed the popularity which made it dangerous.

It was in the East that Gnosticism began, and in its rudimentary form it goes back to the very foundations of the Church. The unanimous tradition of the Fathers in the latter half of the second century points to Simon Magus as the first Gnostic. Both Simon and his successor Menander were Samaritans, while Saturninus, the disciple of the latter, taught at Antioch in the time of Hadrian (117-138).† These heretics were one in teaching that the world was made, not by the supreme God, but by inferior powers more or less in antagonism to Him. Either the highest God, or else some æon begotten by him, descended from above, appeared on the earth in the person of Christ, and redeemed man by the "knowledge" which he gave, from the dominion of matter, and of the angels who ruled the world. But the last of the heresiarchs, whom we have named, Saturninus, gave a new development to the Gnostic ideas. He was at least more pointed and more emphatic than Simon or Menander in his denial that Christ took a real body, or degraded Himself by contact with the impurity of matter. Nor was it enough for him to distinguish between those who received or rejected the higher "knowledge." He made this distinction depend on an original divergence of nature. "He was the first to affirm that the angels had made two kinds of men,—the one good, the other bad. And since the demons helped the worse sort of men, the Saviour came that He might

* We have explicit evidence on this point with regard to most of the Gnostic systems. Thus see for the Naasseni, *Philosophumena* (ed. Duncker and Schneidewin), v. 8, p. 162; for the Peratæ, *ib.* v. 17, p. 196; v. 17, p. 196; for the Sethians, v. 21, p. 212; for the Gnostic Justinus, v. 24, p. 216; for the Valentinians, *Iren.*, i. 6, 1; for the Marcosians, *Philosophum.*, vi. 52, p. 336; for the Basilidians, *ib.* vii. 27, pp. 374-6.

† For the birthplace of Simon and Menander see Justin, i. Apol. 26. For the connection of Simon, Menander, and Saturninus, *Iren.*, i. 23, 5, seq. For the date of Saturninus, Euseb. *H. E.*, iv. 7; Theodoret, *Hæc. Fab.*, i. 2.

bring to nought the evil men and the demons, and that He might save the good.”*

There were two other forms which Gnosticism assumed, while still on Asiatic soil. The Syrian Gnostics were the declared enemies of the Jewish religion. According to Simon, the Jewish prophecies were inspired by the lower powers, who had framed the world. Saturninus held that the Saviour descended “to destroy the God of the Jews.”† Yet Cerinthus, who was a contemporary of S. John in Asia Minor, and the Gnostics who are mentioned in the Ignatian epistles, and who belonged to the same country, united a leaning to Judaism with their Gnostic speculations. Cerinthus must have made his selections from the Jewish law with capricious inconsistency; for while he urged the necessity of Jewish rites, he denied, in the same breath, the fundamental doctrine of Judaism, viz., the unity of God. Still, inconsistency like this is by no means without example in the religious history of the time. The Essenes, who were zealous for the Jewish Sabbath and rites of purification, refrained from the sacrifices in the temple, which were enjoined in the Old Testament.‡ The Clementine homilies, which represent a Judaizing Christianity, teach that the Old Testament has been corrupted by falsehood,§ and professing to separate the gold from the base metal with which it had been alloyed, they got, as the result of this process, a religion which resembled Judaism in some external peculiarities, and differed from it utterly in principle and in spirit. Besides Simon and his successors, besides this Judaizing school of Gnostics which followed the lead of Cerinthus, there was a cluster of sects which had their home in the East, and are known as Ophites, or worshippers of the serpent. They betray their eastern origin by the use which they make of Chaldee names, and it is generally supposed that they mark one of the oldest varieties of Gnosticism. They too, undertook to impart a higher knowledge, the secret by which the initiated could “pass through the corruption” of matter.|| It was their boast that they alone “knew the depth” of truth.¶ If we inquire what was meant by this mysterious knowledge, we find Judaism, Christianity, heathenism, mixed together in the wildest confusion. They held, indeed,

* Iren., i. 24, 2.

† Iren., loc. cit.

‡ Joseph. Antiq., xviii. 1, 5.

§ Hom., ed. Dressel, ii. 38, 50, 51, 52; iii. 46, 49; xviii. 20.

|| So the Peratæ, a subdivision of the Ophites.—Philosophum., v. 16, p. 190.

¶ So the Naasseni, the first of those “who dared to celebrate with hymns the serpent, which was the cause of transgression.”—Philosophum., v. 6, pp. 130, seq.

that an æon descended upon Jesus, and made Him the prophet of the truth. But this is almost the solitary trace of Christianity in their theories. They appeal now to the things which Moses "uttered under a veil of allegory, because all could not contain the truth":* now to Hercules, the prophet of the Gentiles, to Homer, Orpheus, and Linus, to the astrology prevalent in the East, to the heathen mysteries, particularly to the "great and ineffable mystery of the Samothracians, which we, the perfect, and we only, know." Some of them in their detestation of the Jewish God, canonized all who were held up to special reprobation in the Old Testament.† It is hard to single out the characteristic features in this mass of extravagant absurdities. What is most striking, perhaps, is the resemblance in the Ophite variety of Gnosticism to the heathen mysteries. It is to them that the Ophites appeal most strongly and most frequently, and, careless about the very appearance of Christianity, they do not pretend to stand on higher ground than the hierophants of Eleusis or Samothrace.

Had Gnosticism remained within the East, it would have played but a small part in the history of the Church. About the immediate disciples of Simon we hear little, except that in Origen's time there were scarce thirty left.‡ Of Menander, Cerinthus, Saturninus, the early writers of the Christian Church make but brief mention. We cannot tell who founded the Ophitic sects,§ and it has been suggested in modern times|| that the Ophitic doctrine was a phase of oriental heathenism, which ranks as a Christian heresy only, because in the first or second century, the Ophites adopted some Christian terms, and gave them a meaning of their own. It was in Alexandria that the Gnostic heresy gathered life and strength, and came forth as the subtle and powerful enemy of the Christian Church. There it learned to clothe in religious language the ideas of the Greek philosophy; there it formed its elaborate systems, partly Christian, partly Platonic, partly mythological,—systems which seem wild and fantastic to us who are separated from them by so many centuries, but which obtained credit among many, and during many generations for an intellectual depth that

* *Philosophum.*, v. 26, p. 220. We find that they borrowed from heathen mythology, *Philosophum.*, v. 7, p. 138; from the heathen poets, *ib.*, v. 8, p. 150; and from astrology, v. 13, p. 184, seq.; that they venerated Hercules and the mysteries, v. 26, p. 226; v. 8, p. 152.

† *Iren.*, i. 31, 1.

‡ *Origen c. Cels.*, i. 57.

§ This is true only of the original Ophites, the Naasseni, for the author of the *Philosophumena* has given the names of those who founded some of the later sects. *Vid.* v. 13, p. 182; v. 22, p. 214.

|| By Baur, *Kirchengeschichte*, p. 195.

penetrated into regions beyond the ken of a more simple and orthodox Christianity.

Basilides was the first of the great Alexandrian Gnostics. Originally a companion of Saturninus in Syria, he may have got the germs of his doctrine from the Gnostics of that country.* But it was in Alexandria that he began his public life, and to the schools of Greek philosophy there the Basilidians were indebted for the speculative element which first modified and then completely transformed the Gnostic teaching. The system of Basilides himself furnishes a striking example of the increasing influence which Greek philosophy exercised upon Gnosticism; for we are able to compare the original teaching of Basilides, as it is recorded by S. Irenæus, with the later development of his teaching, as it is given in the *Philosophumena*, and to note the changes which he or his disciples introduced in deference to the physical theories of the Stoics.† Basilides, however, has a great place among the Gnostic leaders, not only on his own account, but also because he originated an idea which was taken up and carried out by others. After Basilides came the Alexandrian Valentinus, who attempted the same fusion of Christianity with the philosophy of Greece. He did his work with no mean skill, and undoubtedly with brilliant success. He chose Platonism for the philosophic groundwork of his theories, and for the purpose he had in view he chose well. Of all the ancient philosophies, that of Plato was the most religious in its character, it was the most capable of assimilating religious elements, and adapting itself to pass as a substitute for revelation. We have proof of this, apart altogether from the history of Gnosticism. In the decay of Greek literature Neo-Platonism was the one successful revival of the old philosophy, and owing to its mysticism, and its power of suiting itself to the heathen mythology, it was able to enter the lists with Christianity, and fight a long, though in the end, a losing battle. The Neo-Platonists united the heathen religion to the metaphysics of Plato, altering the one and the other in the process. Valentinus mingled Platonism with Christianity on a similar plan, and with much the same effect. He had, too, a wider field for his labours than Basilides. He left Alexandria for Rome,

* Epiphan. *Hæc.*, 23, 7, 24, 1. Euseb. *H. E.*, iv. 7, makes him an Alexandrian, but most likely only on the strength of Irenæus, i. 24, 1, who says Basilides taught in Alexandria.

† We believe with Hilgenfeld and Lipsius, against Baur and others, that the oldest form of the Basilidian teaching is found in S. Irenæus. See Hilgenfeld's *Jüdische Apokalyptik*, p. 287, seq.

about the year 141, where he remained till 157.* He had many disciples, who formed two great divisions of Valentinianism, known as the Eastern and Western schools. Many of them could boast of fame and influence; one of them, Heracleon, will be remembered as long as history lasts; for he was the first commentator on S. John's Gospel.† The estimate which Irenæus had of the Valentinians may be gathered from the fact that theirs is the only system of which he gives a detailed account. He considers, indeed, that his work, which was directed chiefly against this branch of Gnosticism, may serve as a pattern for the refutation of all error, since he who can overthrow Valentinianism will "overthrow all heresy."‡

A few words on the teaching of the Valentinians will throw more light on the characteristics of Gnosticism than a long dissertation on Gnosticism in general. The fullest account of Valentinianism is given by Irenæus, in the first eight chapters of his first book. The saint is describing the doctrine of Ptolemy,§ —one of the foremost disciples of Valentinus; but the differences among the Valentinians were not very serious, and we may fairly take Ptolemy as the representative of the whole sect. The Valentinians set out from the Platonic principle, that this earth, and all that it contains, is made after the pattern of an ideal world, of which the visible creation is but the shadow. This ideal world alone possesses reality. It is the realm of fulness, the Pleroma, as they call it, in contrast to the emptiness of visible things. This principle they applied to the narrative of Christ's life. His parables, and even His acts, were not meant to teach us our duty, or to instruct us in Christian doctrine, as it is commonly understood. Or at least this was their office for men of lower calibre: for the Gnostic, or man capable of perfect knowledge, they did a nobler work, and unveiled before his eyes, in a symbolical form, the inmost recesses of the ideal, or spiritual world. At the head of this spiritual world stood the supreme God. He was the first principle, the Father existing before all, the Bythos or abyss of being. Now, just as Plato pictures the supreme God as dwelling in eternity, with the ideas or archetypes of things ever present to Him, so the Valentinians people their Pleroma, or spiritual world, with a long series of æons. The æon is the Platonic idea translated into the language of mythology. God, they said, dwelt for countless ages alone with

* Iren., iii. 4, 3.

† Fragments of his commentary have been preserved by Origen. They are collected by Grabe, *Spicileg. Patrum*, ii. p. 85, seq.

‡ Iren., iv. præf. 2.

§ Et Ptolemæus quidem ita, i. 8, ad fin.; cf. Mass., *Diss.* i. n. 83.

his thought (Ennœa): then after long silence He begot two æons, one male, the other female, and they became the parents of other æons in their turn. In determining the number of these æons, the Valentinians follow Plato's lead again, for they arrange them on the principle which he borrowed from Pythagoras, that certain numbers are specially sacred, and have a mystic efficacy. The names given to the æons are taken, some of them from the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity; others are names of the Divine attributes; others, such as "man," the "Church," and the like, point to the Valentinian theory, that things below are the shadows cast from the æon-world.

So much for the nature of God, and the æons begotten by Him. This brings us to the metaphysical questions, which the Fathers regard as the occasion of the Gnostic heresy. It is the taunt which Tertullian throws in the teeth of the Gnostics, that they busied themselves about the same questions which were familiar to the philosophic schools, "Whence is evil and wherefore?"* They could not be satisfied with the answer which the Christian revelation makes to these questions, because Christianity tells us enough on such matters for the direction of our lives, without professing to solve metaphysical problems, or to withdraw the veil of mystery which hangs over such matters. He who had the "higher knowledge" might leave this acceptance of mysteries on faith to the common run of Christians. It was for him to see things through and through. Besides, with an oriental exaggeration of Platonism, the Valentinians held that matter was essentially evil, and scouted the notion of its being created by God. In their straits they were driven to devise a theory which placed imperfection among the æons themselves, begotten though they were by the supreme God, and therefore of one substance with Him. These æons, they held, were less and less perfect, the further they were removed in the long line of generation from the Father of all. The lowest of the æons was overcome by a desire to comprehend Him, and by this fruitless desire she would have been consumed utterly, but for a superior æon who came to her rescue and restrained her impulse. From this desire she begot another æon, called Achamoth, or Wisdom, who wandered outside of the spiritual world, shapeless, helpless, wasted by misery and despair. Higher æons came to the help of Achamoth, as one of them had come to the help of her

* "Æodem materiæ apud hæreticos et philosophos volutantur, idem retractatus implicantur, unde malum et quare?"—Tertull. de Prescript., i. 7; cf. adv. Marc., i. 2; Euseb. H. E., v. 27.

mother. By their aid she was moulded into shape, she was freed from her sufferings, and those sufferings thickened into matter, out of which all that we touch or see is made.

The matter which flowed from the sufferings of Achamoth is of two kinds, one the cause of weakness and pain, the other of moral evil. Achamoth set her son the Demiurge over created things. He was the "God of this world." He moulded men and things out of pre-existent matter, "secretly impelled by his mother" Achamoth. Here again we meet the influence of Plato; the name and the conception of the Demiurge was due to him, but the Valentinians widened the gulf which separated this Demiurge from the supreme God and the spiritual world. The Demiurge was incapable on this theory of receiving spiritual ideas; he did not know that there was a God and a long series of æons higher than himself. He was indeed directed by Achamoth, and made the world on the model of the world above; but all this he did unawares. He had but narrow and imperfect notions of virtue: the Jewish religion was the religion he proclaimed, and in his blindness he bade men believe that he himself, who had made the world, was the only God, and that "beside him there was none." Even this poor and imperfect revelation could be received only by some of the men whom the Demiurge had made. For the "earthly men" (*χοϊκοί*), made from the worse kind of matter, were necessitated to evil, unfit to practise even the limited good enjoined in the religion of the Demiurge. On the other hand, the natural, or "animal men" (*ψυχικοί*) had freewill. They could receive the Jewish religion, or the ordinary teaching of the Christian Church (for the Valentinians put them both on the same level), and if they lived lives of virtue, they were rewarded with a partial happiness in a future life.

The reader will observe in this distinction between animal and earthly men, the adaptation, or rather perversion, of S. Paul's language. He, too, employs the words "animal" and "earthly," though in a sense very different from that of the Valentinians. S. Paul also speaks of spiritual men, and the Valentinians caught hold of this expression too, and made it the cardinal point of their system. Certain germs of spiritual life, as they said, had fallen from the higher world into the earth, which was subject to the Demiurge. Over these higher elements he had no power, for they were infinitely superior to himself. As there were "earthly" men necessitated to evil, "animal" men, who might choose a better path or a worse, so there were spiritual men who tended by the law of their being to the world above, where the supreme God and the æons dwelt. This was the end of their being, and they were

sure to reach it, whatever their actions might be. Meantime they were enslaved by the Demiurge and by matter. How was this deliverance to come? An æon, called Christ, came down upon the earth, and through him all things were restored. S. Paul speaks of Christ as restoring all things in heaven and earth. The Valentinians seized this idea and made it the means of giving a semblance of mysterious depth to their system. It was an æon, called Christ, who had saved the last of the æons from ruin, when she was consumed by a vain desire to comprehend the supreme God; it was the "Cross" which had re-established order in the Pleroma or spiritual world; now another æon, known also by the name of "Christ" or "Saviour," clothed himself in a body which looked like ours, though in reality of a different substance. It was He who revealed to the "spiritual" the knowledge (*γνώσιν*) of their higher destiny, teaching them to slight the God of this world, and his law. This knowledge made them independent, not only of Christian doctrine, but also of good works. It was not "deeds which led to the world above, but the seed which descended from the higher regions in tiny form and comes to maturity here."* And as knowledge was everything, as, moreover, only a limited number were capable of receiving it, and they did so by a necessity of nature, Christ's office could only lie in quickening a spiritual life, which was there already, and bringing about a restoration, which must have come sooner or later of itself. Little importance could attach to His death. Some Valentinians held that the body only which Christ had formed for Himself could die or suffer; others that Christ had descended upon a man, Jesus, and then abandoned him at the time of the crucifixion. But, in whatever way they adjusted the details of their theory, all the Valentinians were agreed, that the death, or rather the seeming death, of Christ was in no real sense the cause of salvation. It served like the events of His life to picture, in a symbolic form, things which had come to pass ages before in the spiritual world. His passion was a type of the sufferings which the last of the æons underwent. When it was over, Christ left His body behind Him for ever. Freed from its trammels, He entered the spiritual world, and one day all the "spiritual" men were to be rid of their bodies too, and united to the æons. The "animal" men, if they had lived well, were to join the Demiurge, and the "earthly" to be annihilated utterly.

We have tried to give an exact account of Valentinianism because it is the special phase of Gnosticism with which

* Iren., i. 6, 4.

S. Irenæus fought, and because the Valentinian tenets illustrate better than anything else the meaning of Gnosticism, and the opposition which it offered to the faith. Another heresiarch, as great as he, came to Rome after Valentinus. This was Marcion, who is mentioned by S. Justin as an heresiarch of his time,* and who, as we learn from S. Irenæus, met S. Polycarp at Rome.† Marcion made great changes in Gnosticism. On the one hand he surrendered the fantastic æon-systems,‡ and allowed greater prominence than Valentinus to ethical ideas, nay, even to the death of Christ;§ on the other, maintaining, like the rest of the Gnostics, that the world was fashioned by a lower God or Demiurge, he intensified the opposition between the supreme and the lower God, for he represented the Demiurge not only as ignorant and imperfect, but also as "wicked," "the author of evil, thirsting for war, at variance with himself."|| He showed the keenest hostility to Judaism, and again he insisted that Christ came down from heaven without the ignominy of birth, and that what seemed to be His body was a mere phantom.¶

There is still one point which must be noticed in Marcion's teaching. We have been considering Gnosticism in its attitude to the rule of faith. We have seen that it was of the essence of Gnosticism to overthrow all external authority in the Christian religion, and that in this way it compelled the Christian Fathers to urge the authority of Scripture, of tradition, and of the Church. It is remarkable that the last of the great Gnostics directed his onset more openly than his predecessors against the regulating principles of the faith which he strove to undermine, viz. the Church in its hierarchical constitution and the canon of the New Testament scriptures, the greater part of which was already fixed by the authority of the Church. He "alone," in the forcible words of Irenæus, "dared openly to cut and hew the Scriptures."** He was not content, like Valentinus, to

* Justin, i. Apol. 26.

† Iren., iii. 4, 3; iii. 3, 4.

‡ Massuet, Diss. i. n. 138, denies this, quoting Iren., ii. 28, 5 et 6, and i. 3, 4, also Greg. Naziaz., Orat. 23 et 44; but the passages from Irenæus prove nothing, and the evidence of S. Gregory is of little weight in such a matter.

§ Thus it was the chief difference between the supreme God and the Demiurge, that the former was good, the latter only just.—Iren., iii. 25, 3. Again, Marcion does not seem to have made salvation depend upon a difference of nature. For his doctrine on the death of Christ, vid. Epiphan. Hær., xlii. c. 8, and the citation from the Armenian bishop Esnig, in Baur's *Christliche Gnosis*, p. 272.

|| *Philosophum*, vii. 30, p. 394; Iren., i. 27, 2.

¶ Tertull. *de Carne Christi*, c. 1.

** Iren., i. 27, 4. The books of the N. T. which Marcion accepted are given by Epiphan. Hær., xlii. c. 9.

explain away the words of Scripture, for even in the New Testament he admitted only ten epistles of S. Paul, and the single gospel of S. Luke; and these he mutilated and interpolated according to the requirements of his theory. With an instinct equally true, he turned against the hierarchical order of the Church. It is the Marcionites whom Tertullian has in his eye when he describes heretics as making "clean work of discipline under pretext of simplicity." They would hear of no difference between catechumens and the baptized; women were allowed to teach and to exorcise: "One man is bishop to-day, another to-morrow: with them it is deacon to-day, lector to-morrow: presbyter to-day, layman to-morrow. For even to laymen they consign the functions of a priest" (*sacerdotalia munera*).*

With Marcion the development of Gnosticism came to an end. The heresy held its ground more or less for centuries, and the same tendencies reappear in the Manichees and in the Manichean heretics of the middle ages. However, after Marcion's death there were no striking changes in Gnosticism proper, and with him we may fitly close this outline of its history. The Judaizing Christians had done what they could to confine the Church within the limits of a Jewish sect. The Gnostics would fain have thrown down the barriers which separated the Church of Christ from the philosophy and religions of the heathen world. All the positive doctrines of Christianity evaporated in their hands, till it sank from its position as revealed truth to the level of a religious philosophy. It was the boast of Gnostic heresiarchs, as we know from Clement of Alexandria, to "preside not over a church, but a philosophic school."† And certainly, they were as far as any Greek philosopher could be from any external rule of truth. In many points they may be compared with schools of opinion in our own day, which have thrown off the yoke of faith, while they retain a certain appreciation of Christianity. We may find points of contact with modern opinion in the Gnostic theory, that creation proceeds not from the free will of God, but from a necessity of the divine nature, in their denial of free will in man, and consequent blindness to the moral evil of sin. The resemblance between Gnosticism and the Rationalism of our own day is most striking, if we compare their teaching on the nature and office of Christ. Both deny that Christ differs from other men except in degree. According to both, He is the Son of God, in no other sense than that in which mere men are the Sons of God too, and His work was but to lead men to an inheritance which was theirs by right from the first.

* Tertull. *Præscript.*, 41; cf. Epiph. *Hær.*, xlii. c. 4.

† Clem. Al., *Strom.* vii. 15, p. 889.

It is true that these comparisons between past and present are often fallacious. It is not to us, however, that this comparison is due. Baur wrote his book on Gnosticism to show that Gnosticism began the work which has been finished by the Pantheistic philosophy of his own country. Neander* and others have described Marcion, with his exclusive attachment to S. Paul and his opposition to the hierarchy, as animated by "the spirit of a genuine Protestantism." We believe that these writers have to a great extent put modern ideas into the mouths of ancient heretics.† Still, modern error may claim kindred with Gnosticism in some of its fundamental principles, and in the second century, as now, rejection of the Church's authority led to the subversion of all belief and to a perpetual flux of opinion. It is well known that the Gnostics were severed from one another in the most vital matters. Some, for instance, forbade marriage and the use of flesh meat; others made profession of unbridled license. To some Christ was an ordinary man; to others a phantom without flesh or blood. Even the particular sects underwent rapid and violent changes. Thus the Marcionites were at variance on the chief points of this system.‡ Basilides respected the moral law, the Basilidians set it at naught.§ Like those who reject dogma now, the Gnostics saw nothing to regret in this chaos of opinion. They attributed differences of opinion to differences in the nature of men; much in the same way that some modern philosophers have supposed that different views of religion succeed each other by a natural necessity in the gradual development of our ideas. Indeed one school of Gnostics made Christ Himself responsible for the variety of opinions on religion. He appeared, they said, in many forms, adapting Himself to the several capacities of men. Thus it came that there were so many contentions among Christians. All were right, except in so far as they mistook the partial truth which they were able to receive for the whole truth.

* Kirchengeschichte, ii. p. 162. (It is fair to add that Neander qualifies his remark, and takes exception to some parts of Marcion's teaching.) Lipsius, *Gnosticismus*, p. 165, says Marcion represents "the Protestantism of ecclesiastical antiquity."

† Baur praises the speculative depth of Valentinus, and makes him a mere pantheist expressing himself in symbolical language. But in so doing Baur assumes (1) that Valentinus made no real distinction between the æons. See, on the other side, Mass., *Diss.* i. n. 49, seq.; (2) that matter itself, according to Valentinus, had no real existence—an interpretation of Valentinianism for which there is no evidence. It is abundantly clear from S. Irenæus and the *Philosophumena* that Valentinus was a dualist, not a pantheist.

‡ Euseb. *H. E.*, v. 13.

§ Clem. Al., *Strom.* iii. 1, p. 509, seq.

But whatever view we take as to the degree of likeness between ancient and modern error, one thing is certain, that the Church, in her struggle with the Gnostics, was contending for the very existence of Christianity. This is acknowledged on all hands, by the Protestants and Rationalists of Germany no less than by the ancient historians of the Church or the learned French Catholics of the last century. The Gnostics apprehended clearly the position on which they stood. They expressed ideas which recur in the unbelief of every age, and they did so in a form which is out of date now, but was, for that very reason, fitted to their own time. They sprang up with their pretensions to superior knowledge at a time when the Church had done little for literature, and could point to no great names except those of the inspired writers on her own side. In consequence, they set the whole intellect of the Church in motion. They forced her to state explicitly the principles on which she rests, to show in reasoning, in the statement and application of her doctrines, the strength she had shown already in action and in suffering.

There were two lines of defence taken by the Fathers of the Church. Gnosticism, like every other error, was the exaggeration and perversion of truth. The desire to add knowledge to faith was good, so long as this knowledge was built upon the foundations of faith, instead of overturning them, and it was in the interest of Christianity to prove that knowledge might grow without prejudice to faith. This was the manner in which Clement of Alexandria and the Gnostic school over which he presided helped to guard the Church against the Gnostic invasion. Clement seldom attacks the heretics directly: he devoted himself to utilizing philosophy in the service of faith. He wrote one book to convert the heathen; another to lay down the rules of Christian life: the last and by far the greatest of his extant works is meant to show that a Christian may do more than believe and keep the commandments. Beyond the "ordinary faith," he says, we may reach by instruction and the perfect observance of God's law a knowledge* which is the "perfection of man as man."† He who has risen to this height is far from the disturbance of passion:‡ he is united to God and, in a mysterious sense, one with Him.§

* Strom. v. 1, p. 644.

† Strom. vii. 10, p. 864.

‡ Strom. iv. 6, p. 581; vi. 9, p. 775.

§ He is ὡς θεός. Strom. ii. 20, p. 484. Θεοειδής. Strom. vi. 9, p. 776. The Gnostic may "become God." Strom. iv. 23, p. 632; vii. 16, p. 890. Similar language on the deification of Christians occurs Strom. vii. 1, p. 830; Protrep. i. p. 8; Pædagog. i. 12, p. 156; and in S. Irenæus, iv, 38, 4. For examples of it in later Fathers see Petav. De

He contemplates divine things.* Moreover, he knows truth with a peculiar accuracy :† he can “demonstrate” the things received by faith. ‡ He can fathom the hidden meanings of Scripture : § he uses all sciences as a means of raising his mind to God, without fear of being led astray by them. He uses well the learning which heretics abuse : he makes it a means of refuting error and conveying to others exact notions of the truth.|| In short Clement defeated Gnosticism by removing the temptations which led to it. It is his purpose to bring home the truth that we can satisfy every aspiration of the intellect within the Church. Against the heretical Gnosticism he sets the “true and orthodox knowledge,”¶ to which faith is as needful as air is to natural life,** and which is never separate from the practice of Christian virtue.††

The second line of defence was maintained by other Fathers, and especially by S. Irenæus. The work of his life did not consist in supplying the want which was the strength of Gnosticism, or in pointing to a knowledge consistent with faith. He preferred to enforce directly the claims of faith in itself, to establish the standard of truth, and to convict the heretics of deviating from it. The two lines of defence are consistent with each other : yet there can be no doubt that a certain difference of feeling led S. Irenæus one way and Clement another. We have seen the free use which many Gnostics made of heathen philosophy. Now though Clement was far from imitating them in this, though in fact he charges them with betraying Christianity in their zeal for heathen wisdom, he himself looked with an indulgent eye on the poets and philosophers of Greece. Like all that is human, Greek philosophy had a bright and a dark side. Clement inclined to see in it all the good he might, consistently with his faith. He points out that all good comes from God, that God therefore is the source of all the truth which philosophy conveyed.‡‡ He reminds his readers that the heathen had, for all their errors, a “dim knowledge of God.”§§ Above all he loves to dwell on the office which philosophy exercised in preparing the way for Christ.||| Plato, he says,

Trin., ii. 15, 5 et 6. These expressions, as startling surely as anything to be found in modern books of devotion about the blessed Virgin, are limited and explained Strom. vi. 14, p. 798 ; vii. 14, p. 886.

* Strom. vii. 11, p. 867.

† Strom. vii. 16, p. 891.

‡ Strom. vii. 10, p. 865.

§ Strom. v. 9, p. 680.

|| Strom. vi. 10, pp. 780-1.

¶ τὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικὴν γνῶσιν. Strom. vi. 16, p. 816.

** Strom. ii. 6, p. 445.

†† Strom. ii. 10, p. 454.

‡‡ Strom. i. 5, p. 331.

§§ Strom. vi. 8, p. 772.

||| Strom. i. 5, p. 331.

recognized the necessity of grace,* of faith, of a divine revelation,† and all but prophesied the “dispensation of the Saviour.”‡ Further, Clement saw that his philosophic culture gained him a hearing in the heathen world, and he became a Greek to the Greeks, pleading the example of S. Paul, who made himself all things to all men.§ This attitude to philosophy is not peculiar to Clement. It appears before his time in Justin, and to some extent in Athenagoras. But there is no trace of it in S. Irenæus. To him philosophy is nothing but the instrument which the Gnostics used in corrupting Christianity. He taunts them with making Homer their prophet: || with collecting “the dicta which pass current among those who do not know God and are styled philosophers.”¶ About Plato he has nothing good to report, except that his views of the Creator were preferable to the blasphemy of Marcion.** He alludes to Aristotle in language which sounds strange, when we recall the place that philosopher acquired many centuries after in the Catholic schools. He charges heretics with “introducing into the things of faith, quibbling and subtlety in dispute, though all this is characteristic of Aristotle.”†† This hostility to speculation was natural in S. Irenæus, for it was the abuse of philosophy which met his eye in the Gnostics. Tertullian and the author of the *Philosophumena* were subject to the same influence, and to them, as to S. Irenæus, philosophy was nothing but the fruitful mother of all heresies.‡‡ S. Irenæus contributes nothing to the history

* Strom. v. 13, p. 696.

† Strom. vi. 15, p. 802; v. 13, p. 697.

‡ Strom. v. 14, p. 714.

§ Strom. i. 1, p. 325. Clement often speaks in strong terms on the functions of philosophy in leading men to God. It must be remembered (1) that he regards the knowledge of God among the heathen philosophers as partial and imperfect (see Strom. i. 20, p. 376, et passim); (2) that though he certainly attributes to heathen philosophers and poets an obscure knowledge of supernatural truths, e. g. of the Trinity and Incarnation, this is explained by the fact that in Clement's opinion they had borrowed from the Hebrew scriptures.

|| Iren., iv. 33, 3.

¶ Iren., ii. 14, 2.

** Iren., iii. 25, 5.

†† Iren., ii. 14, 5.

‡‡ “Ipse denique hæreses a philosophia subornantur. . . . Miserum Aristotelem qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi et destruendi, versipellem in sententiis, coactam in conjecturis, duram in argumentis, operariam contentionum, molestam etiam sibi ipsi, omnia retractantem, ne quid omnino tractaverit.”—Præscript. 7. The *Philosophumena* was written to convict the Gnostics of borrowing from philosophers. There is a special attack upon Basilides for adopting with the doctrines the “very words and names” proper to Aristotelianism.—*Philosophum.*, vii. 19, p. 354. Among the apologists, Tatian and Hermias are equally bitter in their contempt for philosophy. S. Theophilus is more cautious in his language, and qualifies his condemnation by some faint praise. Cf. Theoph.

of Christian philosophy, but he has his place as a champion of the Church's rule of faith, as an expositor of her doctrine—a place in which he stands alone, without a rival among the Fathers of the first two centuries for fulness or for clearness.

Although Irenæus was no philosopher, he does employ arguments from natural reason, and with great force, against the Gnostics. After he has finished his account of the Gnostic teaching in the first book, he goes on in the second to expose the contradictions into which the Gnostics fell with all their pretence of intellectual ability, to show how far they were from any adequate conception of God as a spiritual being. Thus he ridicules them for supposing that the material world lay outside of God, as if God, who is all perfect, could be bounded by space. He urges the absurdity of the theory, that matter could come into being without the will of God, and enlarges on the contradiction in the doctrine of the Valentinians, who held, on the one hand, that matter was the source of evil; on the other, that it proceeded by emanation from the Divine substance. Against those who considered matter to be eternal, he argues, that if so, far from being evil, as the Gnostics alleged, it is self-subsistent, and therefore equal to God. Further, he denies that the world around us, with its multiplicity, its composition from contrary elements, its constant tendency to corruption, can reflect in any adequate degree the simplicity of the spiritual world. These are arguments rather of common sense than of learning, and perhaps for this very reason they are as valid now as ever. Many arguments of Clement rest upon premises long since abandoned; but so far as we know there is not one argument which Irenæus urges which might not be used against theories like those of the Gnostics if they were still in existence. Moreover, though Irenæus does not appeal to it, he manifests a considerable familiarity with classical literature. As to his ability, a critic who has little inclination to pronounce a partial judgment admits that S. Irenæus is "a most adroit and acute opponent"* of Gnosticism, while an authority incomparably superior places him with S. Athanasius and S. Augustine as an example of that "knowledge true and deep which the Gnostics professed."†

We have but given specimens of the arguments from reason which S. Irenæus brings against the Gnostics. Interesting as they are, their interest is of a lower order, for their immediate

ad Autol. ed. Otto, ii. 12, p. 90; ii. 8, p. 69; iii. 3, p. 192; iii. 7, p. 202, with iii. 17, p. 228; ii. 38, p. 182, seq.

* Baur, *Christliche Gnosis*, p. 460.

† F. Newman, *Historical Sketches*, 1872, p. 193.

application is to heretics who have passed away. It is not so with the rule of faith in the stricter sense, as contained in Scripture, in tradition, and in the authority of the Church. This rule, if valid at all, must tell against all heresy and admit of application at all time. The rest of this article is intended to exhibit it, as it was present to the mind of S. Irenæus. To him, consisting as it does of three parts, it was really one, for he knows nothing of Scripture apart from tradition, or of either apart from the authority of the Church. If we examine the writings of S. Irenæus in the light of the Christian literature which precedes him, we shall find that it is one in another sense, because for each part the same kind of historical evidence can be produced. Against each the same sort of objections may be raised. The authority of Scripture, of tradition, of the Church, is indicated from the very beginning of Christianity: it was stated explicitly for the first time in the progress of the conflict with Gnosticism. Last of all, we hope to show that this rule in its integrity was not invented but brought out with greater method and clearness by S. Irenæus.

We shall follow the order which S. Irenæus himself has chosen, and begin with the authority of Scripture. He is among the most important witnesses for the authenticity of the New Testament writings. Every one knows something of the battle which has been raging for some fifty years, and still continues, on the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. It is only about the time of S. Irenæus that that gospel is quoted expressly as the work of S. John,* though there are traces of its use as early as S. Ignatius. Irenæus quotes it some eighty times,† ascribing it to S. John, and the fact that he had been brought up by S. Polycarp, the disciple of that apostle, gives a singular weight to his testimony. It is not, however, the authenticity of the New Testament which concerns us here. We are looking at the New Testament scriptures as a rule of faith, and searching not for evidence that its books were written at particular dates or by particular authors, but for recognition of its authority in the Church. We have to trace, in other words, the development of the New Testament canon.

In the New Testament itself, there is no intimation that the Christian Church possessed a collection of sacred writings, over and above the Old Testament, which it had inherited from the former dispensation. There is no appeal, for instance, in the writings of S. John to the epistles of S. Paul, or to the three

* By Theophilus of Antioch, ii. 22, p. 120.

† We take the number on the authority of Tischendorf, *Origin of the Gospels*, p. 35.

first Gospels. It is true that S. Peter, in his second epistle, classes S. Paul's writings with "the rest of the scriptures."* But we cannot allege this as proof for the early formation of the New Testament canon, because S. Peter's second epistle was for three centuries regarded with suspicion in the Church, it has less external testimony in its favour than any other part of the New Testament, and this very reference to S. Paul's epistles as parts of Scripture has been urged against its authenticity. In fact, it is the final decision of the Church and that alone which assures us of its right to a place in the canon; because it is in the canon we know that it is what it professes to be, viz. the work of S. Peter, and to prove the early recognition of the New Testament by the help of this epistle would be to reason in a circle. The apostolic Fathers furnish no evidence of acquaintance with Christian documents which ranked as Scripture. No doubt there is proof that they had read parts of the New Testament. Their style is coloured by the terminology of the New Testament; sometimes they repeat its very words, but without any sign to mark that they are quoting authoritative scriptures, without the formulæ which they constantly use when they appeal to the Old Testament. There is indeed one notable exception. The "epistle of Barnabas," written probably about the year 120, quotes the words of our Lord in S. Matthew with the formula, "as it is written."† The Greek text of Barnabas has been recovered of late years, and we have the certainty that the formula "as it is written," belongs to the original text. We may take for granted, then, that the author of the "epistle of Barnabas" accepted a gospel narrative as part of the Scripture. Further we cannot go. Neither he nor any other of the apostolic Fathers has shown any sign of like reverence for any other part of the New Testament. Nor must we forget that if these Fathers make some use of the canonical gospels, they also avail themselves of uncanonical books or of oral tradition about the words and life of Christ. This is an additional proof, if proof be needed, that it is one thing to quote a canonical gospel, another to recognize it as canonical.

There is no very marked change in the history of the canon down to the time of S. Irenæus. Justin, in the three works which are certainly his, never quotes S. Paul, and though he mentions "the memoirs made by the Apostles which are called gospels,"‡ it is only by inference and comparison that we can identify these "memoirs" with our gospels. He takes no pains

* 2 Pet. iii. 16.

† Ep. Barnab. c. 4.

‡ 1 Apol. c. 66, p. 156, ed. Otto.

to quote them accurately ; he cannot be said to quote S. John's gospel at all ; nor does he speak of any part of the New Testament as "Scripture." Besides, he must have availed himself of other sources for the life of our Lord, as well as of our gospels, since he introduces circumstances which are not found in the latter, though they do occur in apocryphal gospels.* He does, however, carry us one step further, for he observes that these "memoirs of the Apostles" were read publicly along with the prophetic books in the Christian assemblies.† We do not know precisely how much this public reading implied, but the fact that the gospels were put in such close juxtaposition with the Old Testament is most significant, and we have no reason to think that books not admitted to the canon of Scripture would have been read as a matter of course in all the churches.‡ This is the highest point which we reach down to the middle of the second century. In two other writers, who belong to the same period as Justin, the express recognition of canonical authority in the New Testament is conspicuous by its absence. Hegesippus, who came from Jerusalem to Rome about the year 160, visited many churches on his way. He informs us of the test by which he tried their orthodoxy, and it is remarkable that while the Old Testament is mentioned as a criterion of true faith, the New Testament is not. "In each city," he says, "things are ordered according to the declaration of the law and the prophets and of our Lord.§ The "law and prophets" take in the whole of the Old Testament according to the customary division: the "declaration of the Lord" is a vague phrase, which may refer to written gospels or to unwritten tradition. Again Papias, who died about 165, though he mentions that "Mark, the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately all he remembered," and that "Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew tongue," does not, so far as is known, hint that these books formed part of a general collection, or state that they had canonical authority. He made it his business to question the "ancients" of the Church, and to gather fragments of tradition from them, judging that "what was in

* See Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, cc. 78 et 88, pp. 268 and 306, with Otto's notes. This is not the place to review the various opinions on the gospels which Justin used. The views of modern critics are collected by Kirchofer, *Quellen zur Geschichte des N. T.*, pp. 34 and 89 ; by Anger, *Synopsis Evangel.* xxvii. ; by Credner, *Geschichte des N. T. Kanon*, p. 7, seq.

† 1 *Apel.* at *supr.*

‡ In "all the churches," for of course epistles, e.g. of S. Paul, were read from the first in churches to which they were addressed, and even in neighbouring churches.

§ Hegesipp. *apud* Euseb. *H. E.*, iv. 22.

books would not be so helpful to him as the utterances of the living and abiding voice." *

Papias may have meant to enlarge and complete the gospel narrative by the traditions which he collected with such diligence, and there are cogent reasons for believing that he had no thought of preferring the communication made to him by word of mouth to the inspired gospels. It is enough to note that Papias bears no express witness to the inspiration of the four gospels or of the New Testament in general. But he makes it easier to understand why so little stress was laid upon the canonical gospels in the early ages. There was less motive for recourse to written accounts of Christ's life, or to the apostolic epistles, while the disciples of the Apostles were still known and trusted in the Church. These men were, while they lived, the most powerful bulwark against innovation. They had, as S. Irenæus says of one among them, the apostolic preaching still "ringing in their ears";† and they spoke with an authority which seemed to do away with the necessity of written records for the new generation of Christians.‡ We are speaking of course on the supposition that Scripture never was, and never was meant to be, the sole guide of Christian belief. From the Protestant point of view the historical objections to the authority of the New Testament are insurmountable.

Irenæus began to write some twenty years after the death of Papias, and yet the difference which this short interval makes in the history of the New Testament Scriptures is simply immense. It is a difference so wide that to those who believe that the idea of a New Testament with canonical authority actually arose at this date, it implies nothing short of a revolution in the whole character of Christianity. Indeed on this hypothesis it is a revolution without a parallel in history. A little earlier than Irenæus the definite idea of a canon appears (probably at Rome) in the Muratorian list of received books; the same idea meets us fully developed in the writings of the African Tertullian; Irenæus witnesses to the diffusion of the same principle in Asia Minor and Gaul; Clement speaks for Alexandria; the old Italian version of the New Testament and the Syriac Peshito are further proof that it had permeated the Christian world from end to end. It is necessary to observe how abrupt the change is. It really cannot be said that there

* For the fragments of Papias, vid. Euseb. H. E., iii. 39; for date of his death the Pasch. Chron. ed. Dindorf, p. 481.

† Iren., iii. 3, 3.

‡ See also Iren., v. 6, 1, for the continuance of actual inspiration in the teachers of the Church after the apostolic age.

is a gradual growth in the authority attributed to the New Testament. When the "epistle of Barnabas," about 120, quotes a verse from S. Matthew with the formula, "it is written," it comes nearer the recognition of a New Testament than anything which follows down to the closing years of the second century. Till then there is a silence but faintly broken, and all at once we find Irenæus appealing to the New Testament as the written word of God, and this without a suspicion that there had been a time when no one thought of placing the New Testament documents on a level with the older Scriptures. Surely we are justified in assuming that principles do not come on the scene in this fashion, full-grown and armed from head to foot. The completeness with which the idea of the New Testament canon appears in S. Irenæus are among the strongest reasons for supposing that it was latent in the Church from the first, that circumstances did but perfect and strengthen, that they did not create but only call it forth.

What were the circumstances which served this end? It has been suggested * that the Gnostics, knowing that they were condemned by the living tradition of the Church, took refuge in Scripture. Their method of interpretation made it easy to pervert the meaning of its words at will. Their enmity to the Jewish religion closed the Old Testament against them, and they did their best to avail themselves of the New. An appeal to its hidden meaning may have suited their pretensions to superior knowledge, and contributed to distinguish the science which they claimed as their own from the simple faith of those who received the tradition of Christian doctrine from the rulers of the Church. But all this is little better than conjecture. It is matter of fact, however, that the Gnostics, from whatever motive, gave special attention to the books of the New Testament. Marcion, as we have seen already, made a list of the New Testament books which he accepted, and was, in one sense, before the Catholics in publishing a formal list of canonical books. Heracleon, in the school of Valentinus, wrote the earliest commentary on S. John. Tatian, after embracing the Gnostic heresy, compiled the first harmony of the gospels. The Church could not leave heretics to collect and arrange the sacred books. They were sure to do so with ulterior views. Marcion and Tatian mutilated the sacred books, and, besides this, a multitude of apocryphal writings were circulated by the heretical sects and passed off as part of the Scripture. When the Church drew out a definite canon of the New Testament and stamped it with her authority, she wrested a powerful

* By Reuss, *Geschichte der H. Schriften des N. T.*, p. 287.

weapon from the hands of the heretics.* The very fact that the growth of heresy brought the bishops of the Church into communication with each other, offered opportunities for comparing the Catholic tradition in different countries and gathering into one the sacred books received in different churches. In the face of heresy the Church awoke to the full consciousness of the treasure committed to her care in the written Word of God. Through the Apostles, says S. Irenæus, "the Gospel has come to us. This gospel they first preached, and then by the will of God handed it down to us, that it might be the pillar and ground of our faith."†

Massuet, the Benedictine editor, opens his dissertation on the doctrine of S. Irenæus with the remark, that the saint "professes his belief in the divine origin and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures so plainly and so often, that it would be mere trifling to insist on this point."‡ The state of controversy has altered since Massuet wrote, and no one will doubt that it is worth while now to state clearly and in order the teaching of this early Father on the authority of Scripture. We must begin by observing that Irenæus and his contemporary, Dionysius of Corinth,§ are the first Christian authors who use the word "scripture" for a general collection of books including the New as well as the Old Testament. Even Dionysius, in the fragment preserved by Eusebius, does not state explicitly that he counted the New Testament books in the Scriptures, though this is the most natural meaning of his words. There is no question, however, about the sense of the word "Scripture" in Irenæus. He talks, for example, of the "entire scriptures, both the prophets and the gospels":|| of "the scriptures which the Apostles have left us."¶ And he quotes words of S. Paul as a testimony of the "scriptures."** Nor does he allow the slightest difference in the authority of the books which compose the body of Scripture. It is "one and the same spirit," he declares, "which announced in the prophets what and of what kind our Lord's coming was to be . . . this very spirit also, in the Apostles, brought the news that the fulness of the times of adoption had come, and the kingdom of heaven was nigh, and that Emmanuel, born of a virgin, dwelt among the men who believe in Him."†† We break off the quotation here, only adding that, as the context proves, S. Irenæus is

* Euseb. H. E., iv. 29. The ancient authorities on the *Diatessaron* of Tatian were collected by the Benedictine editor of the *Apologists*, Maranus, de *Apologetis Sæculi Secundi*, p. iii. c. 12. See Westcott, *Hist. of Canon.*, p. 368.

† Iren., iii. 1, 1.

‡ Diss., iii. 3.

§ Apud Euseb. H. E., iv. 23.

|| Iren., ii. 27, 2.

¶ Iren., iii. 4, 1.

** Iren., i. 6, 3.

†† iii. 21, 4.

referring, not to the oral tradition, but to the writings of the Apostles and their disciples, for he proceeds to give verses from S. Matthew and S. Luke, and to demonstrate that the teaching of the Divine Spirit in the prophets is one with His teaching in the gospels. Indeed, S. Irenæus has in his mind heretics who impugned the Old Testament Scriptures, and his object is rather to support the authority of the Old Testament by showing that it is inseparably bound up with the New, than to exalt the authority of the New by linking it to the Old Testament.

These two facts, that S. Irenæus included the New Testament under the name of scripture, and that he put it on a par with the sacred books of the old law, are evidence in themselves that he acknowledged its inspiration. We have fuller information on this last point. The Gnostics, like modern rationalists, refused absolute submission to the teaching of the New Testament on the pretext that the Apostles "adapted their doctrine to the capacity of their audience"—nay, that Christ Himself "exercised his teaching office" in the same spirit.* This induced S. Irenæus to state the doctrine of inspiration with peculiar force and precision. "We know for certain," he says, addressing himself to the Gnostics, "that the Scriptures are perfect, since they are spoken by the Word of God and by the Spirit."† "The gospel is fourfold, but it is bound together by one spirit."‡ "The Apostles, the disciples of the truth, are far removed from all falsehood. . . . Our Lord, who was the Truth, did not lie."§ He regarded this guidance of the Holy Spirit as extending even to the least word of Scripture. One striking instance will show how strict his view of inspiration was. He is discussing the eighteenth verse in the first chapter of S. Matthew: "Now the birth of Christ was thus." "Matthew," he argues, "might have said 'Now the generation of Jesus was thus'; but the Holy Spirit, foreseeing that some would pervert the sense (*i.e.*, those who divided Jesus and Christ into two distinct persons, of whom Christ was not born at all) and fortifying us against their deceit, said, through Matthew, 'Now the generation of Christ was thus.'"

As to the principle on which a book is to take its place in the canon of Scripture, we remark, first, that according to S. Irenæus, the Scriptures come to us from the Church and rest on her authority. Heretics, we read in the twentieth chapter of the fifth book, "arose much later than the bishops to whom the

* iii. 5, 1. † ii. 28, 2. ‡ iii. 11, 8. § iii. 5, 1.

|| iii. 14, 2. Irenæus follows the reading still preserved in the Vulgate, *Christi autem generatio sic erat*. The textus Rec. has *τοῦ δὲ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*; but Tischendorf (edit. vii.) and Tregelles omit *Ἰησοῦ*.

apostles committed the churches." The Church "holds fast to the tradition of the Apostles." "Her preaching is true and firm." The "light of God is entrusted to her"; heretics who "leave the teaching of the Church and despise the simplicity of the holy presbyters," wander without security. "Therefore," he continues, "we must shun their opinions, and keep watch eagerly lest anywhere we should come to harm at their hands, and fly to the Church and be fed at her breast and be *nourished on the Scriptures of the Lord*. For the Church is planted, a paradise in this world." Nothing can be stronger than this chapter, for it speaks of the Scriptures by the way as one among the many gifts which the Church bestows. Tertullian expresses the same thought in his own concise and incisive manner. "Scripturas obtendunt dispici oportet cui competit possessio scripturarum." "They (heretics) allege scripture we must see to whom the Scriptures belong."* Next, we can deduce, at least with great probability, from S. Irenæus, the principle on which, as he believed, the Church inserted books in the canon of the New Testament. He lays great stress on the fact that the New Testament was written by the Apostles, "the disciples of the truth."† And although S. Mark and S. Luke were not strictly speaking apostles, S. Irenæus, in his acceptance of their writings as canonical scripture, keeps to the same test. He notes particularly that S. Mark was "the interpreter and follower of Peter";‡ and that "Luke, the follower of Paul, set down in a book the Gospel preached by him."§ Thus every book in the New Testament had mediately or immediately an apostle for its author.||

We have still to see what the actual books were which Irenæus acknowledged as canonical. Of the Old Testament there are thirteen books which he does not once quote, either in the work "against heresies," or in the fragments of his other writings which have survived.¶ He uses the books of Scripture, as his argument requires, without intending to make a complete list of them. We know however that he attributed divine authority to more than one portion of the Old Testament which the Protestant sects have relegated to the Apocrypha. Thus he refers to a verse of Baruch as "an announcement made by the Word of God," and again he quotes a very long

* Præscript, 15. † Iren., iii. 5, 1. ‡ iii. 10, 6. § iii. 1, 1.

|| This principle is enunciated distinctly by Tertull., Adv. Marc. iv. 2.

¶ Librorum Tobie, Judith, Esther, Paralipomenon, Ecclesiastæ, Cantici Canticorum, Ecclesiastici, Job, Abdiæ, Nahum, Sophonæi, Aggæi et Machabæorum, nusquam nisi me fallit memoria in iis qui extant Irenæi libris occurrit mentio. Massuet, Diss. iii. n. 5.

passage from the same book, considering with many of the Fathers that Baruch formed part of the prophecy of Jeremias,* whose disciple Baruch was. So again, words ascribed to Daniel in the histories of Susanna and of Bel and the Dragon are brought forward as really his and alleged in proof along with words of our blessed Saviour from the Gospels.†

It is of greater moment to ascertain the use which S. Irenæus makes of the New Testament. The Church received the Old Testament, or at least the greater part of it, ready to her hand, and the authority which belonged to most of its books was fixed beyond dispute before the Christian Church arose. With the New Testament it was otherwise; the number of its books was settled very gradually, and Irenæus is the first of the Fathers as to whom we can discover with any approach to certainty which books he did and which he did not admit as canonical. We shall introduce this part of the subject by marking a point in the writings of Irenæus specially characteristic of his circumstances. It illustrates the precise idea he had of the New Testament canon, it adds weight to the quotations he makes, and fixes his place in the formation of the canon. Many apocryphal books were used freely in the early church. Later than S. Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria takes advantage frequently of this spurious literature. When he has a special motive for doing so he makes a clear distinction between apocryphal books and the canonical scriptures of the New Testament; still, he often employs such books without suspicion, taking them for what they were worth; nay, once, in contradiction to a principle which he enunciates elsewhere, he quotes the "Gospel according to the Hebrews," with the formula "it is written."‡

* Iren., iv. 20, 4; v. 35, 1.

† iv. 5, 2; iv. 26, 3.

‡ S. Irenæus, as we shall see, gives canonical authority to the Shepherd of Hermas; and Clement attributes the same canonical authority to the epistle of his namesake, Clement of Rome. Strom., iv. 17, p. 613. So far, one error with regard to the canon, on the part of Irenæus, has to be set against another on the part of Clement. But besides this, Clement quotes the gospel "according to the Hebrews" and the Παράδοσις of Matthias, Strom., ii. 9, p. 452, 3; the "Preaching of Peter," Strom., i. 29, p. 427; ii. 15, p. 465; Strom., vi. 5, p. 759; the Gospel "according to the Egyptians," iii. 9, p. 541; an anonymous gospel, (ἐν τινὶ εὐαγγελίῳ), vi. 10, p. 684; and he cites a saying attributed to our Lord, but not found in our gospels as "scripture," Strom., i. 28, p. 425. Yet it is beyond doubt that he acknowledged in principle the exclusive authority of the canonical gospels, and when an occasion presented itself, he insists upon it. Thus when the Gnostic Cassian alleged a passage from the Gospel according to the Egyptians in support of his heresy, Clement answers that the words do not occur "in the four Gospels which have been handed down to us," Strom., iii. 13, p. 553.

Now S. Irenæus was driven by his conflict with the Gnostics to greater caution and exactness. The heretics had, as he tells us, "a multitude of apocryphal and spurious scriptures," and S. Irenæus whose one endeavour was to confront them with the definite rule of faith, sticks close to the principle of canonicity which we have explained above. He will have nothing of apocryphal writings. There is but one exception, and that an exception which proves the rule. He prefaces a quotation from the "Shepherd of Hermas" with the words, "well saith the Scriptures."* The very strength of this approbation leads us to suppose that he was misled by an error on a matter of fact, not by carelessness about the standard of canonical authority. No doubt he took the Pastor Hermas, as Origen did after him, for a series of revelations made to Hermas, the disciple of S. Paul.

S. Irenæus divides the New Testament into two parts, as they relate more immediately to our Lord or to his Apostles (εὐαγγελικά καὶ ἀποστολικά, i. 3, 6). As to the former class, he asserts that there are four Gospels, neither more nor less. "Ignorant are these men," he says, "and audacious," who increase or diminish the number of the Gospels, "wishing it to be supposed that they have discovered something more than the truth," or else "desiring to undo the dispensation of God."† "It is not possible that the Gospels should be more or fewer than they are."‡ That there are four Gospels, is a fact which he accepts as if it were self-evident, and he occupies himself in finding mystical reasons for this number. It is typified, as he believes, in the four winds, and the four regions of the world; it is prefigured by the four faces of the cherubim, nay, the four faces answer to the characteristic features of the Gospels. The face of man represents S. Matthew's Gospel; that of an eagle, S. Mark's; the faces of the ox and the lion, are types of S. Luke and S. John. Once more, there are four Gospels, because God has given to man four dispensations through Adam, Noe, Moses, and Christ. We have nothing to do with the merits of this typology. Whatever we think of it, nothing can be more shallow or uncritical than to slight the evidence of Irenæus, because he argues from four winds or four cherubims to four Gospels. It proves better than anything else could have done, that S. Irenæus never heard of, cannot even realize a time, since the death of the Apostles, when there were not four Gospels, vested with a Divine sanction. And we have only to recall the close relation in which he stood to Polycarp, the disciple of S. John, to remember that he gives an explanation of a text in S. John's Gospel, on the authority of the disciples of the Apostles,§

* Iren., iv. 20, 2.

† iii. 11, 9.

‡ Ib. 8.

§ v. 36, 2.

if we wish to know how much weight this strong, because unconscious, testimony of S. Irenæus carries with it.

As to the second division of the New Testament, S. Irenæus bears witness not less decisive to the Acts of the Apostles. He regards it as part of God's providence, that many parts of the Gospel history should be given by S. Luke alone, "in order that all following the evidence which he gives concerning the acts and doctrines of the Apostles, and holding to the pure rule of truth, might so be saved."* Besides this, he quotes twelve epistles of St. Paul (all except those to Philemon and to the Hebrews), the first epistle of S. Peter, the first and second of S. John, the epistle of S. James and the Apocalypse.†

Probably it is by mere accident that we find no quotation from the epistle to Philemon, or from the third of S. John. We cannot, however, assume that S. Irenæus was sure about the authority of all the books in our New Testament. It is significant that he makes no citation from the second epistle of S. Peter, or from the epistle to the Hebrews; and again, that he does not quote from the epistles of S. Jude and S. James, at least expressly—significant, because the authority of these books was for a long time questioned in the Church. There is even some positive ground for believing that he did not recognize the epistle to the Hebrews as the work of S. Paul.‡ In fact, everything leads us to suppose that S. Irenæus stood in relation to the general question of the canon where Origen and Eusebius stood after him. He was certain as to the authority of the Gospels and Acts, and of the greater number of the Epistles; but the canon, definite as it was, to a great extent was not yet definitely closed. There was still room for the opinion which included the "Shepherd of Hermas" or excluded the epistle to the Hebrews. Origen and Eusebius formalized the state of things in critical fashion, when they divided the books of the New Testament into *ὁμολογούμενα* and *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, i.e., books universally received and books questioned. It was not till the end of the fourth century that the disputes on the canon of the New Testament were finally closed: in the East the authority of the Apocalypse was doubted or denied for centuries longer.

To sum up on this head. Down to the time of Irenæus, the citations from the gospel of S. John are few and inexact, and are, as a matter of fact, disputed. The reference to a body of books composing the New Testament are fewer still, and much

* Iren., iii. 15, 1.

† The references are given by Massuet, Diss. iii. n. 6, seq., more fully by Ziegler, p. 94, seq.

‡ Photius, Bibliothec., cod. 232.

more open to exception. S. Irenæus marks an epoch in the history of the Church, because the authenticity of the four Gospels is to him a first principle, and because he bears unfaltering testimony to the authority of a New Testament settled upon a fixed principle. He leaves the authority of a few among its books still doubtful, but as to these the tradition of the Church was still uncertain for centuries after his day. If we accept the New Testament, we must be prepared to give decisive weight to the authority of Irenæus and his contemporaries. We must believe that they, and he above them all, are faithful guardians, and interpreters of the tradition which preceded them. We must take S. Irenæus as explaining and confirming—to adopt the words of an able Protestant scholar—“the fragmentary notices which alone witness to the earlier belief.”* We cannot however accept the testimony of Irenæus for the canon of the New Testament without accepting it for much more than this. If he speak strongly for the authority of the Gospels, he speaks out with no uncertain sound for the authority of tradition and the Church. Scripture and tradition were to him the co-ordinate rule of faith. He witnesses to both, and no ingenuity of criticism can sever the evidence which he gives to the one from that which he bears to the other.

It was not enough to settle the canon of Scripture, for the simple reason that heretics as well as Catholics appealed to it. When S. Irenæus is describing the temptation of our Lord, he remarks that Satan “concealed his falsehood by the help of Scripture, as all heretics do.”† In an earlier book he tells us that the Gnostics “picked out texts from the Scripture and tried to fit them in with the doctrine they invented.”‡ Now it may be said that this did not necessitate an authority over and above the sacred text, but only a reasonable interpretation of it. And certainly S. Irenæus did think that the Scripture by itself and with no further help than goodwill and common sense to decipher its meaning, was amply sufficient to refute the most glaring of the Gnostic errors. Thus, against the Gnostic doctrine of two gods, he sets the plain declaration of “the prophecies and the gospels,” since they “may be understood clearly and without doubt, and by all alike; . . . and assert that one only God, to the exclusion of all others, made everything by his Word . . . as we have demonstrated from express words of Scripture.”§ Further, he lays down

* Westcott on the Canon, p. 240. He is referring to the Muratorian canon, but it is obvious that his words may be applied with still greater justice to S. Irenæus.

† v. 21-2.

‡ ii. Præf. 1.

§ ii. 27, 2.

incidentally certain rules for discerning the sense of Scripture, which are no more than the dictates of sound judgment. He objects, for example, to the arbitrary method by which the Valentinians tore words and phrases of the Scripture from their context, and he ridicules their way of going to work by stringing together a number of separate verses from the Iliad and the Odyssey in such fashion that they make sense, but a sense directly contrary to the intention of the poet.* He exclaims against the folly of selecting the most difficult passages in the Bible, and interpreting by them such as have an obvious meaning, instead of taking what is plain and clear in Scripture as a key to the rest. †

In the same spirit he insists that if S. John had meant to convey a knowledge of the mysteries which the Valentinians extorted from his Gospel, he would have expounded them clearly and in order, instead of leaving us to hit upon them by divination. ‡

In spite of this, there was more than one point on which S. Irenæus agreed with the Gnostics, or rather there were points which neither he nor they nor any early writer ever dreamt of disputing, and these made it impossible for them to settle their difference by the bare letter of Scripture. S. Irenæus, like the Gnostics, believed that Scripture contained things hard to understand.§ What is more, he acknowledged that in words which seem to have an obvious meaning, there was a hidden and a deeper sense which could not be penetrated so easily. From the literal sense we learn that certain things happened, but then the things themselves are ordained by God to prefigure greater things in the future, "since nothing with God is insignificant or destitute of a typical meaning."|| This is the same principle which S. Paul applied to the Old Testament, when he saw in Ismæel and Isaac the types of Jewish servitude and Christian liberty. This method of interpretation had been followed universally in the Christian Church. It appears, for instance, in S. Clement of Rome, who explains the scarlet thread of Rahab, as a symbol of our redemption through the blood of Christ,¶ and it would be easy to multiply instances from the "epistle of Barnabas," or from Justin in his dialogue with the Jew Trypho, or from the Apologists. In the same way to S. Irenæus the mysteries of the Trinity and of the Passion were prefigured everywhere in the Old Testament. The sheep

* i. 9, 4.

† ii. 10, 1 et 2; ii. 27, 1.

‡ i. 9, 1.

§ ii. 28, 2.

|| Nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud Deum, iv. 21, 3.

¶ Clem. Rom., i. Ep. 12.

of Jacob symbolized the flock of Christ, gathered out of all nations;* the wood which Eliseus threw into the water, and so raised the axe miraculously to the surface, prefigured the virtue of the cross,† and the events of Samson's death are treated as an elaborate allegory.‡ As in Irenæus first, the Christian gospels came prominently forward, so they in turn are subjected to the same principles of exegesis. Not only is the parable of the importunate widow made to convey a lesson on the times of Antichrist, which certainly does not lie upon the surface, but even the events in the history of Christ have a mysterious meaning attributed to them. If there are seventy-two generations in the genealogy of Christ, our Lord chose this number to show that all the races of mankind, supposed to be seventy-two in all, were to be united in Him.§ If Christ awoke His disciples, when they had fallen asleep in the garden of Gethsemani, this was to indicate that "His Passion awakes (to life) His disciples who sleep (in death), for whose sake also He descended into the lowermost parts of the earth."|| We need not attempt any criticism of these interpretations. It is sufficient for our argument that these were the principles of exegesis which S. Irenæus followed, the only principles which in that age any one thought of following,¶ and whatever their worth may be, in themselves they give a wide opening to the perversion of Scripture by prejudice or caprice. The New Testament nowhere professes to be a complete rule of Christian doctrines, nor does it even draw out articles of faith in systematic order. If Scripture needs an authoritative interpreter, much more is this plain of Scripture interpreted on the method current in the second century. The voice of Scripture might be clear on the unity of God, and the creation of the world, but on many of the questions at issue between Catholics and Gnostics, the one party and the other, had Scripture been the one and independent rule of faith, might have appealed to it with equal plausibility.

Moreover, an authority was requisite to decide what was Scripture. Nobody then could indulge in the delusion once all but universal among Protestants, and still potent in circles which are beyond the reach of historical criticism, that Scripture was settled and established from the first, and tradition an overgrowth upon it. There were Gnostics who received some only of the New Testament books which Catholics

* Iren., iv. 21, 3.

† v. 17, 4.

‡ Frag. 27.

§ iii. 22, 3. There are seventy-five generations in our text of the genealogy in S. Luke, to which S. Irenæus refers. See Massuet ad loc.

iv. 22, 1.

¶ Perhaps we should except Marcion.

admitted; others added books of their own to the number. About certain books the Church herself had not pronounced; as yet they were received in some parts of the Church and suspected in others.

We have been assigning negative reasons for a rule of faith beyond the letter of Scripture. We can hardly say that they weighed with S. Irenæus, for to him Scripture came through the tradition of the Church: it was but part of it. We have shown above, that the apostolic men among whom he passed his youth, guarded zealously the teaching they had received from the Apostles, and that they do not make any express recognition of the New Testament. S. Irenæus himself puts the imaginary case that the Apostles had left no writings at all. The idea, however, does not occur to him that Christians in this case would have been without warrant for their belief. It will be best to give his own words at some length. "We must not seek from others the truths which it is easy to obtain from the Church, since, into her, as into a rich treasury, the Apostles poured in full stream all which appertains to the truth: so that all who will, may drink at her hands the water of life. She is the gate of life: as for all the rest they are thieves and robbers. These we are to shun, but all that belongs to the Church, we are to love with an eager zeal and to hold the *tradition of the truth*. What then? If dispute arise on some lesser question (*de aliqua modica quæstione*, in contrast to the wider questions, e.g. on the unity of God, which were too clearly set at rest by Scripture to need the aid of tradition), should we not betake ourselves to the most ancient churches, in which the Apostles lived, and ascertain from them what is sure and clear on the question before us? *Suppose the Apostles had left us no Scriptures*, should we not follow the order of tradition which they handed down to those into whose hands they entrusted the churches?"* Not only did S. Irenæus contemplate the possibility of a faith based on tradition alone without Scripture, but he knew that many Christians had no opportunity of studying the New Testament, and he will not allow for a moment that their belief is different from or less perfect than his own. In proof, we shall quote another sentence or two from the same passage. But, first, we observe that he is not contending against the theory that Scripture alone is the channel of Christian truth, for of such a theory he had never heard. His aim is to point out that simple people, if they listen to the Church's teaching, may know revealed truth better than the Gnostics with their pretence of learning, and he gives

* Iren., iii. 4, 1.

an example patent to every one. "Many barbarous nations," he says, "who believe in Christ, follow this ordinance (viz., of tradition). The truths of salvation are written not on paper but on their hearts, not with ink, but by the Spirit of God, and they keep zealously the ancient tradition Those who have believed the faith without knowing how to read " (even if they could have read there was no version of the Bible in their tongue) "are indeed, from their ignorance of our language, accounted barbarians, but because of their faith they are most wise and please God, living in all justice and purity and wisdom, and so by virtue of that ancient and apostolical *tradition*, the monstrous doctrines of the Gnostics gain no entrance to their minds."* Of course Irenæus was not situated thus, and he most certainly had not neglected the study of the Holy Scriptures. But he was far from bringing to the study a mind without preconceived notions, or, again, ready to surrender or to alter the belief he had, on the strength of Scripture interpreted by private judgment. On the contrary, he exacts this condition from any one who wishes to understand the parables, viz.: that he should have in his heart "the immovable rule of faith which he has received through baptism."†

There is little of historical interest in this appeal to tradition. It is common to Irenæus and the Christian writers who preceded him: it appears in his contemporaries, and recurs in the Fathers of succeeding ages. Even the expressions, "rule of faith," or "rule of truth," which he employs to denote the leading principles derived from tradition, which were to be kept constantly in view in all doctrinal disputes and in all interpretations of Scripture, may be traced further back than the date at which he wrote. However, the mere fact that Irenæus insists far more definitely than those who had gone before him, on the authority of the written word, gives a new precision to the idea of tradition by parting it off from Scripture. Nor is this all. Just as Irenæus had been driven in opposition to the apocryphal books, to insist in clear and unmistakable terms, on the authority of the New Testament writings, so by like motives he was led to state and to develop the meaning and the force of tradition. It was no longer sufficient to invoke in a vague way the tradition of those who had been disciples

* Ib. 2.

† κανόνα τῆς ἀληθείας i. 9, 4. So regula veritatis, ii. 27, 1, and τὸν ὑγιὲς κανόνα τοῦ σωτηρίου κηρύγματος in Hegesipp. apud Euseb. H.E., iii. 32, though it is not quite clear that Eusebius is reporting the exact words of Hegesippus. The meaning of κανὼν and of its Latin equivalent regula is fully discussed by Credner, zur Geschichte des Canons, 1847, ad init., and by Wescott, p. 541.

of the Apostles, for the Gnostics themselves, when "confuted by Scripture," alleged that "the truth could not be discovered from the Scriptures by those who were ignorant of tradition." * They, too, claimed to have derived their higher knowledge by oral communication from the Apostles. The Valentinians said their master had been instructed by Theodas, a disciple of S. Paul, and Basilides professed to have been taught by Glaucias, the "interpreter of S. Peter." † It was essential, then, to explain what was meant by tradition, and to make it evident that the Catholics did, the Gnostics did not, possess it. It was no less requisite to prove the cogency of the argument from apostolic tradition, for the same heretics who appealed from Scripture to apostolic tradition, on the ground that the former was "incorrect, or without authority, or ambiguous," turned against tradition too when they found it convenient to do so, and boasted that "they who were ahead not only of the presbyters but also of the Apostles in wisdom, had found out the unadulterated truth." ‡ Irenæus secured this twofold end by defining clearly the nature of tradition. He has indeed much to say of things handed down by the ancients who had conversed with the Apostles. But in the last resort he identifies tradition with the teaching of the Church, and then at once wrests it from the grasp of heretics, and turns it into a deadly weapon against themselves. It is here that the position of Irenæus against Gnosticism comes out in sharp outline. The Gnostics claimed to interpret Scripture and tradition by the light of a higher knowledge, and S. Irenæus sums up his impeachment in these pregnant words: "The true knowledge is the teaching of the Apostles and the ancient constitution of the Church over the whole world." Γνωσις ἀληθῆς ἡ τῶν ἀποστόλων διδασχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ἐκκλησίας σύστημα κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου (iv. 33, 8). We have to draw out all that S. Irenæus implies in these words, and so conclude our account of his teaching on the rule of faith.

S. Irenæus adopts the principle which he takes from the mouths of the Gnostics, that truth cannot be found by those who are ignorant of tradition, but with this limit, that tradition must be apostolic. "We challenge them," he says, "to that tradition which comes from the Apostles." § And at once he closes the way against misconception. No one can rightly doubt the truth of this tradition, for "the Apostles, after they were clothed with the might of the Holy Spirit, who came upon them from on high, were thoroughly furnished in

* iii. 2, 1.

† Clem. Al. Strom., vii. 17, p. 898.

‡ Iren. iii. 2, 1 et 2.

§ iii. 2, 2.

all things, and had perfect knowledge.”* The Apostles, however, were not mere teachers: they were the rulers of an organized society. Each of them was bound to his fellow-Apostles, and the apostolic college along with the other disciples of Christ formed the Church.† No excuse will serve for perverting the faith on the pretext of a secret tradition, derived from some one of the Apostles, for “the Church all over the world, has received (her) tradition from the Apostles”: ‡ “planted even to the ends of the earth by the Apostles and their disciples, she inherits (their) faith.”§ The character of the Church’s tradition is itself the witness to its truth. Each heretic in turn “wished to set up for a teacher, and seceded from the sect in which he found himself at first.” “No man could tell the number of those who each on a different plan, separated from the truth.”|| But the Church “dwelling, so to speak, in one house, as if with one soul and one heart, constantly teaches, preaches, delivers this (apostolic tradition) as with one mouth. There are diverse languages in the world, but still the force of tradition is one and the same.” In Germany, in Gaul, in Spain, in the East, and in Africa, the Church holds the same faith. The learned Catholic cannot add to tradition: the simple will not make it less. “For seeing that the faith is one and the same, he who can discourse at length about it will not make it greater, nor will he who has less to say diminish it.”¶ There is a pledge for the Church’s unity of faith and for the fidelity with which she retains it. God Himself has bestowed the faith upon her, and with it “the Holy Spirit, the pledge of incorruption and confirmation of our faith. . . . Where the Church is there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God there is the Church and all grace; now the Spirit is truth.”** Hence, to be “outside of the truth,” is the same thing as to be “outside of the Church.”†† “Those who apostatize from her, and listen to the childish fables of the Gnostics are self-condemned.”‡‡

To stop here would be to leave the principle which S. Irenæus establishes as the bulwark against heresy incomplete. He speaks not only of the Church but of “the ancient constitution of the Church and the distinctive mark of the body of Christ, according to the succession of bishops, to whom they

* iii. 1, 1.

† Cum reversi essent ad reliquos coapostolos et discipulos domini, id est in ecclesiam, iii. 12, 5.

‡ ii., 9, 1.

§ i. 10, 1.

|| i. 28, 1 et 2.

¶ i., 10, 2.

** iii. 24, 1.

†† Qui sunt extra veritatem, id est extra ecclesiam, iv. 33, 7.

‡‡ i. 16, 3.

(i. e. the Apostles) committed the Church in each place.”* It would be waste of labour to prove that S. Irenæus distinguished between bishops and presbyters, for this much is admitted on all hands. The fact that even in so great a city as Rome he recounts the succession of single bishops from the time of the Apostles is conclusive on this point, and although he often calls bishops presbyters, he never calls presbyters bishops, and in one place he distinguishes in express terms between the two offices.† It is more to the purpose to note that while S. Ignatius describes the bishop as holding the place of Christ, S. Irenæus marks him out as the successor of the Apostles. The change of idea is significant of the altered circumstances in which the Church was placed. When S. Ignatius wrote heresy was confined to small and sporadic sects; and though he does indicate the catholicity and unity of the Church, it was each single bishop fighting hand to hand with heresy that was foremost in his thoughts. He was occupied with the Church in each diocese, to which he wrote singly, and there, where the bishop stood by himself without an equal, it was natural to say, “Be subject to the bishop as to Christ.” S. Irenæus was acquainted with the heresy in its widespread and developed form. The whole force of the Church was needed to overawe and to silence the Gnostics, and thus he prefers to call bishops the successors of the Apostles, because the name suggested at once that the bishops were bound together as the joint rulers of the Catholic Church. It implied besides that the bishops were the nobler members of the Church, and that all which had been said generally of the Church as the infallible guardian of apostolic truth was true in an eminent sense of them. “We must obey those who have the succession from the Apostles.” It is from those “who have this succession from the Apostles, soundness of doctrine, conversation without reproach, speech pure and incorruptible, that we must learn the truth.”‡ “They are the men who expound the Scriptures for us without danger” of error. And if we ask how we are to know that the bishops have retained sound doctrine and the true tradition, the answer is that “with the succession of the episcopate they have received a sure *gift of truth*, according to the good will of the Father.”§ “Charisma veritatis” are the words in the text of S. Irenæus, the former of which he uses elsewhere for the miraculous grace of healing and for the inspiration of the prophets.|| We cannot put the belief of S. Irenæus better than in the words of a Protestant writer far

* iv. 33, 8.

§ iv. 26, 2.

† iii. 14, 2.

|| ii. 32, 4; iv. 20, 4.

‡ iv. 26, 2 et 5.

removed from any sympathy with it. "According to the mind of Irenæus, it is quite as true to say that the episcopate sanctions the rule of faith as that the observance of this rule gives authority to the episcopate. With him as with Cyprian the highest ecclesiastical office is inseparable from sound doctrine. . . . He makes the preservation of sound doctrine and the presence of the Holy Ghost dependent upon the bishops who in legitimate succession represent the Apostles, and . . . this manifestly because he wants at any price to have a security for the unity of the visible Church."*

* Ziegler, p. 150. There has been a gradual progress among Protestant critics in their interpretation of S. Irenæus with regard to this the most important part of his teaching on the rule of faith. Ritschl, in 1857 (*Entstehung der alt-Kath. Kirche*, p. 443), doubted whether "*charisma veritatis*" signified an interior grace by which the bishops are enlightened in their doctrinal decisions, or only the gift of the truth, i. e. adherence to the rule of faith. If the latter be the true sense, then S. Irenæus recommends not absolute adherence to the episcopate, but attachment to those particular bishops who hold the rule of faith. But this latter interpretation is utterly untenable; for (1) such a rule would have been useless against the Gnostics. They might have objected to every bishop that he had indeed succession from the Apostles, but not the "*charisma veritatis*," (2.) "*Charisma*" is never used by S. Irenæus for an objective rule of faith, but always for an interior quality, which confers a supernatural power. See *reff. supra*. (3.) The context, "*qui cum episcopatus successione charisma veritatis certum secundum placitum Patris acceperunt*," is decisive against Ritschl's suggestion.

Graul, writing in 1860 (p. 134), surrenders Ritschl's interpretation, but he still maintains that Irenæus requires sound doctrine and blameless life in the bishops, who are to be our guides. Now St. Irenæus undoubtedly assumes that the bishops, who are infallible expositors of Scripture and tradition, are in communion with the whole episcopate and the body of the Church. But given this, (1) in iv. 26, 2, he requires absolute assent to their teaching, without a word of any other qualification, (2) though in iv. 26, 5, he insists on the authority of bishops, who have apostolical succession and sound doctrine; the second of these desiderata is secured in the case of Catholic bishops by the "*charisma veritatis*," (3) though we are told further to learn the truth from those "who have apostolical succession . . . and conversation without reproach"; this only means, first, that the Catholic bishops, in opposition to the immoral doctrines of the Gnostics, which are the constant theme of S. Irenæus, taught sound morals, as well as true faith; and again that the Church, because she is holy, ever "produces bishops (*πρεσβυτέρους*) like those of whom the prophet says, I will give them rulers in justice and bishops in peace." (Iren., *loc. cit.*) Further, to keep the unity of the Church, and to hold office by lawful instead of schismatical succession, is described by S. Irenæus (iv. 33, 8) as "*præcipuum dilectionis munus*." Thus the mere fact that a bishop is in Catholic communion, makes his conversation blameless by contrast with that of heretics and schismatics.

Ziegler, in 1872, silently abandons all these supposed difficulties, and states the theory of S. Irenæus just as Massuet had done. Our desire to make our ground sure and consider every possible objection, together with

Up to this point we have had little occasion for controversy in explaining the rule of faith as it is given by S. Irenæus. The points contested by the older Protestant writers have been abandoned one by one. In the decay of belief they care less to claim kindred with primitive Christianity, and even those who are not quite indifferent on the point have had to give way before the stubborn facts of history. They are ready to admit that S. Irenæus puts tradition on the same level with Scripture, and attributes to the Catholic episcopate the office of interpreting the one and the other. But as S. Irenæus asserts the unity and indefectibility of the Church Catholic, so he makes the particular Church of Rome the centre of unity and the indefectible guardian of apostolic tradition. It is this which gives completeness and stability to his whole theory on the Church and the rule of faith. It is this which identifies his doctrine on these points in every essential feature with that of Catholics at this day. It is this which renders him a witness to the unalterable tenacity with which the Church has maintained the same principles through long ages in which human systems have changed and disappeared. And here, as might have been expected, we part company with historians and critics who are not Catholic. If the constituent elements of the Church's faith were in the second century what they are in the nineteenth, there is an inevitable presumption that the Church of the second century did but teach what she received from the Church of the Apostles. The enemies of the Church know this well, and they have strained every nerve and put every device of perverted ingenuity in requisition, in the endeavour to show that if tradition, the canon of New Testament Scripture, the authority of the episcopate, were prominent in the second century, the recognition of Papal supremacy was still in the distant future.

S. Irenæus treats of the Roman Church and its authority in the opening chapters of the third book. In our analysis of his argument, we shall follow him step by step and in his own order. This will be the best means of ascertaining the force of his testimony to the Roman claims, and the success of Protestant critics in evading it. This course is the more satisfactory because the first four chapters of the book are complete in themselves: in the fifth S. Irenæus returns to a different subject.

The Gnostics, Irenæus says, would submit neither to Scripture nor to apostolic tradition, on the ground that there was an

the extreme importance of the subject, must stand as the excuse for this lengthy note.

admixture of error in both. He replies that the Apostles had perfect knowledge, and neither taught nor wrote error. Moreover, they delivered the truth in all its fulness to their successors, the bishops of the Church, who hold, in the exercise of their teaching office, the place of the Apostles themselves. Catholics, then, are able to prove their possession of the full truth, for the different Churches are able to trace the line of their bishops back to the Apostles. This might be done in the case of all the Churches which the Apostles founded. But it would be tedious to do so in each instance: so S. Irenæus takes the Church of Rome, that "most great, most ancient Church, known to all, which was founded and established by the two most glorious Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul." So far S. Irenæus has said scarcely more than he might have said of other apostolic sees—of Antioch, for example, or Corinth. But he proceeds: "Pointing to the tradition which this Church has received from the Apostles, to that faith which has been announced to the whole world, and which has come even to us by the succession of bishops we confound" all who err from the right way. *"For with this Church, because of its more powerful principality, every Church must agree, that is, the faithful everywhere, in which (i. e. in communion with the Roman Church) the tradition of the Apostles has ever been preserved by those on every side."* After the Apostles had founded the Roman Church, they committed the ministry to Linus, and so it descended in due order to Eleutherus, Bishop of Rome when S. Irenæus wrote. It was under one of these bishops that the Roman Church wrote to the Church of Corinth, "uniting (the Corinthian Christians) in the bonds of peace, and renewing their faith." Finally, S. Irenæus adds that S. Polycarp taught and delivered the same faith: all the Churches in Asia, that of Ephesus in particular, where S. John lived, testify to the same truth: so do the barbarous nations who received the ancient tradition before the Gnostic sects were known.

Let us take the sentence which we have marked in italics, and examine it with the help of the context. S. Irenæus is arguing that all the Churches, directly or indirectly, can trace their tradition and the succession of their bishops to the Apostles. Of these Churches he mentions three only by name, Rome, Smyrna, and Ephesus. The three Churches which he selects got their bishops directly from the Apostles—a selection in accordance with the prominence which he gives in the immediate context to the apostolic sees.* When he comes to the

* Nonne oportet ad antiquissimas recurrere ecclesias, in quibus Apostoli conversati sunt, iii. 4, 1.

Roman Church he changes his tone in the most marked and emphatic manner, the terms in which he speaks of it differ in kind from those which he uses for the other Churches of apostolic foundation. They differ in kind from the language held either by him or by any other ancient writer of any Church except the Roman. Indeed by their very nature his words imply a singular and incommunicable prerogative—a prerogative no less than this, that with the Roman Church “every Church must agree.” It would be an anachronism to divide the Church of the second century into Eastern and Western, above all, when we are dealing with a Father who belonged to both. But it is needless to urge this. For Irenæus, when he affirms that every Church must conform to the Roman standard of faith, has both East and West in his mind. The only other Churches he mentions by name are Asiatic, and before he has done he travels in thought to the barbarous nations beyond the limits of the Roman Empire. And, be it observed, he takes the Roman Church not as a sample of apostolic Churches, but as a centre of unity, in which the Churches of the whole world meet and are gathered into one. When he has proved that the tradition of the Roman Church is apostolic, his proof is complete for the apostolic character of tradition throughout the world. When he has given the tradition of the Roman see, he has given the tradition of every particular Church at the same time, and this because “every Church must agree” with that of Rome. In the teaching of the Roman see the teaching of the whole Church is virtually contained, and he has but to allege the faith of that Church in order to confound all heretics.

Again, the reason why every Church is under the necessity of agreement with Rome, is clearly stated: it is *propter potentiores* principalitatem*, because of the more powerful principality which attaches to the Roman Church. This “*principalitas*” of the Roman Church cannot mean its antiquity, though this interpretation has been advanced by some Protestant critics. Rome could not demand the assent of all other Churches on the score of superior antiquity, for the simple reason that the Roman was not the most ancient of Christian Churches; and so far was S. Irenæus from any confusion on this point, that he calls Jerusalem “the mother-city for the citizens of the New Testament,” since there “every Church took its rise.”† Putting this aside, it is matter of demonstra-

* Massuet reads “*potiores*.” The sense is the same in either case. But the Protestant editors Stieren and Harvey are undoubtedly right in preferring “*potentiores*,” the reading we have followed in the text.

† iii. 12, 5.

tion that "principalitas" means authority or supremacy. Besides the passage in hand, there are ten places in S. Irenæus where this word occurs. Thus, in iv. 38, 3, we read, "God holds the principality in all things ("principalitatem quidem habet in omnibus Deus"), and in ii. 30, 9, "God is above every principality, and domination, and power." In the eight remaining places, it signifies the Pleroma or supreme God of the Gnostics. It is true this supreme God was also original: he existed long before the lower God who made the world. Only whenever S. Irenæus employs the word "principalitas," it is the supremacy of this God which he brings into prominent relief. He describes it as "the principality which is above all" (i. 26, 1), "the principality which is above everything" (ib.),* he speaks of "another principality which must needs be greater" (ii. 1, 2). But the most cogent part of the proof remains. In three of the passages where "principalitas" stands for the highest God, and in three only, we have the original Greek, and in all of them we find that the word "principalitas" is the rendering of *ἀθθενρία*, which has no meaning except supremacy.† We may, then, dismiss this point, and take for granted that in the belief of Irenæus every Church must agree with Rome "because of its more powerful principality."‡

On what does this principality rest? On the Apostolic dignity of the Roman Church, as the whole context shows. S. Irenæus does not make the most distant allusion to the civil authority of Rome: he compares church with church, not city with city, and he turns his eyes to the churches bound most closely in the persons of their first bishops to the Apostles. That of Rome has the principality among all, even the Apostolic churches, because Peter and Paul, "the most glorious Apostles," "having founded and established it," "entrusted the ministry of the episcopate" to the Roman bishops. If we turn to a Greek father contemporary with S. Irenæus, we shall understand better the connection between the "more powerful

* The word occurs twice in the same section, i. 26, 1.

† *Αθθενρία* occurs in the Greek of Irenæus, where the Latin has "principalitas," twice in i. 26, 1, and once in i. 31, 1. The Greek of the former passage is preserved in *Philosophum*. x. 21, p. 526, and of the latter in *Theodoret*, *Hæret. Fab.*, i. 15. *Αθθενρία* is not a classical word. It is found in the Septuagint, where it is translated by Liddell and Scott "absolute sway"; by Schleusner in his *Lexicon Veteris Testamenti* "Jus"; Suicer, sub voc. quotes a multitude of examples from the Fathers, and gives "auctoritas" as its equivalent. In 1 Tim. ii. 12, *αθθενρειν* denotes the exercise of authority.

‡ We must express our great obligation in this part of the discussion to F. Schneemann's exhaustive treatise.

principality" of the Roman see and the history of its foundation. S. Peter was, in the words of Clement of Alexandria, "the blessed (Apostle), he who was chosen and singled out, the first of the disciples, for whom alone, in union with Himself, our Lord paid the tribute."* One more illustration of the connection between the Roman principality and the primacy of S. Peter. Tertullian, after lapsing into heresy, ridicules the "peremptory edict" of Pope Zephyrinus and his pretence to speak as "bishop of bishops." "I want to know," he exclaims, "how you usurp this authority over the Church"? And at once he answers his own question, by supposing that the Pope does so on the strength of the words addressed by our Lord to S. Peter, "On this rock I will build my Church. To thee I have given the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatsoever thou shalt bind or loose on earth will be bound or loosed in heaven," &c.†

This "more powerful principality," the fact that the Roman Church is the centre of unity and that her faith sums up the faith of the whole Church, is the key to what follows. The Roman Church does not derive her principality from the assent of the faithful. On the contrary, "because of her more powerful principality" all the other churches must agree with her, and so in the Roman Church (in quâ),‡ in union, that is, with her, "the faithful on all sides§ have ever preserved the Apostolic tradition." St. Irenæus goes on to prove that the same faith is held as a matter of fact by Catholics all over the world—by the disciples of Polycarp in Smyrna, by the Church of Ephesus, by the churches in the territory of the barbarians. The faith of Rome is by necessity the faith of the Catholic Church.

The interpretation which we have given, in common, so far as we know, with Catholic critics of every school, is the only one permitted by the construction of the words or the context in which they occur. It can afford to stand on its own merits. Were any confirmation needed, it would be found in the

* Quis Div. 21, p. 947.

† Tertull. de Pudic. 21.

‡ This sense of *in* is necessitated by the context, and is so evidently admissible in itself that references are hardly needed to justify it. The preposition has the same metaphorical force again and again in the Latin of Irenæus; e. g., *Salutem in eo dedit hominibus*, iii. 12, 4; *ut quod perdideramus in Adam, hoc in Christo reciperemus*, iii. 18, 1. Schneemann quotes a perfect parallel from S. Optatus, *in quâ una cathedra (S. Petri) unitas ab omnibus servaretur*.—De Schism. Don. ii. 2.

§ Undique, as Thiersch and Stieren admit, is used in the Latin of Irenæus for *ubique*; cf. iii. 24, 1, *Prædicationem ecclesiæ undique constantem*, with i. 10, 2, *Prædicatio veritatis ubique lucet*; cf. also iii. 11, 8.

desperate expedients to which Protestant theologians have been driven in their efforts to explain away the meaning of S. Irenæus. We do not think it fair to urge the mere variety of Protestant interpretations. This shows, indeed, that it is a difficulty to them (and what view of history is without its difficulties?): it does not show that the difficulty is insurmountable. We are convinced, however, that a rapid survey of the Protestant interpretations will be of advantage, and this in two ways. It will prove that, after more than two centuries, during which the most eminent critics have exercised their ingenuity on the words of S. Irenæus, no interpretation has been devised which has even the semblance of plausibility. Not one of the many interpretations has commended itself to Protestant critics in general: some of them have failed to satisfy even the critics who propounded them. And again, as these interpretations are mutually destructive, as one critic has conceded to the Catholic view the precise point which his predecessors had urged against it, this is the best evidence that there is no valid objection to the Catholic exegesis of the passage either in text or context.

Salmasius construed the words of S. Irenæus as we have done, but he took him to mean that the Church of Rome has preserved Apostolic tradition with singular purity, and was, therefore, as it happened, a model for all churches. He held that S. Irenæus exalted the Roman Church as "*principalis*, i.e. first and most pure of all."* The learned high churchman, Grabe† took completely new ground. He translated "*convenire ad hanc ecclesiam*" "*meet in this church*," and S. Irenæus, according to him, was alluding "*to the conflux of those who were sent from every church, in order to plead the Christian cause before the emperor, in whose hands lay the potior principalitas, or supreme power.*" It would be idle to argue at length against these interpretations, which have died a natural death long ago. Against Salmasius, it is enough to say that *principalitas* does not, and cannot, mean purity; against Grabe, that Christians of the second century were not in the constant habit of presenting petitions for toleration to the emperor, much less was this the use with Christian churches. Besides Irenæus does not talk of going to Rome, but of going to the Roman Church; and the "*supreme power*" belonged not to the Roman emperors, who are never mentioned, but to the Roman Church, which is. It is well to remark further that while Salmasius admits that *convenire ad* means to

* *De Primatu Papæ*, p. 65, in the edition of 1645.

† *Ad loc.* in the *Variorum* notes of Stieren's edition.

"agree with," and denies that *principalitas* means "supreme power," Grabe admits that *principalitas* means "supreme power," and grounds his whole theory on a perverted interpretation of the words "*convenire ad*."

Neander has given three explanations. First, without a shred of MS. evidence, he made an alteration in the text. In a later edition of his Church History, he surrendered this conjectural emendation, and gave the following paraphrase:—"On account of the rank which this Church holds as *ecclesia urbis*, all churches—that is, the faithful from all quarters—must betake themselves to it in the natural course of things; and since from the beginning Christians from all parts have had to meet there, so from generation to generation, through the Christians of all parts who gather within its boundaries, the Apostolic tradition has been preserved. Every divergence from this tradition would in Rome be evident to all." Neander himself felt the difficulty of making this paraphrase square with the text as it stands. (He ought to have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with the context, in which Irenæus is arguing against the Gnostics from the Apostolic foundation of the churches, and from the foundation of the Roman Church in particular by S. Peter and S. Paul.) "I will not," he says, "deny the difficulty which attaches to the latter part of the rendering" (i.e. of the clause "*in quâ semper*," &c.), and after giving as an alternative the exposition of Gieseler, he ends by protesting "that he has not been influenced in the investigation by Protestant interest," and that the scientific school of Protestantism to which he belongs cannot be endangered by the "admission of a high antiquity for the Catholic element in general and in particular."* On referring to Gieseler,† we are presented with another emendation by conjecture. He supposes that the Latin translator mistook the sense of the original Greek, and restoring the original Greek from his own imagination, he understands S. Irenæus to mean that every church must agree with Rome, because the Roman Church, and the faithful from all quarters, have together preserved the Apostolic tradition. We shall give his version word for word. "For with this Church, on account of its superior antiquity, the whole Church—i.e. the faithful of all parts—must in the nature of things agree, in which Church, always in common with the faithful of all parts, the Apostolic tradition has been preserved."

We cannot be expected to weigh the merits of this version,

* Neander, *Kirchengeschichte*, 4th ed., i. p. 259, seq.

† Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*, 3rd ed., i. p. 175, seq.

so far as it depends upon an arbitrary alteration of the text. For the rest, Gieseler concedes every point contested by previous Protestant critics. He does not pretend that that *principalitas* refers to the civic dignity of Rome, or deny that *convenire ad* means agree with. Nor does he scruple to take undique as equivalent to ubique. But in opposition to the whole stream of Protestant as well as Catholic criticism, he translates "*principalitas*" antiquity. We have shown already that this is not the meaning of the word: and Gieseler's unproved assertion that it means antiquity does not impair our confidence. What is to be thought of a critic who tells us in the same breath that "*principalitas*"* signifies antiquity, and that it answers to the Greek word *ἀνθενρία*, which, as any lexicon would have informed him, does not mean antiquity but supreme power? Moreover, the Roman Church was not distinguished from other churches all over the world by its superior antiquity. Finally, S. Irenæus could not assume, without the most glaring *petitio principii*, that all other churches agreed as a matter of course, with the most ancient Church. Gieseler himself seems to have anticipated this obvious objection, and to make sense of the passage he was obliged to alter the last clause on conjecture.

Gieseler and Neander do not close the long series of Protestant interpretations. Another has been devised by Thiersch,† another by the English editor Harvey, another by Ziegler.‡ We cannot venture to try the patience of our readers by examining them singly. We may say, in passing, that Ziegler, the last of these critics, makes the nearest approach to an entire surrender before the Catholic interpretation; for he grants that Irenæus, "passing as it were in prophecy beyond himself, anticipates the Papal Church of the future,"—that he marks out Rome "as the chief seat of Apostolic tradition, as the centre which sustains and unites the whole Church—a centre which she would not have required had it been a matter to take for granted that the Apostolic tradition was everywhere established and beyond doubt in the Church herself." But we wish to speak in conclusion of a particular misrepresentation of the passage which was circulated in various pamphlets occasioned by recent controversy. This attempt to wrest the words from this obvious meaning was not more successful than those which preceded it. If it was made with greater confidence, we may fairly set this down to the fact, that the writers of the pamphlets were not addressing a very critical or competent audience. We consider it here, only because the objec-

* Apud Stieren ad loc.

† Ad loc.

‡ p. 150, seq.

tions which are fatal to it are fatal at the same time to all the Protestant interpretations.

Earlier Protestants had, as we have seen, been specially perplexed by the clause at the end of the sentence (in *quâ* semper, &c.). According to the view under examination, this clause contains the pith of the whole sentence, and makes it clear that S. Irenæus lends no support to Papal authority. His meaning is, that every church must agree with Rome, since the faithful come to it from all quarters, each bringing with him the tradition of his own church: so that, in Rome, all the streams of Apostolic tradition meet.

To this we reply: (1.) S. Irenæus never hints that the confluence of Christians to the Roman Church is the reason why "every church—that is the faithful on every side"—must agree with her. On the contrary, he states distinctly the reason why all must be at one with the Roman Church. It is "*propter potentio rem principalitatem*."—"With this Church, because of its more powerful principality, every church, that is the faithful everywhere, must agree." And having enunciated the necessity of agreement with Rome, and its motive, viz., the principality of the Roman Church, he adds the effect: "in which (Roman Church) the tradition of the Apostles has been preserved by the faithful on every side." (2.) S. Irenæus, in the context, is arguing from the Apostolic foundation of the churches, to the Apostolic purity of their tradition. He has just mentioned the Apostolic foundation of Rome, and he continues the same subject exclusively through four chapters. He is not therefore, in this sentence, arguing from the civil position of Rome or the confluence of Christians there. It is the principality of the Church which he speaks of, and this is based on its foundation by S. Peter and S. Paul. (3.) S. Irenæus is giving a clear rule, by which all heretics may be put to shame. He was bound to express himself in explicit terms. Had he thought the confluence of strangers to Rome a guarantee for its faith, he would have said so plainly. The clause at the end should have run "because in it the Apostolic tradition is preserved by those who come there from all quarters": the words "*potentior principalitas*" would have been omitted, or at least connected beyond the possibility of mistake with the last clause. Moreover, S. Irenæus does not represent the other churches as bringing tradition to Rome, but as agreeing with the Roman Church on account of its more powerful principality, and so "preserving" the deposit of faith. In short, S. Irenæus professes to give a criterion evident to all; and, on the theory of Protestant writers, he gives a criterion so enigmatical that they cannot agree among themselves as to its

nature. (4.) Rome was the common resort of Catholics and heretics: it is inconceivable that S. Irenæus should have regarded the chance concourse of strangers in the imperial city as a guarantee for the purity of doctrine in the Roman Church—a guarantee, moreover, so absolute that the agreement of all other churches with Rome was a matter of necessity. No example of such an argument has been adduced from any one of the Fathers. Indeed, it was not till Constantine had made Christianity the established religion, that the civil eminence of Rome was supposed to enhance the dignity of the Roman see.

It has been argued that S. Irenæus could not have acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman Church, because he opposed the policy of Victor, the Roman bishop, in the paschal controversy. The Asiatic Christians kept the paschal feast on the day of the Jewish Passover, i. e. on the fourteenth of the Jewish month Nisan, on whatever day of the week it might fall. Rome, with the rest of the world,* kept Easter as we do now, on the Sunday following the 14th, and prolonged the fast till that day. Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus and leader of the Asiatic party, summoned a council of bishops in accordance with the demand of Victor, but was resolute in his adherence to the old custom of his church. Thereupon Victor “tried to sever from the common unity the dioceses of all Asia, together with the contiguous churches, as if they had been heterodox; and he censured them in letter, proclaiming one and all of the brethren there excommunicate.” This surely was a strong assertion of prerogative on Victor’s part. However, “it was not pleasing” (so Eusebius continues) “to all at least of the bishops,” some of whom “rebuked Victor with some sharpness.” Let us see how S. Irenæus acted. He had gone before to Pope Eleutherus, a predecessor of Victor, in order to secure the peace of the Church, when it was menaced by the Montanists. On the occasion of the paschal controversy he wrote to Victor. He exhorts him not to “cut off whole churches,” though he does not dispute his right to do so; and he reminds him that earlier Popes had shown an example of charity and toleration to the Asiatic churches. His plea for toleration is, that no question of faith is at stake, since “the difference in fasting brings out more strongly the unity of faith.”† So that the argument against us, from the conduct of S. Irenæus to Pope Victor, amounts to this: S. Irenæus cannot have considered the Roman Church indefectible in faith, because, in a

* So Euseb. H. E., v. 23; but see Massuet, Diss. ii. n. 19.

† The account here given of the controversy between Victor and the churches of Asia Minor is taken from Euseb. H. E., v. 24. All the words in inverted commas are either his, or words of Irenæus quoted by him.

matter, which, as S. Irenæus himself emphatically declares, had no connection with faith, he exhorted the Roman bishop to proceed with moderation and charity.

Not a word against the Papal prerogatives can be extracted from S. Irenæus; nothing can be found in his writings or in his life which detracts from the force of his testimony to the authority of the Roman Church. Were we writing mainly in controversial interests, we might well leave the matter here. But he must have read the history of the Church to little purpose who supposes that the idea of Papal power, either in doctrine or discipline, was complete and perfect from the first. Like every doctrine and every institution of the Church, the primacy of the Holy See has been matured by slow and gradual stages. We fail to understand its history, if we consider it apart from that law of development which has affected the whole teaching and life of the Church. It would be absurd to make S. Irenæus advocate the superiority of the Pope over general councils, for he never mentions a council at all: of a general council there is no reason to think that he had any conception. It would be absurd to quote him as a conscious advocate of the Pope's infallibility in *ex cathedrâ* decisions, for such distinctions did not arise till ages after his time. He teaches that the Roman Church is the centre of unity and the indefectible guardian of apostolic tradition. The old Gallican school interpreted his words with perfect fairness,* and, believing in one Catholic Roman Church, they claimed honestly to hold all that he held. They failed to see, not the meaning of S. Irenæus, but the fact that Papal infallibility followed as a logical consequence from the principles which he enunciated and they admitted. Recent events have shown how much the words of S. Irenæus involve. More than one Catholic historian† who had interpreted the words of S. Irenæus exactly as we have done, at the time of the last council ignored instead of explaining their former interpretation, because they found that it implied the very doctrine of infallibility which they were determined at all costs to resist.

We trust that this essay, imperfect as it is, suffices to vindicate the theological importance which we have claimed for

* We cannot repeat too often that in interpreting the testimony of Irenæus to the authority of the Holy See, we have not advanced an inch beyond the great critics of the Gallican school. We have been following Natalis Alexander, Bossuet, Massuet, Ceillier, as much as Ballerini and Orsi.

† Döllinger, *Church Hist.*, Eng. Trans., i. p. 256, and Friedrich, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschland's*, i. p. 409, committed themselves in the strongest terms to the interpretation which we have given.

S. Irenæus. We have been occupied with the rule of faith, with the authority, in other words, of Scripture, of tradition, of the teaching Church, as stated and enforced by him. We have reached definite conclusions, and if these conclusions hold, they have an interest wider and more momentous than any mere historical inquiry. In examining the rule of faith, as it is taught by S. Irenæus, we learn how to estimate the rule of faith as it is taught by the Church at the present day. For first, he closes the path against an appeal from the living voice of the Church to antiquity interpreted by private judgment. It is not simply that he gives deliberate testimony to that divine assistance which secures the perpetual infallibility of the Church: his own writings serve, without intention of his, to set before us the work which the Church had still to do, and this with respect, not only to subordinate doctrines, but to the rule of faith, which is their measure and their standard. He lays down a rule of faith, definite and complete if we compare it with the statements of earlier Fathers, but still falling short of absolute perfection, bearing upon it evident marks that it needed further completion and development. Thus, while he acknowledges the inspiration of the New Testament, he shows that the precise number of its books was as yet unsettled. While he recognizes the infallibility of the Church, he does not set down the limits of this infallibility, or classify the organs through which it was to utter itself. Next, while the rule of faith, which he maintains, contains the means of its own development, because it includes a developing authority, namely, a Church, one, indefectible and infallible, he is the proof that this Church ever since has, in fact, been faithful to her office, that she has but applied, perfected, developed, the original rule, instead of substituting a new one; for on this head she teaches now, only with greater method and completeness, what she taught in the time of S. Irenæus. Once more, we see in him how closely the evidence for each part of the rule is bound together. He who is such an unfaltering witness for tradition and the Church is the first of the Fathers who speaks out clearly on the canon of the New Testament. And a stumbling-block he will ever be to that school of Protestants who "built a new church on the foundation of Scripture, first without understanding, then without the will to understand, that Scripture in its turn rests on nothing but tradition."* Lastly, his testimony has a force from which even they cannot escape, who are willing to be consistent, and to dismiss the claims of Scripture and the

* Credner zur Geschichte des Kanon. Credner is still the leading authority on the sceptical side for the history of the canon.

Church, as unhistorical alike. The character of his own mind ; the universal reception of his rule of faith throughout the Church, and the readiness with which it was produced at the very moment heresy called it forth ; the close relation in which he stood to the disciples of the Apostles ; his habitual and confident appeal to them ; the unwilling admissions of the heretics themselves ; the confirmation which he derives from the Ignatian epistles,—all this is a chain of evidence which cannot be broken, for the Apostolic origin of his teaching on the rule of faith.

ART. IV.—MUSIC AND PLAIN CHANT.

Laudate Pueri : Tenor Solo with Chorus (Soprani). Composed by CAPOCCI.
London : Butler & Co.

CONTROVERSIES on Church Music are among those phenomena of the literary world which, like comets, appear at certain intervals. Like comets, too, they have an angry look and a warlike significance ; but they pass away, and all goes on much as before. Here, however, our comparison must end. Whereas each succeeding comet either confirms the conclusions or enlarges the experience of the astronomer, each succeeding controversy on Church Music results in a conviction which, although it be not of a character to invite the renewal of the question, seems to have no effect in setting it at rest. This conviction is best expressed in the hackneyed proverb “*De gustibus non est disputandum.*” The fact we suppose is that while all parties accept this conclusion as a matter of fact or a suggestion of policy, the advocates of one side at least do not feel that it goes to the root of the matter in debate. They will not concede that the question is one of mere taste. They will not abandon, except for peace and argument’s sake, the position that it involves a great principle. To which of the two sides in the controversy we are here referring, can hardly be a matter of doubt. The advocates of figured music, or as we shall henceforth call it, music, have never, as far as we are aware, denied that Plain Chant has a place, and a very important place, in the public worship of the Church. But the advocates of the Chant

on the other hand are apt to claim for it not merely the title to a preference, but the right of a monopoly. They have sometimes even gone so far as to defend this right on grounds which would imply a somewhat less perfect Catholicity in their opponents than in themselves. Such an imputation has been not merely implied but expressed in the course of a great æsthetical controversy germane to the present. The epithet "Christian" has been vindicated exclusively for Gothic architecture, whereas the style of two among the finest churches in the world, S. Peter's at Rome and S. Paul's in London, has been somewhat contemptuously called "Pagan." In the same way all music excepting the Plain Chant has been sometimes branded with the term "secular," whereas the Chant has been pronounced to be the only form of representing the sacred words of the Mass which has received the sanction of the Church. We are here declaring neither for nor against this opinion, but merely stating it. We do not deny that in a certain sense, and with certain great limitations, it has a foundation in truth, and we propose to point out wherein it seems to us to be true, and wherein exaggerated. We shall first, however, draw out the distinction between the two styles, assigning to each what appears to be its characteristic end or excellence.

Plain Chant is without a rival or competitor in its own department, and that department is one which occupies a high place in the theory of Church Music. It is a form of solemn yet melodious recitation, which imparts dignity to the words of which it is the vehicle, or, as we should rather say, gives effect to the dignity which essentially belongs to them. In a certain sense it is true that these words are, like all things intrinsically beautiful, "when unadorned adorned the most." There is, doubtless, in Plain Chant a character of reverence peculiar to itself. It seems to retire in presence of the words, as if unworthy to embellish them. There are certain portions of the Mass accordingly which never must, and as we believe never will, be torn from its reverential embrace. The idea, for instance, of tampering with the chant of the Prefaces or Paternoster, is one which must strike every ecclesiastically-minded person as little less than sacrilegious. The same observation applies to the precatory and didactic portions of the Mass, and with hardly less propriety to the introit, gradual, offertory, and communio. It applies also, though with very considerable limitation, to the recitation of the Divine Office. To this extent, then, we cordially agree in the opinion of those liturgists who claim for Plain Chant an indefeasible right to be regarded in an especial manner as the song of the Church.

It is impossible, however, to maintain this claim on behalf of Plain Chant on the whole, in the presence of certain indisputable facts. Such a claim could not be asserted without eliminating music, properly so called, from the service of religion. We use the term music, without any prefix or qualifying epithet, because Plain Chant is not in fact a kind of music but a mode of recitation. Pope Benedict XIV. accordingly distinguishes between "music" and what he calls the Gregorian method of chanting (*Gregorianus cantandi modus*). Let us now then enter for a moment on the subject of music; first of all in the abstract, and then in its application to the service of religion. The question will carry us a good way off, and we only hope that the fascination it possesses for ourselves may not tempt us to pursue it beyond the limits of the reader's patience. We fear that in the prosecution of this inquiry we shall be compelled to repeat a great deal of an article which appeared in this REVIEW several years ago, and all the more because we do not write with the article before us.

The musical ear is a kind of sixth sense. It has no necessary connection with the ordinary five. It is indeed a special development of one of their number, but the sense on which it is founded may exist in all its natural perfection without this adventitious refinement. The inequality with which it is distributed is really marvellous. Children of three years old will manifest the tokens of it, while many a one lives to the full age of man, not only without possessing it, but without being even able to understand what is meant by it. Although it be a semi-intellectual capacity, it may exist in persons of no great intellectual power, or be wanting in those who possess that power in a high degree. Neither again is it from intellects of what we may call a heavy calibre alone that it seems to shrink. It is quite as often found wanting in minds of a refined cast, and invested with brilliant powers of imagination. We remember instances in point among the Oxford celebrities of half a century ago. Two men who probably would have been selected out of the rest of the University as eminent specimens of the class to which we have just referred, used to say of themselves, quite as much in the spirit of boast as of humility, that they did not know "God save the King" from the "Hallelujah Chorus." Another eminent scholar paid this queen of the refined arts the compliment of saying that he considered music to be the least intolerable of noises. But while the musical ear is often dissociated from minds to which it might have been supposed congenial, it shows an apparent preference for those with which it might be thought to be out of harmony. The instances of mathematicians who have a

keen perception of the beauties of music and a remarkable aptitude for improving a natural taste for it, are so numerous as to indicate some subtle connection between the two faculties which we cannot undertake to explain.* It is sufficiently evident from the facts to which we have adverted that the musical ear vindicates to itself beyond all power of mistake the character of a gift. Now the idea of a gift implies that of a giver. Theists, of course, refer this singular and even mysterious faculty to a divine source, and attribute to it a divine purpose. Indeed, there are other considerations besides those already mentioned which lead to the same conclusion. Of all senses or quasi-senses with which we are endowed, the musical ear appears to us to be the least tainted with the effects of the Fall. Of course, to say that it is incapable of corruption or abuse would be to say that it is the attribute of celestial and not of sublunary beings; still as compared with our five natural senses, it certainly stands pre-eminent as a medium of pure emotions. The eye and the ear are only too ready vehicles of circumambient mischief; the lips have got a double account to clear at the Last Day, and the touch a still heavier. But the musical ear does not require any exorcism. Music, again, is the only one of the three sister arts which will find a place in heaven. Painting and sculpture will vanish before the realities which they sought on earth to represent, but music enters into the beatific anticipations of the Apocalypse. Its place among the arts is analogous to that of charity among the theological virtues. Hence it is the only one of the imitative arts which can touch the highest of all divine mysteries without sacrilege. As its imitative power consists in creating ideas, not in embodying them in tangible shape, it can represent that subject which retires from the presence of arts whose province is confined within the limits of the material. An instance in point will be found in the opening of the *Credo* of Beethoven's Mass in C. There can be little doubt that the composer conceived this wonderful passage during a kind of meditation on the Blessed Trinity; though whether his meditations were purely religious or partially æsthetic, is a question which we are alike without the power and the inclination to determine. At all events we think it impossible for any ordinarily religious and highly musical mind to fail altogether in sharing and profiting by the composer's appa-

* There is another intellectual power which is connected with the musical ear, and for more obvious reasons; the facility of learning languages and appreciating their peculiar idioms.

rent inspiration. The passage is, in fact, a portraiture of the Celestial court in the attitude of adoring the Most Holy Trinity. From the throne of the Eternal there seem to proceed on either side two lines of angels, arranged as in a choir, and vanishing in the extreme distance into infinite space. The precentor, as we may suppose, intones the note of praise, and its subject is the Almighty Creator of all things visible and invisible. The choir takes up the strain, and continues it till the precentor on the other side announces the praises of the Eternal Son the Only Begotten, and born of the Father before all worlds. Then the two semi-choirs rival each other in celebrating the Divinity of the Son; one crying out "God of God," while the other answers "Light of Light," and then both unite in the words "Very God." The word "begotten" is answered by its corresponding symbol "not made," and lastly both semi-choirs seem to join their voices in a burst of praise, as they comprehend every special claim to worship in the words "Consubstantial with the Father." Before the descent of the Eternal Son upon earth is commemorated, He is exalted as the Creator of all things. The word "all" is taken up by the choir, and thrice repeated, as if to give an especial emphasis to this office of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Then the strain is taken up from the world below, and the Incarnation is confessed with humble and thankful adoration by those who are its objects. To unmusical minds this view of the composer's illustration will probably appear like a mere excursion of a vagabond fancy, while perhaps even those who are not insensible to the influences of the art may be apt to look upon it as exaggerated if not unreal. Such as it is, we throw it out as a subject for the contention of critics, and if their verdict pronounce it to be nothing better than an idiosyncrasy, we must abide by their judgment and cherish it as a vagary of our own.

If the attributes of the musical ear be so mysterious as to indicate the preternatural origin and especial destination of the art to which it relates, the boundless fertility of that art, when taken in connection with the simplicity of the elements which form its foundation, is, if possible, a still more impressive evidence in the same direction. Here, however, we must resign our office into the hands of one who has discharged it in such a way as to drive all competitors out of the field. F. Newman, in the last of his Oxford University Sermons, thus compares the power of dogmatic expansion which inheres in the original deposit of divine truth with the capacities of development which lie hidden in the seven rudi-

mental notes that constitute the basis of all musical expression :—

Let us take another instance, of an outward and earthly form, or economy, under which great wonders unknown seem to be typified, I mean musical sounds, as they are exhibited most perfectly in instrumental harmony. There are seven notes in the scale ; make them fourteen ; yet what a slender outfit for so vast an enterprise ! What science brings so much out of so little ? Out of what poor elements does some great master in it create his new world ! Shall we say that all this exuberant inventiveness is a mere ingenuity or trick of art, like some game or fashion of the day, without reality, without meaning ? We may do so ; and then, perhaps, we shall also account the science of theology to be a matter of words ; yet, as there is a divinity in the theology of the church, which those who feel cannot communicate, so is there also in the wonderful creation of sublimity and beauty of which I am speaking. To many men the very names which the science employs are utterly incomprehensible. To speak of an idea or a subject seems to be fanciful or trifling, to speak of the views which it opens upon us to be childish extravagance ; yet is it possible that that inexhaustible evolution and disposition of notes, so rich yet so simple, so intricate yet so regulated, so various yet so majestic, should be a mere sound, which is gone and perishes ? Can it be that those mysterious stirrings of heart, and keen emotions, and strange yearnings after we know not what, and awful impressions from we know not whence, should be wrought in us by what is unsubstantial, and comes and goes, and begins and ends in itself ? It is not so ; it cannot be. No ; they have escaped from some higher sphere ; they are the outpourings of eternal harmony in the medium of created sound ; they are echoes from our Home ; they are the voice of Angels, or the magnificat of Saints, or the living laws of Divine Governance, or the Divine Attributes ; something are they besides themselves, which we cannot compass, which we cannot utter,—though mortal man, and he perhaps not otherwise distinguished above his fellows, has the gift of eliciting them.

Here, then, we have a power of exciting the emotions of joy and tenderness almost without a rival, and its correlative in the shape of a sense whose exclusive use and object is to convey those emotions into the mind and heart. To suppose that an apparatus so plainly indicative of providential design has no reference to that subject which of all others gives the greatest scope to those emotions in their purest and highest form, would be as injurious to the Author of all good as it is inconsistent with the ordinary tenour of His purposes. No religious person doubts, for instance, that the art of painting, which, in the simplicity of its elements and the magnitude of its effects, bears some resemblance to that with which we are now concerned, is especially given us in order to elevate the mind to divine things by such a representation as may assist our mental conceptions of them. But it may be said that in

order to this end sacred music need not be performed in a church, or at least in immediate connection with the act of worship. This is what we distinctly deny. There is something to us especially incongruous between the highest kind of religious music and the associations of the concert-room ; and we are quite at a loss to understand how any serious person can propose that the Masses of Mozart or Beethoven should be transferred from the church to the Albert Hall or the Crystal Palace. We have no mind for *tête-à-tête* conversations during the *Gloria in Excelsis*, or for an interchange of adieus and an arrangement of shawls during the *Agnus Dei*. The incongruity of these secular accompaniments with the character of a sacred building has led to the very general exclusion of oratorios from cathedrals, and is at this moment the subject of a movement in that direction at Worcester. Yet if the place may suffer desecration from worldly associations, so, and even more, may the music. We shall be told, indeed, that this is precisely the danger to be expected from the introduction of any music excepting that of the severest kind into divine worship. It is supposed that all music savouring of the opera must have the effect of drawing off the mind from the church to the theatre. But the attempt to stigmatize the ecclesiastical music of certain composers by the term "operatic," appears to us to be at once mistaken in theory and impossible in practice. All operatic music is not, as is often supposed, of a light and frivolous character. It is well known that Mozart's beautiful *Ave Maria* is taken note for note from a song in one of his operas, and to a person unacquainted with the fact it would suggest no other idea than that of a highly religious representation of the sacred words. Our argument then comes to this. If we exclude artistic music altogether from the service of religion, we banish one of the most powerful aids to religious emotion from that which seems to be, in an especial manner, its appropriate sphere. If, on the other hand, we give it a place in divine worship, we shall find it extremely difficult to draw any line between its various styles which will not rest on the uncertain foundation of a merely personal taste.

This view of the case appears to fall in with the actual intention of the Church, as either formally recognized by some of her highest authorities or extensively allowed in practice. The attempt to bind her down to the exclusive use of the Gregorian Chant has more than once been made, but without any permanent success. The restriction of church music to one particular style, and that a style not admitting of much variety in the expression of different religious ideas, is an

experiment on the tastes of the people which seems to be met in the teeth by some prevailing instinct of impatience. If it could be shown that this narrow theory were supported by such an amount of ecclesiastical authority as would prove it to be really sanctioned by the Church, it would become a duty to make a stand against popular prejudice, and to believe that the mind of the Church must in this, as in all other matters, ultimately prevail. But there are facts in the opposite direction which the advocates of exclusive Plain Chant have never satisfactorily encountered. It is well known that the music of Palestrina and his school of composers originated in a vote of the bishops assembled at Trent, who were unwilling to banish music from the service of religion, and desired only to reform its abuses. From that time to the present this highly artistic style of ecclesiastical music has prevailed in the Papal choir, and has thus received a sanction which places it beyond question on the score of authority. Again, Pope Benedict XIV., in a passage lately extracted in the *Tablet*, not only commends the decision of these bishops as founded in a wise and conciliatory policy, but characterizes the proposal of other bishops to adopt exclusive Plain Chant as a "novelty"; a word which sufficiently proves that, however admirable plain chant might be in its cöordinate use, there was no precedent for giving it an absolute ascendancy over music properly so called. But it is evident that the same illustrious Pontiff must have contemplated other kinds of ecclesiastical music than such as is used in the Papal choir. That music, as is well known, is not only always executed without the accompaniment of any instrument, but is simply ruined in its peculiar effect by the introduction of such an accompaniment. Yet the Pope expressly, distinctly, and in so many words, allows the use not only of the organ, but of various other instruments; and in his Encyclical addressed to the Italian bishops, specifies those which he allows, and which will be found to make up a very complete little orchestra. The Cardinal-Vicar of Rome some years ago published an edict in the spirit and almost according to the letter of Pope Benedict's instructions. Like the Roman authorities of all times, he protests against the levity of the music popular in the Roman churches, and great advantage has been taken of these protests as an argument against the use of any church music except that of the severest kind. We are confident, however, that these authoritative protests have been pressed by the more rigid school as meaning very much more than they really mean. The music popular in Rome is not merely florid but frivolous, and resembles not so much that of the opera as that of the ballet or pantomime.

We know for a fact that the Masses of Mozart and Beethoven are regarded in Rome as intolerably heavy. But, if we may accept the testimony of a priest, who lately stated in the *Tablet* that he had heard Vespers sung in S. Peter's to brilliant concerted music, it is evident that the objection of the Cardinal-Vicar cannot extend to all figured music of an ornate description, since otherwise we must be driven upon the painful conclusion that the authority of the Holy Father is set at naught in his own Basilica.*

To return to the subject of Plain Chant. Its place in the church, as a mode of recitation, alike solemn and beautiful, cannot be questioned and must not be invaded. If, as we believe and have sought to demonstrate, Music has also a sphere of her own in the department of worship, she discharges an entirely different office and meets quite another kind of want. Plain Chant is subsidiary to the sacred words; music is illustrative of them. Music could never have done what Plain Chant has done for the offices of Holy Week. The Processional antiphons of Palm Sunday, the Lamentations, the Reproaches for Good Friday, and the "Exultet" of Holy Saturday, are specimens of the Chant no less beautiful, and some of them hardly less sacred and inviolable than the Preface and Paternoster. We are even so orthodox as to dislike the Roman innovations on the Chant in the form of harmonized Lamentations and an elaborate "Miserere." We are equally disposed to vindicate for Plain Chant the exclusive province of the Introits, Antiphons and Hymns, in the latter of which more especially we admit that it is without a rival. When we come to certain portions of the Mass we cannot feel that it is equally successful. The choral portions of the Mass obviously demand a variety of musical expression, which Plain Chant is unable to supply. The *Kyrie* is supplicatory; the *Gloria*, joyous; the *Sanctus*, solemn and reverential; the *Benedictus*, tranquil and sweet; the *Hosanna*, joyous again; and the *Agnus Dei*, plaintive. Here are five different sentiments which require the versatile powers of music to give them effect. It is to the more joyous of them that Plain Chant appears to us to be unequal. In the *Kyrie*, it is superior to a great deal of the modern musical representation. The Masses of Haydn are remarkably defective in this particular. The finest specimen of a musical *Kyrie* with which we are acquainted is in Rossini's *Messe Solennelle*. There is a heaving solemnity about it which eminently represents the idea of a

* The writer of this article vouches for the truth of the fact here mentioned.

sinner's burthened petition. But when we come to the *Gloria*, Plain Chant offers no response to the feelings of the worshipper. It embodies the glorious hymn of the angels in a long-drawn, prosaic, and unimpassioned strain. Its *Credo* might be tolerated as the melodious form of a public confession of faith, but fails altogether as an illustration of the various mysteries represented in the Creed of the Church. It can make no distinction between the *Sanctus* or *Benedictus* and the concluding Hosanna, and possesses less than no advantage in the representation of the *Agnus Dei* over the capacities of modern music. We must still think, in spite of criticisms which have appeared to the contrary, that Plain Chant is peculiarly adapted to the spirit of penitential seasons. The fact that the Church has provided Plain Chant Masses for other days in the year, at the utmost can prove no more than that there are churches in which she desires its exclusive use; and this no one doubts.* Its introduction into ordinary parish churches would be attended with obvious inconveniences. It would, as a general rule, be bad of its kind, and even its warmest advocates must admit, on their own principle, that "corruptio optimi pessima." Painful as is all bad music, bad Plain Chant is especially so. The case of the French churches, which has been adduced in favour of its general adoption, is one of the strongest arguments in the opposite direction. Of all the Masses on a Sunday in France, the High Mass is the worst attended; and no one with the slightest pretension to a musical ear, who is acquainted with the character and execution of the chant therein used, can feel the slightest surprise at the fact. It is usually executed by a few howling voices, and sometimes by one alone, and the effect produced on the ear is that of a battle between one or two Stentors and that important personage who is dignified with the name of "Monsieur le Serpent," whose place is sometimes supplied by one or two growling double basses. When the organ is introduced, the organist seems determined on using his opportunity for vindicating the honour of neglected music, which he does by exhibiting it in the farthest possible extreme from that of its rival. He accordingly interludes the verses of the *Magnificat*, or the stanzas of the hymn, with music which sounds exceedingly like that of the ball-room.

To sum up our argument. We assign to the Chant and Music respectively two separate and perfectly distinct departments in the service of divine worship. We are quite ready

* We think that the question of *authority* is excellently treated by the contributor of the communicated article in our last number, pp. 514—518.

to concede to the Chant the office of setting forth the sacred words by a process at once dignified and simple, or, rather, dignified because simple. The great advantage of this process is that it can never encroach on the province of doctrine, or in any degree interfere with it. Father Newman, in a fine passage quoted by the writer of a communicated article in our July number, has paid a tribute to the Gregorian Chant on this especial ground. Music may forget itself, and follow out the mere inspirations of the composer, aided as they are by the countless resources at his command; whereas the Chant is far too elementary, or, as Father Newman expresses it, too destitute of life and vigour, to run any risk of thus subordinating its subject to the art which should be its servant and not its master. Our contributor did not happen to see that it is the defect and not the excellence of Plain Chant that it plays this merely tributary part in the service of religion. Father Newman totally denies to it—as we also, at our humble distance, have ventured to do—the power of illustrating the sacred theme to which it is applied. But he does not, as we understand him, go on to say that Music, however exposed to a temptation from which the Chant is free, is not therefore capable of rendering religion a homage of her own. Plain Chant may be compared to the infant, which, though it cannot sin, cannot merit; music to the adult, who, with the use of reason, has acquired the power of transgression, but is capable of attaining a higher degree of moral excellence in the presence of temptations which he has the grace to withstand. It is, therefore, the defect and not the excellence of Plain Chant on which Father Newman founds his eulogy of it in its own especial province. If our contributor be prepared to deny that it is “rudimental,” “inchoate,” and deficient in “life and vigour,” he must be content to part with Father Newman as an advocate. If, on the other hand, he admit with Father Newman that it possesses these disqualifications, he must abandon altogether the ground on which he claims for it the power of realizing those effects in the way of expression and illustration, which we contend to be the prerogative of music properly so called. We have never denied but, on the contrary, maintained, that music, when employed in the service of the Church, may forget its proper place, and ride roughshod over its subject in pursuit of its own professional ends, and this, as we understand, is Father Newman’s indictment against it. We said, for instance, a little while ago, that Haydn’s ecclesiastical music seems to us to fail in this respect. When he has the *Kyrie* for his theme, he appears to forget that it is a prayer for

mercy, and flourishes upon it as though it were a thing at his command to use for the purpose of producing a brilliant piece of music. The same fault, as we think, pervades the whole of his Masses. Brilliant and beautiful as they are, they rather overlay than bring out their several subjects. We do not recognize the same defect in the Masses of Mozart or Beethoven. Of the illustration which the latter of these great artists brings to bear on the opening of the *Credo*, we have already spoken; and even in the much criticised Twelfth Mass of Mozart we cannot see that the composer has ever allowed himself to be carried beyond the bounds of his subject. Still, we are not quite sure that there is not yet a vacant niche in the pantheon of music for some composer, as yet unborn, or at least unknown to fame, who is destined to carry to perfection the powers possessed by his art towards the illustration of the sublimest of all subjects. Among those who are actually before us, we should be disposed to select Gounod as the one who comes nearest to our ideal. With due allowance for a certain tinge of French peculiarity, we should say that his Mass is, in the true sense of the word, the most dramatic with which we are acquainted, and almost more than any other assists the act of meditation on the successive portions of the sacred rite. The *Kyrie*, though too elaborate, is a *bonâ fide* prayer. The *Gloria* meets the view of our fore-mentioned correspondent by opening with a single treble voice accompanied by a tremulous instrumental movement, as if to denote the angelic intonation and multitudinous accompaniment of the hymn on Christmas night. It is followed by a burst of praise from the Church below, as if in acknowledgment of the unspeakable gift. Rossini adopts the same idea of the subject in the "Messe Solennelle." It is a very beautiful one, but we do not see any objection to that of other composers, who, like Mozart and Beethoven, open the *Gloria* with a burst of praise. To return to Gounod. The transition in the *Credo* from the Incarnation to the Passion and Crucifixion, appears to us most beautiful and touching. The repetition of the words "passus" and "crucifixus," in different tones of voice, is like the echo of a plaint over the sufferings of the Eternal Son: while in the words "sepultus est," faith and hope seem to be brought down to the lowest abyss of discouragement, till once more raised by the glorious words "et resurrexit." The *Sanctus* of the same Mass is, to our taste, one of the grandest with which we are acquainted; and the *Benedictus* combines in the highest perfection the grave simplicity of Plain Chant with the tenderness and sweetness of expressive

music. Gounod has also done church music the great service of restoring the harp to its proper place.

We cannot dismiss the subject without protesting against the indiscriminate application to all ornate church music of such epithets as "theatrical" and "sensational." As to the former of these epithets, it ought always to be borne in mind that the essence of the theatrical is show without reality. It is certainly possible for this principle to find its way even into divine worship. But we venture to think that music is not the department which is most likely to give scope for it. The reality of the subject on which church music is employed is, to a certain extent, secured by the words which embody it, and those words are sufficiently significant to outweigh, in a measure, the effect even of an unsuitable method of illustrating them. Thus it is that the characters and associations of secular music may be wholly changed by the substitution of religious for secular words. We cannot give a better instance of this than by referring to the tunes to which some of Father Faber's beautiful hymns are set; more especially one of them, which is an exact transposition (do not start, good reader) of a song in the ball scene in the opera of "Don Giovanni." We have not denied that there is a certain sense in which the term "theatrical" may be applied even to church music. All we maintain is that music is not the exclusive, nor even the principal, department of public worship in which the fault in question is apt to prevail. For instance, it may easily creep into the department of ceremonial. When ceremonial ceases to represent a religious principle, and degenerates into a mere instrument of popular attraction or opportunity for the picturesque, it savours of the theatrical. Of course, it is always beautiful in effect, but its beauty, like that of nature, is its accident and not of its essence; the result, not the end, of arrangements constructed on an infinitely higher principle and with an infinitely grander design. Even preaching, again, is one of the functions of worship anything rather than safe against the intrusion of the same principle. The preacher who courts popularity rather than the edification of his hearers is in very deed an actor rather than an ambassador of Christ; and those who go to hear him from any other motive than the desire of gaining some spiritual benefit do really, however unintentionally, convert the church into a sort of theatre or lecture-room. Church music has its dangers in the same direction, but they are far more apt to arise from indications of the spirit in which it is performed than from the character of the music itself. The word "sensational" has

also a far wider and, in some respects, truer application in religious matters than that which confines it to church music. It appears to us to be a real danger of the present time ; and, since it has its place in human nature, one from which not even Catholics are exempt. Our preachings, our pilgrimages, in fact, a thousand things excellent in themselves and signs indeed of healthier life, still in some degree are perhaps apt occasionally to suffer from the desire of creating a sensation in the popular mind.

We trust that we have now discharged our debt of criticism towards Plain Chant and Church Music respectively, with an impartiality dictated, not by any desire of effecting a diplomatic compromise between two contending opinions, but by a most real appreciation of their several characteristic merits. We are, in fact, not in the number of those who speak of them as rivals each in its own department, for we believe that they are capable of rendering a joint homage to the subject on which they are brought to bear. We are fully prepared to recognize the high religious character of the grounds on which the advocates of the Chant are disposed to rest its claim on the favour of all good Catholics. But we must ask, in return, for a corresponding recognition of the undoubted power which Music exercises in a religious direction over minds to which she addresses her peculiar fascinations ; and we deprecate the somewhat inconsiderate treatment which a gift so evidently implanted for a great and good end has occasionally received at the hands of those to whom it is not known by experience. We will never believe that, in the words of a celebrated Dissenter, all the "good tunes" are intended to be wasted on the prince of darkness ; and if they are to be rescued from his grasp, there is no place in which they can find so suitable a home as the choir of the Catholic Church.

The beautiful composition of Signor Capocci which we have named at the head of this article, is an excellent specimen of the figured music which the Church approves. It has received the high sanction of our Holy Father, who, besides expressing a marked approval of it, honoured its composer with his apostolic benediction. It is a rendering of the psalm *Laudate pueri*, and appears to be intended either for an occasional piece or for the psalm in question when sung to concerted music at Vespers. The idea on which it is founded is a very striking one. The first verse of the psalm is treated as an appeal to the children to unite in the praises of their Lord, and the remainder as the response made by them to this appeal. The melody is bright and graceful. It reminds

us very much of Dr. Crookall's beautiful motett "*Justorum Animæ*," and his even more beautiful music for the procession on Candlemas Day. To the experienced and discriminating ear, it presents the characteristics of a style quite distinct from that of the great German as well as from that of the lighter Italian composers. But there is an air of graceful vivacity about it which some of our modern critics, especially if unacquainted with the circumstances which surround it, might easily charge with operatic levity. At any rate it forms a most important attestation of authority in favour of a highly ornate style of ecclesiastical music.

ART. V.—REPLIES TO LORD ACTON.

Letter by Lord Acton to the "TIMES," of November 24, 1874.

LORD ACTON published the letter we have named at the head of our article, in elucidation of a much shorter letter to Mr. Gladstone, which immediately followed the publication of that statesman's "*Expostulation*." The general drift of these letters as addressed to Protestants, may fairly, we think, be paraphrased somewhat as follows:—

"God forbid that I should 'dishonour or betray the Church,'
" 'whose communion indeed is dearer to me than life'; on the
" contrary I feel impelled to resist Mr. Gladstone's assault on
" her good name. My line of defence is very simple. Mr.
" Gladstone's whole argument proceeds on the absurd sup-
" position, that we Catholics are at all likely to act faith-
" fully on the doctrines of our religion. No doubt it is a
" doctrine of our religion, that the Pope and Bishops constitute
" the '*Ecclesia Docens*,' and that it is they who are commis-
" sioned by God to train Catholics in the great verities
" of dogma and morality. But we Catholics as a body are far
" too well grounded in sound moral principles to accept their
" instruction. I quite admit that, if we followed the precepts
" and counsels of our divinely-appointed teachers, we should
" indulge freely in rebellion, treachery, and murder; insomuch
" that stringent repression of Catholicism would be the State's

“ bounden duty. Nay, since many of you Protestants may
 “ not be fully aware how fearful have been the scandals
 “ authoritatively sanctioned within that ‘ communion which is
 “ ‘dearer to me than life,’ I think I fulfil a duty by presenting
 “ you with a few pattern specimens. One Pope, who is also
 “ a canonized Saint, hired a bravo to assassinate Queen
 “ Elizabeth; and another Pope earnestly exhorted a king to
 “ the promiscuous massacre of his heretical subjects. And
 “ these, together with the other atrocities which I am now
 “ placing before you, are at last merely specimens; for there
 “ are ‘others which are not less grievous or less certain, because
 “ ‘they remain untold.’ Do you suppose there can be much
 “ real respect among us for such persons as these? On
 “ the contrary, so universal is the disloyalty of Catholics
 “ to the spiritual and moral teachers placed over them by
 “ God, that even Fénelon—who is the proverbial instance
 “ of Catholic docility—yielded no true submission to the
 “ Definition which condemned him. In fact he told his
 “ friends in confidence, that the Holy See was rapidly tending
 “ to heresy; and that for himself, whatever he might be
 “ obliged publicly to profess, he held his condemned doctrines
 “ no less firmly now than he had held them before their con-
 “ demnation. My defence therefore of the Catholic Church
 “ against Mr. Gladstone is simply this:—(1.) No Protestant
 “ can feel more strongly than I do the detestableness of that
 “ depraved morality, which has so constantly been inculcated
 “ on Catholics by their divinely-appointed moral teachers.
 “ (2.) I assure you that most other Catholic laymen, and not
 “ a few Catholic priests, detest this morality as much as I do.
 “ (3.) And I think I may fairly ask you to accept this assu-
 “ rance of mine; and not suspect *us* of those odious qualities
 “ which, I freely grant, are largely exhibited in the public
 “ acts of our spiritual superiors.”

It is plain that we could not characterize Lord Acton's letter as we think it deserves, without using a kind of language which it is very desirable to avoid; and we shall say no more therefore on this particular theme. We must make one reflection, however, on the acceptance which his letter has met with among Englishmen. In his letter of November 24, he plainly set forth the odiously hypocritical conduct, which he imputed to Fénelon, as the proper way for Catholics to treat their ecclesiastical superiors. Englishmen were delighted. Their gratification at his bitter hostility to that Church “whose communion is dearer to him than life” quite blinded them to the mean, underhand, perfidious character of the course which he eulogized.

In like manner, when they heard of this or that crypto-Dollingerite "prowling about from chapel to chapel" (as the "Month" amusingly puts it), in the hope of furtively taking in some unsuspecting priest and so perpetrating sacrilege—instead of being revolted by such incredible paltriness and shabbiness, they seem rather to chuckle over his enterprise and wish him every success.

Returning to Lord Acton's letter, we need hardly say how indefinitely easier it is to adduce such charges as those in which he has indulged than to answer them, however unfounded they may be. We doubt not that in due time every one of them will be dealt with, whether in our own pages or elsewhere. The very week in which Lord Acton's letter appeared a correspondent of the *Tablet* published a complete and conclusive vindication of Fénelon: while another contributor began a series of papers, which he continued in subsequent numbers, dealing with that accusation which has wounded Catholics far more deeply than any other; viz., the frightful charge brought against S. Pius V. At a later period, the same correspondent who had vindicated Fénelon, applied himself to the charges brought by Lord Acton against Urban II. We have thought it very desirable that these replies should be placed on more permanent record than in the columns of a newspaper; and we have obtained permission therefore from their respective authors to republish them. The contributor on S. Pius V. has indeed been kind enough to re-arrange his materials, which appeared originally in a somewhat fragmentary shape, and to give his argument some additional strength. His paper deals of course exclusively with the historical question; and we think therefore that we shall do good service by prefixing some words of Bellarmine's, which bear on the question of *doctrine*. We owe our knowledge of the letter in which these words occur to an article of F. Parkinson's in the current "Month;" and we give the words on his authority. The letter was written by Bellarmine to Backwell, in the year 1650; and it contains the following sentence ("Month" for January, p. 89):—

Nor has it ever been heard of, from the beginning of the Church even up to these our own times, that any Supreme Pontiff has ordered any Prince, whether heretic, or gentile, or persecutors to be slain, or approved of such deed if perchance it has been perpetrated by any one.

We now proceed to place before our readers the three disquisitions we have mentioned, beginning with that on S. Pius V.

I.—THE CASE OF S. PIUS V.

Lord Acton has not delayed long in responding to the various challenges which his letter to Mr. Gladstone called forth. In support of the assertions contained in that letter, he has filled three columns and a half of the *Times* with an array of authorities which at first sight looks very formidable, and which the impartial judges who sit in the tribunal at Blackfriars of course pronounce to be "overwhelming." Neither of these facts is surprising; for no one supposed that Lord Acton invented any of his charges: and his evidences in justification may, without any disrespect to him, be described as exactly suited to the place where they appear, and the audience to which he appeals. We say this without imputing much blame either to him or to them on that score. It is manifest, however, that the defence under such circumstances has but small chance of being heard; for the world is interested and excited by attacks, and has no time or patience for vindications, especially for any exculpations of such unpopular personages as "Romish" pontiffs and theologians. It is obvious that a full answer to every point in this long indictment, which ranges over so many centuries, and refers to so many persons, events, circumstances, and documents, cannot properly be given in the space at our disposal. We will at once, however, grapple with the most important, by far, of the charges brought forward on this occasion—that, namely, which accused S. Pius V. of sending an assassin to murder Queen Elizabeth. Lord Acton has now produced his evidence; and, as was to be anticipated, it entirely fails to establish any such accusation against the saint. Here is the original charge, as stated in the letter to Mr. Gladstone: "Pius V., the only "Pope who has been proclaimed a Saint for many centuries, "having deprived Elizabeth, commissioned an assassin to take "her life." Now for the proofs. These consist (1) of Lord Acton's narrative of certain incidents, and (2) of a few sentences from certain documents, separate from their context, and arranged in juxtaposition, either by himself, or by that bitter enemy of everything Catholic, M. Mignet. The chief points of the narrative are as follows:—Ridolfi, a Florentine, and secret agent of the Pope in England, set on foot a conspiracy against Queen Elizabeth, and thereupon went to Rome to explain the details to Pius V., "and to seek his aid." "Pius earnestly recommended the matter to the King of "Spain, assuring him that it was most important for religion." "At Madrid Ridolfi produced credentials which left no room "for doubt that he spoke the real mind of the Pope." "When

"Ridolfi exposed his commission, it became apparent that it resolved itself into little more than a plot for murdering Elizabeth." This statement is supported by a few scraps of sentences, which seem to prove that one member of the Spanish Council regarded the "despatching" of the Queen of England as desirable, and that another described her death as "the real object"; and the charge is further strengthened by a letter from Philip II. to the Duke of Alva, distinctly saying that Ridolfi had spoken of a plan for killing Elizabeth, and going on to state that Ridolfi had informed the Pope "of all," and that "the Holy Father had written to him (the King), and by his Nuncio had informed him that he regarded this affair as being of the highest importance for the service of God." Such are Lord Acton's proofs, and, as marshalled by him, they might seem at first sight very difficult to rebut. Yet we do not hesitate to affirm that they utterly fail exactly at the point where they should be strongest. There is, absolutely, no proof that Ridolfi ever mentioned to Pius V. the underplot for the murder of Elizabeth. Ridolfi, indeed, may possibly have said so at Madrid; but this is far from certain; and, even if he did say so, there is strong evidence to show that his word is worthless. It is beyond question that in the matter of this very conspiracy he deceived the Pope upon a most important point, namely, the Duke of Norfolk's religion; and, moreover, he informed the Duke that Alva approved their plan, which was false.

And here we must accuse Lord Acton of the suppression (from whatever cause) of facts which are essential. Who would guess from his narrative that the conspiracy which took Ridolfi to Rome and Madrid was that great and well-known scheme for which the Protestant Duke of Norfolk was beheaded? Who would guess that the Pope had been told by Ridolfi that the Duke had undertaken, in the name of the majority of the English nobility (till then supposed to be Protestants), to raise 23,000 men, and overthrow the Government of Elizabeth, seizing her as a hostage for Mary, if only 8,000 Spanish troops could be landed at Harwich or Portsmouth? Or, again, who could guess that the placing of Mary of Scotland on the throne, with the Duke of Norfolk for her Consort, and the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in England, seemed, according to this scheme, to be near at hand, if Philip would only lend his aid? Here were reasons enough for the recommendation of Ridolfi to that monarch; and nothing could well be more misleading and unfair than to keep completely out of view, as Lord Acton has done, the existence at that moment of this apparently formidable

combination in favour of all that Pius held sacred. Ridolfi, however, had, as we have said, deceived the Pope on this subject, and the letter which he took to Rome and Madrid as the Duke of Norfolk's was, if not entirely forged, at least interpolated; for (to mention one proof) it is beyond belief that the Duke ever could have written or have seen the statement that Harwich is in Norfolk, his own county, or that Portsmouth is in Sussex, as the Italian copy has it. And if Ridolfi deceived Pius about the Duke, and the Duke about Alva, he may well have deceived Philip about the Pope. It is plain that Philip had only the agent's word that he had informed the Holy Father "of all"; for there is not a word in the Pope's letter even to indicate, much less to prove, that S. Pius knew anything more of the designs in agitation than the letters of Mary and the Duke of Norfolk had told him: and these letters, though going into much detail, contained not a hint of any personal harm to Elizabeth. The omission was not accidental; and it proves either that Ridolfi did not intend the death of the Queen, or that he did intend to deceive S. Pius. For Ridolfi, and not the Duke of Norfolk, was the real author of the Italian letter intended to be seen by the Pope, and the words of that letter—which we will presently give—are of the highest importance in this inquiry.

The Pope, so Lord Acton told Mr. Gladstone, "commissioned an assassin"; and, by way of proof, he has printed from the notes of the Spanish Council, these words: "Ridolfi affirmed that the Catholics of England have resolved to seize upon Queen Elizabeth, and kill her." So that, on Lord Acton's own showing, the charge against S. Pius has dwindled down, from commissioning an assassin, to acquiescing in a vague resolution of the "Catholics of England" in general to kill the tyrant who was oppressing them; and even this mitigated calumny is shown to rest on no stronger proof than the word of that Ridolfi whom Alva contemptuously styled "a great babbler," and whose statement about the Catholics of England alone stamps him as a man unworthy of belief. Such loose testimony may do for the prejudiced and careless multitude; but justice requires much more. The case is one of the highest importance, and we are entitled to demand that the strictest rules of evidence shall be rigidly applied to it. If that is done, we would leave the charge with perfect confidence to the judgment of all just and competent men.

We will now examine Lord Acton's secondary evidence against S. Pius V., that, namely, deduced from the conduct and writings of the Pontiff. In our view, that evidence, like the direct evidence, fails precisely at the essential point, and

only proves to what straits the accuser is driven in order to make out his charge. Pius V. (argues Lord Acton) was likely to commission an assassin to murder Queen Elizabeth, because he had presided over the Inquisition in the years of its greatest activity. That is to say, because he was the chief judge of an ancient legal court, which, however severe its sentences might sometimes be, still was accustomed to try each individual case with careful discrimination, therefore it was probable that he would do that which no law authorized. It is as much as to contend that, because that great judge, Lord Mansfield, was in the habit, during his long career, of sentencing men to death for sheep-stealing and other comparatively trifling offences, therefore he was dead to humanity, and exactly the man to instigate one of the ushers of his court to kill a notorious thief. Still further to support his case, Lord Acton quotes five isolated sentences from S. Pius, or, forsooth, from certain reporters of his words and sentiments, but not one of these does more than urge the established authorities to put the laws—existing, be it remembered, from time immemorial—vigorously and unflinchingly in force, for the defence of life and property, no less than religion. There is not, among the five, one sentence justifying assassination; and so conscious (it would seem at least) is Lord Acton, or his authority, of this fatal flaw in the “proofs,” that he introduces at this point the opinion of some very obscure theologian *—that a “notorious heretic, if the judges neglected their duty, might be slain by a private person,”—an opinion which in no way bound S. Pius, but which serves well enough to bring odium upon him. We submit, however, that a case which must be eked out by an importation like this must be a very weak one.

We said, just now, that S. Pius, when exhorting secular princes to put the laws vigorously in force, had in view not only the protection of religion, chiefly important as he held that to be, but the defence of life and property, especially the property of the poor, as well. This is a point which is too much forgotten. The Popes were bound, indeed, to strive in the first place for the defence of the faith, but they were scarcely less stringently obliged to protect their flock to the utmost of their power from robbery, outrage, and murder. Now the object of the French Protestants—as of their brethren elsewhere—the very reason of their being, was to extirpate the Catholic faith, and to exterminate or reduce to slavery its pro-

* What, we ask, is the authority of “Stephanus, Episc. Oriolanus, “*De Bello Sacro*” (!); or of Jacobus Septimancensis?

fessors. Their great apostle Calvin—like Luther, Zwingli, Bucer, Cranmer, and Bullinger—declared the Catholic religion heresy, and that death was the punishment due to heresy. They would not even hear of toleration; nothing would content them but the utter destruction of the Catholic Church; and this destruction was begun in very many instances by wholesale massacres, especially of priests and monks, outraging of nuns, and every conceivable profanation of the churches and (worst of all) of the Most Holy Sacrament. These being established facts, it is no wonder that S. Pius regarded the heretics of his time as “impious” and as criminals of the worst kind, and that he believed their crimes to be the direct and inevitable result of their doctrines. “He was,” as Dr. Newman has so well said, “emphatically a soldier of Christ ‘in a time of insurrection and rebellion, when, in a spiritual ‘sense, martial law was proclaimed.’” He would not have lifted a finger to save himself from martyrdom; but he felt it an imperative duty to prevent, if he could, the further commission of such enormities upon the Catholics of France; and to save them from the miserable fate of their brethren in England, who had been forbidden every practice of their religion, even of the most private kind. It was not the mere heresy of the Huguenots which Gregory XIII. condemned in that celebrated Bull for a Jubilee which Lord Acton has quoted, but “the injuries and outrages done to God and His Catholic ‘Church,” and “the sanguinary and implacable rage,” with which they had for years “troubled, pillaged, and spoiled the ‘kingdom of France by murder, robbery, sacrilege, and devastation.” No sooner, however, had the worse than Mahomedan fury of the Reformers subsided, and the movement been got well under the control of their statesmen, cruel and utterly intolerant as most of these were, than the Popes entirely ceased from urging any extreme measures of defence. So far as England was concerned, if S. Pius V. had been the “Old Man of the Mountain” that Lord Acton has endeavoured to make him out, he could have had Queen Elizabeth cut off any day in any year after he came to the Pontificate.

Reverting now to the direct evidence bearing on Lord Acton’s charge against S. Pius, we would invite attention to a few facts which will, we believe, assist those who wish to form an impartial judgment.

1. It may dispel some prejudice if we state that Ridolfi was not (as some might suppose) a Roman prelate, or even a lay member of the Pontifical Court; neither had he been sent expressly to England. He was a banker long resident in

London;* and he acted as "secret agent" of the Pope because the Pope could not communicate with his English flock, nor they with him, except through a secret agent.

2. Ridolfi did not "set on foot" the great conspiracy of 1570. The real author was Lesley, Bishop of Ross,† the Queen of Scotland's zealous agent in London, with whom, however, Ridolfi and the Spanish Ambassador Espés no doubt readily joined.

3. The objects of this conspiracy were (as we have before reminded our readers) the liberation of the Scottish Queen, the overthrow of Elizabeth's Government, the elevation of Mary to the throne of England, with the Duke of Norfolk as her Consort; and, lastly, the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in England, Scotland, and Ireland. To achieve these great objects money and a Spanish army were required, and to obtain these the influence of the Pope must be brought to bear upon the King of Spain. Hence Ridolfi's mission to Rome and Madrid, with letters purporting to come from Mary and the Duke, urgently begging for the necessary aid.

4. It is certain that before Ridolfi left England some Catholics there had been talking vaguely of killing the Queen during her autumnal progresses. He, there can be no doubt, knew of this very underfined project; but, as shall presently be shown, it was not his own scheme. The conspirators must have been very few in number, for the Government, though it had spies everywhere, never discovered them; and to talk of them as "the Catholics of England" proves Ridolfi's capacity for falsehood.

5. There is not a single phrase or word in the Pope's letter recommending Ridolfi to Philip II., which may not most naturally and justly refer to the Duke of Norfolk's proposed action; whereas it is most unnatural to suppose that, altogether passing over that plan which absolutely demanded Philip's co-operation, the Pontiff should have urged upon his attention a plot which could have been carried out by "the English Catholics" without his help, at any moment, if they were in earnest about it.

6. Lord Acton's method of using the Minutes of the Spanish Council of State is as unscientific as it is unfair. In the first place, the notes themselves are mere headings, curt, disjointed,

* "Ridolfus . . . qui mercaturam quindecim annos Londini exercuerat." Camden: *Annales*, p. 194; ed. 1639. Camden is excellent authority here, and his statement shows that Ridolfi settled in England about the middle of the reign of Mary.

† "Cum autem omnibus omnium confessionibus, et ipsius etiam Ducis, Episcopus Rossensis tanquam rei machinator argueretur." Camden, p. 207.

and obscure. Then, not only does he use these notes in such a way as to confuse two entirely different things,—Ridolfi's commission, and the personal views of the Spanish councillors, but he does not accurately represent even these personal views. Supposing that Feria did say (which is very doubtful) that "the whole question was how to get the Queen killed without open war"; this was only his opinion, and no way criminales S. Pius, who, as we shall prove, wanted "open war." And if Velasco for certain gave the opinion that "the death" of Elizabeth was "the real object," this was only his opinion, and is, moreover, positive proof that her death was *not* the obvious and necessary object of the plan then before the Council. So much for Lord Acton's "proofs" drawn from the notes of the Council. We, on the other hand, find therein unquestionable evidence that the proposal "to kill or CAPTURE the Queen" (for those are the words of the Minute) had nothing whatever to do with the Pope's Bull of Deposition, though Lord Acton has coupled them together. "Pius V.," said he, "having deprived Elizabeth, commissioned an assassin to take her life." The reason given by Ridolfi as actuating the proposers was, that unless Elizabeth were prevented by death or captivity, she would murder the Queen of Scotland. The fear of this catastrophe powerfully influenced Feria, who declared in his first sentences addressed to the Council, that if Mary was so allowed to die, all her friends would turn against Spain. (In Mignet, "*Marie Stuart*," ii. 518.)

7. Lord Acton says:—"The man who finally undertook to do the deed was Ciappin Vitelli." Now Ciappin Vitelli was not (as might be inferred) some obscure Italian bravo, but the Marquis Vitelli, a distinguished officer, who had been special envoy to England, and whose face was well known at Court there. If this nobleman really did "finally undertake" to be the assassin, Philip's conduct was singular. He chose that very moment for naming him to the command of the 8,000 Spaniards destined for England, but who were not to arrive until the Duke of Norfolk had taken the field. One would think that the two offices were incompatible. On turning, however, to the notes of the Spanish Council (250) we find that the offer which the Marquis made was not to murder Queen Elizabeth, but to take her (*prenderla*) with ten or fifteen men. This display of zeal and soldierly dash, taken as it was meant, and not as Lord Acton has distorted it, very probably led to the appointment just mentioned.

8. The plan which was laid before S. Pius as the Duke of Norfolk's contained a distinct proposal for dealing with Queen Elizabeth, which was very different from her assassination.

Now, this document was drawn up in the name of the Duke by the Bishop of Ross and Ridolfi, as the former afterwards confessed; and the latter was solely responsible for the Italian copy destined for Rome, and which is still at the Vatican. This "Instruction" to Ridolfi says:—"Tell his Holiness . . . that I am resolved to try the fortune of a battle, and both to rescue her" (Mary) "by force, and to make myself master (*insignorirmi*) of the person of the Queen of England" (Labanoff, iii. 245). We call particular attention to this most important passage. This is what the most powerful nobleman in England, the chief of the whole enterprise, tells the Pope that he proposes to do with Elizabeth. Is it credible that S. Pius should quite needlessly interpose, and select that moment, of all others, to "commission an assassin to take her life," thereby, moreover, putting Mary's life in the greatest peril? Yet this is Lord Acton's theory. He makes the Pope utterly disregard the man upon whose goodwill the Catholic cause in England depended, and straightway despatch Ridolfi to Madrid with a "commission which resolved itself into little more than a plot for murdering Elizabeth." We have already shown that there was ample reason for that commission, without resorting to any conjecture that its object was evil. But we have positive evidence that Ridolfi's own plan did not include anything morally unjustifiable.

9. First. The passage just quoted from the Duke of Norfolk's letter, which was, as we have before said, really written by Ridolfi. Secondly. In the Minutes of Council we find these words:—"Ridolfi goes for conquest . . . the Duke" (of Alva) "for another way." (Mignet, ii. 520.) Thirdly. The Duke of Alva writing, under date of August 27th, to Philip, and arguing against the orders he had received from the King to prepare a force for England, said:—"I have read the memorial which Ridolfi delivered on what might be done in England. When a projector has no one to question the grounds on which he proceeds, it is extremely easy to come to the conclusion which he desires . . . and a man like this, who is no soldier, and who has never seen service, thinks that one can levy armies out of the air, and transport them in one's sleeve, and do with them whatever his fancy paints. For to say that at one and the same moment an army can be formed to take (*para tomar*) the Queen of England, and another army to liberate her of Scotland, and, at the same time, to undertake to seize the Tower of London, and to burn the ships of war in the river, is [to imagine] that which I am confident your Majesty and the Queen of England united could not ac-

comply in the space of time he proposes.”—(“*Mem. de la Acad. de la Historia*,” vii. 448.) So, after all, we thus find upon the most unquestionable evidence that Ridolfi’s plan in August exactly corresponded with that laid by him before the Pope in May, as the Duke of Norfolk’s; and like that, therefore, proposed, not the assassination, but the capture of the Queen of England.

10. Again, Ridolfi, as Lord Acton has candidly told us—therein laying aside the advocate for a moment—did not, in describing to Pope Gregory XIII. his services and his claims, say that the plot was aimed against the life of Queen Elizabeth. But if that Pope and all his Cardinals, save one, were the kind of men Lord Acton has depicted, why should Ridolfi have omitted to urge in this secret memorial a fact—if it were a fact—which he must have known would gain him in their eyes the greatest possible credit? It seems to us that this omission, if it stood alone, would be, under all the circumstances, strong evidence against Lord Acton’s view, but taken in conjunction with the fact that an entirely different plan was laid down in the “Instructions”—drawn up, be it always remembered, by Ridolfi himself, and intended to meet the Pope’s own eyes—at the time when the plot was in agitation, it appears to us very strong indeed.

11. There is yet another point. Lord Acton says that “at Madrid Ridolfi was supported by the Nuncio Castagna”; and he quotes a statement of Philip that the Pope had by his Nuncio informed him that he regarded “this affair” as being of the highest importance for the service of God. The whole question is whether “this affair” means the Duke of Norfolk’s plan, as we maintain, or the murder of Elizabeth, as Lord Acton has affirmed. Now let us see what Philip said in reply to the Nuncio, premising that we know it only from M. Mignet’s version, which would be sure to bring out any unfavourable points as strongly as possible. This, however, is the essential passage, as he gives it. Philip answered the Nuncio that he was willing to co-operate to the utmost of his ability; “but,” continued the King, “it must be with such promptitude, and such powerful means, that the neighbouring princes should not have time to intervene.” (Mignet, ii. 163.) Yet, in face of this again, Lord Acton says that Ridolfi’s commission meant little more than a murder.

12. Once more: we oppose to Lord Acton’s charge against S. Pius the fact that during his pontificate the life of Elizabeth was not taken—was not even attempted. To our minds this fact is evidence of the strongest kind that he did not desire it. There can be no reasonable doubt that, if the Pope had

believed and taught what Lord Acton asserts that he did, he could have found, amongst the English Catholic exiles, many brave and desperate men who would have joyfully devoted themselves to certain death, in order to secure for their brethren liberty, and for themselves eternal salvation.

It will be conceded, we believe, by all who have followed our argument so far, that one thing at least is certain, and that is, that the so-called "conspiracy of Ridolfi," instead of being, as Lord Acton has told the world, "little more than a plot for murdering Elizabeth," was in reality an extensive design, of which her death formed no necessary part. It is also certain that this design was laid before S. Pius V., as coming from the first nobleman of England, "in the name," as he was made to say, "of the major part of the Peers of the kingdom," and it provided for every object which the Pontiff could desire. Elizabeth was to be dethroned, Mary crowned in her stead, and the Catholic religion re-established in England. The forces promised and stipulated for seemed quite adequate for the purpose; and all the Pope had to do, besides the grant of a subsidy, was to urge the King of Spain to carry out his part, a part which, though very important, was not very difficult for so powerful a monarch as Philip II. to accomplish. And these things were, we contend, all that S. Pius did. We maintain, therefore, that the project which the Pope recommended to Philip II. was the Duke of Norfolk's, and no other; and that the words *nonnulla ad honorem ejusdem omnipotentis Dei, reique publicæ Christianæ non parum pertinentia utilitatem* refer to that plan, and no other. Our readers have seen the very words of the Duke's proposal with regard to Elizabeth; but we will remind them that not only did he afterwards protest that he had never thought of harming that queen, but he was not even accused of such a design, except in the technical legal sense of intending to levy war upon the sovereign. It is, moreover, certain that Ridolfi delivered at Madrid the "Instructions" of the Queen of Scots and of the Duke of Norfolk. These letters exist, and they are the counterparts of those laid before the Pope. Both urgently begged the aid of Philip for the Catholic cause in England; Mary, besides, on her own account, imploring him to save her from assassination. "You are to declare," the instruction to Ridolfi ran, "the state in which I am; the ill-treatment I receive; . . . and the danger I run of being poisoned or otherwise murdered." ("Memorias," vii. 463.) In her eagerness she offered to give up Edinburgh or Dumbarton Castle to the Spanish troops, should it be thought best for them to land in Scotland. The Duke, on his part,

asked for 6,000 arquebusiers, 4,000 arquebuses, 2,000 corslets, 25 pieces of field artillery, with the necessary ammunition, and some money. "With this succour," says the Spanish *précis*, "he offers to join 20,000 infantry and 3,000 horse, and to possess himself (*apoderarse*) of the person of the Queen of England, as well as her councillors; and to liberate at the same time the Queen of Scotland, putting her in possession of the kingdom." These documents alone prove how seriously Lord Acton has misled the English people by his assertion that Ridolfi's commission "resolved itself into little more than a plot for murdering Elizabeth." We do not for a moment deny that Ridolfi did also assure the Spanish Council of State that "the Catholics of England" were resolved to kill the Queen. His object before all things, as Alva said, was to lure Philip into an armed intervention in England; and, by way of making the enterprise appear easy, he brought forward and exaggerated every vague and wild project that he had anywhere heard mentioned among the English Catholics, not only against the Queen, but against Cecil and Leicester, and others of her Council. All this, however, was mere unauthenticated talk, with which he did not venture to connect a single respectable or known name directly, though he had the audacity to assert that the conspirators counted for certain, not only on the Duke of Norfolk, but on two such ultra-loyal men as the Viscount Montague and the Earl of Worcester, both personally favoured by Elizabeth, and both employed by her after this time. Here we have another specimen of Ridolfi's want of truth, after which, it would not be surprising if we found that he also brought the Pope's name into connection with this underplot. It is, however, by no means certain that he did so, the only apparent evidence for it depending upon Philip's exact veracity, and accuracy of literary construction, which last at least was, in fact, of the smallest. But before coming to this point, we must, in the first place, affirm that, notwithstanding Ridolfi's talk at Madrid, it may well be doubted that there ever existed any tangible fixed design for killing Elizabeth at this juncture. It is manifest that neither Philip II. nor the Duke of Alva had much faith in it. A month had scarcely passed after Ridolfi's arrival at Madrid, when the King wrote, on August 4th, to Alva in these terms:—"Delay is dangerous, and may lead to discovery, or to alteration of mind" (Gachard, "Corresp. de Philippe II.," ii. 191). This evidently means, in England; and it at least shows that Philip had no confidence in what Ridolfi had called the "resolve" of the English

Catholics to kill the Queen. Nor had Alva any more confidence in it. Three things are clearly apparent from his letters: 1, that whatever plot existed against either the liberty or life of Elizabeth was English or Scottish, and not Roman; 2, that nothing was decided; and 3, that he had no faith in the earnestness of any one in the matter. To understand aright the Duke's words at this crisis it is necessary to understand his exact position. He had asked to be recalled, and was only waiting the arrival of his successor in Flanders to go home. From this personal motive, as well as for weighty political reasons, he strongly opposed the idea of military intervention in England, and exaggerated the difficulties of it. Hence he favoured, or pretended to favour, the idea of killing Elizabeth, which involved no expense and no risk to Spanish interests, while the burden was thrown on the English Catholics, and time, his great object, was gained. Hence it was his game to say to Philip, and he did say: "Let us wait. The true course is to get the Duke of Norfolk and his friends to kill or take Queen Elizabeth" ("Gachard," ii. 186). "They can do it if they are men." ("Memorias," &c., vii. 448). "No army is needed for that." "Then we can act." But though he presses this view, he never once supports it by any appeal to the authority or desire of the Pope, and his whole argument is directed against the adoption of the Duke of Norfolk's plan, which we know was seen by the Pope, and sent on by him to Madrid. Solittle, indeed, did Alvaregard the murder of Elizabeth as part of that plan, that when replying to the letter of July 14, in which the king told him what Ridolfi had said about killing Elizabeth, and had seemed to couple with that the Pope's approval of "this affair," the Duke twice described the design as one for "seizing the person of the Queen" ("Gachard," ii. 188, 189). Three times he uses the expression—"to kill or take the queen." On August 27 he is commenting on Ridolfi's memorial with its proposal "to take" the queen; and, still later, he writes: "The matter now is to dethrone Queen Elizabeth" (ii. 195). So far, in fact, was the death of Elizabeth from being, as Lord Acton has said, the chief object of the conspiracy, that it was treated by Philip, Alva, and Ridolfi as a mere detail, to be discussed or dropped, just as suited their policy at the moment.

There now remains only one point to be cleared up, and that is the letter quoted by Lord Acton, wherein Philip tells Alva that Ridolfi says that the best time for the enterprise would be when Elizabeth left London for her country houses, which would afford a good opportunity for killing her; and then, after a break, indicated

thus . . . the king goes on to say, that the Holy Father (to whom Ridolfi had given an account of all) had written, and by his Nuncio also had informed him, that he looked upon this affair as being of the highest importance for the service of God. It is true that, as the passage stands in Lord Acton's letter, "this affair" seems to refer to the killing of Elizabeth; but by reading the next sentence—strictly speaking, it is the same sentence—we find that "this affair" means, as might be expected, the whole scheme of the Duke of Norfolk, and not a single detail afterwards, as we maintain, imported into it, or combined with it, without the knowledge of the Pontiff. "His Holiness"—continues Philip—"exhorts me in consequence to give my assistance, leaving to me all that concerns the execution, offering his help in general, and without going into any detail, and being ready, poor and distressed as he is, to make use of the chalices of the churches, and even his vestments, for the purpose." It is an unwarrantable straining of evidence to construct out of this a theory that S. Pius was prepared to sell the Church plate for an object which, as Alva said, could "easily" be effected by 100 or 150 men; but if we suppose that the Pope contemplated the necessity of paying the Duke of Norfolk's 23,000 men and Philip's auxiliary force, then, indeed we shall understand what he meant by "this affair," and why he was ready, if necessary, to make such sacrifices in its support. We repeat it, the killing of Elizabeth was never regarded by Philip II. as the chief or even an essential point in the design. This is proved beyond question by the last despatch he wrote on the subject, before the news of the Duke of Norfolk's arrest, which broke the whole combination, was known at Madrid. In this long letter dated September 14, he answers all the objections of Alva, and persisting in holding to the plan laid by Ridolfi before the Pope, he writes:—"There is much reason and ground for judging and hoping that this will be a short affair, which will depend upon one battle, and upon the side which shall be superior in the field, and that it will end with this, without entering upon a regular war; . . . and, if it should come to a war, this would be between the Queen of Scotland and the Queen of England," &c. ("Memorias," &c., vii. 455). After this we are at a loss to imagine how any one can maintain that Ridolfi's conspiracy was little more than a plot for the murder of Elizabeth, or that any one who "participated" in that conspiracy must necessarily have had that object in view.

To sum up: we have now proved from the very documents used by Lord Acton that Ridolfi submitted a great plan, which did not involve the death of Elizabeth, to S. Pius V., in April or

May, 1571; that the plan which S. Pius approved was one which required so large an expenditure of money that he was ready to sell even the church plate to procure it; that Ridolfi submitted the plan which he had laid before the Pope to the King of Spain in July; that Alva, on August 27, had before him the plan submitted to the Pope in May, and to Philip in July; and, finally, that Philip, on September 14, was insisting upon carrying out the very same plan, which he only relinquished on its discovery by the English Government. These being facts which cannot be shaken, we contend further, that any words of the Pope, or his Nuncio, which allude to "matters of high importance," must be referred in justice to the great plan which we know to have been laid before the Pontiff, and not to a vague design which we have no real evidence that he ever heard of. Philip's statement that Ridolfi had told "all" to the Pope is at best only Ridolfi's statement; and we know that *he* told at least two signal falsehoods about this very matter. Moreover, it is the way of such intriguers to pretend that they have the sanction of their superiors for every expedient that their excess of zeal may impel them into adopting. This certainly is not the kind of evidence on which to condemn a saint; and we must utterly refuse to accept it. Again, there is another difficulty which Lord Acton has seen, but has not attempted to solve—namely, the canonization. This difficulty alone is one of the gravest character, and alone, as it stands, ought to prevent the belief in any theory which imputes crime to the great Pontiff. In conclusion we must complain not so much that Lord Acton has believed his shocking charges on fallacious grounds, as that he has proclaimed them to the world as so certain that Catholics do not deny, but only explain them. The cases of Urban II., S. Pius V., and Fénelon, have already shown that Catholics, on the best grounds, entirely reject such calumnies; and we doubt not that refutations on many other points will follow. We do not question Lord Acton's good faith, and it would be too much to ask him to suppress his conscientious belief on the character of any human being, however venerated. All we ask is that his thesis shall not be called "history," and "history" from which there is no appeal.

II.—THE CASE OF FÉNELON.

Lord Acton has published a long letter in the *Times* of Nov. 24th in support of the extraordinary statements which he made in his previous letter of Nov. 9th.

There is little doubt that all his charges will be answered; but a complete refutation would exceed all possible bounds of

a single letter. I propose to deal at present only with that against Fénelon. The answer to this single charge, whilst defending a great reputation against an unjust and odious attack, may serve as a gauge to test the accuracy of the great array of learning which Lord Acton has marshalled in support of his other charges.

Lord Acton says:—"The submission of Fénelon, which Protestants and Catholics have so often celebrated, is another instance to my point. When his book was condemned, Fénelon publicly accepted the judgment as the voice of God. He declared that he adhered to the decree absolutely and without a shadow of reserve, and there were no bounds to his submission. In private he wrote that his opinions were perfectly orthodox and remained unchanged, that his opponents were in the wrong, and that Rome was getting religion into peril."

Now, Fénelon's correspondence teems with evidence that there was no contrast or discrepancy between his outward submission and his inward dispositions. Again and again in his most intimate private letters occur expressions of the sincerity and heartiness of his submission to the judgment of the Holy See on his book. To the Abbé de Chantillac, his bosom friend and his agent at Rome, he pours out his inmost thoughts with perfect unrestraint. In a letter to him dated 27th March, 1699, he says, after setting forth the sketch of a proposed Pastoral, announcing his condemnation: "In all this and in my whole course of action I wish to show, what is perfectly sincere in me, a heart without resentment, a sincere respect for the Holy See, and a submission without reserve to its judgment, rigorous though it be" (*Correspondance sur l'Affaire du Quiétisme*, n. 604, vol. x. Paris: 1828). In another letter, written on the 8th May, after speaking of the terms of his published Pastoral, he adds: "In truth I desire all my life to prefer the lights and the authority of the Holy See on my book to my own sense, the weakness of which I ought to mistrust" (*Cor.* x. n. 631). In October of the same year he writes to a correspondent (pp. 16, 17, vol. xi.) who had written to him about a proposed work in his defence: "I have given up my book and condemned it without reserve, submitting my lights to those of my superior, who is the Pope. There is no reason for keeping the affair any longer before the public; silence alone befits me. Neither directly nor indirectly can I approve in another what I would shun myself" (*Cor.* xi. n. 655).

To the Benedictine Abbé de Gerberon, nearly three years after the condemnation, he writes (3rd December, 1701): "I would rather die than defend directly or indirectly a book

which I have condemned without reserve and from the bottom of my heart, from docility to the Holy See" (Cor. xi., n. 664). From these assurances, which occur again and again in his correspondence, no single expression that I have met with ever varies by a hair's breadth. Indeed, so natural did he think this thorough submission that he is almost irritated at the exhortations he receives from various writers who encouraged him to this course as to an heroic act. "All this is somewhat tiresome," he writes to the Duc de Beauvilliers, "and I am tempted to say to myself, what have I done to all these people to make them think I should find it so hard to prefer the authority of the Holy See to my feeble lights, and the peace of the Church to my book" (Cor. x., n. 595).

On the other hand, he is just as clear and unwavering in his assurances that he had nothing to alter in his *belief* in consequence of the decision of the Holy See. But, first, these assurances are in perfect consistency with those of his sincere submission; and, secondly, they were open and public as well as intimate and confidential. Lord Acton quotes one such declaration as a proof of Fénelon's duplicity. Can he be ignorant of the history of the Controversy?

Fénelon ever declared that his belief throughout had been that which the Holy See affirmed, whilst he unreservedly condemned the words in which he had meant to express it, but which the Pope had rightly censured as conveying another and an erroneous doctrine.

In the letter first quoted, giving the proposed heads of his intended Pastoral, he says: "Secondly, I owe myself the justice to declare once more to the whole Church, that which is in no wise contrary to the judgment pronounced, namely, that I never understood my text, nor thought it liable to be understood otherwise than in that sense alone which I have always given it in my whole defence. Thirdly, I do not, however, pretend that the distinction between the sense of the author and that of his text ought ever to disturb the Church by a question of fact, since my intention in writing, however pure, does not hinder the natural sense of my text from being what the Pope judges it; for the sense of a book is independent of that of the author, and in the matter of expressions on doctrine we must be subject to the superior to whom doctrinal judgment has been entrusted by God." He reiterates this in a letter of April 3rd, 1699:—"I never held the errors they (my opponents) impute to me. I am perfectly able, from docility to the Pope, to condemn my book as expressing what I never thought I was expressing, but I cannot betray my conscience and blacken myself by a cowardly acknowledgment

of errors which I never held," &c. (Cor. x., n. 604). Several years later Sir Andrew Ramsay, whom Fénelon was leading into the Church, candidly confessed to him a doubt of the sincerity of his submission. "If the Church is infallible," he said, "you have condemned the doctrine of pure love in condemning your book of the Maxims of the Saints; if you did not condemn the doctrine, your submission was insincere." Fénelon embraced his friend, who in his distress had burst into tears, and answered him:—"The Church has not condemned pure love by condemning my book. That doctrine is taught in all Catholic churches. But the terms which I had used to express it were not proper for a dogmatic work. My book is worth nothing; I make no account of it," &c. (Mémoires, iii. p. 263). It is useless to multiply extracts which may easily be found in abundance in his letters. Two passages, however, are specially important, because they prove what I have asserted, that the assurances of his unchanged orthodoxy were not limited, as Lord Acton states, to confidential correspondence, but were made publicly, and even to the Holy Father himself. The one is from his letter to the Pope accompanying his Pastoral on the occasion of his censure.

"I thought that I had taken abundant care that my text could never be made to bear (*trahi ad sensum*) a sense at variance with that which I have sincerely and constantly asserted in the writings I published in my defence. Nevertheless, most Holy Father, it is my duty to believe that my meaning was badly explained in that work, and that I failed in the difficult undertaking of guarding my language against errors (*in cautionibus adversus errores adhibendis*)" (Cor. x., n. 611).

The other occurs in his answer to the Bishop of St. Omer, in the Metropolitan Assembly ordered by Louis XIV.; the words are recorded in the *procès verbal* of the Assembly: "He was incapable of ever endeavouring, under pretext of any double sense, to elude indirectly the condemnation of the Holy See; it was true, he could not, contrary to his conscience, acknowledge that he had ever believed any of the errors that had been imputed to him," &c. (Mém., ii. p. 296). In fact, his adversaries tried in vain to obtain, in the condemnation of his book, the clause "in sensu ab auctore intento"; and Innocent XII. repeatedly declared that "neither he nor the Cardinals had intended to condemn the explanations which the Archbishop of Cambrai had given of his book" (Mém., ii. 279).

Further, if it is quite true, as Lord Acton says, that Fénelon asserted even after his condemnation that his adversaries were wrong. But then so they were on the point to which he

referred. They declared his doctrine on the essential nature of charity as having for its formal object God for His own sake, independently of the motive of beatitude, to be erroneous. Whereas, not only was it never condemned, but it is "in agreement with that of the greater number of theologians," and was, moreover, "unanimously approved at Rome, even by the theologians whose opinions were adverse to the book of the Maxims." ("Analyse de la Controverse du Quiétisme, Part III., 91. Œuvres, iv.)

One point only remains. Lord Acton tells the world that Fénelon declared to his friends that "Rome was getting religion into peril." When called upon for his authority, he cites these words of Fénelon: "Si les gens de bien ne se réveillent à Rome la foi est en grand péril." Observe what a difference; *Rome* (i.e. the Holy See) is *getting* religion into peril, and "if good people do not bestir themselves at Rome the faith is in great peril"; where there is no question of the Holy See or of any false steps taken, but of the necessity of taking good measures, viz., of making some declaration in defence of disinterested love. But to look a little further into the meaning of Fénelon.

Throughout the controversy he had been maintaining the more common doctrine as to the nature of charity. Discredited and silenced by the condemnation of his book, he was deeply concerned lest that doctrine, though far from condemned, should suffer from the triumph of his adversaries, and be *thought* by many to fall with the condemnation of the "Maximes des Saints." Hence he writes: "The love of pure benevolence, owing to the conduct which has been pursued towards me, is in the utmost peril in France, a peril that spreads to other parts of the Church (et ailleurs de proche en proche); but it is no longer for me to fight; I am disarmed; henceforth I can only edify the Church by submission and silence. . . . God will have a care of the truth; and we must hope that, according to His promises, the Roman Church will at need uphold the truth, even though she seem to let it be obscured in a very perilous crisis" (Cor. x. 592).

There is certainly nothing either in this passage or in that quoted by Lord Acton in the least degree at variance with the sincerity of Fénelon's submission, nor resembling what he is made to declare in Lord Acton's first letter, viz., that Rome was getting religion into peril.

It is hardly to be hoped that Lord Acton will retract his unjust accusation against Fénelon, but I think any just man will admit that I have completely disproved it. Unfortunately, but naturally, it was no sooner made than it was echoed and

re-echoed through the press, and has, no doubt, found a permanent place in the great Protestant armoury, henceforth to be brought forth on all convenient occasions as a handy illustration by every flippant writer on the "pretensions of Rome." Thus it was paraded as a familiar piece of history by the *Saturday Review* of Nov. 14th, and the *Daily Telegraph* of Nov. 16th, and again by the *Saturday Review* of Nov. 21st.

Let it be remembered that this tradition first came into being in the year of grace 1874, and that its author was the first Lord Acton. E. S. K.

III.—THE CASE OF URBAN II.

In his too famous letter of November 9th, Lord Acton made a statement about Pope Urban II., on which I propose to offer some remarks. "A Pope," he says, "famous in history as the author of the first Crusade, decided that it is no murder to kill excommunicated persons. This rule . . . has been for 700 years, and continues to be, part of the ecclesiastical law." In his second letter he adds the qualification "provided it be done from religious zeal only, and not from an inferior motive," and then quotes from the Decretum of Gratian the following words:—"Non enim eos homicidas arbitramur, quod adversus excommunicatos zelo Catholicæ matris ardentes eorum quoslibet trucidasse contigerit,"—"for we do not consider them murderers, for that, inflamed with zeal for their Catholic mother against the excommunicate, it has happened that they have slain any of them." There is no ambiguity about Lord Acton's meaning. To the penalties incurred by the excommunicate Urban II. added, for all subsequent time, the liability to be shot or cut down like a wild beast, with impunity from conscience and the Church, without trial or public authority, by the first comer.

There is an inherent injustice in attacks such as that of Lord Acton. The charge is made in a few graphic sentences in a daily newspaper, without a hint that it is anything but an unquestioned and unquestionable fact, before an audience the vast majority of whom have no other practicable means of information on the subject save the columns of the "Times." This is true not only of the original statement, but also of the evidence in support of it, produced by Lord Acton in his second letter. If his readers had had before them the surroundings of Pope Urban's words, they would have possessed the means of forming a judgment for themselves on the justice of the charge which has been based upon them.

For the sake of those of my readers who may not be familiar with the Decretum of Gratian, I will briefly describe

the soil in which the fragment in question lies embedded. It does not, as Lord Acton's words and the title of Gratian's work might be thought to imply, form part of a collection of laws or decrees. Gratian proposes an imaginary case (*e.g.*, Cause 23) : "Certain bishops, with their flocks, fell into heresy, and began to compel the surrounding Catholics, by threats and torture, to follow them. On this the Emperor confers civil authority on the neighbouring Catholic bishops, and the Holy See commands them to protect the faithful from the heretics, and, by such means as they may have at their command, to force the latter to return to the truth. The bishops accordingly collect an armed force, and begin to contend against the heretics openly and by stratagems. Some are slain, others stripped of their private or ecclesiastical goods, others thrown into prison; and at length the heretics are compelled to return to the unity of the Catholic faith."

Having stated this supposed case, Gratian uses it as a peg on which to hang a number of moral questions. 1. Is it sinful to wage war? 2. What wars are just, and how were just wars carried on by the children of Israel?—and so on. The solutions to these questions are given by passages selected from a variety of sources—the writings of the Fathers, general or local councils, rescripts of Popes, imperial statutes of Christian, and even of Pagan, times. The passages on each question are divided into capitula, each with a title setting forth the point specially illustrated by it. The fifth question is this, "Whether it is a sin for a *judge or his officer* to put to death the guilty?" In the course of the answer to this question occurs the passage of Urban II., along with capitula with such titles as the following: "It is not a sin to put a man to death *ex officio*." "A soldier who kills a man in obedience to authority is not guilty of murder." "He is not a shedder of blood who punishes murderers and the sacrilegious." "He does not sin who kills a malefactor *ex officio*."

This will be a fitting place to give the fragment of Urban in full. It runs as follows:—"Enjoin upon slayers of excommunicated persons a measure of suitable satisfaction, according to their intention, as you have learned in the practice of the Roman Church. For we do not look upon those as murderers, who, burning with zeal for their Catholic mother against the excommunicate, may happen to have slain some of them. But in order that the discipline of the said Mother Church may not be departed from, impose upon them, in the manner we have said, a suitable penance, by means of which they may appease the eyes of the Divine Simplicity (*i.e.* holiness—*simplicitatis*) in case they may have incurred any guilt (*duplicatis*, con-

trusted with the *simplicitatis* of God) through human frailty in the said deed of violence (*flagitium*)."

After one more short capitulum, Gratian thus sums up the inquiry:—"If then holy men and public authorities have not, by waging war, transgressed the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill,' although they slew some bad men worthy of death, if the soldier obeying his superior is not guilty of murder, because by his order he has killed some ill-doer; if it is not shedding of blood to punish murderers and poisoners, but only execution of the law; if the Church's peace consoles her for those that perish; if those are not judged murderers who, inflamed with zeal for their Catholic mother, slay the excommunicate; it is clear that it is lawful not only to chastise the wicked, but also to put them to death."

That there may remain no doubt as to the nature of all the cases of infliction of death hitherto enumerated, Gratian now subjoins one more capitulum, which he introduces thus:—"But, it is asked, if it happen that some of the wicked are punished by those *who have not legitimate authority*, are those by whom they are punished guilty of bloodshed?"

One thing will now be clear to my readers. Whatever may have been the occasion of Urban's words (they seem themselves to point to some body or aggregate of men—"shall happen to have killed *some of them*"), their meaning is limited to acts of some kind or other done *under public authority*. They are limited to such acts by the subject of Gratian's question which regards the infliction of death *by public authority*, and by his summing up, which *excludes* the case of killing evil-doers *without such authority*.

As to the occasion of Pope Urban's letter I shall have a word to say presently. It is necessary first to draw attention to a circumstance which would alone be conclusive against Lord Acton. He dexterously slides off at once to "the spirit of the rule" (Letter of Nov. 24th) in order to drag in some story of the treatment of heretics near five hundred years after Urban's time. What we want is to be shown some signs of the *existence* of the "rule." It is no unimportant matter. It must have left traces of its working in the records of so many centuries. There is no allusion to it in the rest of the Church's legislation; no mention is made of it by the host of canonists who have commented on ecclesiastical law, or by the theologians who have written treatises on ecclesiastical censures and their effects; above all, there are no traces of it in the broad pages of history. Such an enactment must have come to the surface, must have visibly affected the current of events. There have been times when it would have set every man's

hand against his neighbour and drowned Europe in blood. In the history of such a period as that of Urban II. himself, for instance, it is simply incredible that it should have left no traces. The struggle between Henry IV. and the Church was raging all over Germany and Italy. On the side of the Imperialists it took the form of a regular schism. An anti-Pope was set up. So vast was the number of those who fell under excommunication that a contemporary writer says, "At that time it was scarcely possible for the Catholics to keep themselves from the contamination of the excommunicate" (Baronius, Ann. 1089). Yet we are to believe that a law authorizing every individual Catholic to slay the excommunicate did not produce a single incident which has come down to us, or a single cry of reproach from the schismatical party which has survived. And a like fate has befallen the history of the various schismatical struggles of subsequent centuries!

It may be worth while to answer by anticipation a question which may not unnaturally suggest itself. Is it not strange that the Pope should direct the imposition of canonical penance for an act done under lawful authority? It is probably not unknown to Lord Acton, at least, that this is not the only example of the kind. There occurs in the Decretum of Ivo (Dec. x., 152) a capitulum headed "Concerning those who commit Homicide in Public War." It is taken from a Council of Mayence. "It is needful, however," says the Council, "to admonish most diligently those who make no account of homicides committed in war, excusing themselves from the necessity of doing penance for each of them on the ground that it was done under the orders of their prince, and thus at an end in the judgment of God." The motive assigned for the admonition is, that "wicked slaughter" is sometimes perpetrated "not by chance, but of set purpose . . . from avarice, the root of all evils, and for the favour of temporal lords."

In like manner Pope Urban directs that penance is to be imposed "according to the *intention*" of the individual, and "lest some guilt should have been incurred through human frailty."

As to the fragment of Pope Urban's letter which Ivo and Gratian have preserved, its context is entirely lost, and the circumstances under which it was written can only be conjectured. Baronius mentions it as an incident in the war between Henry IV. and the defenders of the Church (Ann. 1089). De Marca and Berardi connect it with the measures taken in Urban's Pontificate to enforce the Truce of God. This Truce, as many of your readers will remember, was

adopted as a remedy for the terrible and ever-growing evils of the petty private wars carried on by the feudal barons. At the Council of Clermont under Urban, and at other Synods about the same time, energetic steps were taken to enforce it. The penalty of excommunication having been found insufficient to secure its observance, it was now determined to impose an oath on persons of every condition over the age of childhood, by which they bound themselves, when called upon by the Bishops, to take up arms to compel the violators of the Truce to submission. The varying phases of such a warfare, with its private aspect and its official aspect, and the passions and mixed motives which it would bring into play, might well give occasion to the Consultation addressed to Urban and to the language of his letter. Such, in the main, appears to be the theory of De Marca, though he so far loses sight of the quasi-official character of the defenders of the Truce as to suppose the excommunicate in question to be killed, "*ex zelo justitiæ*," indeed, and as "violators of the peace, proscribed by both the civil and ecclesiastical powers," still "*a quocumque privato*," by a private person who commits thereby a fault. "The Pope," he says, "is to be understood of this class only of the excommunicated (i.e. violators of the Truce), and not of all excommunicated persons, as some foolish writers (*male feriat*) have persuaded themselves." He adds: "I am the more glad to mention this interpretation here, because it seems to me that it may remove the odium which a wrong understanding of this text is wont to create against the Sovereign Pontiffs" (Dissert. ad Concil. Claramontan. apud Mansi. tom. xx. fol. 886). Perhaps there is some slight confirmation of this theory in the fact that the passage in Gratian stands in immediate proximity to that concerning the *Pax Ecclesiæ*. "The peace of the Church consoles her for those who perish." The Truce of God was also called *Pax*—"the peace."

It is worth remarking that the author who speaks with such slight respect of the interpretation Lord Acton has put upon the words of Urban, is no "Ultramontane," or thick-and-thin defender of the Popes, but a thorough-going Gallican! Another point worth noting is that Lord Acton's statement is after all an old and hackneyed accusation (*solet invidia creari*), one of the oft-repeated tales of mendacious scandal heaped together by such purveyors of dishonest controversy as the writers of *Janus*. Of course, it appears in *Janus*, and with embellishments (ch. iii. sec. 7). Of course, it was refuted by Hergenröther (*Anti-Janus*, ch. viii.). Lord Acton repeats it as if it had never been answered. No doubt

it will be often produced again with an air of original research, and as if it were a fact which had never been gainsaid.

Catholics will find comfort in reflecting that it is no small tribute to the strength of their cause that those who wish to deal it a deadly blow should think it needful for their purpose to dig out an obscure fragment without history or context of its own; to separate it from its surroundings, which affix to it a meaning unsuitable to their object; to attach to it an odious signification of which no fact in law or history bears a trace, inevitable as such traces must have been; to parade it, thus interpreted, before the readers of a daily newspaper, without a hint that it was so much as capable of another meaning, and without a whisper of the opinions of writers carrying such weight and representing such different schools and times as De Marca, Berardi, and Hergenröther.

E. S. K.

ART. VI.—BERMUDA.

Lecture on the Geological Formation of Bermuda. By T. W. GOLDIE, Esq., Deputy Commissary-General, Bermuda. Donald M'Phee Lee, Queen's Printer. 1867.

Remarks on the Chemical Analysis of Samples of Soil from Bermuda. By His Excellency Major-General J. H. LEFROY, R.A., F.R.S., Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Bermuda. 1873.

Letters from H.M.S. "Challenger" in "Good Words" for February, 1874.
II.—Bermudas.

The Bermuda Pocket Almanack for 1874.

BERMUDA!—where is Bermuda?—is a question that many a one (by no means an *ignoramus*) might even now find some little difficulty in answering correctly. Some years since, having occasion to learn something about the Bermudas, as they, being a group of islands, are more correctly called, we found information very scarce and no less vague and uncertain. Of late years, however, this most interesting, although tiny, English colony seems to have attracted more attention, and its name has appeared more than once within the last few months in connection with the exploring expedition in H.M.S. *Challenger*. The Bermudas or "Somers," or, by

corruption, "The Summer Islands," are so called from their supposed first discoverer, Juan Bermudez, a Spaniard. He seems to have discovered them about the year 1503, when sailing in the *La Garza*, having on board Oviedo, the author of the History of the West Indies. Their second name of Somers' Islands came to them from Admiral Sir George Somers, who was wrecked there in 1609, when *en route* for the young colony of Virginia. They are situated in the North Atlantic Ocean, its lighthouse being in $64^{\circ} 51' 36''$ west longitude, and $32^{\circ} 15' 04''$ north latitude. One of the crew, who was wrecked in the *Sea Adventure*, the flag-ship of Sir George Somers, gives a terrible account of the islands:

We now found that we had reached a dangerous and dreadful island, or rather islands, called the Bermudas, considered terrible by all who have touched at them; and from the dreadful tempests, thunders, and other alarming events prevailing, are commonly called the "Devil's Islands."

They were of course quite uninhabited, except by a large colony of wild hogs, whose ancestors had been considerably landed there by one of the earlier discoverers.

The climate of Bermuda is semi-tropical. During the year 1872 the maximum of barometer was $30\cdot410$, and the minimum $29\cdot500$, showing an oscillation or range of only $0\cdot910$. The highest reading of the thermometer in shade was $94\cdot2$ (in 1871 it was as high as 97), and the lowest 44. In the sun's rays, the maximum was $163\cdot5$. The fall of rain during the four years ending with 1860 averaged $55\cdot63$ inches. The rainfall is a very important matter in Bermuda, as it affords the only water available for drinking purposes. Water may of course be obtained by boring, but it is somewhat brackish. Thunder-storms are often very severe and terrible, and fearful hurricanes are on record. One that took place on September 11th, 1839, is still spoken of with dread. Amongst the mischief it did was the rather serious one of driving the salt-water into almost every tank in the islands. Others are recorded on October 31st, 1780, and July 20th, 1817; by the latter one-third of the houses were destroyed, and all the shipping driven on shore.

Bermuda has acquired—we think undeservedly—a bad sanitary reputation. It is true that there have been terrible epidemics of yellow fever, but all the evidence we have been able to gather inclines us to believe that the disease has always been imported from other places. The climate, no doubt, once the germ has been conveyed there, is highly favourable for its development; but this is very different from its being endemic. The visitations on record of this terrible

scourge are as follows:—1699, 1787, 1796, 1812, 1818, 1837, 1843, 1853, 1856, and the latest 1864. It will therefore be seen that the statement often made that yellow fever occurs in Bermuda every ten years is completely erroneous. We believe that with adequate precautions it would never occur there; and this simply because there is nothing in the islands to account for the origin of such a disease. Such marshes and mangrove swamps as are to be found there are not of a pestilential or unhealthy character, as people live quite close to them at all times with impunity. Besides, the islands are so limited in extent that Bermuda has been said to have no more climate than the deck of a ship. In such islands of the West Indies, and in other places where yellow fever is known to be endemic, scarcely a year passes without some cases occurring; but this is not so in Bermuda. Commercial intercourse with infected places easily accounts for the origin of such an epidemic, more especially as, until within a recent period, the quarantine regulations there were rather loose and undefined. Since the last great epidemic of 1864, greater caution has been observed, and there has been no return of the disease, excepting two or three cases which occurred within a year or so after the last visitation, amongst the inhabitants of a fort close to the cemetery where the victims of 1864 were buried in large numbers.* No outbreak has since occurred. So keenly have the Bermudians been roused to the importance of the quarantine laws, that at the very time we are writing the question of fresh laws enacted by the Colonial Legislature is in debate with the Home Government, which hesitates, if it has not refused, to sanction them, as being of too stringent a character for the exigencies of the naval service. Even those who maintain that yellow fever has its origin in Bermuda, admit that whenever an epidemic breaks out there, the disease has been found at the same time on the North American coast. We can cordially sympathize with the Bermudians in their endeavour to clear the character of their beautiful island home from the imputation of insalubrity, recklessly and ignorantly in many cases asserted; the more especially as we believe they have truth on their side. With how much reason they dread the scourge of Yellow-Jack, as it is called in the West Indies, the following brief statistics of the last epidemic in 1864 will show. The military

* In 1869 the hospital at Port's Island became infected, with fatal results, from some men who were landed from the *Barracouta*, which had yellow fever on board. There could, of course, be no pretence for saying that the climate had anything to do with this instance of infection.

suffered especially ; a regiment, the 2nd battalion 2nd Queen's, having landed fresh from Europe just before the fever broke out. It lasted over five months, and the total loss of life amongst the military (not to speak of sailors or civilians, concerning whom we have no record at hand), amounted to 14 officers, 173 men, 5 women, and 4 children. As nearly as possible, 33 per cent. died of those who were attacked.

The climate is well described in a little pamphlet called "Bermuda as it is," published in 1867 by Mr. Edward James, late Surveyor-General of the Bermuda Islands. He says :—

The climate is, as might be expected from the latitude, as well as from the position of the islands, hundreds of miles out in the clear ocean depths, remarkably salubrious. . . . From September to March and April a pleasant atmosphere is found, constantly kept in motion by the changeable and often boisterous gyrations of the air-currents in this quarter of the world, which, while proverbially eccentric and often violent in their movements, especially during the winter months, have at any rate the recommendation that they keep the air constantly fresh and in brisk motion. It is no uncommon occurrence for the wind during some of the months of the year to veer nearly round the compass in the course of twenty-four hours, with every alternation of force, from a light breeze to a heavy squall, and every change of the sky overhead, from clear blue to stormy. The feeling of the temperature during these months is remarkably equable and delightful, never attaining a sultry heat on the one hand, nor an unpleasant coldness on the other ; now and then a fire is acceptable in the evenings, but it is still a moot point even among Bermudians whether such a thing as a frosty night was ever known in the islands. The summers are warm and occasionally sultry and oppressive, but the constant prevalence of southerly and south-westerly winds during this period of the year effects—especially in the town of St. George's, which is open to the quarters indicated—a very agreeable moderation of the heat ; the early mornings and the evenings are delightfully refreshing, and, by a little judicious arrangement of in-door and out-of-door hours, as in the hotter countries, and a little management of verandahs, open windows, and jalousies—the houses generally being built east and west, so as to take the south winds through their narrowest diameter—there is no difficulty in making the summer months perfectly tolerable. Bermuda, of course, is not exempt from the universal laws by which great heat produces languor and oppression everywhere, by which territories close to the ocean-shore have damper atmospheres than those inland, and by which heat and moisture combined cause greater languor than heat alone. But so far from this circumstance producing general physical inactivity, the inhabitants are to be observed during the summer months, as during the winter, going about their avocations with much the same activity, only in appropriate costumes and with the ordinary precautions of white hat-coverings and umbrellas. It may very safely be averred that by far the greater proportion of all the languor and oppression complained of by temporary residents arises

from deleterious influences, bad habits, injurious regulations, and neglect of precautions.

The scenery of the islands is extremely beautiful, although by no means of a bold character. The highest ground, Gibb's Hill, on which the lighthouse was erected in 1844, scarcely exceeds 250 feet above high water. The light, which is amongst the largest and most powerful in the world, can be seen at the distance of about thirty-three nautical miles from an elevation of 100 feet. The greater part of the land is formed in gentle undulations of from twenty to sixty feet above the sea-level. The principal islands are well wooded, being chiefly covered with the dark green foliage of the Bermuda cedar (*Juniperus Bermudiana*). Bermuda is, Professor Wyville Thomson remarks, practically an 'atoll,' or annular coral reef:

The reef is about twenty-four miles in length by twelve in width. Its long axis extends from N.E. to S.W. The portion above the level of the sea stretches along the southern or western side, and consists of a chain of five narrow islands and a multitude of islets and detached rocks, which raise the number of the elements of the archipelago to over three hundred.

The chief islands are St. George's, St. David's, Ireland, where the dockyard is situated, Boaz, where the convict establishment used to be, and what the Bermudians call the mainland, which contains eight out of the nine parishes, as well as Hamilton, the present seat of Government. The population in 1871 consisted of Whites—males 2,118; females 2,607=4,725: Coloured—males 3,284; females 4,112=7,396, which, with the addition of permanent military and naval departments, amounted in all to 12,426. The garrison, naval and military, at the same date made an addition of 3,188.

The islands are remarkably fertile, and might be the source of great agricultural wealth. They contain about ten thousand five hundred acres of land, of which less than two thousand five hundred are under cultivation. Improved communication with the American continent has, however, been the means of nearly doubling the produce exported between 1870 and 1872, in which latter year it was valued at £61,947, being all the result of vegetable growth. Much however remains to be done, for hitherto little else than potatoes, onions, tomatoes, and arrow-root have been exported, whilst the soil and climate are equal to the production of an almost endless variety of fine fruits and vegetables during months when such things are unattainable luxuries in the northern and eastern parts of the American continent. As an instance of what might be done, we may mention the orchard of the late W. B. Perot, Esq., in Hamilton, where there are to be seen all the known varieties

of the orange and lemon, and many other fruits from the East and West Indies, including the chirimoya from the Andes, which was introduced by the late Sir William Reid. Bermuda owes much to that distinguished and lamented officer, who during the time he was governor there, collected much of the information embodied in his valuable work on "the law of storms."

During about nine months of the year, gardening operations may be followed up with the greatest success, and with very moderate trouble green peas and strawberries may grace the table on Christmas-day. Peaches, bananas, pomegranates, melons, grapes, and figs are, or might be, abundant; indeed there are very few fruits that would not repay the trouble of cultivation. On the same ground in one year are commonly grown two crops of the ordinary and one of the sweet potato. As illustrations of the suitableness of the climate for the productions of almost any country, we may mention that there exists in Bermuda a mahogany-tree planted some twenty years ago, the trunk of which is already seven feet in circumference and has reached a total height of over twenty-eight feet. There is also an india-rubber tree, which in about twenty-three years has attained enormous dimensions, and of which the roots have to be pruned from time to time, lest they should disturb the foundations of the neighbouring houses. Palm-trees of many varieties grow freely, and the leaves of one kind, the palmetto, are extensively utilized for plait and ornamental work, some of which was shown in the last Great Exhibition at South Kensington. We have already mentioned the abundance of the cedar, from which ships are sometimes built. The cotton-plant thrives, and we believe might become a source of wealth. About Walsingham, celebrated for its wonderful and beautiful stalactite caves, the coffee-tree is found and flourishes, and we can further testify to the existence in many parts of calabash, tamarind, and mango trees. The flowers and flowering trees and shrubs, particularly the oleander, in every shade from pure white to deep crimson, are most beautiful, and the latter so abundant and free of growth as to be much used for firewood. It was stated at a recent meeting of the Linnean Society by Mr. Moseley, the first naturalist of the *Challenger*, that "about 160 species of flowering plants were gathered in Bermuda; but of these not more than one hundred were certainly native." Roses bloom luxuriantly all the year round, and many flowers thrive *there*, almost as weeds, which we prize as the ornaments of our conservatories. Amongst what may be called weeds in Bermuda at the present day, we may mention the tobacco-plant, which, however, in days long gone by, was cultivated, and formed an important article

of export. The castor-oil plant, although growing in many places most luxuriantly, is made no use of, and several fibre-producing plants are equally unheeded. There are many beautiful ferns to be found in the islands; and the mention of these reminds us of a fact, which tends to show the former existence of even a warmer climate than at present. General Munro, when in command of the troops in Bermuda, built a greenhouse, and the increased temperature it afforded developed from some peat taken from a marsh near Mount Langton (the governor's residence), a fern at present unknown in Bermuda, but common in Florida. Seeds from the West Indies are constantly washed on to the south shore, and there can be no doubt that many trees and plants, now growing in the islands, are thence derived.

Some of the lower forms of animal life are painfully abundant. Mosquitos and cockroaches much diminish one's comfort. There are also a few centipedes and scorpions to be found, but no snakes of any kind, nor wild animals, except rats and mice. The indigenous birds are few, probably not more than five or six varieties. Amongst them the most conspicuous are the "red bird" (*Guarica cardinalis*) and the "blue bird," the blue-robin of the United States (*Sialia Wilsoni*). The islands are visited by a great variety of birds of passage, and poultry of all kinds are easily and profitably reared. The waters are well peopled with many kinds of fish, which is the staple food of the poorer classes. Many of the fishes are strikingly beautiful in colour, but rather poor and coarse as food. There is, however, an exception in the angel-fish, which is not only more beautiful to the sight than perhaps any other fish that swims, but is extremely palatable, if one has the heart to cook it. The green turtle (*Chelodonia Midas*) is also frequently to be found, and used to be sold retail in the markets at sevenpence per pound. Flying-fish abound outside the reefs, and although sharks are often seen and sometimes captured, no accidents from them are recorded. The octopus is one of the inhabitants of the Bermuda waters, and is spoken of with dread, and the "Portugese man-of-war" (*Physalia Atlantica*) gives a painful warning, by the sting of its long tentacles, to those who handle it unwarily. There is also a very savage fish, one of the *Muraenidae*, with a long formidable jaw, armed with very sharp teeth. It is popularly known as the moray, and is the terror of fishermen, as, if hooked, it springs upon and bites, if it can, any one who draws it out of the water.

Bermuda had once a thriving whale-fishery; but as the wrecks (in old times a source of great profit to the inhabitants) have been diminished by the erection of the lighthouse,

so the steam-ships appear to have frightened away the whales, which nowadays are seldom seen near the islands. Speaking of wrecks, it is said that some of the older inhabitants were by no means pleased at the innovation of a lighthouse. A little old-world experience might perhaps have suggested the idea of demanding compensation for loss of business.

Of one class of the inhabitants of the waters we cannot give a better description than is given by Professor Thomson. He tells us that Bermuda is the coral island farthest from the equator:—

Almost on the limit of the region of reef-building corals. Accordingly, some of the great reef-building genera, such as *Madrepora*, *Cladocora*, and *Astrangia*, which are common even in the West Indies, where the coral fauna is scanty, are absent. . . . Most of the Bermuda corals, such as the *Oculina diffusa*, *Symphillia dipsacea*, *Astræa radians*, &c., are like sea-anemones, or groups of sea-anemones, in every shade of purple, orange, or green. The base or stock of the coral is dead and forms part of the reef; but each of the living branches is tipped with its sea-anemone, and the stars of plates by which its cups are supported are the earthy skeleton of the mesenteric plates which hang the stomach of the sea-anemone in its body cavity. In most cases the bodies of these sea-anemones, with their ranges of tentacles and their high colouring, are so prominent that they entirely mask the coral; but in a few, as for example, in a brain-coral, *Diploria cerebriiformis*, which seems to thrive at Bermuda better than almost anywhere else, forming domes six or eight feet in diameter, the animal matter is in comparatively small quantity, and covers the coral with what appears little more than a coating of greyish or yellow mucus. The *Gorgonia*, the *Bryozoa*, and the *Hydroid* zoophytes are, like the other more prominent weeds in the field, as abundant and as irregularly distributed, growing in the spaces between the clumps of the different kinds of coral. One form, which has been latterly classed with the Hydroids, *Millepora*, represented by two species, *M. alicornis* and *M. ramosa*, is extremely abundant at Bermudas, where it acts in every way the part of a coral, forming massive additions to the reef of carbonate of lime abstracted from the sea. Beneath these large things there is usually a close felting of an undergrowth, consisting partly of sponges and smaller zoophytes, but chiefly of what are sometimes called lithophytes, sea-weeds of such genera as *Corallina*, *Melobesia*, and *Nullipora*, which, like corals, take carbonate of lime from the sea-water and incorporate it with their tissues.

The appearance of the waters amongst the multitude of islands on a bright sunny day can never be forgotten by any one who has seen it. The coral limestone beneath reflects the light through them in a manner that makes them sparkle with such gem-like colour and brilliancy as might well drive a painter to despair.

We should not omit to notice a very important, and for so small a colony a stupendous work, which after many years of

consideration and hope, was on September 19th, 1871, opened to public use. We mean the causeway connecting the island of St. George's with the mainland. It took five years in construction, and is something over a mile and a half between its extremes. Its width is $22\frac{1}{2}$ feet, with retaining walls 3 feet, and guard walls 3 feet 9 inches high, and 16 inches in thickness. It cost £32,000, every penny of which was found by the colony.* It is a work of much importance as insuring communication at all times between the islands, and is of great use in a military point of view. A swing iron bridge enables boats to pass through the Ferry Road at St. George's. The floating dock too, the largest in the world, constructed in this country and safely towed across the Atlantic in July, 1869, is a most important addition to the resources of her Majesty's Bermuda Dockyard. It has already received the ironclad man-of-war *Royal Alfred*, drawing twenty-five feet of water, and weighing about 6,000 tons. The cavernous nature of the rocks made it impossible to construct a dock of the ordinary kind, so that the floating dock has supplied a want long felt, and otherwise not to be remedied.

There can be no doubt that the present Bermudas are the remains of what was once a very much larger island or group of islands. What land there is now is surrounded by reefs, which on the north side extend to a considerable distance, and make navigation exceedingly difficult and dangerous. At a distance of some six or seven miles from the shore there exists a last-remaining fragment above water, known as the North Rock. Observations lead to the inevitable conclusion that great alterations in level have taken place in former ages. Cuttings in various parts reveal the fact that strata of red earth, pretty much the same as now covers the islands, exist between strata of coral limestone. There are in some places as many as four or five of these, the lowest of which would have been washed away by the sea had the islands been at their present level when it was deposited. Then again the evidences of disturbance in the strata tilted in every direction show that great forces must have been at work since the rocks were deposited. We are aware, however, that Professor Thomson looks upon these signs of upheaval as the result of other causes. In many places are to be found, now far above the influence of the sea, rocks that bear unmistakable traces of exposure to the action of the waves. Near Walsingham, on each side of the high road, may be seen pointed, sharp-cut,

* The Home Government has, during the past year, repaid the colony half the cost of the causeway, by reason of its military importance.

and honeycombed rocks. These are very hard, and are bored in every direction by the long-continued dash of the sea pouring over them. This of course would show that this part of the islands once stood at a much lower level than at present; and our own observations lead us to believe that the Bermudas have undergone several alterations of elevation and depression. Some striking confirmations of these conclusions have within the last few years come to light. Mr. Goldie states that one of the belts of red earth has been cut through by a well which was sunk by the Royal Engineers at Prospect Hill, at a level of about 65 feet above the sea, having a mass of rock overlying it of 130 feet in thickness. The belt is about 8 inches thick; the rock below it is close, and looks like a marine deposit, while that above it is made of very coarsely-broken shells, which are held together only by pressure. About 20 feet below the belt of red earth, a crab's claw was found, but unfortunately the contents of the belt itself were not preserved. As Mr. Goldie remarks, it would be a great point of interest if we could only discover what species of vegetation first clothed the Bermudas in their infancy, whether any land-shells existed in that far-off time, and if they were different from those now living in the islands. The land-shells found in the soft rock and amongst the red earth are not found at a great depth, and are identical with those now living on the surface. They belong to the *Helix* family.

From an article in "Nature" for August 1st, 1872, we learn a further confirmation of our theory. The author, Mr. J. Matthew Jones, says, that about two years before he wrote, sub-marine blastings were carried on at the entrance of Hamilton Harbour, and at a depth of over six fathoms, a cavern was broken into which contained stalactites and red earth. Mr. Jones gives some further information received from Major-General Lefroy, to the effect that other discoveries have been made of a most interesting and important character during the extensive blastings which were necessary to form a bed in the Camber for the floating-dock. The excavations extended to a depth of 52 feet below low-water mark. At 46 feet occurred a layer of red earth, two feet in thickness, containing remains of cedar-trees, which layer rested upon a bed of compact calcareous limestone. We have here the first satisfactory evidence of the submergence of an extensive deposit of soil, once upon the surface, and that to the depth of 48 feet below the present low-water level, which consequently grants an equal elevation above it in former times. Mr. Jones forgets, however, that we must still further add to this the rise of the tide, the maximum of which is

4 feet 7 inches, and the minimum 1 foot 4 inches. Now, on carefully surveying the Bermuda chart, says Mr. Jones, we find that an elevation of 48 feet will bring the whole space which intervenes between the present land and the barrier reef, now covered with water, above the water-level. The existence of some rocky ledges from 20 to 25 miles from land to the S.W., known as the Flatts, which seem to be identical with what are marked as the "False Bermudas" on some of the oldest maps of the Atlantic consulted at the British Museum by Mr. Jones, make it almost certain that the land once extended to at least that distance. Mr. Jones promises other evidence (which we have not yet come across), in confirmation of his belief that the existing land is merely the summit of one of a range of islands which extended in somewhat semicircular form for a distance of 70 or 80 miles.

Captain Smith's History of Virginia, written in the early part of the seventeenth century, gives a very good account of the Bermudas, and states, according to Mr. Jones, amongst other notes on their natural history, that flocks of crows (*Corvus Americanus* probably, which is still found in Bermuda), were in the habit every evening of winging their flight from the main island towards the north. This would prove the existence of land in that direction at no great distance; for the habit of this bird to leave "its roosting-place for distant feeding-grounds during the day, to return at sun-down, is one of its characteristics." No reasonable doubt can, we think, remain that the conclusion respecting the former extent of the Bermudas is a correct one. It would be most interesting to ascertain by borings the depths of the recent formations, and to find out the character of the foundations of the islands. What the substrata may be is at present quite unknown. Our own belief is that they would be found to be volcanic rock. No other than volcanic force could have caused this great upheaval from the ocean depths. And it must be borne in mind that the Atlantic hereabouts is very deep. The *Challenger* explorations amply confirm what we had long held as the results of our own imperfect inductions. Professor Thomson says :

The depth of water increases round the island with extreme rapidity. Seven miles to the north there is a sounding of 1,375 fathoms, and about two miles farther off one of 1,775 fathoms. To the north-east there is water of 1,500 fathoms at a distance of ten miles to the north-west, of 2,100 fathoms at a distance of seven miles, and to the southward of 2,250 fathoms at ten miles. The only direction in which there would seem to be a series of banks is along an extension of the axis of the reef to the south-west. We

anchored for a night in 30 fathoms of water on this line, about twenty miles from the edge of the reef, and a shoal is mentioned at a still greater distance in the same direction. About three hundred miles farther on, however, a sounding is given of 2,950 fathoms, and there seems little probability that there is any connection between the Bermudas reef and the Bahamas. What the basis on which the Bermudas reef rests may be we have no means of telling; in fact, its having the form of an atoll precludes the possibility of our doing so. There seems to be little doubt, from Darwin's beautiful generalization, which has been fully endorsed by Dana and other competent observers, that the atoll form is due to the entire disappearance by subsidence of the island, round which the reef was originally formed. The abruptness and isolation of this peak, which runs up to a solitary cone to a height about equal to that of Mont Blanc, is certainly unusual; probably the most reasonable hypothesis may be that the kernel is a volcanic mountain, comparable in character with Pico in the Azores, or the Peak of Teneriffe.

Pace the learned professor, we are still unable to see why something might not be discovered by boring. The subsidence must have been gradual (and, as we have already seen, have alternated with fresh upheavals), as it must be borne in mind that the tiny creatures, from the débris of whose labours all the visible and known rocks of the Bermudas are formed, do not work in a depth much exceeding eight fathoms.

Harrington Sound, a beautiful lake of water, is nearly circular in form, and has but one visible opening connecting it with the sea. Its greatest depth is about 85 feet, but its form strongly reminds one of the crater of an old volcano. Many of the leading geologists attribute a volcanic origin to the coral islands in the Pacific. Mr. Goldie says that in the island of Tahiti, on the summit of its highest mountain, stands a small Bermuda. That is to say, a coral rock precisely like those of Bermuda is there perched on a volcanic peak.

The formation of the Bermuda rocks is well deserving of attention. There appear to be at least two distinct formations in the islands (although Professor Thomson says there is only one kind of rock in Bermuda), exclusive of the drift-sand, which is fast accumulating all along the southern shore, and marching on, too, to the destruction of what is at present cultivated land. Some centuries hence, it will have formed great rocks. Professor Thomson considers that the way in which the sand advances explains the appearance of upheaval to be seen in so many parts of the islands.

The sand-hills terminate landwards in a more or less regular glacis, and as the sand advances, layer after layer is added uniformly to the face of the glacis, producing a very regular stratification at the angle of rest of dry sand

of this particular kind,—an angle of about 30° , entirely corresponding with that of the limestone.

This mode of deposit has been aptly termed by General Nelson, an *Æolian* formation. We are probably very presumptuous in questioning the conclusions of so able a man as Professor Thomson, but the recollection of the eccentric contortions of the strata we had the opportunity, during several years, of remarking, makes us hesitate in renouncing our old opinions on the subject. The two formations of rock we have referred to above, are the hard and the soft. The former would appear to be the older, as it underlies the latter, although in many places, particularly about Walsingham, the hard is exposed on the surface. Both are composed of pretty much the same materials, viz. pounded coral, shells, and serpulæ, but the hard rock seems to have been ground down once or twice, and has been percolated by water holding carbonate of lime in solution. In some cases crystallization has taken place. The soft rock is to be found in every stage of its existence, from drift-sand to the compact but soft stone from which the houses, both walls and roof, are built throughout the islands. The red earth of Bermuda has been long a puzzle to the most eminent geologists, but we seem at last to have approached the solution of the difficulty. The analyses of Messrs. Abel and Manning show that it contains a very large proportion of sesquioxide of iron and alumina. Now, the *Challenger* dredgings revealed the fact that a peculiar red clay, gradually assuming a darker tint until it becomes almost of the colour of chocolate, was found the greater part of the distance from St. Thomas to the Bermudas. Whence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that when the volcanic mountain, which forms the basis of the Bermudas, was first upheaved from the floor of the ocean, the red clay came up with it. There are also large deposits of peaty mud in the marshes, which we have already referred to. The depth of these was, until lately, quite unknown; but in 1872 soundings were made by His Excellency the Governor, in the Pembroke Marsh below Government House, by means of a series of lengths of iron gas-piping about an inch in diameter. These were secured into each other, the lower length having an auger attached to its foot. The deepest sounding gave 46 feet of this peaty mud.

There are in various parts of the islands very remarkable caverns, especially at Walsingham. There, close to the house once inhabited by Tom Moore,* are some very curious and

* The poet was appointed to an office in Bermuda—a financial one, we

extensive subterranean caves, the chief of which are named the Pulpit or Prince's Cave, and Joice's Cave. Several of them contain water, in which there are no fish, although in the second cave named, lobsters make their appearance in the autumn and disappear with the spring. These caves have lofty roofs, supported by great stalagmite columns, one of which is 60 feet in circumference. The walls are fretted and enriched with curtains and fringes of stalactite, which, before they were injured by the smoke of torches and the depredations of curiosity-seekers, must have been singularly beautiful. Mr. Goldie states that the islands of the Bahama group, some of which are 100 miles in extent, are formed precisely like the Bermudas, and that the hard and the soft rocks are precisely the same. The living land shells also are the same as those embedded in the rocks, but differ from those found in Bermuda. Those of the latter are *helices*, of the former, *pupæ*.

This account of the Bermudas would be incomplete without some notice of the government of the islands. Bermuda was settled by a statute of James I. in 1612, and was colonized by English settlers, some of whom, cadets of noble families, gave their names to the various parishes. Until 1687 the affairs of the colony seem to have been managed by a company of adventurers, as they were called. On April 12th of that year Sir Robert Robinson was appointed its first governor, and ever since successors have continued to be appointed by the Crown. There is a Legislative Council of nine members, including the Chief Justice as President, and the Bishop (Anglican) of Newfoundland. The House of Assembly consists of thirty-six members, four for each parish, of whom one is chosen as Speaker. There are Courts of Chancery, Errors, Ordinary, General Assize, and Vice-Admiralty, but in all the islands there are but four lawyers. There are, however, twelve doctors and four dentists. There was for many years a large convict establishment, which was closed in 1863. Most of the fortification works were the result of convict labour. As a naval station Bermuda is of the greatest importance. Its position makes it a halfway-house between North America and the West Indies, being about four hundred miles from either. The naval and other warlike stores kept there amount to the value of at least two millions. After the *Trent* affair, it was considered that the existing forts and other means of protec-

believe, in the Court of Vice-Admiralty. As he held it by patent, he was able to appoint a deputy, which after a few months' residence in the islands he unfortunately did; and his office, instead of a gain, turned out a ruinous loss; he being, of course, responsible for his deputy.

tion were far from adequate to the needs of modern warfare, and consequently, since that time, the fortifications have been, and are, in process of being greatly added to, and the garrison has also been more than doubled. In the event of a war with the United States (never, we hope, to occur) the great importance of Bermuda could not fail to be appreciated.* Small as

* Although the number of Catholics in Bermuda, if we exclude the temporary sojourners of the army and navy, is but small, it is most probable that the first religious worship offered to God there was by members of the old faith. The nationality of its first discoverer well warrants this conclusion. We remember too being shown an alabaster image of our Blessed Lady evidently of European origin, and dating from the sixteenth or seventeenth century, which we were informed was dug up in the islands. For very many years the light of faith burned but dimly in the Bermudas. Many a Catholic must have gone unhouselled to his account, for even so recently as twenty-five years or so ago, the Islands were only rarely—perhaps once in the year—visited by a priest from Halifax. We have seen and spoken to a priest who had made several voyages to Bermuda in this way to give the poor Catholics a chance of making their Easter duties. Then, Mass was said in the house of one or other of the Catholic inhabitants, some of whom bravely and stanchly did their best to hand down the faith to their children in spite of all difficulties. The convict establishment seems to have been the occasion of Bermuda first possessing a resident priest. We believe the earliest was Father Lyons, who, in 1856, returning from a voyage to Halifax, found himself in the midst of yellow fever, to which he soon fell a victim. He was laid in Pembroke Churchyard, and we cannot refrain from quoting, as an instance of good and kindly feeling in an Anglican clergyman, the Rev. F. Lightbourn, who is now lying in the same place, a letter before us, written in 1864, in which he draws attention to the state of the grave of the Catholic priest. "It grieves me," he says, "to see it so little marked and so much exposed."

The Right Rev. Dr. Rogers, Bishop of Chatham, Nova Scotia, was once the pastor of the Bermudas. It is, we believe, to his energy that the Catholics there owe the commencement of their solitary church in Hamilton, the capital of the islands. What Dr. Rogers partially built has since been completed, and is by no means the worst building in the islands. The Catholics are, it is true, but a *pusillus grex*, although of late years their position in the colony has somewhat improved. Some years since they were allotted a share, in proportion to their numbers, of the grant annually voted by the Legislature in aid of the various denominations, although a few years before the proposal, when first moved in the House of Assembly, did not find even a seconder. It is creditable to both sides that the Catholics in Bermuda have earned the good-will of their Protestant fellow-countrymen.

One is not surprised to find a great deal of prejudice in a colony settled at a time when Catholics were a proscribed race. But we are glad to be able to testify that, even so, Catholics have no particular reason to complain of the treatment they receive there from their fellow-countrymen. In reference, for example, to the marriage-law, we find none of the trouble and vexation often to be met with at home. The clergy of all denominations can celebrate marriages after three publications of the banns, or, failing this, with the Governor's license. The officiating clergyman is bound under penalty to deposit in the Colonial Secretary's Office a duplicate original of the register. Thus all parties are relieved from the trouble and expense

it is in size—a mere dot in the broad Atlantic—Bermuda has had an attraction for some men of great intellect. It was visited by the poet Waller; Lord Bolingbroke, it is said, had a pet project of acquiring the sovereignty of the Bermudas and retiring there from the strife of English politics. For at least seven years of his life, Bermuda filled a large place in the mind of the philosopher Berkeley. He projected a sort of Protestant College of Propaganda in the island in the form of a chartered university for the training of missionaries to the North American colonies. Dean Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, the Minister of the day, speaks of Berkeley as “having written a little tract which he designs to publish, and then your excellency will see his whole scheme of a life academico-philosophical, of a college founded for Indian scholars and missionaries, where he most exorbitantly proposeth a whole hundred pounds a year for himself, forty pounds for a fellow, and ten for a student.” The letter just cited was written to introduce Berkeley to Lord Carteret. Swift, although disapproving of the scheme, justly calls it very noble and generous. For, not long before this letter was written, Berkeley had been made Dean of Derry, which was worth no less than £1,100 per annum; this

entailed upon us at home by the necessary presence of a registrar. Reflecting on this, we have sometimes asked ourselves the question why some attempt is not made to obtain for Catholics in England the liberty enjoyed in the colonies, and freely accorded at home to Quakers and Jews. The difficulties that surround Catholic marriages in England are a source of endless trouble both to priest and people.

The census of 1871 showed the following result as to religious denominations in the colony:—

Church of England	9,128
Presbyterian	610
Wesleyan	1,020
Roman Catholic	227
Methodist Episcopal.....	1,060
Other Denominations	76

There are twenty-four churches in the islands, of which twelve belong to the Church of England, two to the Presbyterians, nine to the Wesleyans, and one only to the Catholics. There are sixteen schoolhouses. There is at present but one priest in the islands, the chaplain to the forces, who attends also to the civilian population. His work is far from light, especially during the hot weather, as he has to travel from place to place, and to celebrate two Masses every Sunday at the various military stations, which are attended on alternate Sundays. During the period of the convict establishment, and for a short time since its abolition, there was a second priest. The situation of a priest thus cut off from all society of his brethren, except in the rare chance of one in a passing vessel, is a very trying one. Bermuda is in the diocese of the Archbishop of Halifax.

post he actually resigned, having obtained promises of support for his project from Lord Carteret, which were never fulfilled. In August, 1728, he married, and in the following month, full of hopes for the accomplishment of his darling scheme, set sail for Rhode Island, whence in three years he returned baffled and disappointed so far, but destined in 1734 to become Bishop of Cloyne. His was a noble nature, untinged by avarice or selfish ambition.

We do not wonder at any one loving the calm beauty of the islands, and their kindly, hospitable inhabitants, distinguished for their loyalty, contentment, and antique courtesy. Sensibly appreciating what is valuable and refined in modern customs, they decline the go-ahead ways of some of their neighbours, and, to their honour be it said, they have steadily refused to adopt the divorce court amongst their institutions.

Long may they preserve their good old ways, and, whilst wishing them every benefit from increased industry and enterprise, we earnestly hope the 'Mudians may escape the corruption that too often flows in the tide of prosperity.

ART. VII.—MR. GLADSTONE'S EXPOSTULATION.

The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance. A Political Expostulation. By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. London : Murray.

The Dollingerites, Mr. Gladstone, and Apostasy from the Faith. By Bishop ULLATHORNE. London : Richardson.

Catholic Allegiance : a Pastoral Letter. By WILLIAM CLIFFORD, Bishop of Clifton. Clifton.

A Pastoral Letter on Submission to a Divine Teacher. By HERBERT, Bishop of Salford. Salford : Dominy.

The Abomination of Desolation. A Sermon preached by Rev. Father F. COLERIDGE, S.J. London : Burns & Oates.

The Month, December, 1874 : article by Rev. Father PARKINSON, S.J. London : Burns & Oates.

A Reply to Mr. Gladstone's Political Expostulation. By Right Rev. Monsignor CAPEL. London : Longmans.

Civilization and the See of Rome. By Right Hon. Lord R. MONTAGU, M.P. Dublin : M'Glashan.

&c. &c. &c.

IT is simply impossible to treat Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet as a whole, within the compass of an article. He has touched superficially on a large number of topics,—all of which require careful treatment, and most of which have received it from English Catholics,—apparently without paying such Catholics the compliment of even looking at what they have written. We may add, that he has handled these topics with a degree of recklessness and inaccuracy, which we could have never expected from such a writer; especially when he was engaged in so anxious an enterprise, and one so obviously pregnant with the gravest and most lasting consequences. It is, we say, simply impossible for us to treat to any purpose in one article (1) the theory of dogmatic development; (2) the Church's doctrine on liberty of worship and the press; (3) the due relations between Church and State; (4) the due relations between the Church and education; (5) the due relations between the Church and philosophical speculation. And we are expected to do all this forsooth for the information of one, who has treated all that Catholics have hitherto written on

these grave matters as so much waste paper. We will confine ourselves then on the present occasion, to saying a few words as to those of Mr. Gladstone's topics, which have not hitherto been so prominently treated in our own pages as the rest; and to placing before our readers somewhat long and numerous extracts, from the replies to Mr. Gladstone which have already appeared. At last—when a person in Mr. Gladstone's position thinks it his duty to bring the grievous charge of civil disloyalty against all Catholics who are faithful to their religion—it is more suitable that direct answers should come, not from anonymous reviewers, but from prominent and representative men who shall speak with authority. Pastorals have already been issued by the Bishops of Birmingham, Clifton, and Salford; while longer replies are promised by the Archbishop of Westminster, the Bishop of Birmingham, and F. Newman. These will be the recognized replies to Mr. Gladstone; and we doubt not we shall have good employment for our next number in giving our readers a taste of their quality.*

At starting we will give one or two illustrations—in addition to those numerous ones which have already been pointed out by Catholic writers—of the strange inconsiderateness, with which Mr. Gladstone's intense temporary excitement has led him to write. Consider e.g. his momentary forgetfulness of what he must know to be the elementary doctrines of Catholicity, when he alleges that Catholics have a just cause of grievance, because (in his strange phraseology) "their religion has been changed over their heads." It has been, we need hardly say, the elementary principle of the Church in every age including the Apostolic, that Christians are to learn the doctrines of their religion in no other way, than by docile submission to the Church's teaching. No one is a Catholic at all, who bases his religion on any other principle; and in the event of some doctrine being defined which had not hitherto been of strict obligation, no Catholic would dream of any other course, than of humbly accepting this, as he has humbly accepted every other.

Then again Mr. Gladstone tries throughout to sustain the theory, that he is adverse indeed to ecclesiastical authorities, but in no way adverse to the general body of Catholics. "If I am told," he says (p. 9) "that he who animadverts upon" "the Papal Chair and its advisers and abettors" "assails

* Since this article was in type, the two last-named writers have published their comments on Mr. Gladstone. We give notices of these in our present number.

thereby or insults Roman Catholics at large, who do not choose their ecclesiastical rulers and are not recognized as having any voice in the government of their Church, I cannot be bound by or accept a proposition which seems to me to be so little in accordance with reason." Let us give a parallel to this extraordinary statement. A person tells me that my father is an unscrupulous knave; and when I protest against this remark as personally offensive, he makes me Mr. Gladstone's reply. "If I am told that he who assails or insults your father, assails thereby or insults *you*, who did not choose your father, and are not recognized as having any voice in his government of his family, I cannot accept so unreasonable a proposition."

Here is another noteworthy statement. "It has been alike the peculiarity, the pride, and the misfortune of the Roman Church among Christian communities to allow to itself an unbounded use, as far as its power would go, of earthly instruments for spiritual ends" (p. 40). Why, what on earth can be more admirable, than "the use of earthly instruments for spiritual ends"? He who expends his fortune in building seminaries, churches, schools, is precisely "using earthly instruments for spiritual ends." Does Mr. Gladstone think such a man would have acted more Christianly, had he spent it on his own personal enjoyment? Lord Robert Montagu, in the truly admirable lecture which we name at the head of this article, draws attention (p. 4) to S. Thomas's doctrine, that "wars" in order to be just "must be referred to spiritual and divine good as their end." We fear this must be one of the Catholic propositions to which Mr. Gladstone objects: for does it not involve a reprehensible "use of temporal instruments for spiritual ends"? No, Mr. Gladstone may say, let such corruptions be rejected by faithful Protestants; by *them* let wars be waged, not for spiritual ends, but only for the sake of territorial aggrandizement or dynastical advantage.

Then look at the famous passage from Mr. Gladstone's article in the "Contemporary Review," repeated in the present pamphlet at p. 6. "Rome has substituted, for the proud boast of '*semper eadem*,' a policy of violence and change in faith; she has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused." In the second of these two clauses the writer complains, that after all Rome is just the same as ever she was; whereas in the clause immediately preceding he had censured her for *abandoning* "her proud boast of '*semper eadem*.'" The only mitigation we can suggest for this extraordinary self-contradiction

diction is, that one term of it is expressed in English and the other in Latin.

Here again is a singular sentence in p. 55: "The State, as the power which alone is responsible for the external order of the world, can alone conclusively and finally be competent to determine, what is to take place in the external order." As the words stand, this is certainly a safe proposition, and may be accepted on both sides as indubitable. The State alone "can conclusively and finally be competent to determine," what on any given occasion the State shall choose to do.

Passing to the substance and general contents of the "Expostulation," the first thought which strikes us is this. A plague of extremest infidelity and godlessness is spreading through England, with a rapidity truly appalling.* The crisis calls for the combined efforts of all Christians, nay of all firm believers in Theism. No one, we well know, would be more faithful than Mr. Gladstone, when he saw the occasion to arise, in contesting to the death against this fearful development; and yet, instead of labouring to arouse his fellow-countrymen against this peril which is at their very doors, he does all he can to divert their watchfulness into the very opposite direction. He strives to increase that prejudice of theirs, which is already so deplorably great, against persons, than whom (as he must himself admit) there are no firmer, more unflinching, more uncompromising enemies of irreligion. A pious Christian, who at this moment thinks "Popery" the chief evil against which Englishmen should be warned, must be (one would think) that eccentric person, who (as Dr. Johnson suggested) cried "fire" in the midst of the Deluge.

If England then is to be saved from a national renouncement of religion, the result can only be effected by a vigorous co-operation of all Christians in the work. Doubtless, between Catholics and other professors of Christianity there is a large mass of fundamental difference, which admits of no compromise or concession, and on which under all circumstances the Catholic must always insist. Moreover, as the Catholic expresses strongly and energetically his dissent from Protestantism, so the Protestant, from his point of view, will feel himself under the similar obligation of protesting against Catholicity. But this may surely be done on both sides—we, for our part, have ever striven to do it on ours—as expressly indeed and

* The Rev. Mr. Llewelyn Davies, an Anglican clergyman, testifies that "scepticism" is "spreading through the thought of all classes of society, with a propagative action like that of fever-germs or the spores of a fungus."—"Contemporary Review," for January, 1875, p. 225.

as forcibly as possible, but still in a tone which recognizes, that some fundamental agreement exists even amidst fundamental differences. What we earnestly complain of in Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet is, that (under some violent impulse) he has entirely lost sight for the moment of what he must well know to be his country's gravest peril. He writes concerning Catholicity in a spirit of rhetorical invective, not of grave argument, regret, protest; and he reprints his pamphlet in a cheap edition, with the very purpose of circulating it among a class, which is very accessible doubtless to anti-Catholic declamation, but which is surely (in Mr. Gladstone's own view) entirely incapable of deciding on the merits of the case. Any one indeed who reads his pages would suppose him to think; that Professors Huxley and Tyndall and their rapidly increasing band of followers are sounder patriots and more trustworthy citizens, than the Archbishop of Westminster and other "myrmidons of the Apostolic Chamber" (p. 65).

For our own part, and with our own convictions, no violence of language on Mr. Gladstone's part—though it were ten times greater than it is—should induce us to follow his example. He may forget for a period England's true danger, but we cannot forget it. The practical question of the hour is not (as Mr. Gladstone seems to think) whether the Catholic Church shall gain or lose in number as compared with the Christian denominations; but whether Church and denominations alike shall suffer from those able and energetic enemies, who reject all religion alike, natural no less than revealed. And it is of extreme moment therefore, that firm believers in a Personal God shall not so exclusively dwell on their mutual differences—grave and in some sense vital though those differences be—as to preclude a combined movement against the common foe. God forbid we should desire any such co-operation with other Theists, as can involve the slightest compromise of the Catholic Faith: indeed we expressed an opinion in our last number that, as the controversy proceeds, Catholic principles will be recognized more and more as affording the only effective barrier against the existing plague. But there may be true co-operation without any such compromise.

We shall be promoting perhaps this peaceful purpose, if we can make clearer to Catholics what (as we understand the matter) is at the bottom of that anti-Catholic feeling, which is always latent among the English people. English Catholics are so keenly conscious of their genuine patriotism and their conscientious obedience and subordination to the civil ruler, that they are tempted to regard the anti-Catholic outcry which can

so easily be evoked, as a mere exhibition of passionate and unreasonable ill-will felt towards them by their fellow-countrymen. If this be really not the case—as we are convinced, it is not—the interests of truth will be promoted by Catholics being disabused of their impression. We would suggest then as follows.

No one can fairly doubt, that the sphere of morality is very vast. As Mr. Gladstone truly and beautifully says (p. 37), "Duty is a power, which rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night. It is co-extensive with the action of our intelligence. It is the shadow which cleaves to us go where we will, and which only leaves us when we leave the light of life." Hardly an act of ordinary life can be mentioned, which has not its moral side. Take even those particulars which are most indisputably and immediately within the State's province, yet the same truth holds. It is for the State exclusively to determine what excise duties shall be imposed, or what game laws shall be enacted; but it is a *moral* question how far smuggling and poaching are sinful. The State decides paramountly what contracts shall have legal validity; but it is a moral question how far they possess validity in *foro conscientiæ*.* The State, by its supreme authority, impanels a jury, and gives a barrister the privilege of pleading before it; but it is a *moral* question, how far one individual jurymen may waive his own judgment in deference to that of the rest, and how far an individual barrister may veil truth in the interests of his client. Now all those moral questions, in the judgment of every Christian, are entirely external to the State's province. It is not that Catholics give less to the State than Mr. Gladstone himself; for Mr. Gladstone says expressly (p. 55) that "divine truth," and inclusively of course moral truth, "is not to be sought from the lips of the State, nor to be sacrificed at its demand." The difference between Mr. Gladstone and Catholics, is not at all that the former gives more to the State and the latter less; but only that what Mr. Gladstone decides by his personal reference to Scripture and Tradition, or by his individual reason and conscience, Catholics decide by the Church's teaching. Moreover Catholics know well as a matter of faith, that the *Ecclesia Docens* enjoys most special divine superintendence, and that her whole moral guidance is in fullest conformity

* Take one instance out of a thousand. A and B enter into a legal contract. After it has been duly signed, they find that (owing to some bungle of the lawyers) it confers on A a right, which neither B intended to give nor had A any idea of receiving. Can A, without sin, claim that right? Here is an exclusively moral question.

with the Natural Law ;* while daily experience unmistakably impresses on them the circumstance, how entirely consistent with itself and with the facts of human nature is this guidance ; how singularly temperate, equitable, reasonable are the Church's practical maxims ; how eminently conducive to political order, harmony, submission, is her whole influence. But the Protestant possesses neither this faith nor this experience ; while he knows that the Church is a society very far from exclusively English, and that she is governed by a "foreigner." It is therefore a fact very trying to his patience, that such a society should exercise such influence over a large multitude of British subjects. In proportion indeed as he comes to know Catholics personally—their character, their daily habits, their demeanour in private and public life—he abandons his theoretical prejudices, and pronounces them to be harmless, tranquil, orderly men. He may feel that their type of religion differs very importantly from his own ; but he feels no less unmistakably, that their religious characteristics, so far from having any anarchical or revolutionary bearing, tend emphatically in the very opposite direction. Since therefore Catholics unhappily cannot persuade him of the Church's infallibility, it is to his practical experience of them that they confidently appeal as a guarantee of their innocuousness. And in tranquil times this appeal has certainly no inconsiderable success. But when the "No Popery" cry is once raised, too many Protestants forget their practical experience of Catholics, and fix their attention exclusively on the doctrinal theory of Catholicity. The not unnatural result is, that they burst into a certain paroxysm of excitement. This is very deplorable, and in effect very unfair ; but it is not (as Catholics are sometimes tempted to think) a mere gratuitous outburst of ill will.

The only argument then, which can be addressed by Catholics to a non-Catholic on the question of civil allegiance, consists in pointing to the universal experience of past centuries, as a pledge of their faithful and submissive citizenship. It is the most cruelly unjust part of Mr. Gladstone's

* Catholics often point out most reasonably to the Protestant, that the Pope has no power, by any *ex cathedrâ* Act, to contradict either the Natural Law or previous Pontifical Definitions. The Protestant not unfrequently misunderstands this, as though Catholics claimed to themselves a power of appealing against some Definition to *their own interpretation*, whether of the Natural Law or of previous Definitions ; whereas what Catholics mean is, that the Pope is *infallibly secured* against contradicting one or the other in this *ex cathedrâ* teaching. Yet the appeal of Catholics is most reasonable. "Look at the moral code now reigning throughout the Church ; look at the large mass of existing Definitions. We hold it as infallibly certain, that no part of this teaching will ever be authoritatively interfered with. You may know our religion in its practical aspect by a careful study of this teaching."

pamphlet, that he tries to cut this ground from under their feet; that he tries to make of no avail for them that long past of civil loyalty to which they appeal, by representing the Catholic religion as no longer what it was, and as having been fundamentally altered in its relation to the State by the Vatican Definitions. It is therefore of the greatest practical importance for Catholics to show, that this notion of his has not so much as the faintest vestige or semblance of truth.

Mr. Gladstone's allegation seems to be partly founded on a supposition, that the Syllabus has acquired quite new authority by the definition of Papal Infallibility. Never was there a more manifest mistake. The comparatively few Catholics who, before 1870, doubted the infallibility of Papal *ex cathedrâ* definitions, never on that account doubted the infallibility of the Syllabus; and on the other hand those comparatively few Catholics who, before 1870, doubted the infallibility of the Syllabus, were in no sense obliged by the Vatican Decrees to alter their mind. We say firstly, the infallibility of the Syllabus in no respect depended on the separate infallibility of the Pope. The "*Correspondant*" was the chief organ in France of those who deprecated the definition concerning infallibility; and what was its own language concerning the seat of that prerogative? "*A Pontifical Proposition, corroborated by the sense of the Episcopate,—infallibility is there or it is nowhere; a Catholic owes it his submission or he ceases to merit that name.*" Now no one has ever thought of doubting, that Catholic Bishops throughout the world assented to the Pontifical condemnation of the errors recited in the Syllabus. Those who (most strangely to our mind) doubted the infallibility of the Syllabus, did so—not at all because they doubted the episcopal adhesion to the Pope—but because they doubted whether in its promulgation the Pope had spoken *ex cathedrâ*. It is evident then, by the very force of terms, that they were no more obliged by the Vatican Council than they had been obliged before, to regard the Syllabus as an infallible determination. The infallibility of the Syllabus has no more connection with the dogma defined in 1870, than it has with the severity of this year's winter.

But in truth it is not any doctrine involved in the Syllabus which most profoundly disturbs Mr. Gladstone, but a different one altogether; the doctrine, namely, that the Pope's *ex cathedrâ* infallibility extends throughout the whole sphere of morals. This fact is evident from the extraordinary intensity of language with which Mr. Gladstone denounces any such claim. The passage we are about to quote abounds in elevated sentiments; nor could we have believed it possible,

were not the page open before our eyes, that thoughts so noble could have been disfigured by that absolutely insensate language about Rome, which we put into italics.

Will it be said, finally, that the Infallibility touches only matter of faith and morals? Only matter of morals! *Will any of the Roman casuists kindly acquaint us* what are the departments and functions of human life which do not and cannot fall within the domain of morals? If they will not tell us, we must look elsewhere. In his work entitled "Literature and Dogma," Mr. Matthew Arnold quaintly informs us—as they tell us nowadays how many parts of our poor bodies are solid, and how many aqueous—that about seventy-five per cent. of all we do belongs to the department of "conduct." Conduct and Morals, we may suppose, are nearly co-extensive. Three-fourths, then, of life are thus handed over. But who will guarantee to us the other fourth? Certainly not St. Paul; who says, "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do *all* to the glory of God." And "Whatsoever ye do, in word or in deed, do *all* in the name of the Lord Jesus."

No! Such a distinction *would be the unworthy device of a shallow policy, vainly used to hide the daring of that wild ambition which at Rome, not from the throne but from behind the throne, prompts the movements of, the Vatican.* I care not to ask if there be dregs or tatters of human life, such as can escape from the description and boundary of morals. I submit that Duty is a power which rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night. It is co-extensive with the action of our intelligence. It is the shadow which cleaves to us go where we will, and which only leaves us when we leave the light of life. So then it is the supreme direction of us in respect to all Duty, which the Pontiff declares to belong to him, *sacro approbante concilio*: and this declaration he makes, not as an otiose opinion of the schools, but *cunctis fidelibus credendam et tenendam* (pp. 36, 7).

Mr. Gladstone's point then is, that any authority, claiming for itself infallibility in morals, must be perilous to the State in a degree which words cannot well exaggerate. *But was this claim first made in 1870?* Is it not a fact, known even to Lord Macaulay's "well-educated schoolboy," that the Church of Rome has throughout every age claimed for herself infallibility in faith and morals? Had Bishop Doyle any greater doubt than Archbishop Manning, that such is the Church's claim? What can Mr. Gladstone mean by alleging that the Vatican Decrees have essentially altered the Church's relation to the State, when it is a notorious fact that the claim on which he lays his principal stress was as preremptorily put forth before the Decrees as it has been since?

Mr. Gladstone, we suppose, will reply, that infallibility vested separately in the Pope is a very different thing from infallibility vested conjointly in Pope and Bishops. From the State's point of view however, we are quite unable to understand any

such distinction. To an ordinary English Protestant, the Catholic Episcopate is as simply a "foreign" authority as the Pope himself. Once admit that a certain teaching authority distinct from the State claims infallibility in morals,—we do not see how it can matter one pin to an Englishman who rejects that claim, whether it be put forth in favour of one or of a thousand "foreigners." Now in Bishop Doyle's time, to which Mr. Gladstone apparently looks back as a kind of golden era in British Catholicity, the Church's moral guidance was exercised precisely as it is now. Then, as now, there were authorized Catholic books of Moral Theology, laying down in detail the Catholic's duty under all the diversified circumstances of secular life; and that duty was inculcated on every Catholic by the duly authorized priests. Moreover then, as now, any doctrine incidentally contained in those books was at any moment liable to be corrected by any *ex cathedrâ* definition, which the Pope might issue, and which should be confirmed (as all *ex cathedrâ* definitions were invariably confirmed) by the tacit assent of the Episcopate. If Catholics were harmless and orderly citizens then, what possible excuse can be given for supposing that they may be otherwise now?

And here let us consider Mr. Gladstone's perplexing remarks, on Bishop Doyle and his contemporary prelates. Dr. Doyle's "sentiments" he says (p. 30), "powerfully operated on the open and trustful temper of this people, to induce them to grant, at the cost of so much popular feeling and national tradition, the great and just concession of 1829. That concession without such declaration, it would, to say the least, have been far more difficult to obtain." Now we will not here consider, what was the exact purport of Bishop Doyle's "declarations," and how far we can ourselves sympathize with their tenour: but we ask, what is Mr. Gladstone's purpose in referring to them. The obvious tendency of the sentence we have just extracted is this: "we granted Catholic Emancipation"—Mr. Gladstone seems to say—"on faith in Bishop Doyle's description of the Catholic religion; but we now find that we were taken in by that description, and we must withdraw the concessions we then made." But so far from intending this, he declares that these concessions were "a work of simple justice" (p. 64); that they are a necessary part of England's "moral panoply" (p. 65), however deaf Catholics may be to his Expostulation; and that their abrogation would be incompatible with "the accomplishment of England's mission in the world" (p. 66). At the same time, notwithstanding these very express disclaimers, it will not be safe for Catholics

to forbear from pointing out, that nothing can be more unfounded than Mr. Gladstone's notion about Bishop Doyle's "declarations" having contributed to the achievement of Catholic Emancipation. This has been most opportunely shown by the Bishop of Salford; and the proof he gives is so important, that we will extract the entire passage.

In order, therefore, that the facts which led to your Emancipation may be present to your mind at least, we venture to lay before you the following extracts from well-known historical authorities:—

In the "Memoirs by Sir Robert Peel" (London, John Murray, 1856), Part I., pp. 365, 366, we read:—

"I do solemnly affirm, . . . that in advising and promoting the measures of 1829, I was swayed by no fear except the fear of public calamity, and that I acted throughout on a deep conviction that those measures were not only conducive to the general welfare, but that they had become imperatively necessary in order to avert from interests which had a special claim upon my support—the interests of the [Anglican] Church and of institutions connected with the [Anglican] Church—an imminent and increasing danger."

See also, pp. 360–342, Peel's letter to the Bishop of Limerick; in which he enumerates six reasons for the concession, *without a word implying that he was influenced by any statements of Catholics repudiating Papal dictation.*

To the same purpose are his memoranda on the question, pp. 284–294, and pp. 300–308.

In "The Greville Memoirs" (Longmans, 1874), vol. I., p. 133, chapter 4, [1828], occur the following:—

"The success of the Catholic question depends neither on Whigs nor Tories; the former of whom have not the power, and the latter not the inclination to carry it. The march of time and the state of Ireland will effect it in spite of everything, and its slow but continued advance can neither be retarded by its enemies nor accelerated by its friends."

P. 168, "It was the Clare election which convinced both him (Peel) and the Duke that it must be done. . . . If the Irish Catholics had not brought matters to this pass by agitation and association, things might have remained as they were for ever, and all these Tories would have voted on till the day of their death against them." Read the whole of chap. V., pp. 164–220. See also "Guizot's Memoirs of Sir Robert Peel" (Bentley, 1857).

P. 40, in Sir R. Peel's opening speech, he says:—"I yield therefore to a moral necessity which I cannot control, unwilling to push resistance to a point which might endanger the Establishments that I wish to defend."

Again, read in the "Life of the Duke of Wellington," by J. H. Stocqueler, vol. II. (1853), the speech of Wellington, April, 1829:—

"I call on those who apprehend that danger (*viz.*, to the Established Church) to state clearly whether that danger, on this particular occasion, is more to be expected as resulting from legislation or *from violence.*"

Again, in the "Life and Character of Sir Robert Peel," by Sir Lawrence Peel, 1860, we have this testimony:—"Their conduct has been stigmatised

as a concession to violence. . . . Concession of this nature to the demands of an excited people, whether of a whole empire or of a part, will be judged from the nature of the demand and the motives of those who yield to it."

And lastly, we might refer to the "Life of the Duke of Wellington," by Sir James Edward Alexander, 1840, vol. II., chap. x., pp. 439-471.

In his speech, April 2, 1829, Wellington referred to the prospect of civil war as his chief motive for having brought in the Bill, p. 463:—"If I could avoid, by any sacrifice whatever, even one month of civil war in the country to which I am attached, I would sacrifice my life in order to do it." See again details, in his speech in reply, p. 468 (pp. 36, 7).

Mr. Gladstone is under quite a different impression, as to the means whereby Catholics obtained Emancipation; but he is none the less decided for the moment against any idea of reimposing on them civil disqualifications. It is really then difficult, as we said, to understand what can be the drift of his repeated references to Bishop Doyle; and the only other conjecture we can make on the subject, is this. He may intend to imply that, if Bishop Doyle misrepresented Catholic doctrine, it was the Pope's business to correct such misrepresentation; and that Protestant Englishmen have just right to complain, if the Holy Father failed to do so. But if this is what he intends,—we would ask him whether Bishop Doyle *ever alleged* that the peculiar doctrinal views which he expressed were coincident with the Pope's. Mr. Gladstone himself (p. 44, 5) quotes the Bishop as declaring, that "if the Pope intermeddled with their religion," "the Roman Catholic clergy" would "oppose him by every means in" their "power, even by the exercise of" their "spiritual authority." And as to the Vatican Decrees, it was always a perfectly notorious fact, that the doctrine taught by the Holy See was identical with the doctrine of those Decrees. A very few words will suffice to show that this is admitted by Mr. Gladstone himself. His complaint is (p. 32) that—in opposition to what was held by Bishop Doyle—Catholics are now required to hold certain dogmata concerning the Pope's infallibility and ecclesiastical supremacy. Yet observe his language only a few pages earlier. "The Popes had kept up," he said, "with comparatively little intermission, for well nigh a thousand years, their claim to dogmatic infallibility: and had at periods within the same tract of time, often enough made and never retracted that other claim, which is theoretically less, but practically larger; their claim to an obedience virtually universal from the baptized members of the Church." We will not pause to point out the exaggeration contained in this last clause, because that would

carry us away from our immediate purpose. But it is perfectly plain, even on Mr. Gladstone's own showing, that no Englishmen in 1829 who chose to inquire could possibly doubt, that the Pope *did* put forth in his own behalf that claim which so revolts Mr. Gladstone. And if they chose nevertheless to take for granted that the British Catholic body would always continue to repudiate that claim, this was simply their own most gratuitous assumption, for which none but themselves can with any show of reason be held responsible. The fact however is (as we have already shown) that Bishop Doyle's "declarations" had nothing whatever to do with the achievement of Catholic Emancipation. And we should further add, that the great growth of what is called "Ultramontaniam," which has been witnessed among English Catholics for the last twenty or thirty years, is, in no sense owing to the Vatican Decrees, but on the contrary has been one of the innumerable circumstances which rendered those Decrees opportune.

Our argument has on the whole been this. The Protestant does not believe in the special supernatural guidance, which ever directs the Holy Father and the Catholic Episcopate. If therefore he chooses to judge Catholics, not by his experience of their uniform demeanour but by his view of their theological theory, we cannot be surprised that he accounts them dangerous to the State's tranquillity. The chief cause however of his imagining this danger is their doctrine, that infallibility extends over the sphere of morals. But their doctrine that infallibility extends over the sphere of morals, has been professed by them openly and unintermittingly from time immemorial. It was a doctrine, held as strongly by Mr. Gladstone's pattern Bishop Doyle as by Archbishop Manning himself; nor can it matter one straw to the Protestant, whether such infallibility be ascribed to the Pope defining separately, or to the Pope defining in conjunction with the Episcopate. Mr. Gladstone's central position therefore falls to the ground.

At the same time we do not mean to deny, that there is a doctrine on the true relations between Church and State, which Mr. Gladstone may very plausibly represent as different from Bishop Doyle's, and which has found partial expression in the Syllabus and other similar pronouncements. Our next endeavour then would have been to set forth this theory; in order to show how monstrously it is misapprehended by Mr. Gladstone, when he calls it a claim made by the Pope to "universal monarchy." But this task has been accomplished far more successfully than we could have hoped to accomplish

it, by F. Parkinson, S. J., in the December number of the "Month." We will avail ourselves largely therefore of F. Parkinson's words; and we hope he will not think us disrespectful, if we italicise one or two clauses to which we entreat our readers' special attention:—

It is surely a just ground of complaint that Mr. Gladstone should have indulged in so violent an assault upon Catholics, simply because they can and do give categorical answers to the questions before us, and with the view of showing the false and dangerous nature of such answers and of weakening their reliance therefore on their truth,—and should then leave them to find out fresh answers for themselves. When Mr. Gladstone deliberately attempts to disturb the faith of a large section of his fellow-men, and to root up the foundations on which they have hitherto rested, he incurs at least the obligation of giving them some outline of the system that he would substitute for that of which he would deprive them. In the meantime we will state as plainly and succinctly as we can the doctrines held by the most approved Catholic theologians on a subject of such vast and fundamental importance.

Catholic theologians then, of the school of Suarez and Bellarmine, hold that there are two distinct powers in the world, the temporal and the spiritual, each having its own sphere, its own end, and its own mode of operation; that both powers are ordained by God; and that whatever authority resides in them comes in both cases alike from God. The direct and primary end of the temporal order is the temporal well-being, security, and peace of the social organism, and of each member of such organism, so far as that can be attained. But man is an immortal being, and looks forward to higher and eternal destinies. *The fulfilling, therefore, of such destinies cannot be overlooked in any well-regulated State*; therefore, the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of such State *will then be best ordered* when they are imbued with principles that shall make them available, as far as may be attainable, as helps and furtherances to each individual member of the general body, in complying with the conditions on which depends the gaining of his eternal end.

The spiritual order has for its primary and direct end the eternal well-being, the salvation of men; and to this end solely and primarily are its functions and operations directed.

Having laid down these preliminary principles, let us further add that this view regards all legitimately constituted States, whatever their external form of government may be, as the expression of the temporal power; and that it looks upon the Catholic Church, with the successor of S. Peter the Vicar of Jesus Christ at its head, as the living and tangible expression of the spiritual power. To complete our sketch it only remains to say that of these two powers the temporal power is on a lower level than the spiritual power, and in certain respects subordinate to it. And that this must necessarily be so, can easily be seen from one or two simple considerations. (1) The guide of the temporal power, in so far as it is represented by any State in its simply natural condition, is the law of nature, by which it ought to be of necessity

regulated in virtue of its essential dependence on God the Creator. But the guide of the supernatural power is not only the natural law, but that supernatural complement of the natural law which is embodied in the revelation of Jesus Christ. The spiritual order, then, is of its very nature capable of throwing much light upon and elevating and enhancing the prescriptions of the natural law; and therefore upon the operations of the temporal order; reason therefore it is that the temporal should in some way be subordinate to the spiritual order, and that all the more inasmuch as it is the very reason of the being of the spiritual and supernatural order to aid and support the temporal and natural. (2) Again, we have seen that the ends of the two orders in some respects differ, and in some respects coincide. The temporal has for its primary end the material and social well-being of the community, but *it must not exclude the consideration, over and above this, of man's eternal and supernatural end.* But man's supernatural end is again the very reason of the being, as far as final cause is concerned, of the spiritual order; to some extent, therefore, and in this point of view, the temporal and spiritual orders have the same end. So far, then, as one order may be furnished with more copious illumination and ampler means for the attainment of that common end, so far will it predominate over the other to which less light and scantier means have been allotted. But in this matter there can be no question on which side the pre-eminence lies, and therefore there can be none as to the subordination, in respect of man's final end, of the temporal to the spiritual order. These reasonings seem so plain, that even with the meagre premisses that Mr. Gladstone affords us, we cannot conceive any other conclusion possible.

Let us now turn to the authoritative pronouncements of the Church in support of our conclusion; and in doing this we shall throw the best possible light on the relations involved in the attitude of the two powers towards each other (pp. 483, 4; 484-6).

F. Parkinson proceeds to authenticate this doctrine, by reference to those two Pontiffs who, more than any others, have been commonly alleged as claiming exorbitant temporal authority. It was by Boniface VIII. that the famous Bull "*Unam Sanctam*" was issued; a Bull on which singular stress has always been laid by Protestants, as though it avowedly placed the temporal no less than the spiritual sword in the Pope's sole hand. In opposition to this charge, F. Parkinson quotes (p. 488) the exposition of the "*Unam Sanctam*," which was published by Dollinger when yet a Catholic, and which is indisputably correct; and proceeds to cite in the same sense the express "*words of Boniface VIII. uttered in full Council in presence of the legates of Philip le Bel*" himself. Innocent III., as F. Parkinson points out, had already laid down the very same doctrine with unmistakable clearness. And to sum up the whole matter, we will again avail ourselves of F. Parkinson's words:—"The Popes," he says, "did not claim to wield the

temporal power, in the ordinary sense of the word, over the nations ; . . . but they did assert their right as guardians of the law natural and divine, to see that the principles and provisions of that law were not violated. This was the measure of their pre-eminence over the civil order ; a pre-eminence which was acknowledged by the whole of Christendom. And it was so acknowledged, because the right upon which it rested *was recognized to be vested in them as the successors of S. Peter and the vicars of Christ. Nothing else than the profound conviction of the real existence of this right in the Sovereign Pontiff could have given rise to that magnificent system of public right, which was universally accepted by the Christian commonwealth in the middle ages.*"*

We need hardly say, that—though the principles on which this doctrine is founded must hold good in every age—the doctrine itself could not be reduced to practice, except in those ages which possessed the unspeakable blessing of Catholic unity. As to the relations between Church and State which have *in fact* prevailed at different periods—we have nowhere seen the matter more clearly and succinctly stated, than in F. Coleridge's sermon preached on occasion of the "Expostulation." From this sermon we will also make a somewhat lengthy extract, italicising on our own part (as before) one or two clauses :—

In the history of the Church and of man, we find that there are three possible relations which these two powers may bear to one another. There is what we call the Christian system of Church and State, and again, what may be called the un-Christian or non-Christian system, and a third also, which is the anti-Christian system. In the Christian system, the two powers are in perfect harmony ; in the non-Christian system they are entirely separate, and, as it were, have no dealings with each other ; in the anti-Christian system, the State dominates the Church and tyrannically invades the spiritual sphere. A very few words will be enough to explain how this is.

The Christian system of Church and State once prevailed in Europe, though never quite perfectly. In that system the two powers worked harmoniously together ; the laws of God, as it is said, were the laws of the land, all the members of the State were children of the Church, and, as such, obedient to the Church in the spiritual order. Now, there is a large branch, if I may so speak, of the work and commission intrusted to the Church which may be called her prophetic office, because it is strictly analogous to the office which God in the Old Testament committed to His

* A writer in the "Macmillan" of December has argued in some detail, against that view of the "Unam Sanctam," which we have given in the text. We will add an Appendix to this article in reply to him.

prophets, and if the Church did not discharge it, she would fail to carry out her duty. It is an office of warning and rebuke, and reproof ; but also of instruction, guidance, direction, edification. And this office, dear brethren in Jesus Christ, the Church has always fulfilled, and must always fulfil, if she is not to be unfaithful to God. She must lift up her voice, and denounce sin and offences against God, and cruelty and tyranny towards men ; she must set her mark upon what is dangerous to society, and denounce the machinations of the enemies of the human race and their tools and instruments. As it was Nathan's office to say to David "Thou art the man !" after his adultery, or that of St. John to warn the lustful Herod that it was not lawful for him to take his brother's wife ; so it is the office which the Church has always fulfilled and must always fulfil, to rebuke the lusts, whether of princes or of peoples, to defend the otherwise defenceless, to vindicate the insulted law of right, and to bear testimony to the truth, in whatever order and sphere, religious, moral, social, intellectual, when the eternal interests of souls are at stake, whether men are inclined to listen to her or not. *But in the Christian system men and their rulers are ready to listen*, and to acknowledge the blessing of the guidance with which God has thus provided them. Nor can it be otherwise, for unless men are prepared to deny the mission of the Church and to declare that she is an impostor, they must of necessity acknowledge that Christian states and laws, as well as men individually, must be under the influence of the truths which the Christian revelation teaches, and *must defer to the declarations of the appointed organ of those truths*. Nor can any Christian refuse to listen to her voice, unless he maintain that there is no divine witness to truth in the world except that of the individual conscience.

What I call the un-Christian or the non-Christian system of Church and State is that in which the two powers are absolutely independent, and without any mutual ties or concordant action. Such a state of things necessarily prevails in countries in which the Government and the mass of the population are not Christians, or where they are divided into a number of denominations, and where the State, though heathen, does not persecute or fetter the Church. We have such a system at work in a great country across the Atlantic, the United States of America, which, as a body politic, have no religion at all, but tolerate all. The mass of the population is, however, Christian, of various denominations, and it is perhaps to this that we owe it that the system works so harmlessly as to the Church.

And then, in the third place, we have the anti-Christian system, in which, as I say, the State invades the domain of the Church, sets what bounds it likes to the exercise of spiritual power, and consequently puts itself, in a great measure, in the place of that power. This system has been introduced of late years into more than one country in Europe and in South America. The State denies to the Church her natural right, for instance, to hold property for the support of her institutions ; it seizes that property, and applies it to its own purposes. The State makes war on the practice of the Evangelical counsels in imitation of our Lord ; it proscribes religious orders, and sets the brand of exile on their members. The State tears the priest from the sanctuary, and forces him to bear arms in wars, just or unjust, as it

lays hands on the student in the seminary and educates him as a soldier, though God calls him to the altar. The State takes the child from the parent and from the pastor, and educates him in its own schools in a mixed religion of its own ; it even enters once more into the seminary, prescribes what the future priest shall learn, what books he shall study, and makes itself the final judge as to his fitness to enter upon the sacred ministry, and then it supervises his doctrine and his preaching, and takes into its own hands the control of his relations to his bishop, or the conditions of his communications with the Chief Pastor of all the faithful. And so I might go on, dear brethren, to other encroachments and usurpations and forms of tyranny which are no imaginations, but which have been actually in operation, or are at this moment paralyzing the free action of the spiritual power in some parts of Europe. I might speak of usurpations as to marriage, or as to the teaching of doctrines of faith, or as to the reception of the decisions of the Church. But surely these are enough to describe the system which is the anti-Christian system of relations between Church and State, and which is the result of the working of the same domineering and impious spirit which carried the Roman ensigns into the holy place, and which shall have the fullest manifestation which God will ever permit, when Antichrist shall seat himself in the Temple of God, showing himself as if he were God * (pp. 10-14).

The same general topic is handled by Lord R. Montagu, in his very interesting lecture on " Civilization and the See of Rome." " In days of old," he says, " every Pontiff inflicted punishments in exercise of his right as Supreme Ruler over the Christian Commonwealth, in which all Christian nations were united in a divine federation " (p. 11). Lord Robert proceeds to cite a number of historical facts, with the view of showing " how the Church worked to the amelioration of society " ; and we heartily commend these facts to our readers' attention. But we cannot refrain from placing before them two extracts given by him ; one from so decided a Protestant as M. Guizot, and the other by so violent an anti-Catholic as Mr. Froude.

First M. Guizot shall speak :—

If the Christian Church had not existed, the whole world would have been delivered over to mere brute force. She alone exerted a moral power. She did more ; she observed, and she inculcated the idea of rule, the idea

* We may be allowed to digress from our subject in a foot-note, for the purpose of drawing attention to one of F. Coleridge's characteristically beautiful applications of Scripture. He has been saying that " the most detestable of all forms of persecution " is " the grossest injustice and the extremity of violence *under the name of law* " (p. 15). Then he quotes in illustration our Blessed Lord's address to Pilate. " Thou shouldst not have any power against Me were it not given thee from above : *therefore*, he that delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin."

of a law above all human laws. She herself professed this belief (so essential to the rescuing of humanity), that there is, above all human laws, a law which . . . is, at all times and in all places, the same law. . . . There was another cause which also led to the same result: the frightful condition of the temporal order of things, the violence, the iniquity which was dominant in the secular government of all societies. Lately persons have talked at their ease of "the rights of the secular power"; but at the period with which we are engaged, the secular power was simply brute force—an intractable brigandage. The Church . . . was infinitely superior to such a secular power; the earnest cry of the people was ever urging her to take the place of the secular power. . . . Generally speaking, whenever men lost their liberties, it was the Christian Church which undertook to restore those liberties. In the tenth century, nowhere was the people able to defend itself, and to establish its rights in the face of the violence of the State; the Church then interfered in the name of Heaven (p. 15).

Now let us hear Mr. Froude:—

In the Middle Ages, a lofty effort had been made to overpass the common limitations of government, to introduce punishments for sins as well as crimes, and to visit with temporal penalties the breach of the moral law. The punishment best adapted for such offences was some outward expression of the disapproval with which good men regard acts of sin; some open disgrace; some spiritual censure; some suspension of the communion with the Church accompanied by other consequences practically inconvenient, to be continued until the offender had made reparation, or had openly repented, or had given confirmed proof of amendment. The administration of such a discipline fell, as a matter of course, to the clergy. The clergy were the guardians of morality; their characters were a claim to confidence; their duties gave them opportunities of observation which no other men could possess; while their priestly office gave solemn weight to their sentences. Thus arose, throughout Europe, a system of spiritual surveillance over the habits and conduct of every man, extending from the cottage to the castle, taking note of all wrong dealing, of all oppression of man by man, of all licentiousness and profligacy, and representing upon earth, in the principles by which it was guided, the laws of the great tribunal of Almighty God.

Such was the origin of the Church Courts, *perhaps the greatest institutions ever yet devised by man*. . . . Each private person was liable to be called in question for every action of his life; and an elaborate network of canon law, perpetually growing, enveloped the whole surface of society. . . . The misdemeanours of which these courts took cognizance were "offences against chastity, heresy, or matter tending thereunto, witchcraft, drunkenness, scandal, defamation of character, impatient words, broken promises, untruths," &c. . . . Workmen were not allowed to take advantage of the scantiness of the labour market to exact extravagant wages, and capitalists were not allowed to drive the labourers from their holdings and destroy their healthy independence, &c. (pp. 15, 16).

Monsignor Capel in his valuable pamphlet has appositely cited the similar expressions of Dr. Arnold; than whom a more violent opponent never existed of "sacerdotalism" in every shape:—

The principle in itself was this, whether the papal or the imperial, in other words, the sacerdotal or the imperial, power was to be accounted the greater. Now, conceive the Papal power to be the representative of what is moral and spiritual, and the imperial power to represent only what is external and physical; conceive the first to express the ideas of responsibility to God and paternal care and guidance, while the other was the mere embodying of selfish might, like the old Greek tyrannies; and who can do other than wish success to the Papal cause? Who can help being, with all his heart, a Guelf? But in the early part of the struggle this was, to a great extent, the state of it; the Pope stood in the place of the Church, the Emperor was a merely worldly despot, corrupt and arbitrary (p. 55).

On our own part, we will cite Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, an enemy to Catholicity if there be one in the world.

Can any one doubt that the principles of monogamy and the indissolubility of marriage controlled the most ardent passions of the strongest-willed races in the world during the dark and the middle ages, or that the control so exercised was in its results eminently beneficial to the human race? De Maistre claims . . . justly great credit for the mediæval clergy, for having upheld those principles, which are the central principles of our version of morals, against the repeated attacks upon them which were made by kings and nobles in the most violent periods of history. ("Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," pp. 239, 240.)

We cannot better sum up this part of our subject, than by saying with F. Parkinson (p. 493) that to put the temporal order "on a level with the spiritual, is of the earth earthy; to elevate it above the spiritual, is to shut God out from His own world."

We will venture to call the doctrine set forth by F. Parkinson the one Catholic doctrine. We do not mean by this that Catholics as such are bound to hold it, except so far as parts of it may have been actually inculcated on them by the Church's authoritative utterances. But we mean (1) that in our view the doctrine necessarily follows from principles which Catholics are obliged to hold, and is the only doctrine on the subject which explains and harmonizes the various acts and words of successive Popes; (2) that it has been distinctly taught, as F. Parkinson observes, "by the most approved theologians"; and (3) that it has been indicated by the Church in a thousand ways to those who are desirous of knowing her real mind.

And here we will make a comment in passing on Mr. Glad-

stone's remark in p. 34, that "there is no established or accepted definition of the phrase 'ex cathedrâ.'" As so stated, this remark is evidently an exaggeration; because the Council itself gives a definition of the phrase, which is most indubitably "established and accepted." Still we do not deny that there is some difference among grave theologians, when they debate whether this or that individual Pontifical declaration is or is not to be accounted *ex cathedrâ*. But we maintain that this circumstance really presents no inconvenience to truly docile Catholics. In the first place (as we have often pointed out) the question has literally no practical bearing whatever on the Catholic's apprehension of revealed dogmata; of all which concerns the true type of Christian character and the practical road to individual salvation. In the Catholic Church one definite body of instruction, whether as to dogma or practice, is placed alike before student and peasant—to be apprehended by them of course variously according to their respective mental endowments, but nevertheless one and the same—whether they are only seeking to obey God's commandments, or whether they desire to advance interiorly in His love and service. The question raised by Mr. Gladstone does not ever so distantly affect this great central body of instruction. But secondly we say that, even as regards those ministrative and subordinate truths which are necessary for the *protection* of revealed dogma, the Catholic who studies them in the Church's spirit suffers no inconvenience from not certainly knowing—among a large body of relevant Pontifical utterances—which precisely are *ex cathedrâ*. "There are a thousand" such questions (as F. Newman observes) "on which the Church intimates her judgment" without imposing it. The truly docile Catholic is careful to guide his speculations throughout—on matters which come into any kind of contact with Revelation—by the full light of these authoritative intimations. And whether this or that particular portion of the Church's doctrine, proposed perhaps in so many words by a series of Pontifical declarations, have as yet been actually imposed by an *ex cathedrâ* definition—this is an inquiry comparatively irrelevant to his purpose.

Perhaps, however, the point on which Mr. Gladstone intends here to insist, may be the moral perplexity resulting (as he thinks) to individual Catholics, from their uncertainty whether acceptance of this or that doctrine be of strict obligation. But Catholics fully understand that no obligation formally exists, wherever there is a solid and well-founded *doubt* of its existence. And as regards the application of this general principle to the particular case of obligatory *belief*, we may

perhaps be allowed to refer to some remarks of Dr. Ward, in a pamphlet on the extent of infallibility appended to our number for April, 1868, pp. 21-23.

But we must not delay longer in directly confronting that cardinal allegation of Mr. Gladstone's, which gives its life and meaning to the whole "Expostulation." Of course it is this, that Catholics who are thoroughly and heartily devoted to the Pope's teaching cannot be good citizens; that they must be deficient in patriotism and in due allegiance to the State. Firstly then as to the former.

If by being "deficient in patriotism" it be meant, that Catholics have no passionate desire of their country's power, territorial aggrandizement, and military glory—that they are immeasurably more desirous of her spiritual and temporal welfare—that they could not desire her success e.g. if she embarked in a flagrantly unjust war—greater praise can hardly be given to any men than to say that they are deficient in patriotism. Is Mr. Gladstone himself patriotic in any such sense? We think too well of his Christian consistency to entertain concerning him so discreditable an opinion. We will take one particular instance as illustrating what we mean, because Mr. Gladstone happens to have expressed a strong opinion on it; for he has implied that in his view the re-establishment of the Pope's temporal sovereignty would be an inexpressibly great European calamity. Let us imagine it proposed in influential quarters, that England shall engage in some war tending to such restoration. First of all, Mr. Gladstone would strain every nerve, whether by Parliamentary action or otherwise, to dissuade the Government from embarking in such a war. But secondly (and it is on this we wish to insist), when the war actually began, he would earnestly desire and pray for his country's discomfiture. We confidently make this second assertion; because every Christian would account it a less evil that his country suffer ever so serious a reverse, rather than that an inexpressibly grave calamity be inflicted on all Europe. Why then are Catholics to be accounted unpatriotic, because they would do in one case precisely what Mr. Gladstone himself would do on the opposite hypothesis?

Just now, no doubt, a vigorous attempt is being made to rehabilitate the old pagan "patriotism"; and to inculcate on men a burning desire of their country's aggrandizement, which shall preponderate over every antagonistic impulse. Let us see for a moment how this would work in practice. It is no extreme supposition to make, that at some time

or other the constituencies may force Parliament into a war, which every educated and impartial mind without exception shall see to be flagrantly unjust. Is every Englishman, under such circumstances, expected to think a course of action just, which is most manifestly unjust? or is he expected to desire his country's success in a most manifestly unjust war? We hardly know which of the two alternatives would be more degrading and corrupting to his moral character. It is to this hateful pseudo-patriotism that public opinion in all countries has more or less tended, since the Church's active intervention in politics has unhappily been rendered impracticable. But this feeling has hitherto been more or less unconscious and implicit; whereas an attempt is now being made to vindicate it as a theoretical principle, and raise it to be an admitted standard of conduct. We are confident that Mr. Gladstone's Christian convictions will lead him to abhor it, as we abhor it ourselves.

In truth he cannot really differ from ourselves on the nature of true patriotism. What would be his definition of the word? To be patriotic, he would say, is to love his country; and to love his country, is to desire her highest good. But what does he account her highest good? That she be great and powerful? That she have large territorial possessions? Nay, even that her population be plucky, brave, and spirited? As a Christian, he considers all these things to be as dust in the balance, when compared with true Christian virtue. In proportion then as he is a genuine patriot, in that proportion he would rejoice that England should sink into the lowest depth among European nations, if by such means her growth in all Christian virtues would be notably forwarded. We do not mean that such patriotism can be easily attained by any given person, any more than the highest excellence in *other* moral virtues can be easily attained. We only say that *in proportion as* Mr. Gladstone or any other Christian grows in true patriotism, his wish must be such as we have said.* Now we will venture to say that among no class of Englishmen is this genuine patriotism so approximately realized, as in those Catholics, who are most devoted to the Church, most docile to her teaching, most reverential to her Saints.

And now as to the chief point of all, the Catholic's civil

* It is plain that a quality which should dispose men to seek their country's lower good at the expense of her higher, would be no virtuous but a faulty quality. If "patriotism" meant this, then moderate patriotism would be a fault, and earnest patriotism would be a vice.

allegiance. In this matter the Archbishop of Westminster struck at once the true chord, in his first letter on Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet. The Catholic offers to the State as full allegiance, both in kind and degree, as can be offered by any one, who believes in Christianity, nay who believes in God and a Natural Law: we need hardly add — what is evidently included in this statement—as full in kind and degree, as is offered by Mr. Gladstone himself. This is the conclusion which we are now to maintain.

Mr. Gladstone says in effect (p. 24), that any Catholic, who heartily submits himself to the Church's teaching, disables himself thereby from rendering an "entire allegiance" to the civil government. We reply that the Catholic's allegiance is neither more nor less "entire," than Mr. Gladstone's own. Of what kind is his allegiance? He has enounced (as we have seen) the vitally important truth, that duty is "a power which rises with us in the morning and goes to rest with us at night"; nor need we add that it is *de jure* supreme over the whole of man's conduct. What then is his rule and standard of duty? The voice of the State? If this were so, he would not be a Christian; and he declares accordingly (p. 55) that "divine truth is not to be sought at the hands of the State, nor sacrificed at its command." He admits then that there is no disparagement whatever of the State's just claims—no derogation from "entire allegiance" to the civil government—though his conduct, from the time when he rises in the morning to the time when he goes to rest in the evening, is regulated by a standard entirely independent of the State. He does not profess for a moment that there is any security whatever for any given piece of English legislation being reconcilable with morality; nor will he obey any English law whatever, great or small, without having first satisfied himself that such obedience is consistent with duty. So far, at all events, he and the Catholic are on the same ground. The Cæsarists will say that his is a very "divided allegiance" indeed.

What then at last is the difference between him and Catholics? Both parties admit, that every utterance of human law requires to be measured by some external standard, before it rightly challenges obedience. The only difference is, that with Catholics this external standard is the Church's voice, whereas with Mr. Gladstone it is individual conscience and reason. We are the very last to undervalue the importance of this contrast; but manifestly it has no bearing whatever on the deference given to State authority. Mr. Gladstone yields no more to the State, than a Catholic yields. Sir George

Bowyer put this point very clearly in a letter to "The Times"; and Mgr. Capel expresses it with great force. "Mr. Gladstone," he says (p. 52), "ought in common fairness to have said, that Catholics do render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; but that they learn what things are Cæsar's, not by the fallible authority of private judgment, but by the infallible voice of their Church."

It is involved in what we have said, and it must evidently be true in the case of all Christians, that cases may arise, in which they will recognize it as their bounden duty, to resist the State's command and endure every imaginable penalty rather than submit. For instance Mr. Gladstone agrees with Catholics in considering that, by the law of Christ, no divorce à vinculo is possible in the case of Christian marriage. Some lady in early life has obtained from the English law what purports to be such divorce, and has married again. Under these circumstances, she becomes a convert to Mr. Gladstone's doctrine, and leaves her putative husband; while he on his part threatens a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. She asks Mr. Gladstone's advice. "Should any such legal precept be issued," he will tell her, "you must die rather than obey: the law of God takes precedence over the law of man." Mr. Gladstone then would urge direct, deliberate, and continued disobedience to the English law as a peremptory duty; a duty not confined to the one person before him, but extending to every parallel case throughout the country.

In truth we believe that the limit placed by Mr. Gladstone to his civil allegiance is more dangerous to the State's tranquillity, than the limit placed by a Catholic. Suppose a country to exist in which it is universally held that all the State's laws, without exception and without examination, claim justly the subject's allegiance; and then suppose a set of men to rise up, who declare that they will pay no obedience to any law, until they have tested its morality each by his individual reason and conscience. The State, if obliged to make terms with such men, would at once say: "If there is to be external rule limiting obedience, we had far rather such a rule proceeded on definite and cognizable principles, than on so shifty a standard as each man's private judgment. We would rather have Archbishop Manning's allegiance than Mr. Gladstone's." The State can come to an understanding with the Holy See; but what understanding can it come to with the individual reason and conscience of all its multitudinous subjects?

But then there is the "deposing power." Really, to hear some Protestants speak, one would suppose on the

one hand, that the Pope deposes some sovereign about once in every ten years; and on the other hand, that non-Catholics commonly profess the doctrine of passive obedience. We cannot do better on this head than reprint an extract from an article of the "*Civiltà*," of which we published an entire translation in our number for October, 1871.

With respect to the causes which in past times operated so as to render the exercise of the Pope's right reasonable and useful, Pius IX. has justly assigned it, in the discourse attributed to him, to the public custom of those times, in which Christian nations, by common consent, recognized in the Pontiff the supreme guide of princes and of peoples in civil affairs. In the uncertainty and mobility of rights under the feudal order, in the partly hereditary, partly elective system of succession to thrones, in the frequent and continuous conflicts between lords and vassals, between governors and governed, in the easy exorbitance of power, and its ill-defined distribution, Europe would never have come out of barbarism, would never have attained to any elevated grade of civil life, if a power, revered by all men as divine, and whose sole force was moral, had not assumed a real supremacy over the social order, in respect to civil and political interests. The very instinct of self-preservation and the love of life itself impelled princes and people to place themselves spontaneously under this supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, even in matters which concerned the purely temporal order. Thus, in the *Diritto Germanico* we find the affirmation and recognition that the material sword of political power is a derivation from the power of Christ, conferred on S. Peter and his successors. This is expressed in the following words:—"The Prince of Peace, recalled by God, before He ascended into heaven, left to us below two swords for the defence of Christianity, and committed them both to S. Peter. One is the sword of secular, the other that of ecclesiastical justice. The sword of secular justice has been given by the Pope to the Emperor. But the sword of ecclesiastical justice the Pope has reserved for himself, so that he may do justice in due season, mounted upon his white war-horse, and the Emperor shall hold the stirrup for the Pope, so that his saddle may not be shaken, which signifies, that if any shall resist the Pope, so that he cannot compel them by his ecclesiastical judgments, the Emperor, and all other secular princes and judges as well, shall constrain them by their proscription." In such a condition of things, it is plain to the perception of all, that the exercise of the right to punish princes, rebels to God and the Church, was most beneficial to the people, and acted as a curb to political power, when, as was but too frequently the case, it degenerated into tyranny, and that, if it sometimes, in consequence of the resistance of the guilty, produced violent social shocks, this evil was very much slighter than those which would otherwise have befallen human society, and was easily remedied by the submission of the obedient to the voice of the Supreme Pastor.

But, in the present age, this state of things has ceased to exist. The heresy of Luther has destroyed the unity of Christendom. Little by little, Governments have withdrawn themselves entirely from the paternal arbitra-

tion of the Popes, and have chosen rather to decide their destinies on the battle-field. Princes, though they do not run the risk of becoming tyrants, have lost all real authority, and have become the laughing-stock of the tumultuous multitude, or of those who claim to represent it. Pope Pius IX. said truly, in the discourse which we have already quoted, that "to recall in these times the right of deposing sovereigns, once exercised by the Holy See, is to revive an idea of which no one thinks, and less than any the Sovereign Pontiff."

Another indication of the absence of wisdom in the politicians of whom we are speaking, is the frivolity of this pretext, showing their complete ignorance of the changed conditions of modern society. Would to God the princes of our time were in no danger of deposition except on the part of the Pope! They might sleep tranquilly, to quote the old saying, "on both their ears." But the danger they are in at present comes to them from a very different quarter, and has nothing of the paternal element in it leading the father to punish the son, with bitter grief, and only when he has vainly tried every resource of gentleness and love. In eight lustres we have seen at least a dozen princes turned adrift, a greater number than were deposed by the Popes in eight centuries. Who turned these princes off their thrones? The rabble; for it is on them the right of judging and dethroning princes has devolved. And what has made the rabble so arrogant and so rebellious? The idea of the sovereignty of the people, absolute and inalienable; the principles of unchecked liberty and independence which have been diffused, and are more and more widely diffused every day among the ignorant multitude; the negation of all social order, and of all legitimate rule, which is gaining ground rapidly in the hearts and minds of the peoples. These are the influences which are shaking every throne, and our politicians ought to meditate deeply upon them, if there be any true zeal in them for the cause of their own sovereigns. Instead of doing so they are taking fright at Papal Infallibility! These imprudent men do not understand that that very Infallibility is the only invulnerable shield which, in this day, could be spread over the sovereignty of which they are so jealous. In No. LXIII. of the Syllabus, Pope Pius IX. has condemned the following proposition: "That it is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and to rebel against them." This condemnation sweeps over the entire tribes of revolutionaries which at present menace the authority of sovereigns on all sides. What assistance would it not lend to the secure maintenance of authority if the voice which has promulgated such a condemnation were universally acknowledged to be infallible? Where could an arm more powerful to strike down the converse error be found, and to reform human society by reforming intellect, than that which lent to human society its normal form, and beginning?

But now lastly, while Mr. Gladstone is so zealous in advancing against Catholics what we may call a *constructive* charge of civil disloyalty, he has most strangely altogether omitted to consider the *direct* evidence on the opposite side, which is so conspicuous on the very surface. We will venture to say, that there is no other body of religionists in England who make it

so prominently a part of their religion as Catholics do, to venerate the civil ruler, as being God's minister and vicergerent on earth for purposes of momentous importance whether to men's spiritual or temporal welfare. So far is this from being inconsistent with their unswerving fidelity to God's precepts natural and revealed, that the very opposite is true: the Catholic would not so profoundly reverence human law, did he not predominantly reverence divine; did he not regard his civil obedience itself as a duty to God. And the evidence adducible for his reverence of human law is so superabundant, that our only difficulty lies in the selection. In our very last number we were accidentally led to cite Gregory XVI.'s ex cathedrâ teaching on this head (pp. 262-3). He sets forth e.g. certain "bright examples of immovable subjection to sovereigns," as "coming necessarily from the most holy precepts of the Christian religion"; and declares that "both divine and human laws cry out against those, who labour to set at nought their fidelity to their sovereigns." And this Catholic doctrine is so important an element in the present controversy, that we shall make no apology for placing before our readers numerous extracts from the various works which we have named at the head of this article. We will begin with a venerable prelate whose name carries with it peculiar weight, the Bishop of Birmingham:—*

Let Mr. Gladstone and all men know, that we Catholics—you brethren, your priests and your bishops—besides the motives common to other men, have a motive for obedience to the civil power that is peculiar to ourselves; and that is the fixed and unchangeable doctrine and enforcement of the Catholic Church; that, not merely for man's sake, but much more for God's sake, and as a part of our religion, we should be loyal and obedient to whatever civil government is constituted and established over the society in which we live. Need we point to other proof beyond our own habitual conduct? Indeed we have been often reproached by active politicians with too great an acquiescence in the existing state of things, and with too much indifference as to political changes. Nor is this unnatural with men, who have quiet consciences, and who care more for the future than for the present world.

What would Ireland have become, with all her grievances, had not her bishops and clergy incessantly inculcated the Catholic's duty of obeying the civil authority? It is a well-known fact that the heads of Fenianism maintained and inculcated that the one great obstacle to successful rebellion and revolution was the influence of the Pope and the Catholic Church, ever

* The Bishop of Birmingham has given a name to those who call themselves the "Old Catholics," which we think will stick to them. He calls them "Döllingerites."

inculcating the duty of civil obedience. That society was condemned and put down by the Pope at the instance of the Irish Catholic Prelates (pp. 12-14).

The Bishop of Clifton :—

Nearly half a century has elapsed since the passing of Catholic Emancipation. During that period Catholic peers and Catholic members have sat in Parliament; Catholic judges and Catholic magistrates have administered justice on the bench; Catholic barristers have pleaded at the bar; Catholic soldiers have fought in the army; Catholics have served their country in every office of trust. During the whole of that period the public voice of the country has proclaimed that Catholics have proved themselves to be loyal (p. 6).

The Bishop of Salford is peculiarly energetic on this head :—

To talk of our allegiance either to the Civil or to the Spiritual Power as being "divided," leads in popular language to misunderstanding; nor does it appear correct. To say that we pay a "divided allegiance" is as though we were to say that we paid a "divided debt," or performed a "divided act of mercy." And to assert of a wife that she pays a "divided" allegiance to her husband would suggest suspicion. Allegiance is due to each power within its own order or province. That which is one is not divisible or divided; and the two Orders of Power, as set up by God, are not antagonisms but harmonies, as God designed them. Only the sin of man can create a conflict. In intensity and degree our civil allegiance, whether to a sovereign person or to a sovereign body, is without limit in its own order. We must lay down our life in its service when required. We must be faithful to it unto death (pp. 7, 8).

Mgr. Capel thus concludes his pamphlet :—

If her Most Gracious Majesty is at any time in danger from enemies abroad or at home, amongst none of her subjects will she find men more willing to shed their blood in defence of the Throne and Constitution than amongst those Catholics who are most loyal in their devotion to the Holy See, who most steadfastly hold every doctrine of the Church, and most heartily accept the condemnations of the Syllabus (p. 67).

We may be allowed to bring up the rear by a citation from our own pages. We are certainly among those whom Mr. Gladstone accuses of failing in civil allegiance; for "however far" we must indubitably ever be in our humble sphere from being "*abettors* of the Papal Chair," we cannot deny that we have consistently endeavoured to "write from a Papal point of view" (p. 7). Now it so happens that in our very last number, when certainly we were far enough from expecting Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet, we wrote as follows :—

There are various external marks, by which a good Catholic is known.

He is known by being a good son, husband, father, friend ; he is known by being just and upright in his commercial and social relations ; he is known again by his loyal devotion and obedience to the Church and to the Holy See, both in matters primarily spiritual, and in matters indirectly spiritual though primarily within the temporal sphere. But no less characteristically is he known, by his profound obedience to his legitimate civil sovereign wherever that sovereign's commands are consistent with God's Law ; by his stern disapproval of every attempt to bring the sovereign into discredit, except indeed when such discredit is necessary for a due appreciation of the prerogatives of Christ and His Church ; by the utter detestation with which he regards every machination tending to promote sedition and revolt. He wages an irreconcilable warfare against anarchists and revolutionists, regarding them as among the basest, the most odious, the most contemptible of mankind (pp. 263, 4).

At the same time, as we have already said, it is absolutely impossible in the case of any one whatever—however strongly he may feel the obligation of civil allegiance—that conjunctures shall not arise, in which a still higher duty interferes with that allegiance : unless indeed he takes the State's utterances and enactments as a supreme and definitively authoritative guide, throughout the sphere of morals. But the most extreme Cæsarists have not yet ventured to make such an affirmation as this last ; though, to do them justice, they are very rapidly advancing even to this. And those who believe in any rule of morals independent of the State's voice, must inevitably be liable to come from time to time into conflict with the civil ruler. Monsignor Capel has done excellent service, by citing a letter from Mr. Frederick Harrison to the "New York Herald," which expresses this with so much force that we cannot refrain from reprinting it. Mr. Harrison, it should be explained, ranks among the followers of M. Comte ; and these thinkers have this one (to a Catholic) redeeming feature in the midst of their anti-Catholic and anti-Christian doctrine, that they duly appreciate the utterly fatal character of that Cæsarism, which has of late begun so ominously to display itself in England. These are Mr. Harrison's words :—

The revival of a subject which is purely one of technical theology is at the present time a piece of mere mischief.

The Pope's infallibility is a matter entirely between the Pope and his own people.

The Catholic priesthood in England is one of the most industrious, respectable, and peaceable in the world, and the very little political power it wields has long been exerted to national and liberal ends. In Ireland the priesthood has far greater power ; but it has been using it to check, not to fan, the insurrectionary movement. It is therefore most wanton for English

politicians to worry a Church like this about mere casuistical difficulties in its theology ; and all theologies are full of such difficulties. This may be sensational literature, but it is not statesmanship.

To tell a Church that it is never to meddle with politics, never to teach a duty different from that approved by the Government of the day, is to tell it that it is not to be a religious community at all, but a Government bureau on a par with the official gazette. There is no religious community, no moral or intellectual association, which would honestly accept these terms. And it would be easy to push any religionist into similar logical dilemmas by using hypothetical cases. Quakers object to war : therefore the Society of Friends will turn traitors to an enemy ; therefore Mr. Bright is unworthy of political trust. The Cobden Club swears by the doctrines of Mr. Cobden : one of these doctrines was to surrender the Colonies : therefore the Cobden Club might be found plotting the dismemberment of the empire. Exeter Hall denounced the opium war : some of our civil and military officers are under the inspiration of Exeter Hall : therefore we may expect them to desert to the enemy in a possible war with China. These exercises of irritating logic are as easy as they are puerile. If every opinion a man may hold is to be followed out to what we think its logical result, and every man is to be supposed in any dilemma which our ingenuity can frame, every man is a rebel. If Mr. Disraeli and the Archbishop of Canterbury succeeded in passing an Act to burn every copy of the Bible, Mr. Newdegate and Mr. Whalley would be preaching sedition and heading a rebellion. If they passed an Act abolishing in Anglican churches vestments, crosses, fonts, and organs, rubrics, prayer-books and hymn-books, Mr. Gladstone would be raging about the country as the Hugh Peters of a new rebellion. No religious body whatever, no association of citizens, ever would, or ever ought, to bind itself beforehand to passive obedience ; and it is a mere bit of claptrap to call upon the Catholics of England to surrender in terms a right which, perhaps, they would be the last people in this country to exercise in deed.

The hubbub about the Vatican Decrees is silly mimicry of this flagrant aggression of the military bureaucracy of Prussia. Though no man can have less sympathy than I have with the historical pretensions of the Vatican, or can more heartily detest the intellectual and political aims of Catholicism in Europe, I cannot but regard the Catholic side in this controversy as being, in its broad features, the side of liberty and moral independence.

We repeat : Mr. Gladstone, as being a zealous Christian, should have pursued a course diametrically opposite to that which he has chosen. Instead of inculcating on his countrymen a distrust of the Catholic's civil allegiance, he should rather have eagerly availed himself of Catholic aid in the political sphere. So might he have more effectively resisted that detestable and anti-Christian Cæsaro-revolutionism, in regard to which he must agree with Catholics that it is immeasurably the most threatening political peril of our time. The extreme infidels of this day hold that the State

is bound by no laws external to itself; that there are no rights whatever—say of family or property—except those derived from the State; that the father e.g. has no right to the office of educating his children, nor the husband to his wife's fidelity, except so far as the omnipotent State may see fit to concede such right. Where the civil ruler is earnestly Christian, no men are more unscrupulous than these in promoting disaffection and revolution; but let them once obtain a sufficient number of proselytes, and they will have just as little scruple on the other hand in making the Legislature their instrument, for forcing their tenets on the rising generation. Anarchy they know, and despotism they know, but orderly Christian liberty is what they cannot understand. It is precisely on this middle ground between two detestable extremes, that the Catholic Church has fixed her immovable position. It is a position with which Mr. Gladstone in his heart must deeply sympathize. And surely it will be a bitter moment when he begins to find out, that he is powerless to arrest the mischief he has himself set on foot; and that he has done all which in him lay, towards assisting, atheists, anarchists, and Cæsarists in their assault on true Christian freedom.

In our last number (pp. 461 et seq.) we argued that Catholic principles, and they only, can save England from the perils which threaten her in the theological and philosophical order; and we have now made the same remark in regard to the social and political. This thought suggests the true Christian revenge which Catholics may take, of those who impugn the genuineness of their patriotism. In proportion as they hear it alleged on all sides that they are comparatively indifferent to their country's welfare—in that very proportion (we trust) they will be more active and energetic in using every effort, for qualifying themselves to bear part in the great patriotic work, now lying before them and which none but they can accomplish with full success; the work of succouring their country against her direst foes in this her hour of sore need.

APPENDIX ON THE BULL "UNAM SANCTAM."

A writer in the "*Macmillan*" for December has attempted to show, that the "*Unam Sanctam*" inculcates the Pope's "direct," as contrasted with his "indirect" temporal power. The writer's immediate attack is on the Archbishop of Westminster; who has most reasonably declined to bandy arguments with a writer, so deficient in knowledge, so flippant and disrespectful in tone. For our own part, we shall of course not be impertinent enough to volunteer a defence of the

Archbishop against this ignoble assault. But the writer's sophistry concerning the "*Unam Sanctam*" has on its surface a certain plausibility; and our reasoning in the preceding article may lose part of its effect with some minds, unless we encounter this writer in straightforward argument. Before beginning our reply however, we must make three or four preliminary statements to prevent misconception.

I. Whatever be the doctrine inculcated in the body of the Bull, Catholics as such are not obliged to accept that doctrine. In the first place, the large majority of Catholic writers consider that the Bull contains no *ex cathedrâ* definition (beyond an incidental one on the heresy of "two principles") except in its last sentence. "*Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omnem humanam creaturam declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.*" Now the word "*subesse*" is certainly most vague; and the words of this final clause taken by themselves need not be understood as expressing more, than the strict obligation of obeying the Pope in matters exclusively spiritual. Many Catholics accordingly understand the Definition in this sense; and they have more than one plausible ground for their interpretation. When Leo X. and the Fifth Lateran Council confirmed the "*Unam Sanctam*" (see Leo X.'s "*Pastor Æternus*"), the Pope's words certainly ran as though he cited the Bull in testimony of no other doctrine than that just mentioned. Then (as has been pointed out to us by a friend who advocates this interpretation) the words themselves of this final clause are a quotation from S. Thomas ("*contra errores Græcorum,*" c. 32); and his context makes it evident, that he is speaking exclusively of subjection in things purely spiritual. We may add also, that this interpretation of the "*Unam Sanctam*" has been lately brought before the notice of authority, and (to say the least) in no way discountenanced.

II. For ourselves however, as a matter of private opinion, such would not be our view of the Bull. It is true that Leo X. cites it only as testifying the Pope's just claim to *spiritual* allegiance. But it by no means follows (we think)—merely because such was his immediate purpose—that therefore he intended so to limit the sense of the Bull. The less so indeed, because no one doubts that he himself held that doctrine of the Pope's indirect temporal power, which (as we shall presently show) is indubitably the doctrine contained in the main body (as distinguished from the final sentence) of the "*Unam Sanctam.*" And in the manner we do not at all see why Boniface VIII. should not use S. Thomas's words, in a sense wider than that in which S. Thomas used them.

This being so, although we admit that the word "subesse" is vague, we cannot think that it is reasonably open to any arbitrary interpretation. On the contrary, if the Definition be really confined to the final clause, we should say nevertheless that the "Preamble" affords the one authentic and exclusively admissible sense of the word "subesse." Catholics of every school hold, that the Vatican Definition on infallibility is authentically explained by the Preamble to that Definition; and we should take the same principle for granted, in reference to the "Unam Sanctam."

But our own bias would be to consider, that the whole Bull contains a sustained *ex cathedrâ* Instruction; as in the case of S. Leo's celebrated Letter to S. Flavian, and of many other Pontifical utterances which are indubitably *ex cathedrâ*. At the same time,—we need hardly say—it is universally understood by Catholics in the case of such *ex cathedrâ* instructions, that infallibility appertains only to the substantial doctrine drawn out; not in any way to the arguments, Scriptural illustrations, &c., &c., by which it may be incidentally supported.

III. We see no ground whatever for thinking that the Bull—though indubitably containing a Definition *ex cathedrâ*—contains a Definition of *faith* on the Pope's authority in temporals. Thus Fénelon's condemnation is admitted by every one to have been *ex cathedrâ*; yet it noted no one of Fénelon's propositions with the brand of *heresy*. In like manner the "Unam Sanctam" condemns implicitly any tenet contradictory to its main Definition, as theologically *false*; but we see no reason to think that it intends to condemn such tenet as *heretical*. On former occasions we have often set forth the important distinction between these two classes of definitions; but it would be quite out of place here to pursue the subject.

IV. Whatever be the purport of the actual Definition, it is of much importance at all events to show, that so solemn a Pontifical utterance as this famous Bull contains no such notion as that of the Pope's "universal" civil "monarchy" over Christians; that it contains indeed nothing contrary to the traditional Catholic doctrine, on the due relations between Church and State.

The writer in "Macmillan" purports to establish the reverse of this. Here are his words: "The Bull . . . asserts in its crudest and most aggressive form the great *medieval* doctrine of the Pope's universal monarchy over mankind, and of his direct authority (*directa potestas*) over all temporal princes" (p. 173). "The one object of the Bull was to enunciate this principle of the '*directa potestas*' in the most unmistakable terms. . .

. . . . Words could not express more plainly the direct and immediate jurisdiction claimed by the Supreme Pontiff over purely temporal matters" (p. 179). This statement we totally deny, and proceed to give grounds for our denial.

Nothing can be more intelligible, than the doctrine of the Pope's direct temporal power. Suarez, who of course entirely rejects it, thus sets it forth :

It was the opinion of some Catholics, especially jurists, that in Christ's Church not the spiritual rule only, but the temporal is monarchical ; and thus that in the whole Church there is one only supreme temporal prince, having by himself and directly supreme civil power over the whole Church ; and that this prince, by Christ's institution, is the Supreme Pontiff. From whence they consistently inferred, that no Republic, nor King, nor Emperor possesses supreme power in temporals.—" *Defensio*," l. 3, c. 5, n. 4.

Here is the very doctrine ascribed by Mr. Gladstone to the mediæval Popes ; the claim of " universal monarchy." We have already said that Suarez entirely rejects it ; and he proceeds (c. 22) to lay down an entirely different one, as " received by the common consent of Catholics " : viz., that whereas princes derive their civil authority from God (not mediante Pontifice but) " mediante populo " . . . nevertheless the Pope has authority to " direct " them " in the use of their temporal power, in order to a spiritual end ; by reason of which he can enjoin or prohibit such or such use thereof, so far as may be expedient for spiritual good." The " *Macmillan* " writer has the audacity to say (p. 179) that the Jesuits invented this theory in the sixteenth century, and that the mediæval doctrine was different. Why, putting aside the " *Unam Sanctam* " which is here in debate, let him name if he can a mediæval Pope, who ever presented so much as the superficial appearance of putting forth any such claim as he alleges. F. Parkinson, as we have said in our article, cites the most express statements to the opposite effect, from those two mediæval Popes who are most accused of aggressiveness ; viz. Innocent III. and Boniface VIII. : the latter being the very author of the " *Unam Sanctam*." We are now then to consider, whether the " *Unam Sanctam* " presents any exception to this received doctrine ; and we need hardly point out at starting, how extremely improbable *à priori* is any such supposition. This is our first adverse remark.

Secondly our opponent (in some moment of inadvertence, we suppose) admits the very thesis which we maintain ; for he says in p. 179 by most manifest implication, that, according to mediæval doctrine, the Pope's power in temporals extended no further, than that " he might call the temporal prince

directly to account, for any of his temporal acts *in which he discovered a sinful tendency*." According to this writer himself then, the mediæval Popes claimed no *direct* temporal power (out of their own temporal dominions), but only in relation to a spiritual end.

Thirdly, Boniface VIII.'s illustration of the "two swords," on which our opponent chiefly relies, is conclusive against him. According to the doctrine of the direct temporal power—a prince is as simply the Pope's delegate in temporally governing his people, as a Vicar Apostolic e.g. in spiritually governing his flock. But if this were so, there would not be "two swords" at all. No one ascribes any "sword" to the Vicar Apostolic, for the obvious reason that his whole authority is directly derived from the Pope; neither then would any "sword" be ascribed to the prince, if *his* authority were directly derived from the Pope.

Fourthly. "It is therefore necessary that we should clearly declare, that the spiritual power exceeds the temporal in dignity and nobility, in the same proportion that spiritual things excel temporal." This is the writer's own translation of a clause in the Bull; and the said clause emphatically negatives the notion, that the spiritual and temporal "swords" constitute one identical sovereignty vested in the Pope. The Bull speaks distinctly of a temporal sovereignty existing, with temporal affairs as its primary end.

Fifthly, the Bull proceeds to say that "it is the function of the spiritual power to instruct* the earthly." Is it the function of the Pope to instruct *himself*?

It is not too much to say, that there is only one expression in the whole Bull, which presents even a colourable appearance of claiming the direct temporal power: viz. its affirmation, that the temporal sword is "in the power of the Pope," "in the power of the Church." It can very easily be shown however how completely this affirmation is in harmony with all the rest, if we read the Bull as a whole. Its scope and argument, as we understand the matter, run thus:—

The Church by her divine constitution is one in communion, and her ruler is provided with means for imparting one and the same spiritual and moral doctrine to all her members. He has two different means given him by God for doing this. One of these is his exercise of the spiritual power, which directly belongs to him; and the other is his divinely-given

*The "Macmillan" writer reads "instruere." The true reading however is "instituire"; but the meaning is evidently the same.

authority over the prince's exercise of temporal power. If the prince had been permitted by God to exercise his temporal power without obedience to the Pope in matters indirectly spiritual, he might practically inculcate on his subjects a moral teaching most false and dangerous; and the Pontiff would have no means for securing unity of moral teaching within the Church. Nay generally, if princes were not subject to the censures of the Church in political matters bearing on religion, it would follow that as princes they are out of the Church; that the two powers are totally distinct from each other; and that they were descended from distinct and even opposed principles:—an error approaching to the error of the Manichees.*

Any fair-minded person, we think, who reads the Bull, will admit that such is its general purport. And if this be conceded, we see very easily the meaning of its statement, that the temporal sword is in the Pope's power. By this is not meant that the prince's civil authority is derived from the Pope; but that the Pope has power to sway the temporal sword into this or that direction, whenever it may happen that spiritual interests are concerned.

And here we must complain, that the writer whom we are criticising has perpetrated a somewhat serious mistranslation. He renders "*ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*" by the words, "at the Pontiff's nod and pleasure." Surely "pleasure" is a very odd version of "*patientia*." We would rather say, "according to the Pontiff's direction and sufferance." In the normal condition of Catholic civil society, what takes place is this. From time to time the Pope interferes with the course of civil government, for the protection of spiritual interests; and on such occasions the prince recognizes obedience to the Pope as of obligation. But very much more commonly the Pope exhibits "sufferance," or in other words sees no call to interfere; and so long as this is the case, it is the prince's duty to govern according to his own conviction of what will be for his people's highest good. Only he understands, that this is by the Pope's "sufferance"; or in other words that the Pope has *power* to interfere on spiritual grounds, whenever he may see fit. During these long intervals the prince, while carrying on the civil government, exercises a power, in no way derived from the Pope, but conferred on him by God "*mediante populo*."

So much on the contents of the Bull itself. But we shall not have been able fully to exhibit it in its true light, until

* This last sentence is mainly taken from Dr. Dollinger's exposition of the "*Unam Sanctam*" cited by F. Parkinson.

we have replied to an objection, derived by the "Macmillan" writer from Clement V.'s "Meruit."

How was it that the infallible successor of the infallible enunciator of the doctrine was forced to retract the Bull as regards France? The decree by which Clement V. rendered the "Unam Sanctam" inoperative in France yields a curious result, which amounts to this; that the Holy Ghost declared that in the monarchy of Philip the Fair there were *not* two powers ordained by God, &c. &c. (p. 174 and note).

The writer proceeds to put a ridiculous answer into the Archbishop's mouth, which the latter would certainly not dream of making; whereas the true answer is most simple. Certainly the Fifth Lateran Council saw no contradiction between the "Unam Sanctam" and the "Meruit"; for it expressly sanctioned both: and nothing is really needed for our purpose, except to place before our readers the actual words of Clement V.'s pronouncement. Having commended Philip's present devotion to the Holy See, the Pontiff thus proceeds: "Therefore we will and intend that no prejudice be engendered against the King and Kingdom by the Definition and Declaration of our predecessor Boniface VIII., of happy memory, which begins 'Unam Sanctam'; and that neither the King, Kingdom, nor inhabitants thereof be more subjected to the Church of Rome, than they were before; but that all things be understood as remaining in the same state in which they were before the said Definition, both as regards the Church and as regards the aforesaid King, Kingdom, and inhabitants thereof." In what possible sense can Clement V. be said here to *revoke* one iota of the "Unam Sanctam"? There is not a single syllable of the latter which can even be tortured into the interpretation, that Boniface VIII. was purporting to impose on France any increased subjection whatever to the Holy See. The Bull purports on its very surface to set forth authoritatively the existence of a certain right, which (as the Pope expressly says) had been originally given to S. Peter. Clement V. commands that all relations between France and the Holy See should be understood as being in the same state, in which they were before the publication of the "Unam Sanctam." Well, S. Peter certainly lived and died before the publication of the "Unam Sanctam"; and it is plain on the surface of history, that Boniface VIII. claimed the very same rights, whether before or after such publication.

It may be asked perhaps, how Philip can have been precipitated by so "illusory" a declaration as this of Clement V.'s. We reply that it was by no means illusory; because (as F. Parkinson observes) it *rectified a misconception* of Philip's.

If our opponent has been capable of so misunderstanding the "Unam Sanctam," Philip was doubtless capable of the same blunder; and Clement V. aimed at putting him right, in the manner which should be most gratifying to his feelings. The whole circumstance is excellently set forth by Darras, the French historian.

As soon as the Pope had entered on the government of the Church, Philip at once demanded of him the repeal of all the bulls of Pope Boniface, the solemn condemnation of that Pontiff, and the obliteration of his name from the list of Popes. Clement lacked the enterprising energy of Boniface, and did not, like him, beat down resistance by main strength; but he was gifted with that persevering tenacity of character, which wears out the force of passion by time and forbearance. Benedict XI. had already absolved Philip from the personal censures incurred by him. Clement confirmed the sentence of absolution. He also removed the particular prohibitions expressed in the Bull "Clericis Laicos." Those concessions touched no point of dogma. But Philip was not satisfied with these first acts of indulgence: he particularly insisted on the annulment of the "Unam Sanctam." . . Philip demanded the utter abrogation of the Bull. Clement refused. . . However, to soften his refusal, and to ward off the dangerous effects of Philip's violent passions, the Pope agreed to make a declaration, which should at once respect the rights of truth and the claims of the monarch. (American translation, vol. iii. p. 464.)

We need hardly say that our argument is wholly unconcerned with the question, whether Clement V. acted wisely or unwisely, either in his concessions and explanations themselves or in his way of making them. No one has ever claimed for the Holy See infallibility in matters of ecclesiastical prudence.

There are various other anti-Catholic arguments in the "Macmillan" letter, even feebler and easier of refutation than those already cited; but as they do not concern the "Unam Sanctam," we have nothing here to say about them.

Notices of Books.

Contemporary Review, Dec., 1874; article on "*Necessary Truths*."

By Mr. FITZJAMES STEPHEN. London: Strahan.

MR. STEPHEN'S article is a criticism of some of Dr. Ward's, which have appeared in this REVIEW. For obvious reasons Dr. Ward has been unable to give his mind to the controversy before the issue of our present number. In all probability, however, his reply will appear in the "*Contemporary*" of March, and will also be appended to our next number.

Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation Unravelled. By Bishop ULLATHORNE.

London: Burns & Oates.

OF the three replies to Mr. Gladstone for which Catholics have been waiting, and which we hope to treat fully in our next number, two have appeared early enough to be noticed in our present. If we may compare them, we should say that (as their respective titles express) the Bishop's is a much more direct and sustained reply to Mr. Gladstone; whereas F. Newman has rather addressed himself to topics, suggested indeed by Mr. Gladstone's "*Expostulation*," but not there fully treated.

One most important point, and on which no one (we think) has insisted before him, is taken by the Bishop at the outset. Mr. Gladstone asserts that the Church's recent action has been violent and aggressive. Rather, replies the Bishop, the acts and words of *anti-Catholics* have been violent and aggressive; and the Church in her own defence has been obliged to unusual frequency of doctrinal definitions. On the one hand, there was the profoundly unsound German taint, manifesting itself on its native soil in Günther, Froschammer, and the Munich Congress; and at home in the "*Home and Foreign*," "*North British*," and "*Chronicle*" (p. 5). On the other hand there was the unsound French taint, exhibited in an extreme shape by Lamennais, and in a "milder" but still "dangerous" form by the school of Montalembert:* while "in reaction against these errors there arose another class of unsound doctrines that touched upon the relations of reason and faith, and another" tending to rationalism or pantheism. Moreover "not only had the Popes of recent times to strive

* "Other errors, milder but dangerous, sprang up as remnants of" Lamennais' "teaching at a later period."

against these various errors *infecting even members of the Church*, but they had likewise to contend against a number of political assaults upon the rights and immunities of the Church that for many ages she had held in undisputed possession" (p. 6). All these errors "it became the sacred and solemn duty of the Popes to expose, denounce, and mark with their censure as anti-Christian" (p. 7); while it was no less their duty to denounce those irreligious acts above referred to. From this twofold duty resulted the Syllabus.

The Bishop is very express on the authority of the Syllabus. He notices Mr. Gladstone's absurd notion (originating with "Janus") that there had been a project of making the Syllabus dogmatical at the Vatican Council. What can be meant by this? asks the Bishop. Does it mean that the Syllabus was to be invested with more definitive authority than it now possesses? But "the Papal documents" from which the Syllabus was compiled "were promulgated by the Bishops throughout the Church, and the condemnations embodied from them in the Syllabus were condemned by the Bishops in their joint and spontaneous address to the Pope. *What more do they require to give them every kind of force?*" (p. 66). Or does "Janus's" statement mean that the contradictories of the errors mentioned in the Syllabus were to be defined as dogmata of faith? "But the propositions of the Syllabus are far from all of them capable of being pronounced *heretical*" (p. 67).

Now as to the misbelievers of whom the Bishop has spoken, "whatever else they might allow, the infallibility of the authority that condemned them they would not agree to" (p. 5). Consequently "no sooner did the Pope convoke the General Council than they took alarm. Whatever good was hoped from it by all staunch Catholics, who received its announcement with joy, these lax professors felt that it boded no good to their designs" (p. 9). This very fact was one of the many providential circumstances which led to the Definition; and the Bishop's account of the motives which prevailed with the Fathers is so extremely interesting, that we are sure our readers will thank us for extracting it entire.

"Many of the Bishops began to reflect, and to communicate their reflections one to another. It was observed how much these men, some of whose other doctrines had been already corrected at Rome, were in fear of the Infallibility. Their positive denial of it was noted, and their spurious defence of the opposite doctrine. If this was not repelled, it would go far towards establishing the impression that the doctrine was not definable; the result would be, that men like the writers in the *Augsburg Gazette* notwithstanding the traditional teaching of the Church and the canonical practice of all times that involved the Papal Infallibility, would resist or disown the doctrinal decisions of the Pontiff whenever brought against them. The consequence would be that the authority of the Pontiff definitively to settle controversies of doctrine, which the Church had ever acknowledged and acted upon, would be set at naught by a party within the Church, and between Council and Council there would be no authority recognized by them that could with irresistible vigour put down new errors against faith or moral doctrine. There was precisely that justification for action which Mr. Gladstone ascribes to the definitions of the earlier Church. 'The justification,' he says, 'of the ancient definitions of the

Church, which have endured the storms of fifteen hundred years, was to be found in this—that they were not arbitrary or wilful, but that they wholly sprang from, and related to, theories rampant at the time, and regarded as menacing to Christian belief. Even the canons of the Council of Trent have in the main this amount, apart from their matter, of presumptive warrant.’

“ Besides the motives already assigned, to borrow Mr. Gladstone’s words again, ‘the levity of the destructive speculations so widely current, and the notable hardihood of the anti-Christian writing of to-day,’ as it appeared to many Bishops, rendered it all the more important that the Pope should be armed with that full strength with which Christ had invested Peter and his successors, to confirm his brethren in the truth, and to smite with irreversible judgment the false doctrines that might lift up their pride within the Church. For these reasons many Bishops united in a postulation that the question of Papal Infallibility might be brought into the Council; and accordingly it was introduced. Once introduced, there could be no doubt of the decision; for even those Prelates who argued against its opportuneness, with the exception of three or four, maintained the doctrine. I have already declared that no political motive, or notion of giving political dominion to the Pope, ever entered the minds of those to whom we owe the Definition ” (pp. 49-51).

No wonder however, that Mr. Gladstone misunderstands the dogma of Papal Infallibility. Even F. Gratry, as the Bishop shows (p. 57), had been led to think that there were some very strangely-minded Catholics indeed; some Catholics who wished the Council to define, that the Pope is infallible even when not speaking *ex cathedrâ*, nay even when not speaking officially at all. How a Catholic can have been so wildly misled concerning his fellow-Catholics,—is one of those mysteries in the history of the Council, which we suppose will never be cleared up on this side the grave.

There is another misconception of Mr. Gladstone’s which the Bishop has been (we think) the first to expose: viz., as to the form in which the Vatican Decrees were published. As the Bishop points out from p. 40 to p. 42, no other form than that adopted is known to the Church, in those cases in which the Pope personally presides over a Council.

We have now said enough to illustrate the pamphlet before us; and enough also to show our readers the importance of studying it, if they wish to be thoroughly protected against Mr. Gladstone’s persistent (however unintentional) misrepresentations.

A Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk, on occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s recent Expostulation. By J. H. NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

F. NEWMAN announces this to be probably his last publication; but we entirely agree with the *Spectator*, that “if one may judge in any degree of the vitality that is left in a man, by the grasp of his

thought, the lucidity of his exposition, the imaginative ease of his illustrations, and the accuracy of his memory, there is no sign at all as yet of the end of Dr. Newman's career." In his new pamphlet, as in his former publications, he throws a flood of new light on the matters which he treats; and even those who in this or that particular are unable to follow him, will always testify, that from no other writer do they learn at all so adequately the full strength of the view opposed to their own. With far the larger part however of the present work, we need hardly say that we are entirely in harmony. We hope (as we have elsewhere said) to treat it fully in April, in combination with the other Catholic replies to Mr. Gladstone; but our readers may probably expect from us some little criticism of it in our present number. We will give, therefore, a brief summary of its contents, accompanied by the briefest possible running commentary as we proceed.

F. Newman begins with treating very suggestively a matter, small in itself, but which seems especially to have affected Mr. Gladstone's mind: the opposition put forth to that statesman's Irish University Bill, by the Irish Catholic members under influence of the Catholic Episcopate. There was a strange rumour—taken for granted, even by a journal ordinarily so well informed as the *Pall Mall Gazette*—that the Holy Father had personally interfered in this matter. F. Newman "altogether disbelieves" this (p. 9); and we believe we may ourselves say with some confidence, that there was no vestige of foundation for the rumour. From this particular case, the author proceeds to the general question of Irish Catholic politics. The Irish people, he says (p. 11), "put the Catholic religion before everything else in the world"; yet their political conduct, in many instances, "has had a flavour rather of their nation than of their Church." But what is there surprising in this? "Ireland is not the only country in which politics, or patriotism, or party has been so closely associated with religion in the nation as a class, that it is difficult to say which of the various motive principles was uppermost." F. Newman is thus brought naturally to the mention of Mr. Gladstone's friend, Bishop Doyle. His treatment of this matter seems to us very masterly. His conclusion is, that the whole misunderstanding as to the trustworthiness of Bishop Doyle's "declarations" has arisen from the fact, that English politicians chose to content themselves with "the pamphlets or examinations of bishops whom they never asked for their credentials," instead of going to Rome, the fountain head.

Having disposed of this preliminary matter, the author proceeds to what Catholics will probably consider the two most valuable chapters of all; on "the Ancient" and "the Papal" Church respectively. In the former of these chapters, his argument, over and above its intrinsic strength, has a peculiar force "ad hominem" against Mr. Gladstone, because that statesman has so warm an admiration for the Church of the first centuries. Did that Church then satisfy Mr. Gladstone's present requirements? "When was it in ancient times that the State did not show jealousy of the Church?" (p. 19.) "The history of the Church in all past times, ancient as well as mediæval, is the very embodiment of that tradition of

Apostolical independence and freedom of speech, which in the eyes of man is her great offence now." And some very interesting quotations follow (pp. 21, 22) from Mr. Hurrell Froude and Mr. Keble in illustration. These last authorities again are such as particularly ought to weigh with Mr. Gladstone. But apart from Anglican authorities altogether, let facts of the Ancient Church speak for themselves. "As she resisted and defied her persecutors, so she ruled her convert people." "There was no middle term. Either" civil rulers "must deny her claim to divinity, or humble themselves before it, as far as the domain of religion extends; and that domain is a wide one" (p. 22).

Coming to the mediæval period, says F. Newman, we find no change in the recognized relations between Church and State, but only in the Church's internal organization. The difference between the two periods consisted only in this, that the Holy See had become able more and more to exercise that sovereignty over the Episcopate, which from the first had been vested as of right in S. Peter's successors. Now this centralization of authority—which on its theological side was the progressive realization in fact of what had always existed in right—on the political side "was simply necessary for the civilization of Europe" (p. 30). F. Newman points out that even Protestant historians now generally recognize this fact; and he adds his own further "judgment" (p. 28). He considers that the Church will never relinquish her mediæval claims: claims put forth, as partly warranted "by the direct endowment of her Divine Master, and partly as a legitimate outcome of that endowment." Nay, he proceeds to state that he himself accepts the doctrine of the deposing power, as laid down in Pius IX.'s now famous answer to the *Academia* (p. 36).

We cannot too earnestly or unreservedly commend these two chapters to the careful study of Catholics. From them he proceeds to consider "divided allegiance" and "conscience." His decision, briefly stated, is this. He considers that in the present age there will very seldom be any collision between ecclesiastical and civil precepts; and that whenever such may happen, no general law can be given as to which should prevail, but that each separate case must be guided by the individual's conscience. Now the general proposition on which this decision rests—viz., that no one can do otherwise than sin by acting against his conscience—is a first principle among Catholics. Bertha e.g. knows facts within her own personal experience, which make it absolutely certain that, according to Catholic doctrine, she is not Titius's wife; but she cannot convince the ecclesiastical court of the truth of these facts: under these circumstances she is under the strictest obligation to resist any amount of ecclesiastical or Papal pressure, rather than consort conjugally with Titius. But we think a demur may very reasonably be raised, whether a command of the Pope—issued deliberately, officially, with all due circumstances of solemnity—ought not of itself to determine the individual's conscience, in those cases where the question is not one of fact personally known to the latter, but of moral judgment on admitted facts.

In particular there is one point of terminology, which we would submit

to the judgment of theologians. F. Newman uses language (pp. 55-58) of extraordinary strength—with which we for our part sympathize more strongly than we can express—on the momentous importance of insisting urgently on the truth, that there is a moral “voice of God” heard “in the nature and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of Revelation” (p. 51). But we certainly doubt—speaking under correction—whether (as F. Newman thinks) theologians “mean” to express precisely this moral voice, by their word “conscientia.” We said a few words connected with this inquiry, in January 1872, p. 46. If our doubt be well founded, it will affect to some extent (though by no means fundamentally) the interpretation of those passages about “conscience,” which F. Newman quotes in pp. 65, 66.

We have run on at so great length, that we must abridge our remaining comments. We will pass over, then, the chapter on the “*Quanta Cura*” — which F. Newman entirely admits to be *ex cathedrâ*—and proceed to his comments on the Syllabus. For ourselves we have always held what the Bishop of Birmingham expresses; that this is certainly an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement. F. Newman considers it an Index of past condemnations, compiled indeed by the Pope’s order, but with which he does not identify himself. It “has no dogmatic force,” therefore (pp. 81-2); “and is to be received from the Pope by an act of obedience, not of faith: that obedience being shown by having recourse to the original and authoritative documents (Allocutions and the like) to which the Syllabus pointedly refers.” In the next sentence he characterises these various Pontifical Acts, as utterances of the “Apostolic Voice,” whereby “errors” are “condemned.” Then (p. 83) he parallels the Syllabus by a lawyer’s reference to “the Statutes of the Realm, or Judges’ decisions, *in which the Law’s voice really is found.*” We do not see how it is possible to interpret such language otherwise, than as meaning that the various Pontifical Acts, to which the Syllabus refers, contain one and all some *ex cathedrâ* teaching; and that, in issuing the Syllabus, Pius IX. intended to declare this fact, and demand submission to that teaching.

Nor is this interpretation of his words at all inconsistent with the circumstance that he considers *ex cathedrâ* determinations to be “of rare occurrence”: for the word “rare” is quite ambiguous; and plainly he only means to say, that *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements constitute a very small *proportion* of the Pope’s official Acts. And so F. O’Reilly, quoted with approval by F. Newman in p. 124, says that “infallibility is *comparatively* seldom brought into action.” And this is a fact which it is necessary again and again to press on the attention of Protestants, who constantly tax Catholics with ascribing infallibility to every thing which the Pope officially says or does.

So likewise in treating the Definition itself, F. Newman does not fail to point out, what is familiar to all Catholics, but which Protestants can never be got to understand; that “the Pope is not” accounted by Catholics “infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a priest, or a bishop, or a temporal prince, or a judge, or a legislator, or in his political views, or

even in his government of the Church" (p. 115): and, again, that in any given *ex cathedrâ* Act his infallibility is not accounted extend to beyond the doctrine actually defined; by no means, e.g., to the arguments by which that doctrine may be defended, the obiter dicta by which it may be illustrated, the preamble by which it may be prefaced. We may add also a word of admiration on the clearness with which F. Newman sets forth (p. 121) the Church's exact intention, in her doctrinal censures of every grade.

It is a bold thing to dissent from F. Newman on a matter of ecclesiastical history; but we must really profess a grave doubt whether he has not, in one or two portions of his pamphlet, done much injustice, to the amount of historical evidence directly producible for the dogmata of the Immaculate Conception, and, still more, of Papal Infallibility. On the other hand, there is no single point of his pamphlet which we would more earnestly press on the attention of thoughtful Catholics, than the admirable exposition (in reply to Dr. Dollinger), of the place which ecclesiastical history should occupy in a Catholic's estimation: pp. 104-107.

Some expressions have been noticed in various quarters, in which F. Newman has spoken severely of certain unnamed Catholics; and we fear we can hardly flatter ourselves that we are not, with many better men, included in his rebuke. We cannot affect to be indifferent to blame coming from so eminent a man; but this does not seem to us the fitting time or occasion for saying what we might say in our defence.

After having been bewildered by Mr. Gladstone's wild and reckless declamation, it is a real refreshment to study F. Newman's cautious and well-weighed statements. The very remarkable review of his pamphlet, which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of Jan. 20th., is one sample of the effect produced by this contrast on the mind of non-Catholic Englishmen.

The Life of Our Life. Part Second. The Public Life of our Lord Jesus Christ.
By the Rev. FATHER COLERIDGE, S.J. London: Burns & Oates.

IT is with peculiar pleasure that we greet the appearance of the first instalment of F. Coleridge's great work; a work which we trust will be the beginning of a new era in Catholic study of the Gospels. It has so recently appeared, that, in the press of work at the end of a quarter, we have had no leisure for the much desired labour of studying it. In our next number we hope to give a very careful exposition of its contents; meanwhile the following extracts from the Preface will give our readers a general notion of what they are to expect:—

"The idea that there is a great importance in the order of our Lord's Life, apart from the order in which parts of it had been represented by

this or that of His historians, seems hardly to have impressed itself on the minds of modern critics with sufficient force; and we consequently find the most arbitrary arrangements of certain incidents in some of the Harmonies, or in some of the narratives which pre-suppose them. In such arrangements the order of the Evangelists is sometimes violently dislocated, to a degree which almost implies the opinion that they put their materials together, as it were, by accident. And, on the other hand, no attempt is made to trace the onward march of the manifestations of our Lord, the gradual training of His Apostles, the development, so to speak, of His moral or doctrinal or ascetical teaching, and other elements which do not perhaps lie on the surface, but which are still certain enough and precious enough when they are discovered to repay with abundant interest the patient labour which may have been spent upon them. It has been said that the science of New Testament criticism is as yet in its infancy, and I cannot help thinking that a great deal more general knowledge than is at present common concerning matters such as those just now indicated might be acquired without any great difficulty, if only a right method were carefully adhered to in the reverent examination of the fourfold record in which it has pleased God that the Life of our Lord should come down to us (pp. xi. xii.).

If God really visited earth in human nature, and if by a marvel of merciful Providence His very acts and words are largely accessible to us, a careful and minute study of those acts and words must be among the noblest exercises of human thought. Catholics of this day are fortunate indeed in having such a guide as F. Coleridge to assist them in this study.

Johannis Maldonati, S.J. Commentarii in IV. Evangelistas. Quos pristinae integritati restitutos, novisque studiis auctos denuo edidit Dr. J. M. RAICH, Ecclesiae Cathedralis Monjuntinae Præbendatus.

WE welcome with great pleasure this new edition of Maldonatus. There is no need to enlarge on the merits of this illustrious commentator, which are universally recognized. His wide knowledge of patristic interpretations, his own vigorous, independent, and consistent judgment, his great philological knowledge, his clear and nervous style which never fails to go straight to the point and to rivet the attention of his readers, has given him a place among commentators on the Gospels which he is never likely to lose. In one respect especially he is a model for all who give themselves to biblical and, indeed, ecclesiastical science. He began with a thorough training in the scholastic philosophy and theology. And having laid this indispensable foundation, he threw himself with ardour into the new learning, and brought a profound knowledge

of Greek and Hebrew to the illustration of the sacred text. At least twenty editions have appeared since the *editio princeps* in 1596. Unfortunately, in subsequent editions, great liberties were taken with the original text of the first edition ; and it is the great merit of the present editor, Dr. Raich, that he has for the first time since 1596 given us the Commentaries of Maldonatus pure and entire. His labour has not been small. It was necessary to have the text of the *editio princeps* copied out in manuscript, for the abbreviation made it unintelligible to modern printers. It was labour well bestowed, for the variations from the original text of Maldonatus, which had crept into the additions, were very considerable in extent and importance. He has increased the number of references to parallel passages, and added a few critical and dogmatic notes, which are always marked with asterisks. Great attention has been paid to correctness of typography. He may fairly expect to reap the fruit of his toil and to see his edition recognized as the only genuine reproduction of the famous commentaries on the Gospel.

Our Lady's Dowry ; or, How England gained and lost that Title. By the Rev. T. E. BRIDGETT, C.S.S.R. Burns & Oates, London.

WE rise from the perusal of this book with no common feelings. It is hard to say whether a sentiment of pain or of satisfaction is more definite. Let not our readers suppose this is to be laid to the account of the author, or as he modestly terms himself, the compiler, of this deeply interesting volume. Our mixed feelings are due, on the one hand, to the sad history here drawn out of how England lost—or rather cast off, and trampled under foot—the glorious title of “Our Lady’s Dowry;” on the other to the picture of what our dear land was in times past, and of what we may hope, in God’s mercy, through the intercession of His Holy Mother, so tenderly loved, so earnestly invoked, England may yet be once more. But without dwelling on these thoughts, it is our business to give in a brief space an account of the contents of this volume of near upon five hundred pages ; and it is our most pleasant duty to say it is long since any work issuing from the English Catholic press has merited a more entire and cordial welcome. The Rev. Father Bridgett has already won the reputation, eminently well deserved, of wide reading, power of argument, justness of view, outspoken and manly honesty, by his “Ritual of the New Testament,” but this present work will still further increase his literary

credit, did he seek no higher objects. No words of praise of ours, however, can bear a greater weight than that which has been written by The Bishop of Salford, in which we perfectly agree, that "Our Lady's Dowry," is the most "excellent, the most interesting, and the most original work of its kind that has been published in the English language." And he concludes by "strongly recommending it to the clergy, and to all educated Englishmen, whether Catholic or Non-Catholic, who have any care to investigate the religious history of their country."*

It was as early as 1399, as the Archbishop of Canterbury tells us, that England was "commonly called" the "Dowry of Mary," and the manner in which our country made herself worthy of such a title, is worked out by our author on the following exhaustive scheme. The first part of the book is devoted to the Doctrinal aspect of devotion to the Blessed Virgin; and in six chapters, The Immaculate Conception; The Incarnation; The Joys; the Words; The Dolours; and the Glory of Mary, are treated of. "The Doctrine that was current in England" for over a thousand years down to the period when, except in a few faithful hearts, the so-called "Reformation" swept away every thing of respect even for the Mother of God, is here given in a series of extracts from English writers, "valuable" indeed, as Father Bridgett writes, "for their intrinsic excellence," and affording glimpses of the deep theological knowledge, the profound spirituality, and the ardent and tender piety of the Catholic theologians and spiritual writers of the Middle Ages in England. As we dwell on these extracts, we deeply feel with our author how much it is to be regretted, that we Catholics of to-day know so little of these writings of our own countrymen of past times, fallen into an oblivion which they certainly do not deserve, or left to be published by the zeal of the scholars of other countries. We would fain cull from this delicious nosegay of flowers of piety some few choice flowers to set before our readers, but our space forbids. We cannot, however, pass on beyond this first division of the book, without remarking the striking coincidence of the entirely conclusive proofs brought forward by the Rev. Father Bridgett, from the eighth century downwards, of the firm belief in the Immaculate Conception, and this just at the time when we have been told by the ex-premier that the Definition of the Immaculate Conception was "a violent breach with history."

With the second part of the work, we enter upon a vast field of the most patient research, the most deeply interesting, historic, and archæologic lore, the most touching memorial of the refined and yet simple piety, and, in a word, to quote our author, a summary "of the various methods in which our forefathers (for nine centuries, between the conversion of England and the Reformation) strove to show their love and veneration for the Mother of their God and their Redeemer." Under this head, the honours paid to our Lady, private and public devotions, the Angelic Salutation, beads and

* Note to Ninth Thousand of "A Pastoral Letter on Submission to a Divine Teacher, &c." By the Right Rev. Bishop of Salford.

bella, feasts and fasts, churches, altars, &c., images of our Lady, pilgrimages and miracles, sanctuaries and holy wells, memorials, guilds of our Lady, and the final invocation of Her name at the hour of death, set before us an abundance of matter of interest and edification, such as has assuredly never before been collected on these subjects. And here we must make a remark on what we cannot but consider a matter of regret, and that is the meagreness of the index, specially felt in regard to this second portion of the work, which teems with apt and interesting citations from modern as well as ancient writers and authorities, a very considerable proportion of which do not appear on reference to the index. To attempt to give the barest analysis of these chapters would be hopeless; we can only beg our readers to refer to the work itself, and we answer for it that their love for our Lady will be deepened, their affection and veneration for their forefather's tender faith tenfold increased, and their gratitude to the author of "*Our Lady's Dowry*" most sincere, when they have read his pages. We cannot, however, pass on to the third and last part without alluding to the learned disquisition on the "*Angelic Salutation*," in which, with a characteristic modesty, and yet with a clearness and precision of argument equally remarkable, Father Bridgett proves that "the learned and pious antiquarian," Canon Rock, is incorrect when, in his most useful work, "*The Church of our Fathers*," he limits the use of the "*Hail Mary*" to the thirteenth century, and gives us, amongst various citations and arguments, the testimony of S. Peter Damien, born in the tenth century, of its use in the eleventh century, "while there is everything to lead us to suppose a much higher antiquity." In the same manner a disquisition on the *Rosary of our Lady*, as regards the history of its use in England, is full of interesting matter, whilst the Catholic doctrine of Devotion to Images, referring of course to representations of the Mother of God, is treated in a most masterly and learned chapter on the subject; nor is the subject of *Relics* less learned or less able. It need hardly be said that as mere illustrations of the subject, the lists of churches dedicated to our Lady, now forlorn and desolate; of statues yet remaining, despite the banner of the iconoclast; of pictures on wall and vellum-page, might have been drawn out to considerable length had Father Bridgett's task been simply that of an antiquarian. Those who are wont to linger in our deserted cathedrals and neglected village churches; to visit with sad footstep our ruined abbeys; to turn over the brilliant pages of illuminated manuscripts, can recal hundreds of representations, quaint and naive though they be, of our Blessed Lady; but all with that deep inner sentiment of tender love and piety which, as Father Bridgett sufficiently shows, was the universal sentiment of the ages of faith in Her regard in this Her dowry.

But now we pass from the sweet radiance of love and faith, to the gloom and storm of hate and disbelief, and the vices of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth, which head the concluding chapters, under the general title of this third part—"Disloyalty," sufficiently indicates the sad history to be unfolded to the reader. But it is in special reference to the subject of his work that Father Bridgett writes, and we get as the result an unwritten

chapter—there are many more still to be written—of the history of the “Reformation.” “How the revolt against the teaching and practice of the Catholic Church, as regards devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary,” was brought about “by declarations of doctrine, legislative enactments, royal proclamations and commissions, and popular movements,” is told us in these four chapters, whilst the fifth and last sums up this history of “English devotion to the Virgin Mother,” and cites the further testimony of modern Protestant writers in favour of its happy influences, and ends by a few but conclusive words as to Mr. Gladstone’s unhappy and groundless attack on “Mariolatry,” as he calls it, and his unfounded allegations as regards the Catholic devotion of to-day to the ever Immaculate Mother of God. But to return to our more immediate subject, there is a deeply interesting estimate of “the degrees of responsibility of the various classes who engaged in the overthrow of Our Lady’s Dowry,” and with a few words on this subject we must conclude. Certain it is, that when the upholders and the destroyers of “Our Lady’s Dowry” are compared, Catholics “have nothing of which to be ashamed.” Yet, as Father Bridgett says, alas! the enemies of Our Lady were, not unbaptized heathens, not even Protestants brought up from infancy in anti-Catholic prejudice, but those who had been children of the Catholic Church. A remarkable prediction from the writings of an English Dominican, 150 years before the blow fell, sets forth the unhappy part that certain—even amongst the priests of God’s Church—were to take against their Mother. As regards the upper classes, the old spirit of chivalry, linked with devotion, had largely died away, the decay coming downwards from a corrupt Court, and they cast aside their faith to lay hands on the spoils of the sanctuary. As for the people, Father Bridgett arrives at the conclusion that all “who actively co-operated in doing despite to Our Lady were not equally guilty,” and he is “glad to believe that many of the simple people, even of those who consented to acts of sacrilege, were deluded by sophisms into the thought that they were doing God service.” How the people were thus deluded, is told by extracts from the Prayer Books, Primers, &c., of the period, where the downward path of the “Reformation” is traced—how little by little prayers to Our Lady were erased, lights extinguished before her image, her shrines pillaged, until at last her effigy and her sanctuaries were given to the flames; and though the Angelic Salutation still held its ground, even when the faithful servants of Mary were suffering on the scaffold for their faith; that, too, was at last expunged, and England was no more “The Dowry of Mary.” Such is a brief and most imperfect sketch of this remarkable book. We earnestly hope, and venture confidently to predict, that it will have a large circulation. To Catholics, it cannot be other than a book of pious meditation as to its first part, of deep interest and edification as to its second, and of earnest prayer as to its third. To Protestants, who honestly desire to inform themselves of the real history and aspect of devotion to the Mother of God in past times in England, in contradistinction to the “ignorance and flippancy” of even “the best informed and most impartial” amongst their own historians, this work, calmly read and pondered on, cannot but

bring new lights and graces, for which they may bless the writer. We should not omit to mention that some beautiful illustrations from the pencil of the able Catholic artist, Mr. H. W. Brewer, add greatly to the value of the work.

Peace through the Truth. Second Series. By Rev. Father HARPER, S.J.
London: Burns & Oates.

IT is hardly possible to exaggerate the controversial importance of the work with which Father Harper is engaged, in his successive volumes of "*Peace through the Truth*" viz: the refuting carefully and profoundly the various historical objections, raised by Dr. Pusey against the dogma of Papal infallibility. F. Harper says—and we are quite disposed to agree with him—that there are "very many who, if their judgment could be reformed by a satisfactory solution" of these difficulties, "would not be able to resist the claims and attractions which the Catholic Church offers to their intellect and their heart." The present volume is entirely occupied with the supposed mutual contradictions of Popes on prohibited marriages. This inquiry leads to theological investigations of great interest, and we hope to give our readers some idea of them at an early opportunity. We sincerely hope Father Harper may have health and leisure to complete his invaluable labours.

*The Vatican Decrees and Catholic Allegiance, and
The Syllabus for the People.* By a Monk of St. Augustine's, Ramsgate.
London: Burns & Oates.

THE writer of these two valuable pamphlets has fallen into one mistake, which was pointed out in the *Tablet*. "Marriage between two Protestants" he says "wherever contracted, is held by Catholic divines to be valid and indissoluble." On the contrary we believe the large majority of theologians would hold an opposite opinion as regards those countries in which the decree of clandestinity has been published, and in which a special indult or declaration has not been obtained.

The only other point in which we cannot follow his teaching, is what we understand to be his doctrine on the relation between Church and State. The author ("*Vatican Decrees*," pp. 25-7) may not unnaturally be understood as ignoring the power possessed by the Church, of visiting with spiritual censures any political act, which may involve injury to men's eternal interests. On the other hand, in his second pamphlet (p. 36) he

asks "Does the State ever aim at the sanctification of its members?" and answers "Assuredly not." Surely the civil ruler and legislator, if Christian and devout, directs his earnest political efforts to the religious welfare of his countrymen. The author adds, that "the aim of the Church is distinct and independent of the object of the State." For reasons which we have given in our article on Mr. Gladstone, we greatly prefer F. Parkinson's statement that the ends of the two societies are in part different indeed, but in part identical. The divergence, however, between the author and ourselves, seems rather matter of words than of thought; as he says expressly (p. 37) that "if the eternal welfare of the subjects of a State could not be obtained without the loss of its temporal prosperity, eternal interests must take precedence of earthly ones."

Otherwise we heartily welcome the two pamphlets; and we think, indeed, that the second originates in a very happy thought, and is likely to be extensively useful. The author begins (p. 6) by arguing from the tenor of the "*Quantâ Curâ*," and from subsequent Pontifical declarations, that, when censuring the errors recited in the Syllabus, "the Pope claims intellectual obedience on the ground of his infallibility." Next comes a translation of the Syllabus (pp. 7-21). This is followed by a very clear exposition (pp. 21-26) of what it is which the Pope teaches, in condemning certain errors. The author then proceeds to set forth with great perspicuity (pp. 27-8) the absolute necessity—if revealed dogma is to be securely guarded—that the Church's infallibility shall extend beyond the mere teaching of the Deposit. "The Church," he says accordingly "may pass sentence on such philosophical principles, on such opinions of human science, as imperil the purity of dogma; and can exact intellectual submission to such pronouncements." And, lastly (pp. 29-34), he goes severally through the various propositions of the Syllabus. It is really surprising how clearly he sets forth their bearing in so short a space; and we must add that in this exposition (as it seems to us), he succeeds as nearly as possible in hitting the happy mean, between Mr. Gladstone's extraordinary misconceptions on one side, and any kind of unfaithful compromise on the other.

The Liberal Party and the Catholics. London: Longmans.

ONE word will suffice on this ably and temperately-written pamphlet. The author is confident (p. 25) that "for years to come the battle-cry of political parties" will be the question of religious education. Surely he cannot doubt that Cardinal Cullen and Archbishop Manning will be to the full as staunch and energetic in that cause, as those other prelates will be with whom he somewhat invidiously contrasts the former. If irreligious education be (as he confidently thinks) involved in the essential programme of political liberalism, he need not fear that any Catholics will give the latter any kind of support.

Three Essays on Religion. By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans.

WE hardly know so remarkable a fact in the history of philosophy, as the collapse of Mr. Mill's fame which has so speedily followed on his death. To us the reaction seems as exaggerated on one side, as his philosophical name was indubitably exaggerated on the other. But when his opinion became publicly known, that it would not be easy even for an unbeliever to find a better rule of conduct than "to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life"—nay, that not impossibly Jesus Christ was "a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue"—we may well understand with what contempt his memory is regarded by some of his former admirers. His very particular friend, Mr. Morley, has published in the *Fortnightly* what we must pronounce to be a crushing criticism of his work.

In fact, we are bound to admit that it is by far the weakest thing he has ever published. His philosophical principles lead to antitheism by legitimate consequence; and his passionate attempts to construct some kind of religious edifice do more credit (if we may use the common antithesis) to his heart than to his head. Such attempts, we think, are due to that passionate emotionism, which was so very prominent and so very singular a part of his character.

It is certain that his writings had more powerful effect in promoting speculative irreligion than any other of his time, and that his great influence was predominantly directed against the cause of God. Without, however, attempting to deny this, we may say that the present volume has much confirmed an opinion which we have frequently expressed, that in several points he was distinguished for the better from the body of his brother irreligionists.

As to the contents of this volume, our time for discussing them will be at the appropriate period of the controversy which we are still carrying on against his philosophy. When we began that controversy, his was confessedly the greatest English name on his own philosophical side; whereas there is now hardly one which carries with it so little authority.

Characteristics from the Writings of John Henry Newman: being Selections Personal, Historical, Philosophical, and Religious, from his various works. Arranged by WILLIAM SAMUEL LILLY of the Inner Temple, &c. King & Co. 1874.

IN noticing, some time since, in this REVIEW, a volume of "Miscellanies," collected by some Protestant hand from F. Newman's writings, we took occasion to let our readers know that a more extensive and complete

volume was preparing by his own sanction, of far greater value, and likely to be more generally interesting to the Catholic public. Of this fresh volume we now propose to give some account, and we sincerely trust that it will soon be in the hands of a multitude of readers who may not be in circumstances to possess themselves of F. Newman's collected works. It is divided into four heads, "Personal," "Philosophical," "Historical," and "Religious;" and the Religious portion is again subdivided into three sections, under the titles of Protestantism, Anglicanism, and Catholicism. These subjects are chosen from the whole range of F. Newman's published works, from the "Athanasius," and the "History of the Arians," to "Calista," and the "Verses on Various Occasions;" and it will easily be understood that the task was one of no common labour and difficulty, both from the great variety of subjects to be handled and also from the close and singularly complete style of the author. For where arguments are condensed into a few phrases, or linked in a chain of perfectly connected rings, or set before the mind in one or two consummate, exhaustive illustrations, it is exceedingly difficult to make any selections or disconnect the series of passages of equal power and beauty. We begin, naturally, with the Philosophical portion; as the "Grammar of Assent" is not merely the only great finished work of F. Newman, but is also a remarkable step in philosophical development. In the "Grammar of Assent," also, over and above the concentration of power, F. Newman has poured out the apparently exhaustless riches of his mind in the illustrations which he multiplies to convey scientific principles. Take, as an instance, the fragment given on the education necessary for insuring accuracy of mind:—

"When the eyes of an infant first open upon the world, the reflected rays of light which strike them from the myriad of surrounding objects present to him no image, but a medley of colours and shadows. They do not form into a whole, they do not rise into foregrounds and melt into distances; they do not divide into groups; they do not coalesce into unities; they do not combine into persons; but each particular hue and flint stands by itself, wedged in amid a thousand others upon the vast and, at mosaic, having no intelligence, and conveying no story, any more than the wrong side of some rich tapestry. The little babe stretches out his arms and fingers, as if to grasp or to fathom the many-coloured vision and thus he gradually learns the connection of part with part, separates what moves from what is stationary, watches the coming and going of figures, masters the idea of shape and perspective, calls in the information conveyed through the other senses to assist him in his mental process, and thus gradually converts a kaleidoscope into a picture. The first view was more splendid, the second more real. . . . Alas! what are we doing all through life, both as a necessity and a duty, but unlearning the world's poetry and attaining to its prose! This is our education, as boys and as men, in the action of life, and in the closet or library; in our affections, in our aims, in our hopes, and in our memories. . . . To a short-sighted person colours run together and intermix, outlines disappear, blues and reds and yellows become russets or browns; the lamps and candles of an illumination spread into an unmeaning glare, or dissolve into a milky way. . . . It is this haziness of intellectual vision which is the malady of all classes of men by nature, of those who read and write and compose,

quite as well as of those who cannot—of all who have not had a really good education" (pp. 71, 72, 73).

Speaking of the origin of political watchwords, this inaccuracy is treated scientifically by F. Newman in a previous passage in the "Grammar" as "formalism," and the difference between assent and assertion is pointed out in a well-known passage. For instance, there is, first, the distinct intellectual assent direct, with the clear apprehension of the subject. Secondly, there is the assent indirect when there is submission to authority as a principle, without individual apprehension. Thirdly, there is the adoption of any proposition or set of propositions without appreciation, merely because others have adopted them, and used certain words as their signs.

"Such words are 'liberality,' 'progress,' 'light,' 'civilization'; such 'justification by faith only,' 'vital religion,' 'private judgment,' 'the Bible and nothing but the Bible.' Such again are 'Rationalism,' 'Gallicanism,' 'Jansenism,' 'Ultramontaniam,'—all of which, in the mouths of conscientious thinkers, have a definite meaning, but are used by the multitude as war-cries, nicknames, and shibboleths, with scarcely enough of the scantiest grammatical apprehension of them to allow of their being considered really more than assertions" (p. 76).

A very important passage with an exquisitely-drawn illustration, and branching out into very full exposition, too long to insert at length, is given upon reasoning in concrete matters :—

"It is plain that formal logical sequence is not, in fact, the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete; and it is equally plain what the real and necessary method is. It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible. As a man's portrait differs from a sketch of him in having, not merely a continuous outline, but all its details filled in, and shades and colours laid on and harmonized together, such is the multiform and intricate process of ratiocination, necessary for our reaching him as a concrete fact, compared with the rude operation of syllogistic treatment. . . . As true poetry is a spontaneous outpouring of thought, and therefore belongs to rude as well as to gifted minds, whereas no one becomes a poet merely by the canons of criticism, so this unscientific reasoning, being sometimes a natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes approaching to a gift, sometimes an acquired habit and second nature, has a higher source than logical rule—*nascitur non fit*. When it is characterized by precision, subtlety, promptitude, and truth, it is, of course, a gift and a rarity; in ordinary minds it is biassed and degraded by prejudice, passion, and self-interest; but still, after all, this divination comes by nature, and belongs to all of us in a measure, to women more than to men, hitting or missing as the case may be, but with a success on the whole sufficient to show that there is a method in it, though it be implicit" (pp. 82, 85, 86).

There are various opinions stated in the "Grammar" with which we cannot concur; but at this time, when countless questions, of real philosophy and false, are agitating all minds, and the more keen and thoughtful among us are likely to be the most agitated and disturbed,

we could wish that the work were carefully studied by all competent persons. The marvellous summing-up on the passage headed, "Intellectual Abstractions" is an instance in point:—

"As even saints may suffer from imaginations in which they have no part, so the shreds and tatters of former controversies, and the litter of an argumentative habit, may beset and obstruct the intellect,—questions which have been solved without their solutions, chains of reasoning with missing links, difficulties which have their roots in the nature of things, and which are necessarily left behind in a philosophical inquiry because they cannot be removed, and which call for the exercise of good sense and for strength of will to put them down with a high hand. . . . Whence comes evil? why are we created without our consent? how can the Supreme Being have no beginning? how can He need skill if He is omnipotent? if He is omnipotent, why does He permit suffering? if He permits suffering, how is He all-loving? if He is all-loving, how can He be just? if He be infinite, what has He to do with the finite? how can the temporary be decisive of the eternal?—these, and a host of like questions, must arise in every thoughtful mind, and after the best use of reason, must be deliberately put aside as beyond reason, as (so to speak) no thoroughfares, which, having no outlet in themselves, have no legitimate power to divert us from the King's highway" (p. 92).

And further on, in the "Grammar," we find what may be called the countersign to this passage, to which, in its full extent, Catholic students may well cling with reverent thankfulness of assent; for they, at least, will not follow the method of the world, asking, "what is truth?" and going out, like Pilate, without caring to hear the answer.

"The laws of mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of His will. . . . Since one of their very functions is to tell me of Him, they throw a reflex light upon themselves; and for resignation to my destiny I substitute a cheerful concurrence in an over-ruling Providence. . . . As if on set purpose, He has made this path of thought rugged and circuitous above other investigations; that the very discipline inflicted on our minds in finding Him may mould them into due devotion to Him when He is found. 'Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel the Saviour,' is the very law of His dealings with us" (p. 94).

It is obviously impossible out of a volume of more than four hundred pages, each one of which contains some or many pearls of suggestive thought, to do anything like justice to its contents. We should like to linger lovingly over its "Personal" portion, taken from the "Apologia," that consummate picture of a human mind and a human soul working out its own completion by co-operation with God's grace. And again, we could transcribe whole pages from the "Historical" section, in which an admirable choice of extracts has been put together. And we need scarcely say that the "Religious" selection contains some of the finest passages of F. Newman's writings—passages, as in "The Christian Year" (p. 286), "Faith in the Catholic Church" (p. 324), "Relics and Miracles" (p. 370), "A Bad Catholic" (p. 398), and the exquisite, tender extracts, "Maria Assumpta" and "S. Mary Magdalene," which will

always live among the most striking, powerful, and touching examples of eloquence in the English language.

Among the historical extracts two are chosen out, giving the two special contrasts of F. Newman's manner; one of brief, and, as it were, stern concentration, as if the subject and its accumulation of thought and feeling were overpowering in their intensity: the other exhaustively setting forth the whole matter as the fairest mental picture, so full of charm that every succeeding reading of the passage is a fresh delight:—

"Gregory thought he had failed. So it is; often a cause seems to decline as its champion grows in years, and to die in his death. But this is to judge hastily; others are destined to complete what he began. No man is given to see his work through. 'Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening,' but the evening falls before it is done. There was One alone Who began, and finished, and died" (p. 189).

"A confined triangle, perhaps fifty miles its greatest length and thirty its greatest breadth; two elevated rocky barriers meeting at an angle; three prominent mountains commanding the plain—Parnes, Pentelicus, and Hymettus; an unsatisfactory soil; some streams, not always full;—such is about the report which the agent of a London company would have made of Attica. He would report that the climate was mild, the hills were limestone; there was plenty of good marble; more pasture land than at first survey might have been expected, sufficient certainly for sheep and goats; fisheries productive; silver mines once, but long since worked out; figs fair; oil first rate; olives in profusion. . . . He would not think of writing word to his employer how that clear air of which I have spoken brought out, yet clouded and subdued, the colours on the marble, till they had a softness and harmony, for all their richness, which in a picture looks exaggerated, yet is after all within the truth. He would not tell how that same delicate and brilliant atmosphere freshened up the pale olive until the olive forgot its monotony, and its cheek glowed like the arbutus, or beech of the Umbrian hills. He would say nothing of the thyme and thousand fragrant herbs that carpeted Hymettus. He would follow with his eye the chain of islands which seemed to offer a sort of viaduct across the sea; but that fancy would not occur to him, nor any admiration of the dark violet billows with their white edges down below; nor of those graceful fan-like jets of silver upon the rocks, which slowly rise aloft like water-spirits from the deep, then shiver and break, and spread and shroud themselves, and disappear in a soft mist of foam; nor of the gentle, incessant heaving and panting of the whole liquid plain; nor of the long waves keeping steady time, like a line of soldiery, as they resound upon the hollow shore; nor the distinct detail, nor the fine colouring, nor the graceful outline and roseate golden line of the jutting crags, nor the bold shadows cast from Othrys or Sunium by the declining sun" (pp. 170, 171).

Mr. Lilly has thrown his whole heart and mind into his enviable task, in which he had not only the full sanction but the invaluable help of F. Newman himself. His preface will best convey what kind of help that was, and his own appreciation of the loving labour of a careful selection of passages from thirty-four volumes. A list of the complete works consulted, and a careful index, add considerably to the usefulness of this

volume, which is a real gift to the public. Mr. Lilly quotes from Austin's "Poetry of the Period," that F. Newman is "the man in the working of whose individual mind the intelligent portion of the English public is more interested than in that of any other living person." There are large multitudes, then, by whom this volume will be eagerly read, as being, what it it undoubtedly is to its extent, an authentic exposition of F. Newman's mind.

Rome and her Captors. Letters collected and edited by Count HENRY D'IDEVILLE. Translated by F. R. WEGG-PROSSER. London: Washburne, 1875.

THIS volume of M. d'Ideville is an admirable companion to Mr. Powell's "Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves." The letters are written by two anonymous correspondents, and describe the attempted capture of Rome by Garibaldi, and the tissue of events which brought about in 1870 the seizure of Rome by Victor Emmanuel. M. d'Ideville is not the narrator of events recorded in this volume, but is simply the editor. In addition to a full table of contents, which the reader and even the student of passing events will find very useful, Mr. Wegg-Prosser gives a preface in which he shows the connexion between the lawlessness of Garibaldi's attempt in 1867 and Victor Emmanuel's successful capture in 1870. Of Count d'Arnim, now persecuted by his quondam master, Bismarck, M. d'Ideville's correspondent says (p. 115): "It is a fact that the Baron d'Arnim, having left Rome on the 12th for *Florence*, arrived from *Leghorn*," supposed from a visit to Caprera, "on the evening of the 18th, and that since his return the Liberals are in a state of exultation. Besides that, this is the news which is going about amongst the most able men of the sect. Baron d'Arnim is supposed to have brought back since his journey a treaty of alliance with Garibaldi, by which the hero of Mentana engages himself, as soon as ever the war begins on the Rhine, and even before if it is possible, to attack the French division at Civita Vecchia. Prussia will furnish money and arms," thus showing the complicity of Prussia, through its "active and zealous agent," with the Government of Victor Emmanuel. On the French ambassador, the Marquis de Bonneville, announcing the departure of the French troops from Rome, Pius IX. lifted up his eyes to Heaven, and contented himself with saying, with perfect calmness, "It is now time to pray; but all will end well." Would that M. d'Ideville's correspondent had been Emperor of France, for, speaking of the desire of Prussia to send the Prince of Hohenzollern to Spain, he says: "Since one must absolutely go to war with Prussia, why not begin by allowing her to weaken herself by sending this young prince of Hohenzollern to try his hand in Spain? Ah! if I were Emperor of the French, not only would I let the King of Prussia accept this crown for his relative, but I would strongly push him on to this piece of madness. Then, once the

King of Spain was installed in his position at Madrid, I would give a million to the Carlists, a million to the Isabellists, a million to the Montpensierists, a million to the Republicans, and muskets to all these people ; and before a little time was over you would have some fine news about Spain and about the destinies of her young sovereign." His idea of the Prussian army proved true ; he says (p. 120), "there is one of your colleagues here who does not comfort us with regard to the Prussians. It is Lefevre de Behaine ; he passed five years at Berlin as first secretary, and he is frightful to listen to. He maintains that the Prussian army is better organized than ours, perhaps better commanded ; in short, he foresees much self-deception on our side. His conversations upset all my ideas as to Germany and the Germans. It appears that those good, bulky men, with their devout mien, are specimens of all that is most false, most tricky, and most wicked in a cold-blooded way ; and with all that very rapacious, very thievish, and capable of the greatest excesses. Be distrustful, then, of appearances ! Behaine assures us that the King of Prussia can dispose of an army of a million men, perfectly drilled ; in short, it seems that we shall not arrive without difficulty at Berlin. Ah, well ! the *furia francesca* has completely overthrown others besides." How true was the prediction of this correspondent regarding M. Minghetti, then a minister of Pius IX., to whom the Bishop of Orleans lately addressed his letter. He says (p. 200) : "M. Minghetti and his party correspond to what is called in France the party of the Conservative Republic. M. Thiers, Casimir Perier, &c., accept the Republic because they say Monarchy is not possible in France. In the same way, M. Minghetti and his associates accept the taking of Rome and all its consequences, because, say they, it would have been impossible to oppose oneself to the unanimous wish of the nation. M. Minghetti, however, knows very well how far to rely upon the real aspirations of the majority of the Italian people, and he is not ignorant that the crime of the 20th September is the triumph of a minority ; but he accepts accomplished facts, and like M. Thiers, he counts upon his skill and upon his eloquence to chain down the revolution, and to trace out for it the limits which it must not pass. Poor M. Minghetti, his illusion will not be of long duration. And if, as they pretend, he dissolves the Chamber in the month of November, in the hope of reconstituting the *Consorteria* upon the most solid basis, and with the most numerous elements, the *voting* electors will send to the Chamber deputies still more revolutionary than those who are now sitting at the Monte-Citorio. M. Minghetti will have to yield his place to M. Depretis, chief of the Left Centre, and of the Piedmontese *Permanente* ; he again will be dethroned in his turn by M. Sella, who is going to try his hand, I think, at playing the part of the late of M. Ratazzi, and endeavouring to rally and to discipline the Left and Extreme Left. Then at last they must allow M. Mancini to arrive at supreme power ; he appears decidedly to be the candidate preferred by Prussia."

Letter from the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Orleans to M. Minghetti, Minister of Finance to King Victor Emmanuel. Burns & Oates. 1874.]

TO those acquainted with [the trials which have lately afflicted Italy, the name of Signor Minghetti must be familiar, whether it be as Minister, in former times, of our Holy Father, or later, of King Victor Emmanuel, whom he has aided in despoiling the Church of God, and wounding the heart of His Vicar on earth. Well and truly does the Bishop remind M. Minghetti of the time when he co-operated with the Holy Father in a "great, fruitful, and glorious undertaking," and adds, "I know that you have retained a grateful recollection of the generous sovereign who gave you such a proof of his esteem"; and the Bishop continues that "nothing can be more sad, and I like to think that it is not without bitter regret that you are taking part in such proceedings. Everything is done with consummate skill, and with a deep meaning. There is no noise, no outward violence; everything is concealed under an apparent legality; but, nevertheless, what is being done is the greatest disaster that could befall the Church, and if she could be destroyed by the hand of man, would be her ruin," and because there is no noise or outward violence the truth is weak, and the Catholic world deceived. He reminds M. Minghetti of the memorandum addressed by M. Visconti-Venosta to the Italian agents at the various foreign courts, when he said that "the Government *promises to preserve all the institutions, offices, and ecclesiastical bodies existing at Rome, as well as those employed therein.*" "The Government *promises to preserve intact, and without submitting them to special taxation, all ecclesiastical properties, of which the revenues belong to offices, corporations, institutions, and ecclesiastical bodies having their seat in Rome, and in the Leonine city.*"

The memorandum went on to say: "The Government will not meddle with the internal discipline of the *ecclesiastical corporations in Rome.* The bishops and priests of the kingdom are free, in their respective dioceses and parishes, of *all interference from the Government* in the exercise of their spiritual functions." "These articles shall be considered as a *public and bilateral contract, and the point of union with the powers having Catholic subjects.*" How was this promise kept? We know that (p. 10) "all Church property had been confiscated, all religious orders suppressed; thousands of religious despoiled and hunted down; the nuns turned out of their convents night after night by the Carabineers, and left in the street. "I thank God," writes one superior, "that none of my sisters perished in the high road"; bishops and archbishops, including the Archbishops of Turin and Cagliari, and many others, thrown into prison; bishoprics left vacant by the hundred; the Concordat, with the Holy See violated; all ecclesiastical immunities, stipulated in a treaty with Rome, abolished. The Siccardi law voted to the cry of "Down with the priests!" "The marriage law voted on the 5th of June, 1852, in spite of the Pope, in spite of the Concordat, in spite of the bishops," and in spite of the words of the

statute (p. 11): "*All property, without any exception is inviolable.*" Notwithstanding the fact that a former minister of Charles Albert reminded the Government that these words "*without any exception*" which are not to be found in any other Constitution, were added to the statute by the King himself, and precisely with the object of protecting ecclesiastical property. In vain did he, pointing to the statue of Charles Albert, exclaim "Certainly, gentlemen, if the King, Charles Albert, whose statue is before your eyes, could have foreseen how, to-day, you dare to interpret his intentions and his acts, he would have drawn back that hand stretched out to swear to the Constitution. Yes, gentlemen, he would indignantly have withdrawn it!" Noble, but fruitless words. The law was voted. Victor Emmanuel's Government enacted (p. 11): "7th July, 1866—Law regarding religious corporations, and on the conversion of real property belonging to ecclesiastical institutions." "15th August, 1867—Law on the liquidation of the dominions of the Church." "27th July, 1868—Law as to the pensions to be granted to the members of suppressed religious corporations." Lastly, "11th August, 1870—Law on the conversion of the property of the parishes, and ecclesiastical fabrics."

On accepting the plebiscite, Victor Emanuel declared it to be (p. 12) "the firm resolution of the Government to guarantee, *by efficacious and lasting means*, the liberty and spiritual independence of the Holy See," and the Government added, "This *royal promise* was a confirmation of the votes of the Italian Parliament, and of the declarations made both before and after the entry of the Italian troops into Rome, by your Majesty's Government to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to the *Catholic powers*." "The Italian Government," they continue, "wished to justify the expectation of Europe, and the confidence of the Catholic world." In addition to this promise, M. Minghetti drew up his famous Law of Guarantees. "What were these acts?" asks M. Dupanloup. Truly and eloquently does his lordship depict the manner in which they have violated every engagement entered into by them; he treats of the spoliation of the Church, and reminds M. Minghetti that (p. 14) "the Pope does not even possess St. Peter's, or the Vatican, not even the little chapel where he says Mass, not even the room where he lives; that he is living as a lodger and a stranger in that palace built by the Popes, and still filled with the majesty of their secular sovereignty," and that "he can no longer set foot in Rome." That (p. 15), "from the Sovereign Pontiff down to the humblest ecclesiastic in the poorest church in Rome, everything is at your mercy; the daily bread of all the clergy depends upon you; Pope, cardinals, bishops, priests, all are, as far as regards their material subsistence, under the yoke of your finance; a revolution, a war, a movement of caprice in your Chambers, and all the Roman clergy may be, in one moment, reduced to utter mendicity," for, he adds (p. 17), "you were determined to take everything: *Una ripresa del fisco*. Italian unity being a gulf in which all the resources of Italy are being swallowed up, you must have money, still more money, always money; and to get it, in spite of your protest, in face of the whole world, that the patrimony of the Roman Church should remain intact in the hands of the Church, your

Exchequer has swallowed up all : *Ripresa del fisco*." He then refers to the suppression of religious orders. He reminds M. Minghetti that "thousands of religious of both sexes in Italy, struck down by your laws, found themselves suddenly torn from these secular asylums of piety, science, and charity which they had themselves founded, and where they had a right to live and die. At Rome alone 126 monasteries of men gave shelter to 2,375 religious, 90 convents of women, 2,183 nuns. Your agents, a brutal soldiery, ravaged those venerable asylums ; and the cry of the proscriptions of old times has again been heard, *Hæc mea sunt, veteres migrate coloni* ! And they were compelled to turn out ; to tear themselves from their peaceful sanctuaries, and to give you up everything. And there they are at this very day, dispersed, wandering, taking shelter where they can in the houses which charity has opened to receive them. After having robbed these religious, whom you threw into the street, of all that was their own, you were obliged to recognize that you had a duty of honour and justice towards them : *Un debito di giustizia e d' onore*." Justice and honour ! Fine words and great things. Let us see how they have been understood by the Italian Government, and what "justice and honour" induce you to give to enable those persons to live whom you have turned out of their homes, and from whom you have taken everything that they possessed. To the professed members of the Mendicant Orders you give 250 francs a year, or a little more than 50 centimes a day ; to the lay brothers of the same Orders, 144 francs a year, or even 96 francs, that is, 25 centimes a day, according to their age. (Fivepence a day for the professed monks, and twopence-halfpenny for the lay brothers.) When offering them so ridiculously inadequate a means of subsistence, you might, perhaps, have imagined that they would throw themselves on the charity of the public. But at the very same time your police laws forbid their having recourse to it, and you punish begging in the name of social morality : *abitudine dannosa nei rispetti della moralità sociale*. Well, then, in the name of "social morality" let them die of hunger, or get out of it as best they may. "As to the lay brothers of the non-Mendicant Orders, you expect them to live, in the midst of the daily increasing dearness of every article of consumption, at the rate (according to their ages) of 300, 240, and 200 francs a year. For the choir monks and nuns, if they be sixty years of age or above it, they are to receive 600 francs a year ; if they be from forty to sixty years old, 480 francs, and these, even when they have attained the age of sixty, are not to receive any more ; while if they be under forty, they are only to get 360 francs a year, or less than a franc a day. And no matter what amount you have taken from them. The monks of the Chartreuse, at Pisa, had large possessions, three parts of which at least went to the poor. This monastery was the Providence of the country. Well, you have robbed them of everything. They were very numerous at the moment of their suppression ; one or two only are left to guard the house. Well, these poor religious, to whom you tender the miserable pittance I have quoted above, if they wish to eke out their wretched subsistence by taking a few vegetables from their own kitchen garden, must pay you for them" (p. 20). He further refers to the fact

that a great number depend upon a small emolument for saying masses in order to exist at all, and many of them have not even this resource, and, on this miserable sum given to the poorest of these priests, you impose a tax. He was even told that one of these poor priests who occasionally says Mass in a private house belonging to a Frenchman, whose name was mentioned to me, and who invited him, on these occasions, to take his place at his table afterwards, had been forced to pay for these occasional invitations what you call the family tax of 26 francs, on what your fiscal authorities were pleased to consider his revenue.

Mgr. Dupanloup refers to the old, blind, and infirm, and asks (p. 22):—

“What have you done with them? You have discovered an economical way of keeping them alive; and I was a witness in Rome of the saddest possible sight, which takes place in the Capuchin Convent near the Palazzo Barberini. There you have gathered, or rather huddled together, all the old and infirm members of the different religious communities in Rome. They have been dragged, in spite of their tears and protestations, from the homes where they had lived under a rule of their own choice, and where they had certainly purchased the right to die by a long life of labour, penance, and prayer. And now they are dying of misery, neglect, and desolation, in this hospital of your invention, far from all those who loved them, and who were the companions of their whole existence. Thus, then, all this grand, religious life in Rome, where you solemnly promised to respect it, is destroyed; all these creations of Christian centuries are annihilated. Centuries of toil, prodigies of economy, sobriety, and self-devotion, had been needed to create them. You rob them of all, and say to them, ‘Of what do you complain? You have the same virtues, the same chances; begin again! You have been centuries about it? Well, you will be centuries more.’”

He then inquires what has become of the goods? We are told that at Assisi a whole army of police were despatched after a poor lay brother, who was accused of having concealed some articles which had belonged to his monastery. The house was surrounded, the lay brother seized and thrown into prison with great indignities, and finally released. The poor brother had never hidden anything at all. And, “at Bologna, in spite of the 24th article of your law of 7th July, 1866, all the furniture of the church of S. Dominic was sold by public auction—chasubles, busts of saints, even the sacred vessels themselves.”

“The archives of the Chartreuse at Pisa, which go back to the tenth century, are equally menaced with destruction. Two hundred thousand volumes were contained in the magnificent library of the learned monks of the monastery of Minerva; what will it please you to do with them? Less rich, perhaps, but still magnificent also, was the library of Valli-celliana, in itself a *chef-d’œuvre* of art, possessing 40,000 volumes and 3,000 manuscripts. It is there that the sons of S. Philip Neri preserve the private library of their holy founder, including 300 volumes *annotated by him*. This library, which has remained as it is since the days of Baronius—have you not tried to destroy it altogether, and to divide the space into ten rooms, to be filled with I know not what! The other day I went all over this magnificent convent of S. Philip’s Oratory, where, at every turn one comes upon recollections so dear to piety and religion. In a distant corner, at which one arrives with difficulty by low doors and

back staircases, are huddled together a few of the members of the old community, who have been allowed to remain there out of tolerance. It is in that usurped home, invaded by force, and under the very eyes of its ancient possessors, that you have installed your law courts, and administer justice!" (p. 24).

"I saw at Naples the celebrated Chartreuse, that admirable monastery which all Europe has visited, on that beautiful mountain in front of Vesuvius, and of that glistening sea. Formerly a gentle and benevolent monk received the traveller, offered him refreshment, and showed him over the monastery with kindness and intelligence; now a rough soldier receives you and conducts you over the place, making ridiculous efforts to make his bad French understood. Instead of the magnificent library, which has been carried off and thrown no one knows where, they have placed there a shop of Venetian glass and painted crockery. Such is the progress of civilization! Of the thirty-two monks who were there, two only have been permitted to remain, who wander sadly in the solitude of their desecrated and desolate cloisters. No longer do the praises of God rise up to heaven in hymns and spiritual songs; the choir is deserted. No venerable white-robed monks remain to walk majestically under those magnificent porticos, or to rise and pray during the splendour of those Neapolitan nights for the great and populous city sleeping at the foot of the holy mountain" (p. 26).

"There are churches in Italy which have been already turned into stables" (p. 26).

In a word, if the ministry of Victor Emmanuel are left to themselves, Rome will be no longer Rome, for "Christian Rome, all her religious character, is rapidly disappearing in your greedy hands." He reminds M. Minghetti (p. 28), that "all Catholic nations of the Old and New World have fixed themselves at Rome—English, Belgians, &c., all nations, in fact; and France—and it is our glory and our pride—figures in the foremost rank. We possess, therefore, in this city, certain *pious foundations*,—S. Louis des Français, founded by Catherine of Medicis;" several others which he mentions, "all houses administered by our ambassador, by means of a commission. We have also a number of *religious houses*; the French Seminary;" and other foundations. "Our brave Trappists, who have made more healthy, though at the risk of their lives—and many have died—the deadly plains of S. Paul, at the Three Fountains; without counting a number of houses of brothers and sisters. Independently of other expenses which they have to meet, the administration of the *pious foundations* distributes annually from 30,000 to 40,000 francs to succour such poor or sick French people as may be living in or passing through Rome." He then speaks of "the enormous taxation of French property in Rome;" and then says that—

"Property bought with charges beyond its value does not stop you. The Trappists of S. Paul, at the Three Fountains, to whom Pius IX. confided that unhealthy tract of land to try and improve it—so unhealthy, as I before mentioned, that many have died in the attempt, and who are obliged each year to leave their monastery for three months—these Trappists, I repeat, bought with their savings (to escape from the malaria of that deadly season) a house near S. John Lateran. Well, the Government want them to sell it, and to take, be it understood, the third of the price of

the sale, and squeeze out of the remainder the previous deductions we have before mentioned. The Chartreux, for their house at S. Mary of the Angels, have spent an enormous sum, granted to them *on loan* (of which they have the title-deeds) by the great Chartreuse in France. In the same way the Chartreuse of Pavia, closed for a long while, but reopened in 1843 by the French Chartreux, has been also taken possession of by you. They have not yet had permission to touch their own funds. Well, these too, sir, are French funds, which do not belong to you in any way whatever."

He then speaks of the "*agreement or union with the powers* possessing Rome Catholic subjects," and asks, "Where, then, is this agreement?" &c. At p. 30 he says—

"Rome is the universal country, the capital, not of Italy, but of the Catholic world; and it is to the Catholic world that she owes, in a great measure, her riches and her splendour. And to begin with, do there exist in the whole world possessions more ancient, more consecrated by centuries, than those of the Roman Church? Only the other day, M. de Rossi described two stone monuments attesting 'the very ancient origin of this patrimony of the Roman Church, which,' he adds, 'maintained for sixteen centuries, amidst a thousand vicissitudes, until these latter days—is now sold by auction before our eyes.'"

It was reserved to the Italian Government to destroy what the revolutions and wars of the middle ages had spared :—

"S. John Lateran, for instance, the Pope's cathedral, built by Constantine, and secularly honoured as the head and mistress of all churches (*omnium ecclesiarum mater et caput*), and the metropolis of the Catholic world, of what does its property consist? Of foundations of the most ancient, the most illustrious, and the most incontestable in the whole world. It is, perhaps, a unique fact in history, that, amidst the vicissitudes of centuries, S. John Lateran possesses a farm, that of Cento-Celle, which was a gift of the conqueror of Maxentius. The gifts of Pepin, of Charlemagne, of other Carlovingians, to the same metropolis, are not more doubtful. Those of Louis XI., of Henry IV., and of the governments which have succeeded one another in France since 1801, rest upon equally authentic titles, as you are well aware." And yet "the patrimony of S. John Lateran even is at this moment threatened." . . . "But it is not only to the emperors and Christian monarchs that the patrimony of the Roman Church owes its origin. History records numerous and important donations made, since the first centuries of the Church by the faithful of every class and of every land in favour of S. Peter and his successors. Under all circumstances, and in a variety of forms, these donations have succeeded each other without interruption. To these gifts were added, in proportion as the Church developed itself, the contributions of the Catholic world, reserves of benefices, annual consistorial dues, produce of tribunals for dispensations, of secretaryships of briefs, fines of kingdoms which are fiefs of the Church, and Peter's pence: all revenues coming from without." It is "to Catholic Rome, the common home of Christians, that the whole world has granted consistorial dues, paid for vacant benefices, sent the produce of subscriptions and contributions from all the provinces of the religious orders to enrich so many magnificent buildings consecrated by religion, and all the marvels which have there been accumulated." . . . "The Roman States gave very little to the Popes; it was only towards the second half of the fifteenth century that direct taxes of any sort were

imposed; older, but purely local, the indirect taxes were so alight that they hardly sufficed to defray the current expenses of the municipality."

After protesting against the appropriation by the Italian Government of property belonging to others, he goes on (p. 32)—

"The Italian Government has deceived the Catholic world by a series of promises which it has not kept. It has despoiled and is despoiling the Roman Church more and more, day by day, and in the most disgraceful manner. It has destroyed its exterior position and very existence, and accumulated ruins upon ruins. In one word, of which you must feel more than any one the full bearing, and against which your colleagues protested in vain, *una ripresa del fisco*, of this you must bear the shame. The occupation of Rome is simply that, and nothing else: *una ripresa del fisco*."

He then speaks of the arbitrary military laws, which bear hardly upon the clergy, and says (p. 34) that—

"It is a well-known and undoubted fact, that, at the siege of Rome in 1870, the army of invasion contained a large number of these poor priests, who, once in Rome, used to go secretly into the sacristies, and tear off for half an hour their hateful military costume, so as to be able once more to celebrate the Holy Sacrifice." And adds that "every effort is made to deprive the children of the poor of all religious instruction." . . . "The Pope free! Free? yes, to bear every attack, every threat, every outrage."

He then goes on to the destruction of the Roman College (p. 36), which "was an institution essentially Catholic, a school of theology for the whole world. Rome is the centre of faith and doctrine. It is important to the whole Catholic world that from every land the bishops should be able to send their future priests to classes where, with the highest authority, under the eyes of the Supreme Pontiff himself, ecclesiastical science should be taught. That is why, in execution of the decrees of the Council of Trent, the Popes founded these seminaries in Rome; a diocesan seminary, the Apollinaire, for the priests of the Roman Church, and a seminary for the whole Catholic world—*omnium gentium seminarium*—the Roman college; a college which, from the hour of its foundation, has been international—international by the decrees of Gregory XIII., from the professors who taught in it, and from the various nationalities and origin of the students who frequent it, and have frequented it for the last three centuries. It is there, also, that in our days the seminaries of the different nations, and the rectors of the English, Irish, Scotch, Belgian, American, French, and German Colleges, sent their students in order to perfect them in their studies; with masters who reckoned, among their body, the most illustrious representatives of the sacred sciences. Well, what have you done with this grand and noble institution? From the moment of your entry into Rome, in September, 1870, you invaded the halls of this college, you forbade the Roman youth to frequent it, you diminished, by one half, the salaries which the Sovereign Pontiff had awarded to the professors; and then, on the 8th of October, 1873, you definitively suppressed the whole university." After saying that the professors had been deprived of the whole of their salaries, notwithstanding

the remonstrances made from various sources, he says (p. 37) : " The rectors of the different foreign colleges addressed to you fresh remonstrances, and again claimed your promise. *No answer.* The Holy Father then took up the cause and claimed restitution : so did the bishops, the professors, the rectors of colleges, even directly to yourself. You never deigned to give the smallest response. You keep the buildings of the Roman college, which are ours by right, and you pocket the 12,000 Roman scudi which was assigned to the professors by the Pontifical Government. And thus M. Minghetti and his Government ignore the 'sacred rights of the Pope, the bishops, and the Catholic powers ; they have thrown immense difficulties in the way of instruction in the sacred sciences ; and they have injured, in the highest degree, the spiritual and scientific interests of Catholicity itself.' Notwithstanding the fact that the law recognizes the principle that '*the Pope is entirely free to accomplish the functions of his spiritual ministry, and that he cannot fulfil the functions of his ministry alone, and that the Church is necessarily a secular body served by regular Orders,*' yet the first thing you did was to destroy these regular Orders. By striking at them in the centre or heart of the Church, you have done an irreparable injury to institutions which are of vital interest to the whole of Catholicity, and which were created, not only for this universal end, but with funds to which the Pontifical States have contributed little or nothing." He then goes into the subject of the disorganization of the Roman congregations, and then regarding the menaces made to the Propaganda he says (p. 41) " This is the institution, the most inseparable from the Papacy, and the most necessary to Catholicity ; that, also, which the highest interests of civilization, no less than those of religion, command you to respect." He reminds M. Minghetti (p. 42) " that he will find Catholic missionaries in Europe from the Highlands of Scotland and Sweden, to the banks of the Danubian provinces, and at Constantinople, in the whole of Asia, at Jerusalem, and all the cities of the Levant ; in Persia, China, in the Indies and Japan, and in Oceanica. There, the black savages of New Guinea, the Protestant colonies of Holland, the new world of Australia, the scarcely known islands of Polynesia, are full of missionaries. In Africa they are labouring in Algeria, at Tunis, Tripoli, &c. ; beyond the Sahara, in Abyssinia, Senegal, Zanzibar, in that vast Nigritia, where 50,000,000 poor negroes are waiting to become men and Christians ; at the Cape of Good Hope, in Madagascar, in Sierra Leone. In America you find them in New York, as in Canada, even to the wild lands of Arkansas and Hudson's Bay ; in Texas, at the Antilles, in Guiana, everywhere ! Shall I reckon up all those Orders devoted to distant missions,—Lazarists, Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Passionists, the Lyons Missionaries, those of Picpus, the Marists, the Oblates of Pignerolles and of Charity, the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, &c. And how many others ? I stop ; for it would be too long to pass, in review, that great and noble army of the Catholic Apostolate, and this noble army of missioners is organized and directed by the Propaganda, which is the prime minister of the Catholic missions ; the first and most indispensable of those administrations by which the Pope governs the universal Church. It is the Propaganda

which, by its Vicars Apostolic, governs and directs all those countries where the Catholic hierarchy is not yet regularly constituted. She is the resort of all the missionary establishments (both men and women) scattered throughout the East, in India, China, Africa, America, and the isles of the ocean; all the clergy, regular and secular, who, under one name or the other, are labouring for the propagation of the faith, are consolidated, directed, and depend entirely upon her. It is so true that the Propaganda is an Apostolate, not for local purposes, but for the whole world, that she does not receive students of Italian nationality. All her subjects, formed in her school, are to return to their respective orders, belonging to different countries who have sent them there." Besides this (p. 44) "each Order had certain fixed missions assigned to it. For instance, the Carmelites had, at St. Pancrazio, their seminary for the Malabar Mission and the Indies; from whence came the first lights that were thrown on Sanscrit, a language which is now studied throughout Europe as the mother tongue of the Indo-Germanic tribes. The Franciscans had, for their Syrian and Egyptian missions, the convent of St. Bartholomew *à l'Isola*. And so with all the others. You have suppressed all these seminaries and convents; their libraries have been confiscated and scattered, and everything is disorganized and destroyed. And now the Italian Government would attack this great congregation of the Propaganda. Its expenses are defrayed by certain houses situated in Rome, and certain lands in the Pontifical States; but how heavy would be the loss which you would make the Propaganda incur by the inevitable depreciation of the value of its property, consequent on a forced sale in a limited time!" The Government has further attacked all the scientific lay institutions, and because the Professors of the Roman University have remained faithful to the Sovereign Pontiff, they have been compelled to take the political oath to the Government. M. Dupanloup then proceeds to ask M. Minghetti if Italy has been enriched by these spoliations, and reminds him of Bossuet's words: "Woe," he exclaims, "be to those who lay their hands upon Church property!" Look at Spain, and so many other nations, whom such robbery has neither saved from bankruptcy nor from invasion, nor from the disaster of *assignats*. For Church property never brings any luck to those who take possession of it. How vividly do these words bring back to our mind the state of England at the Reformation. Was she enriched by the dissolution of the Monasteries? Henry VIII. died poor, so did nearly all the grantees of Church property. In Italy the expenses are enormous, something quite incredible. Eternal justice still exists, and Eternal justice will, sooner or later, have her day; to Eternal justice every Catholic must appeal against the enormities daily enacted against Rome, the mistress and mother of the Church. As M. Dupanloup says, the present rupture is a deplorable aberration, which will become more fatal to Italy than to the Church. It is this fixed principle that leads us to hope that He, who in His Divine ineffable mercy spared the penitent thief, and said to him on the cross 'This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise,' will open the door of repentance to Victor Emanuel and M. Minghetti, and lead them, in a truly penitential spirit to the feet of that magnanimous

Pontiff, whom they have so deeply insulted and injured, Pius IX., the prisoner of the Vatican. We may say, in conclusion, that the translation of M. Dupanloup's letter has been well done, and reads as smoothly as if written in English.

Catechism made Easy. By the Rev. HENRY GIBSON. Rockliff Brothers : Liverpool. 1874.

WE directed attention to the first volume of this valuable aid to pastors of souls on its appearance, so far back as 1869 ; and we congratulate its painstaking author upon the recovery from a long indisposition which has enabled him now to give us the second volume of his work. Father Gibson has thus made progress with what promises to be a most useful manual in the hands of those whose duty it is to instruct others unto justice. And which of us is altogether exempt from such a duty ? "All are bound," say the Fathers assembled in the Provincial Council of 1873, "pastors and parents, and all the faithful according to their power, to labour, and, by all the means they can devise, to maintain in the hearts and minds of Catholic children of every class the full doctrinal knowledge of the Faith." They go on to state that it will be their endeavour "to provide catechetical formularies adapted to the several degrees of intelligence and culture in our youth," and "to promote the diffusion of Catholic books." Now, in the two volumes before us, we have "means to maintain in the hearts and minds of Catholic children of every class the full doctrinal knowledge of the faith" and of the laws of God and the Church ; and we have a much-needed resource for all who are bound to instruct others, to enable them to perform efficiently an important duty. With but one—and that, we venture to think, a most opportune—extract, we heartily commend this work to our readers.

"From this it follows, my dear children, that we are bound to obey the laws of our country as long as those laws are not in opposition to the law or commandments of God. Hence, we are bound to pay the taxes which are laid upon us by lawful authority for the expenses of government, the support of our armies, and the preservation of the public peace ; and this not only from a motive of obedience, but also of justice ; for it is just that those who share in the protection of the State should contribute to the expenses of the State. Hence, also, we are strictly forbidden to resist the authority of the law, by rebelling against our established rulers, opposing the officers of justice, or joining in secret or illegal societies. And notice, it matters not whether the rulers of a state be good or bad, gentle or cruel, we are still bound to respect and obey them. And why so ? Because the authority which they hold is the same, whatever their own conduct may be, and is worthy of reverence, since it comes from God, who will require from *them* an account of how they have ruled, but from *us* of how we have obeyed."

Passages of Historic Life. By ETHEL IRVING.

London: Chapman & Hall.

MISS IRVING has here collected into one volume four historical sketches, the most important of which, "The Star of Poland," has been the subject of a tragedy from her pen, as well as of an article in our pages. Hedwige, second daughter of Lewis of Hungary, renounces her own lover William, Duke of Austria, for Jagellon, Prince of Lithuania, for the sake of the conversion of the Lithuanian people, which is promised by Jagellon, if Hedwige will marry him. The story is one of heroic self-sacrifice, and most beautiful and touching. Our only regret is that Miss Irving has fettered herself with antique forms of expression, which, though they have long passed muster as the colloquialisms of a mediæval age, are not very acceptable to modern readers. The authoress has evidently considered that something was due to the dignity of history, whereas an historical sketch in its very idea rather pre-supposes an absolute freedom in the mode of phraseology and narration. We regret the more what appears to us a defect, inasmuch as Miss Irving, in the fourth tale, "Ellanston," shows us her own natural and graceful style, and here and there throughout her book, no mean powers of description. Few, for instance, can fail to be touched at the closing scene of the saintly Queen's life:—"She rested her head on Ida's shoulder with a murmured expression of gratitude, and slumbered for several moments. Ida laid her gently upon her pillow and knelt beside her, and almost unconsciously as she knelt, there broke from her lips the words, 'There remaineth a rest.' The eyes of Hedwige opened, and looked into hers with solemn serenity, then they closed again; the faltering breath passed away, and all was still" (p. 84). Again, when Margaret, Duchess of Alençon, tells her tale at the court of the Emperor Charles, "her listeners were all attention; and as their interest became more apparent, her animation increased. The strange events of the story followed each other in rapid succession, and elicited the eager inquiries of her hearers, as their excitement was aroused. The Infanta woke from her habitual languor; the young Eleanora sat with clasped hands and flushed cheeks, her eyes beaming with delight or astonishment; and as Marguerite ended the tale, and folded up the manuscript, Charles rose impulsively from his seat, and taking her hand cordially in his, looked round upon his ministers and friends assembled" (pp. 130, 131). No less admirable is the opening description, in the third story, "Penshurst and Wilton," beginning with "the late beams of an Italian sun fell upon the domes of Venice, lit up the rich architecture of the Doge's Palace, and struck upon the lofty column of St. Mark" (pp. 161-5).

We are forced, by the way, to object to the following sentence:—"Hedwige was a Catholic princess, a member of the Church of Rome; but if her forms were that (*sic*) of an especial community, her spirit was of the universal Church of her Lord" (p. 82). What is this but the well-worn phraseology of those who would fain explain away the denials

and affirmations of truth, and the endless inconsistencies amongst heretics? The fourteenth century certainly knew nothing of the blessings of Protestantism. To atone for this sentence we are glad to produce another :—"The abolition of the convent life and education to so large an extent has lost us much, far too much, of the devotion and the beautiful culture of women."

We can only conclude with thanking Miss Irving for her book ; more especially for having reminded us once more of the affecting history of the great Catholic Queen Hedwige.

Characteristics of English Poets from Chaucer to Shirley. By WILLIAM MINTO, M.A. W. Blackwood & Sons.

THERE has been, perhaps, a little too much, lately, of that delicate and sickly criticism of works of the imagination which closely parallels the sort of devotion to culture which the Italians significantly call *morbidezza*. Those who are somewhat nauseated with the half-sensuous æsthetics of such writers as Mr. Pater, will find refreshment in this really very masterly work of Mr. Minto's. There is none of the effeminate beauty of the mannerism that goes off to painting, to porcelain, to lace, to find analogues for a poem or a thought, but there is, instead, a manly and firm analysis of character that reminds one rather of the anatomist than the artist. Strange to say, the scope of the book is one hitherto almost unattempted. "What sort of man was he?" not "How was he formed?" has been the question before the author's mind, and the reader has but to glance retrospectively over what has hitherto been written on the early English poets to realize how completely this question has been overlooked. Coleridge was conscious that it had to be answered, but his fine brain was lacking in the peculiar fibre needful for this peculiar work, and the phantom of his own individuality floated too constantly before his eyes to render him capable of forming a just opinion of any one who was dissimilar to himself. Charles Lamb has left some precious words, "alas! too few"; but they are mere fragments at the best. Hazlitt did much, but not enough. Hallam, and other critics of that stamp, lacked sympathy and imagination, and wrote worst where a clear and fine judgment was most needed. Mr. Minto's new book will not supply the want exhaustively, but is a thoughtful and scholarly contribution to this neglected side of our literary history. His opening chapter deals with Chaucer, and is full of new suggestions. Over the poor poets that swarmed between Chaucer and Spenser he lingers almost too lovingly, giving to the dissection of these more or less radiant minds much patient thought and labour. The chapter on Spenser is remarkably fresh and original; on the whole, however, we prefer, to almost any other section of the book, the

chapter on the Elizabethan sonneteers, perhaps prejudiced by the especial love we personally have always had for the pure and stainless cycle of love-songs that preceded the sudden development of the powerful and gross dramatic literature. Constable, especially, who was confined to the Tower as a Catholic, on suspicion of treason, and who wrote there those "Sonnets to our Blessed Lady" that are among the most exquisite religious poems in the language, is particularly well analysed here.

We cannot close, although space fails us, without drawing attention to the extraordinary vitality of the ninety pages which Mr. Minto devotes to Shakespeare. Perhaps it is not too much to say that these contain the most valuable part of his volume. For, in proportion to the extreme difficulty of saying anything new, and yet true, about the greatest of poets, so is the preciousness extreme of any really new light thrown on his character and work. And it seems to us that Mr. Minto has succeeded, by dint, it would appear, of direct common sense and resistance to traditional authority, in presenting the individuality of Shakespeare in a fuller and clearer way than it has ever hitherto been presented. In his views of the separate plays, we do not always concur; yet sometimes, as, notably, in his analysis of Hamlet, he seems to us to come nearer to the truth than any previous critic, nearer than Taine or Hazlitt, nearer even than Goethe.

The great dramatists that followed Shakespeare are treated a little too hurriedly, as though the author, like the compilers of encyclopædias, found he had lingered too long over letters A and B. But they are not too hastily passed over to prevent us from cordially commending the volume as a most interesting and suggestive addition to critical literature.

Islam and Christianity. By J. M. ARNOLD, D.D. Longman. 1874.

DR. ARNOLD, in the third edition of his "Bible and Koran," under a new title—"Islam and Christianity," has given us a fresh view—founded on the researches of Weil in his "Mohammed der Prophet"—that the first Moslems were not apostate Christians and Jews, but Arabs. Dr. Arnold further says, that Mahommed was possessed with an evil spirit, and that the spasmodic convulsions of epilepsy, to which he was subject, were really the convulsions of a demoniac; and that the

"assumption (p. 71) of satanic influence can alone solve the mystery which envelops the origin of this fearful 'delusion.' Even supposing that no evidence existed of Mohammed's having been afflicted with a malady which was invariably ascribed to the powers of darkness, could we consider it possible that so comprehensive and lasting an apostasy as that of Islam should have obtained such a fearful dominion over nations, some of them polished and civilized, without the direct and immediate co-operation of the prince of darkness?"

And that (p. 70)—

"Mohammed commenced his career with honest intentions. Though Satan contrived to delude him, it still remains to be proved that he was from the beginning a desperately wicked impostor. A man may be in error, and yet be sincere; those who killed prophets and apostles thought that they were doing God service: nor can we ascribe want of sincerity to Saul the Pharisee, when raging against the Church and destroying her members."

And that it was not till after the first drop of blood had been shed in his name by Abdalla during the sacred months that Mohammed entered on the path of gross deception and wilful imposture.

Dr. Arnold, in his examination of the doctrines of the Koran *per se*, concludes that the

"Total negation (p. 94) of the holiness of God may be considered the fundamental lie of Islam, which marks its teaching as directly opposed to reason and revelation, and as false from beginning to end."

Dr. Arnold enters fully into the question as to what Mohammed borrowed from Judaism, both from the Old Testament and the Talmud; at the same time, he acknowledges that Mohammed shows his complete ignorance of Jewish history, as (p. 125)—

"He appropriates none of the historical way-marks which determine the great epochs recorded in the Old Testament, but confines himself to certain occurrences in the lives of single individuals."

So also, with regard to what he borrowed from Christianity, Mohammed may be said to have been better versed in the traditions of the Christians than in the New Testament, and probably was instructed in them by his convert Waraka, an apostate religious and a relative of Khadija. Dr. Arnold refers to the statement of Dr. Kotschy, who says that—

"The entire Moslem community expect a speedy dissolution of the Turkish empire, and this upon the ground of ancient traditions. On a Sunday it will happen that the Christians will receive back all that was taken from them by the Moslems. Not only European Turkey, but the whole of Asia Minor and Syria, with the exception of Damascus, will be restored to the Christians, and Arabia alone will constitute their inheritance. During the appearance of the last comet, addresses were delivered in the mosques at Constantinople till late at midnight, in which the approaching destruction of Islam and of the Turkish empire formed the chief subject."

Hence it is clear that the sick man is expecting his demise, and it is to be hoped that the Church will carry on the work of S. Raymond, O.S.F., to whom Oxford is indebted for its Arabic professorship; and, although Victor Emmanuel has suppressed the convent of S. Bartholomew à l'Isola, founded for the Syriac and Egyptian missions, still the elasticity of the Church of God is such that missionaries will be ready when the hour of the fall of the Moslem apostasy has tolled; and hundreds of the followers of the apostate Mohammed will seek shelter in the One Living and True Church of God.

Meditations on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ. By F. NICHOLAS AVANCINUS, S. J. ; with a Preface on Meditation by Rev. G. PORTER, S. J. Two vols. London : Burns & Oates. 1874-5.

WE have to thank F. Porter for giving us an English translation of these *Meditations*, "*de Vita et Doctrina Jesu Christi*," of Father Avancinus, which have long been known to us ; and there is no volume of *Meditations* better adapted for every Christian than these now lying before us. "Meditation," Father Porter says, p. 12, "is a *colluctatio cum Deo*." In prayer the soul contends with God, as Jacob did with the Angel in his mysterious sleep. It is, moreover, a *colluctatio cum diabolo*, a wrestling with the devil, who commonly makes the morning meditation the battle of the day. It is a *colluctatio cum carne*, a struggle with the flesh, with drowsiness, with a slothful heart, with love of ease, love of honour, love of the world, with a wearied head. In meditation more than in any other exercise is verified that axiom of S. Ignatius,—“ Let every one reflect that he will advance in all spiritual things in proportion as he divests himself of self-love, of attachment to his own will, and of self-seeking.”

In these *Meditations* “the chief points in the ‘Life and Doctrine of our Divine Lord,’ taken from the four Evangelists, have been arranged so as to occupy the whole year. During Advent the Mysteries of the Incarnation are contemplated ; between Christmas and Septuagesima, the Holy Childhood and Hidden Life at Nazareth ; during Lent, the circumstances of the Passion ; after Easter, the particulars of the Resurrection ; and after Trinity, the Miracles and the Parables” ; thus developing, throughout the year, suitable subjects for each day’s Meditation.

S. Bernard and his Work. By the Rev. P. CAUSETTE, V.G. Translated from the French by the Right Rev. Abbot BURDER, O. Cist. London : Richardson & Son. 1874.

ABBOT BURDER has done a good work in giving us this translation of Father Causette’s admirable appeal for the Cistercian Monastery of Notre Dame du Désert, near Toulouse. This discourse is a panegyric of S. Bernard and his work. He says of this glorious saint,—whose arrival at Cîteaux cheered the heart of our S. Stephen Harding, when he saw S. Bernard and his companions seeking the frightful desert of Cîteaux, which he was to change into a garden,—that “he was no sooner in the desert than he frequently asked himself : ‘Why art thou come here?’—and he incarnates the reform in his own life ; he personifies it before he preaches it”—that “his reform extended to persons living in the world, and he is not repulsed.” “He offered his reform also to the priesthood;

and it was accepted. He turns to the prelates, exclaiming : ‘ Your horses have trappings of precious stones, whilst we go barefooted. Tell me, Pontiffs, why do you use gold, I do not say in your sacred vessels, but in your saddle and harness ? ’ And at these intrepid words the Archbishop of Sens, the Bishop of Paris, Suger, the Abbot of S. Denis, change their mode of life. And in vain does the truth, like a painful glare, call forth murmurs against this indomitable censor ; the bishops humbly acknowledge him to be their judge, who often refused to be their equal ; and the priesthood is regenerated.” “ Bernard presents his reform to kings, and they listen to him. Henry, the son of the King of France, seeks an asylum at Clairvaux, and he is employed in the kitchen. Amadeus, a relative of the German Emperor, becomes a monk under his direction. Peter, the son of the King of Portugal, receives the Cistercian tonsure in exchange for the crown ; Gumard, King of Sardinia, considering Heaven more beautiful than his own island, made the vow of obedience to the family of S. Bernard, preferring it to the splendour of a throne. After this, it is not surprising to find that Louis VI. and Louis VII. of France, Lothair and Conrad of Germany, in a word, all the ministers and potentates of the period, have been numbered among those who were under the influence of our saint. At that time the arbiter of worldly events dwelt in the wilderness (and judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, Is. xxxii. 16), and that power, irresistible by his miracles, when his words were silent, was to have monarchs themselves for his subjects.” In February, 1145, Bernard of Pisa, a religious, and a disciple of this intrepid and true reformer, was raised to the Pontifical throne as Pope Eugenius III. He was a timid and simple monk (p. 17), “ whose function at Clairvaux was to look after the stove, and to light the fire for the monks, who were benumbed with cold after matins.” On hearing this news, S. Bernard exclaimed, “ Behold Bernard is named Eugenius, and my son has become my father.” He wrote, for the direction of this son who was to govern the world, his works on “ Consideration,” which he offered him on his knees ; he besought him to banish all display as the successor of Constantine, and only to appear as the successor of S. Peter, and for eight years all the great inspirations that emanated from the Holy See for the guidance of the Catholic Church, had issued from the desert of Clairvaux, and from the great soul of S. Bernard. How well may the words of Father Causette be applied to the Church at the present day ! A crisis, an agony is now pending, she is now on the Mount ; and we, her children, are apt to forget that, like Jesus in the tomb, “ she possesses within herself the power to rise again, when it shall please *Him*. And you, who are so discouraged at seeing her abandoned by ministries and by kings, should remember that a new Bernard will do more to repair our losses than all the ministries and kings in the world ; for spiritual increase is not according to natural laws ; and, whilst ordinary paternity is regulated by invariable periods and proportions, the paternity of a saint, united with the inexhaustible maternity of the Church, may bring forth, by one single life of Christian heroism, entire centuries of Christian marvels.” We quote no more, but refer our readers to this admirable little *brochure*.

Regina Sæculorum ; or, Mary venerated in all ages. Devotions to the Blessed Virgin, from ancient sources. Partly translated from the French of M. LEON GAUTIER. By E. A. M. London : Washbourn. 1875.

WE hail this little manual, partly translated from the valuable and interesting book of M. Léon Gautier, "*Prières à la Vierge, d'après les MSS. du Moyen Age*," &c., as a new "*Mois de Marie*" for this present year of grace. Here the clients of our dear Lady will find all they require for devotion ; and here, those who taunt us with Mariolatry will see that the devotion of the living Church of God has ever been the same to the Virgin Mother of God, the pure and immaculate Virgin of Judah ; that although but twenty years have elapsed since the glorious Father of Christians proclaimed her Immaculate Conception as *de fide*, still it was usual in the fourth century (p. x.) for "the Bishop in going to and from the church, &c., to be preceded by a deacon, who from time to time cried aloud to the people, 'Be mindful of the Most Holy and *Immaculate* Mother of God.'" The Doctors of the Church, S. Denys of Alexandria and S. Athanasius, did not wait for the Council of Ephesus to give her the title of *θεοτοκος*, but anticipated it in their writings. The Feast of her Immaculate Conception was observed in England as early as the eleventh century, under S. Anselm, and even at an earlier date in Spain ; but it was left for Pius IX., in 1854, to pronounce infallibly of Our Lady, "*Macula originalis non est in te.*" We have in this little volume "Daily and Occasional Prayers," "Prayers taken from Primitive Liturgies," from the early and mediæval Fathers of the Church, and from the Saints of the Middle Ages ; and in conclusion, "Four Early English Hymns to the Blessed Virgin," selected for the "Month," from the "Old English Miscellany," published in 1872.

Jesus Christ the Model of the Priest. Translated from the Italian of Mgr. FRASSONETTI, by the Right Rev. Mgr. PATERSON. London : Burns & Oates. 1874.

THIS useful little work, being a second edition of the translation of "Jesus Christ the Model of the Priest," may be already well known and appreciated by our readers, but for the information of those who are not yet acquainted with its contents, we may say, that in its original language it was recommended by the Provincial Council of Urbino, 1558, to the clergy of the province of Urbino ; and that in 1558, the Archbishop of Orvieto presented each priest in his diocese with a copy. It is divided into three chapters ; viz.—1st. Of the interior life of the priest, according to Christ. 2nd. Of the virtues of the priest, according to Christ. 3rd. Of

the priest's zeal, according to Christ. The various sections under these heads: "On the Interior" and "Exterior Life," "Of Humility," "Meekness," &c., are so treated as to make this little work an invaluable companion to every priest.

The Children's Bible History, for School and Home use; from the beginning of the world to the martyrdom of SS. Peter and Paul; with an Appendix. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

AS we are informed in the preface to "The Children's Bible History," "the language is simple, and the description of the various events is given in mere outline, so that the pupil may, to commence with, acquire a knowledge of the *principal* facts, and thus form a basis for a more extended and detailed knowledge of the subject."

This *Bible Primer* is divided into three parts: the first portion treats of the Old Testament; the second, of the Life of our Lord; and the third, of the Acts of the Apostles; the Appendix containing the various promises made by God of a coming Messiah; of the prophecies, the miracles, and parables of our Lord; with other subjects, which make it a very complete compendium of Bible History, and not only useful as a school book, but a valuable boon to many an anxious parent.

Afternoons with the Saints. By Rev. F. ANDERDON, S.J.
Burns & Oates. 1874.

WE have to thank F. Anderdon for a new and enlarged edition of his "Afternoons with the Saints," and we hope that he may yet afford us pleasure by publishing other volumes of *Lives of the Saints*.

F. Anderdon, in his advertisement, says, that "few more useful labours could well be undertaken for the 'apostolate of literature' than a series of *Saints' Lives*, compiled with the accuracy and care of Alban Butler, in a form more graphic, and appealing to the habits of modern thought." In these sketches the actual life of each Saint, with its surroundings, is brought vividly before us, whether the scene be laid in our own island where S. Joseph of Arimathea brings the glad tidings of salvation to our uncivilized and idolatrous ancestors; in Smyrna, where the aged Polycarp is called in his last hours to receive the martyr's crown; or, in the cave of Maurea, where Ignatius Loyola, following up the course of preparation for the work appointed him by His Divine Master, spends his days "alone with God" (p. 210).

"In that cave, Ignatius, now transformed into a new man, began the contemplations of the Illuminative Way. The soul that seeks this has

been purified from affections and motives of earth by considering the end for which it was created, the use of creatures simply as means toward that end, the necessity of indifference in their use, the shortness and end of the term during which they can be used, the scrutiny the soul must undergo when that term is over, and the doom of such as shall have misdirected their means, and failed of their end. So far the soul has already proceeded on the Way of Purification. It then seeks a personal example, a model, in some One who has actually trodden the path of life before, whose footprints may be way-marks to follow. The soul finds this in the life of Our Lord Jesus Christ—in His incarnation and birth, His hidden life at Nazareth, then His public ministry; in His discourses, parables, miracles, mysteries, and, finally, in His Passion—all of which made up the three-and-thirty years of the Word made flesh, dwelling among us. Each of these still further enlightens the soul as to its duties, teaching it to follow where He had led the way."

What an example of the divine gift of fortitude have we in Japan, in the person of S. Anthony, aged thirteen, the second youngest of the boy-martyrs of Japan (p. 76).

"He had been arrested with the Franciscan fathers in their convent at Ozaka, and went through all the sufferings which tested the faith of his companions. A terrible trial awaited Anthony on his arrival with the rest at his native place. His father and mother, though both Christians, and strong enough in the faith to rejoice in the first news of their child's approaching martyrdom, yet failed in the very moment of trial. Their natural tenderness prevailed over the supernatural aid of grace: they pressed towards him, they besought him not to yield himself thus to death on the very threshold of his opening life, but wait and confess the faith when he should be older. They accompanied this pleading with tears and sobs, heartrending to witness. But the youthful martyr, knowing that he who loveth father or mother more than our Lord is not worthy of Him, firmly put aside this pressing temptation, as he did also the promises of honours and distinctions made to him on the part of the Emperor by Fazamburo. Then, giving a little farewell gift to his parents, he said to them, 'Here is something to console you, and I will pray to God for you in heaven. Weep not for me, but rather for these poor unbelievers. I am going to enjoy the sight of my God for ever, while these unhappy ones remain in their blindness. Do not let them think you can be mourning to see me die for God. On the contrary, you ought to rejoice, since He Himself died for us.'"

We might make many other selections from this volume, but we prefer to ask our readers to read it for themselves.

Purgatory Surveyed. Translated from the French of Rev. F. BINET, S. J., by F. RICHARD THIMELBY, S.J. Edited by Rev. F. ANDERDON, S.J. Reprinted from the edition of 1663. Burns & Oates. 1874.

WITH the reverend editor of this delightful reprint of F. Binet's "*L'Estat heureux et malheureux des ames souffrantes du Purgatoire*" we sincerely hope that the day is not far distant when the fathers,

of the English province of his own society will find some competent pen to reproduce some (if not all) of Father Binet's ascetical works. The original translator of this reprint was Rev. F. R. Thimelby, S.J., of Lincolnshire, himself a confessor of the faith in that troublous period when the Church in this country was struggling in "prisons of darkness," and when it was death for a priest to offer the unbloody sacrifice, or for the faithful to assist thereat, when the priest, who was faithful to his vocation was obliged to have his life always in his hand. F. Binet takes six "surveys of the happy yet unhappy state of the souls in purgatory."

In the first he speaks of its "hellish pain," its worm and its fire, and in its fourth and fifth sections discusses the question of how long souls are detained in purgatory, and whether their pains grow less and less: and on this point we cannot but be reminded of that beautiful vision which Blessed John Joseph of the Cross, O. S. F., had of his mother, which we translate from the "*Palmier Séraphique*," for March.

"He was offering the sacrifice of propitiation for the repose of her soul; who can form a true idea of what was passing within him? How his feelings of sorrow disturbed his holy thoughts which occupied his soul! How he saw in spirit the supplicating soul of his mother rejoice at each prayer which issued from the lips of her son! How he saw her face brighten with a greater splendour, as her temporal punishment was remitted by the blood of the Lamb of God! With what happiness, at the end of the sacrifice, did he see that grateful soul ascend to the abode of eternal felicity, and there immediately exercise her right by praying in her turn for her beloved son!" In the second survey he notices the ineffable joy and heavenly consolation of the souls in purgatory.

In the third he lays down that there is not in the world a more eminent or prudent act of fraternal charity than to help the souls in purgatory.

In the fourth, he considers the means how to quench the flames of Purgatory, by the Saints and Angels, who, he says (p. 107), "are not content with a quarant hour, now and then, as our custom is, on occasions of pressing necessity, but they keep a perpetual and constant course of prayer in heaven, in favour of these holy souls." They further "inspire the living to offer up their satisfactory works for the dead, and to find out a thousand inventions to help them." . . . "They strive to shorten the time by procuring that the intensity of their pains may supply for the length and extension thereof." Those holy, innocent hermits, those chaste virgins, who have left behind them great treasures of satisfactions "pray God to apply the superabundance of these their merits and satisfactions to the poor souls in Purgatory; and who knows whether the infinite goodness of God may not accept it for good payment." . . . "May we not piously imagine, that even those saints who have no such remainder of merits, pray those that have it, to bestow it as an alms to relieve the poor souls." . . . "In fine, the Saints beseech our Blessed Lady, and even Christ Himself, who has an infinite treasure of satisfactions in store, to apply some of their precious merits this way." So that we may conclude with F. Binet, "That whatsoever the Saints can do for the comfort of

these languishing souls, we may be sure they do it, and do it punctually, without neglecting the least moment; and, where they cannot prevail without breaking the just decrees of their Sovereign, there they willingly acquiesce, and with due submission adore the Divine justice."

The fifth survey shows how all antiquity was ever devoted to pray for the dead, and the last gives twelve excellent means to avoid Purgatory. This last survey we should earnestly urge our readers to study and adopt, for surely "it is a good and wholesome thought to pray for our departed friends." F. Binet (p. 131) mentions the fact that M. d'Argenton ordained by his will, that one Religious belonging to his foundation at Paris should say aloud, "Let us pray for the soul of Monsieur d'Argenton; and then all should instantly say the Psalm *De profundis*." We may add that this custom was prevalent in *all* our English religious houses previous to the Reformation.

A Sermon on Priestly Absolution. Preached before the University of Oxford in S. Mary's Church, on Sunday, November 24, 1793, by the Rev. HENRY DIGBY BESTE, M.A., Fellow of S. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford. London: Longmans. 1874.

THIS sermon, preached in 1793, has been republished by the author's son, Mr. J. Richard Digby Beste, in consequence (p. 229)

"of the sound of discord, occasioned by the arrogant or silly attempt to establish the confessional amid the Protestant population of England, reaching his home amid the hills of Tuscany," as it was "sadly interesting" for him to hear that "the doctrine of auricular confession and priestly absolution preached by his father for the first time since the Reformation should be still remembered in the land; for the members of the Established Church think that, by stealing the Catholic vocabulary, by imitating Catholic ritual and ceremonial and practices, they are deluding the world and the Almighty into forgetfulness that they have separated from the Catholic Church, that they are not in communion with the Catholic Church. They are mistaken. Neither the world nor the Almighty can be mocked. Nor, however much they may make believe, do they really and truly deceive themselves. They know, in their hearts, that they are only playing at being Catholics; they know in their hearts that, however many sets of vestments they may advertise to draw an audience, all the upholstery and millinery and mimicry and mummery of the stage, will not make their churches Catholic churches, nor themselves Catholic priests."

They flatter themselves that they have set at rest all such questions for ever, but it is evidently true, notwithstanding Mr. Mackonochie and the other leaders of the Anglican communion to the contrary.

"Educated, serious men, cannot believe that union with the Catholic Church can exist without communion; that they can be in union with a body that repudiates and disowns them," though they do deceive, let us hope unintentionally, "uninstructed, impulsive individuals and congregations; but sincere thinking men cannot so delude themselves."

At the same time, with Mr. Beste, we believe that they do not

"allure or deceive the great bulk of Protestant England—the great common sense of a people, who, above all other people, abominate shams. It is for this common sense, it is for these men who are, at least, honest in their adherence to their various forms of Protestantism, that I have compiled this volume. These men are not misled or allured by ecclesiastical assumption and the tricks of scene-shifters. If these men are dissatisfied with their religious position; if these, unsettled, seek more positive truth, they seek it with sincerity and earnestness, not with frivolity and pretence."

Mr. Beste gives us two characteristic letters from two of his father's companions at Oxford, who have both been long since called away—Dr. Routh and Dr. Phillpotts, late bishop of Exeter. Dr. Routh says (p. 234) that he is sorry

"to be informed by you that you have left the communion of our holy mother, the Church, in whose bosom I myself hope to live and die, believing her to be a true and sound member of the Catholic Church, notwithstanding the unjust censures of the Bishop of Rome."

The late Bishop of Exeter (would that he had died a Catholic!) wrote to Mr. Beste as follows:—

"I have just read, at the President's, a distressing confirmation of what your last letter had led me to expect. My mind is much harassed by the result of your inquiries. I am not so stiff a Protestant as the President, who, in private and familiar conversation, calls the Pope, Bishop of Rome, and his Church, the Romish Schism; but I see a man in whose honesty I have the most perfect confidence, and to whose judgment I pay very great deference, decide, on the most important of all concerns, in a manner opposite to what my education has taught me is the most true, and the opinion of the wisest and best men I meet. The departure of any man on earth from the same religious belief as my own would not have filled me with half the solicitude which I feel at yours. May God bless us both, and uphold us in His truth!"

"The biographical notice, showing who the preacher was," occupies eighty-five pages, and is full of interest to the reader. As our space will not permit us to quote so largely as we would wish, we must refer him to this interesting work, which we find, from the title-page, has already reached its *third* edition.

The Perfect Lay Brother. Translated from the Italian of F. CUMPLIDO, S.J., by F. MACLEOD, S.J. Burns & Oates. 1874.

THIS useful little manual will doubtless be most acceptable, not only to the lay brothers of the Society of Jesus, for whom it was originally written by F. Cumplido, but as a text-book and *vade mecum* to the lay brother of every order, and also to the Tertiaries of S. Francis and S. Dominic. It is divided into five parts. The first, in three sections, treats of the "excellent advantage and happiness of the lay brother." F. Cumplido refers especially to the humility of blessed Simon André, who, "although well versed in Latin, positively refused to enter holy orders on the suppression of their society by Pope Clement XIV.;" and to the "extraordinary love shown by our Lord and His immaculate Mother to lay brothers, as B. Bernard of Biscay," and "B. Francis, who had the happiness of receiving the bread of *angels* from those holy spirits themselves in the presence of their Queen." In the second part, F. Cumplido treats of the obligation of the lay brothers to correspond to the goodness of God in giving them such a vocation. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of giving the following extracts from F. Cumplido, who, inculcating love of work, refers to a Capuchin lay brother, who, whilst the others were sweeping the house, or were engaged in begging alms, or tilling the ground, or toiling hard in other corporal works, insisted on going up and down through the convent, repeating in tones full of gravity and recollection, "Martha! Martha! thou art careful, and art troubled about many things: to prayer! to prayer! behold that which is necessary, instead of all this useless trouble and excitement." After a time this poor religious became very seriously ill, and our Lord manifested great goodness towards him, clearly because there was no malice in his fault. God appeared very distinctly to him in a vision, distributing crowns to all the other lay brothers, but passing him by altogether; nay, more, this poor man felt himself on the point of being condemned along with the miserable herd of the slaves of idleness. Happily, the vision was sent only as a warning, for he soon recovered his health; but the lesson which it left behind was so complete and wholesome, that from that day he gave himself up to work with heart and soul, left off preaching about prayer, and never lost a moment of time to the hour of his death.

In the third part, F. Cumplido refers to the various offices discharged by the lay brother, such as sacristan, infirmarian, &c. In each section, while inculcating the spirit of charity and obedience, he also reminds them of the maxim of B. Giles, who replied to one who complained of his not having time to pray, "Ah! my brother, it is evident that we do not know the nature of prayer—to pray is to obey, and that those always pray who always work."

The fourth part is on religious politeness, and is divided into seven chapters. In it he bids his readers remember that God abhors saints

without civility. In the last part F. Cumplido gives an abridged "Life of B. Alfonso," which is divided into nine sections. He gives the following remarkable instance of his implicit obedience:—"On one occasion he calmly remained seated on a bench till the following morning, because at the moment when the bell sounded the end of evening recreation, and he was on the point of leaving, the superior, engaged at the time in reading a letter, asked him not to stir just then."

This little manual closes with two appendices, the first an extract from an Italian Life of F. Peter Claver, the apostle of Paraguay, treating of his friendship with B. Alfonso, and the maxims given by him to F. Claver; and the last appendix a "Catalogue of the Lay Brothers of the Society who have been raised to our Altars by Holy Church."

The Prisoners of the Temple. By M. O'C. MORRIS. Burns & Oates. 1874.

"THE Prisoners of the Temple" will doubtless become a popular volume of this interesting series, "The Quarterly," under the direction of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, published as it is at a period when preparations are being made for the beatification of Louis XVI., the martyr-king of France. Louis XVI. was scarcely twenty, and his fascinating queen, the persecuted and unfortunate Marie Antoinette, but nineteen, when they came to the throne. The first act of this youthful couple, destined to lead so eventful a life, was to fall on their knees, and exclaim, "Guide and protect us, O God; we are too young to reign." Marie Antoinette was in every sense the victim of that licentious court, led by the Comte de Provence, which gave to her the *sobriquet* of *l'Autrichienne*, a *sobriquet* which she heard at the last moment of her existence, on the dread scaffold, where she expiated the girlish follies of former days at Versailles and the Trianon.

In reviewing the causes of revolution in "la belle France, la fille aînée de l'Église," Mr. Morris says with truth (p. 3), "The sources of that elasticity seem now more profoundly affected than heretofore; and those who have honestly examined the causes of existing French weakness declare that for its cure there is needed a return to the old customs, and especially to those which secured family order, if the existing waste of national power is to be checked, and the people enabled to live on the interest, without exhausting the capital, of their strength." So it is that a "double misfortune" has overtaken the nation, and, as a consequence, its "natural authorities became corrupt, and, in their corruption, those germs of error fructified which have wrought that worst evil of misleading pure and ardent minds eager for reform." To such as are unacquainted with the horrible details of the first French Revolution we would

commend this volume of Mr. O'C. Morris, who has depicted, in sad but beautiful language, the sufferings of Louis XVI. ; of the fastidious and charming Marie Antoinette, who, true to her courtly training, asks pardon of her executioner for having accidentally trodden on his foot as she ascended the scaffold ; of that fine, noble child who was left to pine in his dungeon after the *soi-disant* resignation of Simon, his jailor, or, rather mentor ; and of the last days of "our S. G  nevi  ve," as the poor of Paris called the martyred daughter of France, Madame Elisabeth. We hope that no Catholic library will be without this admirable little volume ; and most sincerely do we thank Mr. O'Connor Morris for his valuable contribution, not only to the "Quarterly Series," but also to Catholic literature.

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DUBLIN REVIEW.

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CARDINAL MANNING.

THE English traveller who, after strolling along the Via Sacra under the Arch of Titus, pauses at the Meta Sudans immediately in front of the Colosseum, and turning to the right passes through the Arch of Constantine, along the valley between the Cælian and the Palatine, will shortly perceive on his left an abrupt ascent to the plateau of the first-named hill, and just beyond it, before the main road turns to the left, by the site of the Porta Capena and the Valley of Egeria to the Gate of S. Sebastian, he will see a white church and monastic buildings crowning the westernmost spur of the Cælian. The steep ascent is the ancient "Clivus Scauri," which derived its appellation from the dwelling of one of that branch of the great house of the Æmiliï, and which in later days was to become associated with the home of another far more illustrious, and with a sanctuary which has a special claim to the veneration of every Englishman.* If, then, our traveller leaves the high road, and climbing the little hill, stands on the steps before the atrium of the church, he will enjoy a prospect which is as suggestive as it is fair. Before him lies the empty tomb of the dead Pagan Empire, behind and around him is the cradle of Christian England. Towering from the base to the summit of the Palatine hill rise the colossal ruins of the Palace of the Cæsars, their yawning fissures wreathed

* The full official designation of the Cardinalitial "titulus" of St. Gregory is "Sanctorum Andreæ et Gregorii in Monte Cælio ad Clivum Scauri."

with the vegetable growth of centuries, and immediately at the feet of the spectator are the shapeless remains of the Septizonium of Septimius Severus, the last embellishment which Imperial pride added to these enormous structures. But let him turn and enter the church, for it is the house of S. Gregory the Great. Here dwelt his father Gordianus, and his mother S. Silvia, whose memory is preserved in the small chapel to the left; this is the home of the great Pontiff's early and monastic life—the monastery dedicated by him to the Apostle S. Andrew, whose name it still bears, associated with his own—the witness of his preaching—the scene of the well-known legend of the apparition of an angel among twelve poor men, fed at the saint's table; but above all, the house from which he sent forth S. Augustine and his companions to save "from the wrath of God" that island whose fair sons he had pitied as they stood in the slave-market of the Forum. Here, at these gates, began that weary journey which, after many toils and discouragements, led the apostles of our nation to the Kentish bay whose waves washed the foot of Richborough Castle, near to which King Ethelbert, seated under an oak, saw them approach with cross and picture of the Redeemer, to the sound of the solemn chant which still bears their father's name, and received from them the message of salvation. On the walls of the atrium of this Roman church is to be seen the record of their mission, and of the fact that not only the first Archbishop of Canterbury, but the first Bishop of Rochester, S. Justus (afterwards fourth Archbishop); Mellitus, first Bishop of London and third Archbishop; S. Paulinus, first Bishop of York; and Laurence, second Archbishop of Canterbury, came forth from these walls. This, then, is the source from which the Christianity of England, of her colonies, and of her great Transatlantic daughter, and, through England, that of the Teutonic nations also, first drew its origin and life.

Such are the memories recalled by the event of which this sanctuary was the scene on the 31st of March just past. A numerous assemblage, largely composed of English and American Catholics, was there to witness the enthronization of the Metropolitan of England as Cardinal Priest of a church most appropriately selected to be his "title." No English Cardinal has sat in that seat before. The house has, since the sixteenth century, been a Camaldolese monastery—Gregory XVI. was formerly its Abbot—and twenty-five years ago, when Cardinal Wiseman was raised to the Sacred College, the title was occupied by a Camaldolese Cardinal, Cardinal Bianchi. The first Archbishop of Westminster had, therefore, to choose

another titular church, and selected that of S. Pudentiana, a virgin of the noble house of the Cornelii, who, through her mother, was of British descent. And it is not without a special propriety that the title of S. Gregory is now, for the first time, conferred on the chief pastor of England, at an epoch when the Catholic Church in this country, ever since the Reformation a missionary Church, is now extending her borders and appealing more generally to the people of England than she could do in the days of oppression and of fear. The work of S. Gregory is beginning over again—small beginning though it be,—and it is fitting enough that at this moment the memory of our Father in the Faith should be thus revived among us.

But it was not the thought of the past alone which drew the crowd of English-speaking Catholics to that picturesque corner of ancient Rome. It was also the love and veneration which they felt for the chief actor in the ceremony of the day, for the Pastor who now sits in the seat of S. Augustine, though his Chair has been removed from S. Augustine's city by the same supreme authority which first founded it. Many of those present, as His Eminence is reported to have said, were known to him personally. He had "tended them as their Pastor, and meant to tend them till he died." Others were not his—he "would that they were,"—all he hoped to meet one day, "when the Good Shepherd makes up the full tale of his sheep." But if any were not known to him, he is well known to all, and not only to Catholics of English race and tongue. Just as during the lifetime of his illustrious predecessor, the first remark made by a foreign Catholic to an Englishman had usually reference to the great Cardinal who then ruled the Church in this land, so we have been often struck by the interest which Catholics of all countries are now wont to display in our present Metropolitan. To say more would perhaps be unfitting; towards so exalted a personage the language of direct panegyric would be out of place; but we may say that ever since the consecration of the Archbishop of Westminster ten years ago, it has been the conviction of all that his elevation to his present dignity was only a question of time. This conviction has sometimes been rather amusingly expressed by the organs of Protestant opinion, but its existence is worth noting, as a recognition of the eminent qualities of a countryman for whose religion the writers in those papers have certainly but little sympathy. Such also is the judgment of an acute thinker beyond the Channel, who sees in the creation of His Eminence a peculiar significance. We refer to M. John Lemoigne, whose bias is certainly not Catholic, but who wrote thus in the *Journal des Débats* of the 24th of March.

Of all these nominations the most significant is that of the illustrious Manning, Archbishop of Westminster, or, in other words, of London. It is for the first time since Cardinal Wolsey and the Reformation that a purely English Cardinal reappears. The predecessor of Mgr. Manning, Mgr. Wiseman, was also a Cardinal; but he was an Irishman, as is also Cardinal Cullen.

Here M. Lemoigne is a little too absolute in his statement; there have, of course, been several purely English Cardinals since the Reformation, but he probably means Cardinals resident in England.

We remember (continues M. Lemoigne) having seen some years ago Cardinal Wiseman burnt in effigy in the streets of London on the anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot. Passions have calmed down since then, and we have no fear of any demonstration of that kind against Mgr. Manning, who is universally respected for his labours, and for the asceticism of his life. What is especially painful for the English Church is that the new Cardinal was one of her most celebrated sons, the companion of the Gladstones and Wilberforces, and one of the ornaments of the University of Oxford. The determining cause which threw him into the Catholic Church was a celebrated trial, in which the civil authority, in a matter of theological interpretation, forced the ecclesiastical authority to bow to its decision; it is evident, therefore, what side he will take now.

M. Lemoigne then alludes to the scene at the English College, when all the English Catholics in Rome were assembled around their Archbishop in an apartment the walls of which are hung with the portraits of English Cardinals,* and

* The portraits alluded to are those of the Cardinals since the Reformation, but a list of all the Cardinals of English birth may be interesting to our readers:—

1. ROBERT PULLUS, DE POULE, or PULLEYN, Archdeacon of Rochester, was made Cardinal and Chancellor by Lucius II. in 1144. He was the author of *Sententiarum libri*, and died in 1150.
2. NICOLAS BREAKSPEARE, Benedictine, Abbot of S. Albans, named Cardinal Bishop of Albano by Eugenius III. in 1146. In 1148 he was Legate in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and was elected Pope under the name of Adrian IV. in Nov. 1154. He died in Sept., 1159, and his tomb is still visible in the crypt of S. Peter's.
3. BOSO BREAKSPEARE, was created Cardinal Deacon in 1153 by Anastasius IV., and afterwards Cardinal Priest of the Title of S. Pudentiana.
4. HERBERT OF BOSHAM (or BOSANHAM) was created Cardinal in 1178 by Alexander III., and was Archbishop of Benevento. He was the friend and biographer of S. Thomas, of Canterbury. (Bosham, anciently Bosanham, was a monastery four miles from Chichester.)
5. JOHN CUMMING was created Cardinal Priest by Lucius III. in 1183, and was Archbishop of Dublin.
6. STEPHEN LANGTON, of famous memory, was elected Archbishop of Canterbury in 1206, and was created Cardinal Priest of S. Chrysogonus by Pope Innocent III. in 1206 or 1212. He died in 1228.

quotes at length the short allocution made by His Eminence after his reception of the official notification of his elevation.

"I thank you all," said the Cardinal, "for your presence here to-day. I feel it is a sign of goodwill to me, and of your devotion to the Holy Father

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7. ROBERT CURZON was created Cardinal Priest of S. Stephen on the Caelian (Santo Stefano Rotondo) by Innocent III. in 1212, and was sent as Legate à latere to France by Honorius III. in 1216.
 8. ROBERT SOMERCOTE was created Cardinal Deacon of S. Adrian by Gregory IX. in 1234, and afterwards of S. Eustachius. He died in 1241.
 9. JOHN OF TOLEDO (so named from his monastery), a Cistercian monk, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Laurence in *Lucind* by Innocent IV. in 1244. He died in 1274.
 10. ROBERT KILWARDBY, Dominican, made Archbishop of Canterbury in 1273, was created Cardinal Bishop of Porto by Nicholas III. in 1278.
 11. WILLIAM BRAY, Archdeacon of Rheims, was created Cardinal by Urban IV. in 1262.
 12. HUGH OF EVESHAM was created Cardinal Priest of S. Laurence in *Lucind* by Martin IV. in 1281.
 13. THOMAS JOYCE, Dominican, who had studied with S. Thomas Aquinas, and was confessor to Edward II., was created Cardinal Priest of S. Sabina by Clement V. in 1305. He died in 1310.
 14. SIMON LANGHAM, Benedictine, of S. Peter's Abbey, Westminster, was Abbot of Westminster in 1349, Bishop of Ely in 1362, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1367, and was made Cardinal Priest of S. Sixtus by Urban V. in 1368. He died in 1376.
 15. ADAM ESTON, Benedictine, Bishop of London, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Cecilia by Urban VI. in 1378. He died in 1398.
 16. PHILIP REPINGDON, Abbot of Leicester, Chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1400, Bishop of Lincoln in 1408, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Nereus and Achilleus by Gregory XII. in 1408. He was the founder of Lincoln College, Oxford.
 17. ROBERT HALLAM, Chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1403, and Bishop of Salisbury in 1407, was created Cardinal Priest by Pope John XXII. in 1411. He died in 1417 at the Council of Constance.
 18. HENRY BEAUFORT, second son of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, by his third wife, Bishop of Lincoln in 1397, of Winchester in 1405, and Lord High Chancellor, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Eusebius in 1418 by Pope Martin V. and Legate à latere. He died in 1447, and is buried in Winchester Cathedral.
 19. JOHN KEMPE, born in 1380, of an ancient Kentish family, Fellow of Merton College, Rector of Southwick, Sussex, successively Bishop of Rochester, Chichester, and London (1422), Keeper of the Privy Seal and Grand-Justiciary of Normandy; Ambassador to France and Scotland; Archbishop of York, 1423, and twice Lord Chancellor, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Balbina by Eugenius IV. in 1439, and Cardinal Bishop of S. Rufina and Legate à latere in 1452. In the same year he was translated from York to Canterbury. He died in 1454, and is buried in Canterbury Cathedral on the Epistle side of the choir.
 20. THOMAS BOURCHIER, Bishop of Worcester in 1436, of Ely in 1443, and Archbishop of Canterbury in 1455, was created, in 1464, Cardinal Priest of S. Cyriacus in Thermis. He died in 1486.

and to the Church. I do not affect to think lightly of the great dignity conferred on me without any merit of mine. It is truly an honour to be associated with the Sacred Council immediately around the Vicar of Our Lord, and to share his lot in good and in evil. Indeed, I would rather that

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21. JOHN MORTON, born in 1410, Bishop of Ely in 1478, and Archbishop of Canterbury in 1486, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Anastasia in 1493, by Pope Alexander VI. He died in 1500.
 22. CHRISTOPHER BAINBRIDGE, Bishop of Durham in 1507, Archbishop of York in 1508, and Ambassador of Henry VIII. to Rome, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Praxedes by Julius II. in 1511. He died poisoned by an assassin in 1514. His tomb is in the English College.
 23. THOMAS WOLSEY, Bishop of Tournai in 1513, of Lincoln in 1514, Archbishop of York in 1514, and Lord High Chancellor, was created Cardinal Priest of S. Cecilia by Leo X. in 1516, and Legate *à latere*. He died in 1530.
 24. JOHN FISHER, born in 1459; professor of theology at Cambridge 1502; Bishop of Rochester 1504; attained and imprisoned 1534; created Cardinal Priest by Clement VII. in 1534; suffered for the faith 22nd June, 1535, and is buried in the chapel of the Tower.
 25. REGINALD POLE, Dean of Exeter, 1527; created Cardinal Deacon of SS. Nereus and Achilleus by Paul III. in 1536 (afterwards of Sta Maria in Cosmedin, and subsequently Cardinal Priest of S. Prisca); Legate to England in 1554; ordained priest and consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury in 1556. He died in 1558, and is buried in "Becket's Crown" in Canterbury Cathedral.
 26. WILLIAM (OF PETER) PETO, PEYTO, or PEYTON, Franciscan; Bishop of Salisbury, created Cardinal Priest and Legate *à latere* by Paul IV. in 1557, but never received the insignia or reached Rome, dying in 1558.
 27. WILLIAM ALLEN, ALAN, or ALLEYN, educated at Oriel College; Canon of York in 1556; created Cardinal Priest of S. Martin in Montibus by Sixtus V. in 1587; founder of the College at Douai, and counsellor of Gregory XIII. in the foundation of the English College at Rome; appointed in 1589 Archbishop of Mechlin; died in 1594. Buried in the English College. A jewelled crosier presented to him by Sixtus V. is preserved in the Archiepiscopal residence at Westminster.
 28. PHILIP HOWARD, third son of Henry Lord Mowbray, by Elizabeth, daughter of Esme Stuart, Duke of Lenox; born 1629 in Arundel House, London; professed as a Dominican at Cremona; appointed one of the Chaplains to Queen Catharine of Braganza; left England at the outbreak of persecution; founded a community of his order at Bornheim in Flanders; created Cardinal Priest of Sta Maria supra Minervam in 1675, by Clement X. He was generally styled Cardinal of Norfolk, or Cardinal of England. "Protector" of England. Died 1690. His tomb is in his titular church.
 29. HENRY BENEDICT MARY CLEMENT STUART, Cardinal of York, born 1725, created Cardinal Deacon of Sta Maria *in Porticu* by Benedict XIV. in 1747; subsequently Cardinal Priest (1) of the SS. XII. Apostoli, and (2) of Sta Maria in Trastevere, consecrated Archbishop of Corinth by Clement XIII.; Cardinal Bishop of Frascati (1760) and Dean of the Sacred College; died 1807.
 30. THOMAS WELD, born 1773, took holy orders in 1821, and consecrated Bishop of Amycla *in partibus* the same year; created Cardinal Priest of S. Marcellus by Pius VIII. in 1830; died 1837.

this dignity fell on me, as it does, in the time of danger than in the time of safety. It is, as it were, being told off to the forlorn hope in the sight of the world ; but it is a forlorn hope which is certain of victory. I feel that your presence this day is a representation of England, especially of those in England who have preserved unbroken the tradition of the faith, and that your kindness to me proceeds from love to England, and I feel assured that on returning to our country I shall meet with the same kindness and affection."

"This" (continues the great French critic) "is indeed the resolute, penetrating, feeling language of a man who is girding up his loins for the combat"; and he proceeds to compare the whole scene with a recent performance in the Diet at Berlin, when Prince Bismarck profited by the laughter excited by an allusion to him in a work of fiction, "to show that he was still a Colonel of Cuirassiers by executing a violent charge against the Pope." "On which side," asks M. Lemoigne, "on which side is the dignity?" Such is the impression created on a keen and impartial intellect by the strong individuality of the illustrious Prince of the Church who now presides over her destinies in England.

But English Catholics, while they perceive and are proud of the estimation in which their Chief Pastor is held in other lands, know that he has very special claims on their respect and affection which those less familiar with his labours in this country would necessarily fail to appreciate. He has had a special work to perform. So had his great predecessor, and it appears to us as though to each had been assigned by Providence, apart from the mission shared by all apostolical pastors, a separate and distinct task. The first great Cardinal Archbishop of the restored Hierarchy had to re-build and re-furnish the holy place, and to display to the dwellers around the beauty and order of its courts: the special office of the second seems to be to open still more widely its gates, and to obtain for its inhabitants the privileges of citizenship and neighbourhood, to make it better known to those to whom it was a strange and

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31. CHARLES JANUARIUS ACTON, born 1803 ; proclaimed Cardinal Priest of Sta Maria della Pace by Gregory XVI. in 1842 (created and reserved *in petto* in 1839) ; died in 1847.
 32. NICHOLAS WISEMAN, born 1802, Bishop of Melipotamus *in partibus*, 1840 ; Archbishop of Westminster 1850 ; created Cardinal Priest of S. Pudentiana 1850 ; died 1865.
 33. HENRY EDWARD MANNING, born 1808 ; Archbishop of Westminster 1865 ; created Cardinal Priest of SS. Andrew and Gregory on the Cælian, 1875.

Cardinals Erskine and Cullen (as purely Scottish and Irish Cardinals) are not included in this list.

new thing ; to strengthen its walls and fortify its bulwarks, and to assert, and, perhaps,—who knows?—to defend its sacred and indefeasible liberties. And in each case the same Providence which allotted the task, ordered also the preparation for it. He to whom we owe the restored splendour of Catholic worship, the plantation in this country of so many Religious Orders and Congregations, the revival among us of so many practices of Catholic devotion, was familiar from his tenderest childhood with “the beauty of God’s House,” and at an early age was called to complete his education at Rome, there to become imbued with the learning, traditions, and usages of the very centre of Catholic life. He who was to claim for the Church a fair hearing from Protestant Englishmen, was brought up in the midst of them and among their most characteristic national institutions. In his subsequent theological training essentially Roman, in his youthful education and general culture Cardinal Manning is typically English. Harrow, Balliol, and Merton were the steps which led him to the prominent position which he occupied at an early age in the Anglican Establishment. He had won the love and veneration of all who knew him, and of many who knew him not ; of many who have entered with him, or after him, into the true fold ; of many, also, who have been unfortunate enough to remain without. Already there was apparent in his public discourses that severe sweetness which has since become so familiar to us all, and there was little—scarcely more than one or two passages—in those four volumes of sermons which might not have been preached now, although the Archbishop has thought it right, in order to assert a principle, repeatedly and steadfastly to refuse his consent to the republication of them.

But with this part of His Eminence’s career we have little to do : its features are lost in the light which was afterwards shed upon his path. Ordained priest by Cardinal Wiseman in 1851, Dr. Manning soon repaired to Rome, there for several years to drink deep at the richest sources of Catholic doctrine. Returning to England, and entering on the missionary life, almost his first act was to introduce into the diocese of Westminster, with a rule specially adapted to the circumstances, and under the sanction of the Holy See and of the Ordinary, the Congregation which S. Charles Borromeo had founded at Milan, as a help to the Archbishop in the pastoral work of his diocese. The Congregation of the Oblates of S. Charles was established in the Church of Our Lady of the Angels, at Bayswater, and Dr. Manning was its first Superior as well as its founder. It furnished the Archbishop of Westminster with a valuable staff of auxiliaries entirely at his command for

missionary or educational purposes, and, besides supplying several churches with pastors, has already given one Bishop to the English Hierarchy.

Appointed successively Provost of the Metropolitan Chapter on the resignation of Dr. Whitty (who had entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus) and Protonotary Apostolic, Mgr. Manning continued to preside at Bayswater until, on the 30th April, 1865, he was elected successor to the late Cardinal Archbishop, who had died on the 15th February of that year.

Since then, with what laborious zeal, with what courage, and with what self-sacrifice he has toiled among us, we Catholics of England well know. First among the tasks which the Archbishop set himself to perform was the providing of the means of a Catholic education for our poor children. To this all other enterprises were subordinated, and when His Grace at length opened a subscription towards the building of a future Metropolitan Cathedral he was able to announce that the more important works—the construction of “the spiritual temple,” the protection of the faith of future generations, was virtually effected, and that the provision made for the Catholic education of our poor would, if carried out on the lines now laid down, keep pace with the necessities of the case. More than seventy new schools had been built within the diocese of Westminster, existing school-buildings had been extensively enlarged, the educational movement throughout the country had received a strong impulse, and, more recently, our higher schools and colleges have been crowned in the foundation by the collective Hierarchy of the University College at Kensington.

Nor have the personal labours of the Archbishop, as regards instruction and exhortation, fallen at all short of his administrative activity. Unsurpassed, perhaps, by any prelate in the world in the assiduity of his preaching, he has put forth a rapid succession of publications either in defence of Catholic truth or in exposition of Catholic doctrine. Through all of these, from his treatise on *The Grounds of Faith*, and his book on *The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, down to his last work on *The Internal Working of the same Holy Spirit*, there runs, like a thread, the doctrine of the perpetual indwelling in the Church of that Divine Teacher, as well as of His work as Sanctifier in every individual soul. This has been the constant keynote of His Eminence’s writings and discourses; and it was, therefore, only natural that ever since the meeting of the Bishops at the eighteenth centenary of St. Peter’s martyrdom in 1867, when the doctrine was first made the subject of general public discussion, the Archbishop should have been

most prominent in asserting the Infallibility of the Pope, whenever, speaking from the Chair of Peter as Universal Pastor, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church. This was the doctrine laid down in the famous Definition by the Vatican Council, and this it is, and no other, which the Archbishop of Westminster has always taught. From a still earlier period the same conviction respecting the prerogatives of the Pope as Universal Teacher and Universal Pastor, and the consequent necessity that he should be independent of all earthly control, led Mgr. Manning to be most earnest in the defence of the Temporal Principedom of the Holy See. Ever since 1859, and especially in 1860, 1861, and 1862, he may be said to have borne the whole brunt of that controversy in this country, and a reference to the newspapers of the time will show that it was he who was selected for almost daily attack, as the most conspicuous and redoubtable champion of those temporal rights and that spiritual independence. In his protest against the iniquitous violation of them which began in 1859 and was consummated in 1870, His Eminence has never wavered. And though we feel certain that he would utterly repudiate the imputations conveyed in Mr. Gladstone's rhetoric about the re-establishment of the Temporal Power on the "ashes" of Rome and the "whitening bones" of its inhabitants, and would consider that few things, even from a mere human point of view, in the present circumstances of the world, could be more disastrous than that the Vicar of the Good Shepherd and Prince of Peace should have to be restored to his independence by the arms of a foreign invader, we have no doubt that the Cardinal's conviction of the necessity of such a restoration is in no whit diminished, and that his hopes of its eventual accomplishment are no more dead than ours.

But while the Archbishop has been thus energetically employed within the field of the Church, another work has been pressed upon him outside her pale. Unable to co-operate with his non-catholic fellow countrymen in matters of religion, he has continually found himself called upon to give his aid to movements concerned with morality and beneficence. To such appeals His Eminence has never turned a deaf ear. He has always embraced with alacrity any opportunity of working together with those outside the Church for any lawful and good end. Nor, we must say, have those engaged in such charitable undertakings been at all backward in soliciting his help and countenance. It is much to their credit, for many of them differ from us *toto celo* in their religious opinions. Yet the Archbishop has been frequently urged to take a prominent part in such de-

liberations, and deputations from many parts of the kingdom, some even from as far as Scotland, have waited upon him to ask for his co-operation in the works on which they were engaged. All this has, of course, brought the Archbishop into frequent contact with all sorts and conditions of men ; and we refer to this fact here specially for two reasons : first, in order briefly to point out the advantage which has accrued to Catholics from the course thus adopted by their chief Pastor, and secondly, to protest against the use which some of the more malicious enemies of the Church are now making of the fact. First, then, it is obviously for the interest of Catholics to be brought, in the person of their Metropolitan, into frequent and friendly relations with the general body of their countrymen, and particularly with those who interest themselves in meritorious public movements. They are thus much more likely to obtain a fair hearing when their own rights are concerned, for justice is still happily a characteristic of Englishmen, and their prejudices against Catholics are owing to their want of knowledge of them far more than to anything else. It is this kind of social intercourse into which the Cardinal Archbishop has entered, not into that of mere "society," in the ordinary sense of the word, for this he has rather avoided than sought. And this brings us to the second remark we have to make. Certain Prussian official papers have asserted that our Archbishop was ambitious of social distinctions and successes, and have laboured to prove that his elevation to the Sacred College would produce a difficulty which they very much desire should arise. They expect, or seem to expect, that His Eminence will insist upon his due precedence, a claim which they think "the great temporal peers" are sure to resist. Now, in the first place, we—together with the *Standard*—"are happy to think that among sensible and well-bred people such questions settle themselves." And we must acknowledge that the English press and the English public in general have received the announcement of His Eminence's elevation in the most good-natured way. They are, in fact, however much they may disagree with him, rather proud of him after all, and by no means dislike seeing so distinguished a countryman selected to fill so high a dignity in the communion to which he belongs.

They are very much shocked in Germany (continued the *Standard*) that Englishmen should talk and write thus calmly, not to say indifferently, concerning the elevation of Cardinal Manning and his expected return amongst us. They cannot understand how it is that we are not highly indignant with the Pope, with Cardinal Manning himself, and with all our Roman Catholic

fellow-countrymen for what they stigmatize as a piece of intolerable impertinence. We, on the other hand, can hardly comprehend their touchiness. We think we may safely assert that whilst the enrolment of Dr. Manning among the members of the Sacred College has given pleasure to the Englishmen who belong to his Church, there are no Englishmen who are annoyed, offended, alarmed, or in any way unpleasantly affected by the incident.

On our part such courtesy and goodfellowship deserves this acknowledgment, but we have a word more to add. The German papers to which we have referred are probably not very well versed in the British table of precedence. Now it so happens that for those who were "sensible and well-bred" enough to give to the Archbishop, as Archbishop, his due precedence, his elevation to the Cardinalate can only in very rare cases make any practical difference at all. However great may be the distinction in rank between a Cardinal and an Archbishop, they both fit into a space which is occupied by very few others. They both come after the last Royal prince, and before the first temporal peer, except the Lord Chancellor. It is only, therefore, when either one of the Protestant Archbishops or the Lord Chancellor happens to be present that the different precedence of a Cardinal and of a Catholic Archbishop (supposing his rank to be admitted by the courtesy of his hosts) would come into practical operation. But, if analogy is to rule in such a matter, the question has been already settled by authority. At the Queen's visit to Ireland it was ordered—and the order was published in the *Dublin Gazette*—that the Catholic Archbishops were to take precedence immediately after the Protestant Archbishops, and Catholic Bishops after Protestant Bishops. And on another occasion, after the Archbishop of Dublin had become a Cardinal, and before the Disestablishment of the Protestant Church, Cardinal Cullen had his due precedence recognised by the Vice-regal Court, and took rank next after the Lord Lieutenant, who was, we believe, the same that now holds the office. But this matter may well be left, as the *Standard* suggests, to the courtesy and good feeling of all concerned. His Eminence, at least, will never raise it in any aggressive way. His invariable practice hitherto has been to take whatever place has been assigned to him; and on one occasion, at Oxford, on which he was most unfairly alleged, in a letter to the *Times*, to have claimed precedence over a Protestant Bishop—which, by the bye, he might well have done if the precedent just quoted is to be followed,—he had simply taken the seat bearing the number which had been officially forwarded to him without any demand on his part. As head of the Catholic Church in England, the Cardinal Archbishop of

Westminster may have many things to fight for before he dies, but social precedence, we may confidently affirm, will be the very last thing for which he will contend.

He has, indeed, a conflict to wage, but it is a conflict against error and in defence of evangelical freedom. Hitherto, we are happy to say, the virus of oppressive Continental Radicalism has not to any appreciable extent infected the Liberal party in England. God grant that it may be always so, and that our native land may always remain a sanctuary in which the rights of conscience are as inviolable as the freedom of the citizen. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the enemy is on the war-path. One of the very prelates who has just been promoted to the Sacred College is actually in prison for asserting the liberty of the pastoral office, and, when he has endured his sentence, will be further condemned to forced residence in a place assigned him by the Government, at a distance from the see from which the State pretends to depose him, and under the surveillance of the police. It was with justice that an eminent diplomatist said the other day in Rome, "*J'ai dit au Saint Père que ce consistoire est le consistoire du combat.*" Nor was it with less truth that it has been also remarked that whereas the last nomination of Cardinals was that of "the Cardinals of the Governments," this is the creation of "the Cardinals of the peoples." The elevation of Cardinals Ledochowski, MacCloskey, and Manning is sufficient to impress this stamp upon it. The first is the imprisoned representative of an oppressed nationality; of the second, what need we say more than that he is the first American Cardinal? Not, we believe, that there has been any special reluctance hitherto to invest with this dignity a prelate from the great Transatlantic Republic, for there has never been a Cardinal in any other part of America. The great and comparatively ancient sees of Lima and Mexico shared in the disability—if disability there was—equally with Baltimore and New York. Boston, indeed, had once a Bishop who became a Cardinal,* but it was when Archbishop of Bordeaux that he was raised to the Sacred College. It was, therefore, probably on account of the great distance from Rome, and the impossibility of arriving there in time for a Conclave, that no American has ever before been created a Cardinal; and this objection has of course been, to a great extent, removed by the increased facilities of locomotion. Cardinal McCloskey could be telegraphed for in an hour, and could reach Rome in twelve days. The third of the Cardinals mentioned—our own

* Mgr. de Cheverus.

Archbishop—is also “a Cardinal of the people,” for he represents at Rome the English Catholic body, and not the Government. He has also, as the *Spectator* has said, “gone out of his way to help in all charitable works”; he has laboured hard to convert the drunkard, to better the position of the artisan, to aid the agricultural labourer, and to educate the children of the poor. In this sense the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster is indeed a “Cardinal of the people”—not, as the *Nord* would represent him, as a favourer of a democratic propaganda against thrones. The *Monde*, in an excellent article on “The Mission of Cardinal Manning,” sets its Russo-Belgian contemporary right upon this point, and observes with truth, that, although to the world without solicitude for the poor and working classes may seem a piece of Popish propagandism, yet to those who know what the work of the Catholic Church has ever been, it is nothing new or strange. It was to the poor, to the labourer, to the serf, as well as to the king, that S. Gregory sent S. Augustine. It is to them, as well as to the rich and noble, that Pius has sent his successor. The work is the old work; the Divine Worker is the same; and His instruments are armed with the same powers. Only the other day, at the opening of the University College, the Cardinal Archbishop told how the Holy Father, when he was placing upon his shoulders the Archiepiscopal Pallium, said to him in an undertone, “I am not S. Gregory, but I have the same faculties.” Our heartfelt prayer, and the prayer of all loyal English Catholics, will be that His Eminence, thus invested with the plenitude of S. Augustine’s jurisdiction, may be spared to us for many years to carry on S. Augustine’s work.

Canterbury, indeed, is dead; but Westminster has taken root, and is putting forth green and vigorous shoots. We have at this moment a most signal illustration of the vitality and fecundity of the Churches planted by the Holy See. The hierarchy which Rome has bidden to live again has, by its first creative act, called into existence what but a few years ago seemed the wildest of dreams, the most impossible of chimeras. The Catholic Church in England was so poor in resources of all kinds, that anything like a university appeared to be utterly beyond our reach. We had neither the money, nor the professors, nor the students. Now, if we have not a university, we have the germ of one. The Church has ever been the Mother of Universities. And the manner of their birth was much the same as that of the future Catholic University of England. S. Augustine and his successors brought to our forefathers not only the faith of Christ, but the best

culture of those days; and monasteries, such as those of Canterbury and of Abingdon, of Jarrow and of Medeshamstede, were storehouses of learning and centres of civilization for the whole land. Little more than two centuries had passed when other schools, distinct from the monasteries, and unfurnished with settled endowments, were opened between the streams of Isis and Cherwell. As yet there was no university, in the modern sense of an aggregate of colleges; there was only a central school—the “Great Hall of the University”—to which the professors of the different branches of learning which made up the “universum” of science attracted students from all parts of the island.* Around this centre, in time, as the number and needs of students increased, arose the cluster of colleges which is now, to English ideas, almost essential to the idea of a university. Such a centre we have again in the new University College at Kensington.† There may never be a crown of colleges immediately around it, but it may throw out its suckers very far indeed; and in these days, when distance is almost annihilated, a university may cover counties as easily as in the Middle Ages it extended over parishes. And the beginning has been actually made. The commission was given by the Holy See to the successor of S. Augustine and his suffragans; the lines of the undertaking were prudently marked out; munificent offerings were contributed in a few months; and the first act of the Cardinal-Archbishop, after his return from Rome, was solemnly to inaugurate the Catholic University College. A distinguished body of professors, most of them men from our ancient national universities, who had been providentially called into the Catholic Church, have given their services, in many cases at a considerable sacrifice, to the young foundation. And the sight of the ancient habit of those famous homes of learning, which for three centuries have been Protestant, in the Theatre of a Catholic College, the Founders and Visitors of which were there—one with the sacred Roman purple, and the rest with the insignia of Catholic Bishops—was suggestive of strange recollections. One might have thought of Cardinal Wolsey visiting his foundation at Oxford, if the Prince of the Church now amongst us were not one of so totally different a type. But it is rather to another Arch-

* A record of this state of things still exists in the Latin name of University College, Oxford, which is “Collegium Magnæ Aulæ Universitatis.”

† It is a curious coincidence, that whereas the neighbourhood of the great monastery of Abingdon had probably not a little to do with the birth and growth of Oxford, it is on the site of the abbot of Abingdon's town residence—the property, of course, of that abbey—that the new University College is founded.

bishop, though he was not a Cardinal—to S. Edmund of Canterbury, once himself a teacher in the schools of Oxford, and a constant lover and patron of his Alma Mater—that our memories most naturally turn.

But this subject would lead us too far, and there is another point to which we must devote a few words before we conclude. The second public act of the Cardinal, following immediately after the inauguration of the Kensington College, has been the solemn opening of a church dedicated to S. Thomas of Canterbury. Each act is representative of a part of the work which his Eminence has set before him. The first concerns the Catholic education of his flock; the second is connected with the defence of the liberties of the Church. S. Thomas, as Daniel O'Connell (quoted by the Cardinal at Canterbury) declared, was "the greatest patriot England ever had"; and the cause for which S. Thomas died, said his Eminence in his sermon, was that of those "manifold and divine liberties of the Church of God" which in his days were also "the laws of England."

The cause of S. Thomas (the Cardinal is reported to have said) is the cause of the Church in Germany at this moment. I do not believe that in our country there exists a man, be he poor or rich, mighty or humble, who would force the conscience of his neighbour if he could. Every Englishman says, "I have a right to my own faith, and I give to my neighbour what I ask for myself." For a time the English people were misled, and did not understand what was passing in Germany. They understand it now, and they say that these governors, in the might of their power, have been passing laws more and more severe, in order, if possible, to overthrow the supreme authority of the Christian Church on earth. But they have come into conflict with the public opinion of all free Europe, which is ranging itself unconsciously around the Christian Church, and is making answer that it cannot be a party to any human law which shall limit the freedom of conscience, or the just freedom of speech, of any man on earth. I have, I hope, made clear the cause that brings us here to-day, and that is to venerate once more, in a sanctuary consecrated to his name, the sacred Martyr who laid down his life for the Church; which Church lives to this day in England, in Ireland, even in Scotland, and in Germany. In those days it was the son that stood and suffered; in these it is the Father of the faithful who inflexibly maintains the contest.

These are clear, straightforward, courageous words, such as our countrymen well know how to appreciate. Now, if ever, was the moment for speaking them; and we were certain to hear them from the Cardinal's lips. No man is more liberal than his Eminence has ever been in making allowances for prejudice and ignorance, and in recognizing the good faith of many who are outside the visible fold; no man, at the same

time, can be bolder in the denunciation of hypocrisy and tyranny. We Catholics of England may well be proud to know that whenever there is an error to be slain, a social evil to be combated, or a battle to be waged in defence of Christian liberties, the Cardinal-Archbishop of Westminster is sure to be foremost in the fight.

ART. I. MIRACLES: THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THEIR POSSIBILITY AND ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY.

Supernatural Religion: an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.
Second Edition. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1874.

THIS work has been generally received by the free-thinking press of this country with vehement applause, and its author saluted as a choice compound of colossal learning, accurate scholarship, and invincible logic. The scheme of his attack on revelation may be exhibited in the following propositions:—1. Christian revelation is confessedly incredible without the sanction of miracles. 2. A miracle is always incredible, not to say impossible. 3. The circumstances of time and place of the Gospel miracles form so many grounds for doubting even their reality as phenomena. 4. The Gospel narratives are the product of an age long subsequent to that of the phenomena which they profess to record. The proof of this last thesis, embracing three-fourths of the whole work, in the main consists of a minute criticism of all the supposed references to the Gospels made by the Fathers of the first 150 years, with the intent to show that they knew nothing of the Gospels as we possess them, but were quoting from a disjointed and often fragmentary narrative, written by nobody knows whom, of which our Gospels were the ultimate outcome.

Of the worth of the learning, and the accuracy of the scholarship of which this portion of the work is the field, something is to be said in another article of our number. We shall here confine ourselves to an examination of the author's logic as manifested in his treatment of the arguments for and

against miracles, and his criticism of previous writers on the subject.

He observes (p. 8) that "if the reality of miracles cannot be established, Christianity loses the only evidence by which its truth can be sufficiently attested. If miracles be incredible, the supernatural revelation and its miraculous evidence must together be rejected." Now this is not exactly the language we should have chosen, for we do not admit that the supernatural works wrought by our Lord were strictly necessary in order to justify us in accepting Him as what He professed to be. However, we of course allow that if miracles are shown to be incredible, Christianity must fall:—1. Because Christianity is committed to miracles, inasmuch as certain miracles form an intrinsic part of her teaching. 2. Because, although what are ordinarily called miracles are not strictly necessary to sanction revelation, at least they are its most proper sanction. It was not necessary, says Benedict XIV.—"*sed omnino decebat et quodammodo oportebat*"—that Christ should work miracles.* Dr. Mozley, whose Bampton lectures our author especially combats, seems to admit this evidential necessity of miracles in too unqualified a manner. Our author continues (p. 10). "Our inquiry into the reality of divine revelation, then, whether we consider its contents, or its evidence, practically reduces itself to the very simple issue, are miracles antecedently credible? Did they ever take place?" He appeals to Scripture for proofs that miracles must be uncertain attestations of truth, because:—1. God sometimes works miracles in support of a lie. 2. The devil, the father of lies, has the power of working miracles. As to the first charge, either our author's appeal to the Bible is a mere *argumentum ad hominem*, in which case it is enough to observe that we do not understand the texts upon which he rests in the sense which he gives to them; or it is advanced seriously, when we have the right to demand that so novel an interpretation should be justified. The author of "*Supernatural Religion*" cannot at the same time make Scripture self-contradictory and appeal to it as an authority. With regard to the second charge some explanation will be necessary.

Theologians generally allow that the devil can work what S. Thomas calls miracles, "*quoad nos*," that is to say, produce effects entirely beyond the range of any unassisted or humanly-directed material agents. He performs these wonders in

* De Canoniz., lib. iv. pass. i. cap. 2. Cf. Suar., in part iii. disp. 31, sect. i.

virtue of the powers inherent in his angelic nature, which remain in substance what they were before his fall. The works, however, within the compass of the angelic nature, magnificent and marvellous as they are in respect to man, are in respect to the Creator's power strictly conditioned. The power of creation is incommunicable as a natural gift. If at an angel's word something that was not should come into being, it could only be the result of a direct interposition of Almighty God, a miracle strictly so-called. Under the same category with the creation of substances the scholastics included the origination of all such modes or relations as they conceived could not result from any possible combination of existent passivities and activities. Hence they denied that the devil—in regard to whom there could be no question of God's miraculous assistance—could restore the union between soul and body, or cause a dead body to perform such vital actions as the assimilation of food, for instance, or bring back a sense the organs of which had been really destroyed; whilst on the other hand they allowed him a power practically infinite of combining the forces of Nature, and of evoking in an almost inconceivably short time all the natural results of such combinations. Thus the devil could cure many diseases instantaneously, produce things suddenly from great distances, and anticipate by his rapid and subtle ministries the laborious growths of Nature. Whilst granting possession of these great natural powers to the devil, and so admitting him as a possible rival of the Almighty in the field of secondary miracles, theologians have always insisted that in a war of divine and diabolical miracles, such as that between Moses and Pharaoh's magicians, God's champion cannot be worsted, for God's so permitting would be equivalent to his attestation of a falsehood. Many theologians, in addition to this, maintain that, seeing God has adopted the miracle, in the very formal way which Scripture affirms, as the seal of His revelation, He is pledged never to permit the working of miracles even of the secondary order in attestation of a false religion. No doubt it belongs to God's general merciful providence not to allow us to be tempted beyond our strength, as might frequently be the case if the devil were allowed to use on behalf of a false religion his power of working miracles of the lower order, and counterfeiting miracles of the higher; still this is a very different thing from saying that God is pledged invariably to negative the devil's power on such occasions. Anyhow, this view, however respectably supported, is not universally accepted, and obviously does not admit of proof.

To return to "Supernatural Religion," we grant that

miracles of the inferior class, i.e., such as although distinctly superhuman and supernatural—taking nature to mean the normal action of the mechanical, chemical, and vital forces of this sensible world—are either admittedly within the devil's power or not certainly beyond it, are, *taken by themselves*, no sure attestation of the divine sanction of the doctrine on behalf of which they are wrought. Nevertheless, we affirm that they form a proper and sufficient recommendation of a body of doctrine which in other respects, and as a whole, commends itself to the conscience of mankind. Such recommendation is wanted in proportion as a body of doctrine embraces points unattainable by human reason. The character and history of the witnesses, the scope of the doctrine may be such as, when sealed by miracles of the inferior class only, to approve the doctrine divine. In fact, were all the Gospel miracles of this inferior order, Christianity would still have a rational claim upon our acceptance, owing to the impossibility of regarding its influences as diabolical.

But, in fact, Christianity comes to us with an array of miracles, some of which are of a kind of which theologians unanimously assert the devil is quite incapable—such, for example, as our Lord's resurrection. And our Lord's miracles are still further heightened by occupying a place in a scheme of prophecy; and again, Christian miracles have signally triumphed over the diabolical miracles that were in possession. The charge of arguing in a vicious circle made (p. 19, &c.) against those who test the doctrine by the miracle and the miracle by the doctrine, falls to the ground if we consider that a miracle, even of the inferior order, gives a superhuman sanction to the doctrine, whilst the doctrine, character of the thaumaturgus or witnesses, shows that the superhuman sanction is divine. The author of "Supernatural Religion" appears not to see that distinct facts may exercise an evidential office proper and essential, and yet each requiring the other as a *sine quâ non* of its efficaciousness. We believe a man because he is well informed on the subject under discussion; and because he is truthful, his whole life bearing loud and consistent testimony to his love of truth. Should we say that his information had no evidential bearing upon the truth of his statement because, forsooth, it would be practically inoperative on the supposition of his untruthfulness?

The author of "Supernatural Religion," true to his plan of isolating miracles, and so giving Christian evidence as it were one neck, insists that, inasmuch as the doctrines of Christianity are beyond the attainment of reason, an appeal to the character of a doctrine which a miracle has sealed, on behalf

of the miracle, is meaningless. On the contrary, Christianity embraces a body of doctrines many of which are not beyond the capacity of reason; and of those of its doctrines which reason at its highest and best could never have attained to, and cannot completely grasp when they are presented to it, there are few, if any, which reason cannot in some degree appreciate. For instance, that God should become man in order to be the sick world's physician, is a conception far beyond the range of reason and incapable of entire comprehension by man; but at the same time it must recommend itself to all who understand the wants of human nature, as at least fulfilling those wants in a way that nothing else could. The reasonableness of the body of doctrine must always be the negative criterion of the miracle, and in some cases may be much more.

Chapter II. is entitled "Miracles in relation to the Order of Nature." It is mainly taken up with a criticism of Dr. Mozley's sixth lecture, "Unknown Law,"* although freely garnished with the *disjecta membra* of writers like Archbishop Trench and Dean Mansell. It is so characteristic a specimen of our author's controversial method as to be worth examining at some length. As nothing could well be more clear and coherent than this sixth lecture of Dr. Mozley, an artificial incoherence is produced by the interpolation of passages from the authors we have mentioned. Not that we admit that there is any substantial disagreement between Dr. Mozley and Archbishop Trench, but on such a subject even those who are in fullest accord will express themselves differently. For instance, the Archbishop protests against the epithet "*contra naturam*" being applied to miracles, as implying discord or imperfection, whereas they are examples of the action of a higher law—not a higher law of nature, but a higher law of God, a higher system of Divine action. Dr. Mozley and others are inclined to admit the expression "*contra naturam*" as expressing the truth as far as it goes, limiting nature to the range of our sensible experience. The point of intersection of two spheres is not less a point of section because in other relations it is only one point in a line of progression. Again, the higher law hypothesis which Dr. Mozley repudiates as an impossible account of the miracle, is not the Archbishop's higher law, but an unknown law of material nature. Dr. Mozley, equally with the Archbishop, contends that, to use Bishop Butler's words ("*Analogy*," part ii. chap. iv.), "God's miraculous interpositions may have been all along by

* "Bampton Lectures," 1865.

general laws of wisdom. Thus that miraculous powers should be exerted at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons rather than to others,—all this may have been by general laws." Our author complains that the Archbishop "repudiates the idea of their being natural phenomena, and yet attempts to deny that they are unnatural. They must be one or the other." Yes, but their being not unnatural in the Archbishop's sense need not make them natural in "Supernatural Religion's" sense. Because a man is not an unnatural son, it does not follow therefrom that he is a natural son in the legal sense of the term. Invincible logic would seem to be sometimes synonymous with word-chopping. Miracles are unnatural in the sense that they are no outcome of the mechanical and chemical forces of this sensible world, but are neutralizations effected by a supersensible force. They are not unnatural in the sense that they do not offend that universal nature part of whose constitution it is that the lower law should be subordinate to the higher, the second cause to the first cause, the creature to the Creator.

Archbishop Trench points out very truly that the antecedent probability of miracles depends upon the view taken of the relative position of man in the universe. "If God be indeed only or chiefly the God of nature, and not in a paramount sense the God of grace, the God of man, if nature be indeed the highest, and man only created as furniture for this planet, it were indeed absurd and inconceivable that the higher should serve or give place to, or fall into the order of, the lower. But if rather man is the end and object of all, if he be indeed the vicegerent of the Highest, the image of God, if this world and all else that belongs to it be but a school for the training of man, only having a worth and meaning when so considered; then that the lower should serve, and where need is, give way to the interests of the highest, were only beforehand to be expected."*

Dr. Mozley, in the course of this lecture, has examined and triumphantly exploded two hypotheses by which persons have attempted to explain away miracles; the first is that of an unknown connection of the phenomena in question with a known law of nature; the second, that these phenomena fall under an unknown law of nature. The author of "Supernatural Religion" so ludicrously misapprehends the controversial position of his antagonist as to speak of Dr. Mozley as "being obliged, therefore, to abandon the attempt to explain

* "Miracles," Introductory Essay, p. 67.

the Gospel miracles upon the theory of unknown connection with unknown law." And again, of the second hypothesis, "Dr. Mozley is therefore constrained to abandon also this explanation. We are bound to say, and we do so with sincere pleasure and respect, that Dr. Mozley conducts his argument with great fairness and ability, and displays his own love of truth by the impartiality with which he discusses and relinquishes many a favourite but untenable hypothesis." Dr. Mozley may congratulate himself upon receiving so splendid a compliment from the enemy, not for blowing up his own position but two of theirs. The explanation of this absurdity is not far to seek. Our author imagines that somehow Dr. Mozley had abandoned Archbishop Trench's position, whereas the two positions he is complimented for abandoning could never be abandoned, for they could never have been occupied by a sincere defender of miracles.

"We pause here to remark," says our author (p. 36), "that throughout the whole inquiry into the question of miracles we meet with nothing from theologians but mere assumptions against which the invariability of the known order of nature steadily opposes itself." The opposition does not really lie between the assumptions of theologians and the facts of science; at the worst, it is assumption against assumption. Science, not contented with rigidly recording its experiences in the sphere of second causes, and deducing therefrom the laws of their action, assumes that any interference with natural results by beings the law of whose action it may not hope to discover, is impossible, or incredible, which practically comes to the same thing. A miracle is an irregularity, urges science, therefore a deformity, therefore incredible. Theology replies by asking how we know that what science—fairly enough from its own point of view—calls an irregularity, is not the submission of one regula to another, as when an animal springs from the ground instead of lying inert in the iron grasp of gravitation; or, to take an apter illustration, were an engineer to suspend the action of one of the wheels of his machine there would follow, supposing the machinery's continuous and perfect action to be the maker's one object, a complete frustration, to the engineer's deserved discredit; yet were such temporary and partial suspension to fall into a design for instructing a pupil, it would be not a frustration, but an achievement, not irregular, but systematic. This, in the case of miracles, is an assumption, an unproved hypothesis may be, but the proper and sufficient answer to the reproach of impossibility is precisely this—a possible hypothesis. To the analogy of the subordination of mechani-

cal laws, in the case of the animal, how is it an objection that after all the law of gravitation goes on acting, and that we can estimate its relations with the vital force after the initiatory moment of the latter? We do not know what means God uses in a miracle. There need be no suspended energy, no paralysis of force when, in the particular case, the fire does not burn, the water is not displaced, but the force may be absorbed, diverted, counteracted by another force created at the moment, evoked from elsewhere. And if such intermediate agents are to be discarded, is not Almighty God, whatever else He is, a force?

The author of "Supernatural Religion" (p. 46) strongly reprobates Dr. Mozley's argument "that upon the supposition of the divine design of a revelation, a miracle is not an anomaly or irregularity, but part of the system of the universe, because though an irregularity and an anomaly in relation to either part, it has a complete adaptation to the whole. There being two worlds, a visible and invisible, and a communication being wanted, a miracle is the instrument of that communication." He says of it—"the proposition for which evidence is demanded is viciously employed as evidence itself." That is to say, the system of revelation being on its trial is admitted as evidence of its own evidence. We submit that this is no account whatever of Dr. Mozley's argument. The charge of arguing in a vicious circle would indeed be just had Dr. Mozley attempted to prove *the existence* of miracles by means of doctrine incredible without miraculous evidence. But on the contrary, what he really does is to show that miracles, *supposing them to exist*, would not be hopeless anomalies, for in Christianity they would find a system affording a scope, and, as it were, a habitat for miracles. The fact that this is given in the Christian system is so far an argument for miracles, for no one pretends that the system was invented to account for the miracles.

If the doctrines of Christianity are absurd they are not true; but in this place it is not Christianity immediately which is in question, but the possibility of a *raison d'être* for miracles. The author of "Supernatural Religion" should understand that a little logic is a dangerous thing. We have no intention of discussing with him the intrinsic probability of the doctrines of Christianity; it will be enough to observe—1st, that there is an antecedent improbability that all God's doings should be justifiable to His creatures in this world; 2nd, that to many the doctrine of the fall, which is so offensive to our author, is the one satisfactory explanation of what they see and feel in the world about them.*

* Newman's "Apologia," No. vii.

He reproduces (p. 50) a long passage from Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Social Statics" in confirmation of his statement, "That the constitution of nature, so far from favouring any hypothesis of original perfection and subsequent deterioration, bears everywhere the record of systematic upward progression. Not only is the assumption, that any revelation of the nature of ecclesiastical Christianity was necessary, excluded upon philosophical grounds, but it is contradicted by the whole operation of natural laws, which contain in themselves inexorable penalties against natural retrogression, or even unprogressiveness, and furnish the only requisite stimulus for improvement." Mr. Spencer attempts to demonstrate man's ultimate perfection as a logical necessity of his nature, thus :

All **imperfection** is unfitness to the conditions of existence. This unfitness must consist either in having a faculty or faculties in excess ; or in having a faculty or faculties deficient ; or in both.

A **faculty in excess** is one which the conditions of existence do not afford full exercise to ; and a **faculty that is deficient** is one from which the conditions of existence demand more than it can perform.

But it is an **essential principle of life** that a faculty to which circumstances do not allow full exercise diminishes, and that a faculty upon which circumstances make excessive demands increases.

And so long as this excess and this deficiency continue, there must continue decrease on the one hand and growth on the other.

Finally all excess and all deficiency must disappear, that is, all imperfection must disappear.

This is supposed and meant to militate against the doctrine of the fall ; but the truth is, the law of progress, even if admitted exactly as it is here expressed, does not touch that doctrine. "The constitution of nature . . . bears everywhere the record of systematic progression." Be it so ; but no one has supposed that the paradisiac state of our first parents was of that sort of civilization which leaves records, and the fall was not a process that could record itself. But when our author talks of this "universal upward progression," he completely ignores a fact very patent to all honest students of ethnology, viz., that, if there is a law of progression widely operative, there is also a law of degeneration. Over and over again savages have been found presenting indubitable marks of having fallen from a higher, sometimes a very high, stage of civilization. Were it to the purpose, in confirmation of Christian doctrine, we might refer to a most interesting account of the populations of Easter Island and of Central

America in Mr. Mott's essay "On the Origin of Savage Life." *

As to Mr. Spencer's demonstration, which our author brings out with a child's air of respectful triumph in something deliciously mischievous, we can only say that if this be one of Mr. Spencer's chosen arrows, if he have nothing better in his armoury, his formidableness as an antagonist has been strangely overrated. Its efficacy as proof that man must needs, in process of time, by a necessity of nature, become quite perfect, depends upon a tissue of gratuitous assumptions. The conditions of existence in which a man is placed must be assumed to be themselves perfect for a perfect adaptation to them to insure perfection, or, if not perfect originally, they must themselves progress to perfection in correspondence with man's development. But in the latter case it is hard to see how such flexible conditions can be the instrument at once of trimming and developing man's faculties. In God's hands circumstances are, to some extent, such an instrument, but they cannot be conceived capable of putting themselves to such a use. Again, it is assumed that there is no such thing as free-will, by which a man can quarrel with and resist, in whole or part, the instincts of his nature. We know that Mr. Spencer is fond of illustrations, and with reason, for his illustrations are particularly felicitous, so we will essay one. Plant an acorn in a cucumber-frame, and suppose the conditions of existence, the glass, too strong for the springing oak-tree to break through; well, if it did not die, we suppose it would adapt itself to its conditions. Its leader would wither, its lateral branches would expand, and instead of a forest-tree under abnormal circumstances, it would become a perfect shrub. But it would not have attained to its perfection, which is that of a forest-tree, for the very reason that the conditions of its existence did not permit it, and that instead of overcoming them it perfectly adapted itself to them, trailing its branches on the ground instead of tossing them in the free air of heaven.

In his third chapter, "Reason and the Order of Nature," our author is engaged with Dr. Mozley's second lecture, "Order of Nature," wherein the Bampton lecturer investigates "the mental character of our belief in the uniformity of nature, in order to estimate the objection to the miraculous thence arising." What is the rationale, Dr. Mozley asks, of the firm

* Opening Address delivered before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, October 6, 1873. See, too, *Quarterly Review*, July, 1874. Art. "Primitive Man."

expectation, e.g. that the tide will ebb and flow? The proposition is not self-evident, for its opposite is not self-contradictory; it is not properly a judgment of experience, for experience pronounces on the past not on the future. It is a judgment resting "upon no rational ground, and can be traced to no rational principle," and it is not to the purpose to say "that this unintellectual and unreasoning character belongs to it in common with all the original perceptions of our nature which cannot, as being original, rest upon any argumentative foundation," because the opposite of such an original perception, *where it does not involve self-contradiction*, at least involves "an absurdity shocking to reason," as, for instance, the proposition that the world with all its complicated adaptation of means to ends came together by chance, whereas, so Dr. Mozley insists, no such "collision with reason" can take place in an inference from the past to the future. He points out that this inference in the case of the investigator who, by a course of experiments, has discovered a new law, is no whit more rational, less simply instinctive, than in the case of the every-day observer. The scientific man has been sagacious, with the sagacity may be of genius, in discovering amongst the mass of the antecedents of a phenomenon the fact which is its invariable antecedent or cause, but in generalizing the outcome of particular observation into a law which shall hold good for the future, he is blindly and helplessly obeying a law of our common nature. Enlarging upon this theme with the utmost vigour and acumen, Dr. Mozley "flutters the doves-cots" of science to their inhabitants' grievous indignation, not to say dismay. The amusing thing is that our author is no more able than was Professor Tyndal before him* to make any direct attack upon Dr. Mozley's criticism of the principle of induction, for it is precisely Hume's criticism in a long passage which Dr. Mozley quotes, and Hume is the patriarch of English agnosticism, and there is no more obedient disciple to authorities of a certain class than your modern man of science. And so they both take the line of protesting against Dr. Mozley's language, as though when he called the principle of induction irrational he meant to reflect upon the reason of inductive philosophers. Professor Tyndal, after a series of arguments against miracles,† which, whatever may be their substantial value, are unfortunately clothed in the ordinary garb of fallacies, concludes with a lofty panegyric, not of

* *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1867.

† In those days Professor Tyndal had not convinced himself of the "logical feebleness of science." See "Scientific Scrape."

science so much as of scientific men, as though afraid lest Dr. Mozley's onslaught should discourage the world from breeding them. To do the author of "Supernatural Religion" justice, he is made of sterner stuff, and he thus fiercely turns upon his antagonist with an argumentum ad hominem (p. 58). "Dr. Mozley's argument, however, is fatal to his own cause. It is admitted that miracles 'or visible suspensions of the order of nature' (Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 6), cannot have any evidential force unless they be supernatural, and out of the natural sequence of ordinary phenomena. Now unless there be an actual order of nature, how can there be any exception to it? If our belief in it be not based upon any ground of reason,—as Dr. Mozley maintains, in order to assert that miracles or visible suspensions of that order are not contrary to reason,—how can it be asserted that miracles are supernatural? If we have no rational grounds for believing that the future will be like the past, what rational ground can we have for thinking that anything which happens is exceptional, and out of the common course of nature? . . . It is as irrational to wonder at the occurrence of what is new as to expect the recurrence of what is old." We must honestly confess we think this a crushing blow, nor do we see how Dr. Mozley can meet it without a considerable change of front. As Pyrrhus perished in the moment of victory by a tile flung by the hand of a woman, so falls Dr. Mozley before an adversary in every way his inferior in the midway of his triumph.

As if a lark should suddenly drop dead
While the blue air yet trembled with its song.

The retort was so obvious a one Professor Tyndal might have made it. What a godsend it would have been to his Falstaff's regiment of arguments. But whatever may be his regrets he is above envy, and is glad to set a quotation from his more fortunate brother in the forehead of his latest attack upon the religious aspirations of mankind. After all, properly considered, it is Dr. Mozley's own hand that has caused his fall. Like many an able man before him, he has sawn through the branch upon which he has been sitting, and it hardly needed a hostile shake to precipitate the catastrophe. We must now point out where we think Dr. Mozley has gone astray. Belief in the order of nature is defined by Dr. Mozley "as consisting in an expectation of likeness—that the unknown is like the known—that the utterly invisible future will be like the past." The order of nature is the invariable fulfilment of that expectation hitherto. If we are not mistaken, he confuses, under the term "order of nature," or the

inference of which it is the basis, two very distinct ideas. No doubt there is a natural instinct to believe in the recurrence or any sequence of sensations to which we have been accustomed. An infant supposes that the sensation of hunger will be followed by the sensation of deglutition, although the former has no real tendency to produce the latter. Such a belief may well be called irrational. It is, in fact, hardly more than mechanical. It is as native to the mind before it is roused into reflection as inertia is to a stone. As soon, however, as the child begins to reflect, it discovers that the satisfaction of its appetite is not the natural result of that appetite, but the consequence of an appeal—mute, perhaps, but none the less eloquent—to those who are able and desirous to satisfy it, but who may cease to be either the one or the other. In the same way, to take Dr. Mozley's instance, a man believes that the sun will go on *ad infinitum* rising and setting, just because it has been doing so hitherto ever since there have been men to record the fact; which simply means that a mechanical seesaw of going to bed and getting up is in possession until gainsaid or conditioned by reflection. Till quite lately we were confident in our supply of coal; but coal may fail, and the sun is only another kind of fuel, and may fail too. No doubt, if a miracle occurred, it would shock such an instinctive expectation, but we need not go beyond the circle of very natural occurrences for the shock. The question is, whether our belief in the order of nature finds its complete resolution in an expectation which is blind to any relation of cause and effect. If it is to be answered in the affirmative, then, the sum of our experience remaining the same, no revelation as to the nature of the cause ought to influence our expectation. But is this the case? If we had been every morning of our lives pulled out of bed by what we supposed was an automaton constructed for the purpose, should we expect the recurrence of its action as confidently after we had learned that it was no automaton but a free human agent. Now there is another view of the order of nature held commonly by Catholic theologians, and accepted, we venture to think, at least implicitly, by the great mass of mankind, according to which the law of nature may be defined "the law regulating the physical interaction of the material world." According to the teaching of the schoolmen, "the principle of being or essence is also in everything the principle of activity, and under this aspect the essence is called nature."* S. Thomas says, "This natural agent does not transplant its own form into another, but

* Klentgen, *Phil. Schol.*, iii. p. 424. Fr. transl.

reduces the subject which sustains the action from potentia to act." * Suarez remarks, that this physical influx "is proved in the first place by experience; for what do the senses tell us more plainly than this, that the sun enlightens, fire warms, water refreshes? But if our opponents should say that we experience these effects in the presence of these substances, but that they are not caused by them, they plainly destroy the whole argument of natural philosophy, for we cannot otherwise have experience of the efflux of effects from their causes, or infer causes from effects. And this experience the common sense of mankind and all language attests." † Our belief in the permanence of the laws of nature is no judgment of experience, urges Dr. Mozley, for experience is of the past not of the future; but if our experience of causation is not merely the experience of a sequence, but of the necessary operation of an essence, or a nature, seeing that the essences of things are unalterable, under given circumstances it must ever so operate. If we are challenged to say what more than the bare sequence we do in fact detect in the phenomena of causation, we can only answer doggedly that we are capable of perceiving, after more or less investigation, that one thing is the cause of another. We have experience of the highest kind of causation in our own persons—that of freely applying means to the attainment of an intelligently apprehended end. We feel that we are the cause of such application, besides being its invariable antecedent. We do not merely expect a certain sequence of phenomena, but we judge with a judgment we are totally unable to suspend, that such means are the cause, real although instrumental, of the accomplished end; and the combination of means to ends which we see around us in like manner we judge to be true causes. This judgment is as irresistible as our judgment that the external world is a reality, and that we perceive it; although, if we were challenged to assign the difference in any given case between the impressions made immediately upon the nerve-centres and thence referred to the circumference, to which no external realities correspond, and the impressions made by these supposed realities through the circumference, we can only remain mute. We cannot reject the law of causation, and so the reality and permanence of the laws of nature, any more than we can reject the reality of the external world, without losing our trust in our nature altogether.

From all this it follows that we do not with Dr. Mozley

* Sum. cont. Gent., lib. iii. cap. 69.

† Metaph., pars i. disp. 18, § 1.

reduce scientific investigators to the same level as witnesses to a law with ordinary observers. We allow that they are discoverers, not merely of invariable antecedents, but of a nature or natural law. Again, we could not admit, without feeling that we were committing most gratuitous suicide, the notion that the mental principle, whatever it may be, to which we owe our conception of a law of nature, was violated by a miracle.

We think that Dr. Mozley has been seduced by Hume into using a sceptical method against a doctrine that could never have been effectively used against him, and which was especially necessary to the position which he had assumed with regard to miracles. If miracles are to be a logical proof strictly required as Christian evidence, they must be something more than a surprise; if we did not really know the laws of nature, we should require a revelation to convince us of the miracle. It is noteworthy that Suarez, in defending physical causation, implies the converse of "Supernatural Religion's" argument. It must be fire's nature to burn, for "Wisdom xvi. it is set down for a miracle that the fire, forgetful of its power, did not consume the just men and their garments."* We admit then with "Supernatural Religion" (p. 60) that an order of nature is necessary to miracles, but we deny that the invariable action of a natural cause involves any contradiction of the possibility of a miracle. In the case of a miracle, the invariable antecedent or cause is still working after its kind; but another cause, which refuses to submit itself to any positive investigation, has entered the field, and, under cover, so to speak, of the invariable antecedent of one phenomenon, produces its opposite.

The author of "Supernatural Religion" insists (p. 63) that, in order to establish the bare possibility of miracles, we require a God other than the God of which our reason is the warranty. He will have it that a personal God, a God with a free will, who may interfere here and there as he lists, is altogether an outcome of revelation; and he tries hard to convict Dr. Mozley of an admission which would land him in a vicious circle. For our part we think that Dr. Mozley's line is here intelligible and consistent enough.† He says that, looking at the matter historically, reason had not made out a personal God, "not from any want of cogency in the reasons, but from the amazing nature of the conclusion, that it is so

* *Metaph.*, l. c.

† *Lect. IV.*, "Belief in a God."

unparalleled, transcendent, and inconceivable* a truth to believe." But when once the idea of a personal God is presented to us by revelation, reason recognizes it as the one adequate expression of the synthesis of its manifold conclusions and experiences. Reason had fragmentary conceptions of the divine attributes drawn from experience of the spiritual and material world. We see that the Creator must be personal and free willing, for how could He bestow a perfection which He did not possess? And in conscience we "perceive the voice or the echoes of the voice of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign."† Again, the God of revelation at once appropriates those vast ideas, from which the venturesome scholastic used to construct proofs, but which the timid modern mind shrinks from handling boldly, whilst unable wholly to escape: first cause, necessary being, absolute perfection—a royal and gigantic wardrobe, so to speak, identifying the God of revelation with the God of reason. Reason has data, has colours, for the conception of a God at once absolute and personal, antecedently to revelation; but the contrasts are so vivid and the canvas so vast, that man, fallen as he is, loses heart, and eye and hand fail him. Revelation has not only taught him much about God that he could not otherwise know, but it has fortified him and enabled him to recognize confidently and grasp as a whole what his reason was already telling him, but he had not heart to take in. Revelation was to him as the honeycomb which fainting Jonathan ate and found his eyes lightened. The eyes saw although they were helped to see, and reason need not cease to be reason because assisted by faith.

Thus far (p. 78) our author has directed his attack against the possibility of miracles. The question being whether the existence of an order of nature and of a God who is its author, precludes ipso facto such interference as we suppose a miracle to be. We may fairly assume that even in the opinion of the author of "Supernatural Religion" it does not, for he proceeds to discuss what would be quite a superfluous question supposing the impossibility proved, viz., the credibility of miracles, that is to say, the attitude which in reason the human mind ought to take up in regard to the evidence for a miracle. In this portion of his work he travels, as we think, very clumsily, over very old ground—Hume's argument and Mill's view of that argument. But it is worth examining

* In Dr. Mozley's phraseology this means "unimaginable."

† Newman, "Grammar of Assent," p. 108.

as a flagrant instance of the bad criticism into which a craving for the patronage of authority may seduce a disciple of reason. We cannot make out our charge unless we take the whole matter in detail.

To begin at the beginning is to begin with Tillotson, upon whose argument against transubstantiation Hume professedly modelled his own against miracles. King William's archbishop had ventured to insist that we cannot accept what he considers second-hand sense against first-hand sense—what the apostles said they saw and heard against what we see; therefore, transubstantiation, even granted for argument's sake that it be apostolic, could not reasonably be accepted. If an answer be needed the following may suffice. When we look on green fields and flowing streams we rightly follow our senses to the extent of believing that the grass and water are really there. But suppose we are told, on the authority of unexceptionable witnesses, that a cunning artist whom we know possesses the power, will, under certain circumstances of time and place produce a mirage, by which water and grass which are not there shall be represented, could our then acquiescence in authority be rightly stigmatized as a submission of first-hand sense to second-hand sense; on the contrary, would it not be the righteous submission of a conclusion of sense the probability of which in the particular case had been evacuated to a conclusion of reason? Hume, however, was charmed with Tillotson's argument—he saw all its capabilities. "Nothing," he says, "is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the account of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane." *

Hume thought to do for miracles what he thought, or pretended to think, Tillotson had done for transubstantiation. As Tillotson had urged that the latter doctrine could not be maintained except by acting in the teeth of a preponderance of sense-evidence, so, Hume urges, we cannot believe a miracle without committing the absurdity of choosing the least probable of two alternatives, nay, of choosing the one

* Sect. x. on Miracles.

which is contradicted by a uniform experience amounting to a "*full and direct proof*" of the contrary. He maintains that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, "unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish." In a word, mistakes and lies are of daily experience, whilst a miracle is entirely beyond our experience ; therefore, a miracle must never be accepted on any such evidence as we have experience of.

Mr. Mill's comment upon Hume is as follows :—

Hume's celebrated principle, that nothing is credible which is contradictory to experience, or at variance with the laws of nature, is merely this very plain and harmless proposition, that whatever is contradictory to a complete induction is incredible. That such a maxim as this should either be accounted a dangerous heresy, or mistaken for a great and recondite truth, speaks ill for the state of philosophical speculation on such subjects.

Mr. Mill's example of a complete induction which justifies our rejecting any fact at variance with it, is a case of causation in which there has been an "*experimentum crucis*," in which one out of many antecedents has been established as the invariable antecedent or cause by a gradual elimination of alternatives. He continues :—

In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that it happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle the assertion is the exact opposite of this ; it is that the effect was defeated not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature, and in particular of a being whose will being assumed to have endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects may well be supposed able to counteract them. All therefore which Hume has made out, and this he must be considered to have made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect state of our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it always possible that some of the physical antecedents may have been hidden from us) no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power ; or who believed himself to have *full proof* that the character of the being whom he recognizes is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question.*

The dispute between the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" and his orthodox opponents is, whether Mill has substantially

* "*Logic*," vol. ii. chap. xxv.

confirmed or substantially evacuated Hume's argument against miracles. The question can only be settled by comparing the points which Mill conceives Hume to have established and failed to establish with the scope which Hume proposed to himself, and to which he thought he had attained.

We suppose no one will dispute that when Hume spoke of his argument as a "decisive" argument, "of a like nature with Tillotson's against all sorts of superstitious delusion," he undertook to show in a single argument the intrinsic absurdity of what may be called supernatural religion. Therefore, when Mill laughs at those who regard the principle underlying Hume's argument either as "a dangerous heresy," or as "a great and recondite truth," he distinctly implies that Hume mistook his argument for something which it was not, for Hume certainly regarded it as both great and dangerous (*vide sup.*). Our author denies that the dangerousness which Mill pooh-poohs is dangerous to miracles. But if it is not, then either Mill's words are meaningless, or he must be understood to taunt both the assailants and the defenders of religion for their folly in thinking it important enough to attack or to defend, a notion no one who has the slightest acquaintance with Mr. Mill's writings could entertain for a moment. Mr. Mill points out that, although a complete induction, or, to use Hume's expression—a "uniform experience," when properly tested, is conclusive against any pretended instance to the contrary, a miracle is no such instance, inasmuch as in a miracle the presence of a fresh cause is predicated, upon the credibility of whose existence the question of the credibility of miracles must depend. What is this but saying that in his (Mr. Mill's) opinion Hume's "short and decisive method" is a failure, his "pugio infidelitatis" a dagger of lath, and quietly referring him back to the ancient battle-ground of the controversy "*de Deo*," to make his cause good against adversaries whom it was not the fashion in Hume's day to assume had been worsted. When Mr. Mill tells us what he thinks Hume has really proved in the matter, it comes to this—that miracles are quite unfit to prove what no intelligent advocate of miracles ever thought they could prove—viz., the existence of God. The author of "*Supernatural Religion*" (p. 79) insists that so far from shattering to pieces the logical consistency of Hume's argument, Mr. Mill substantially confirms it (p. 87). "The assumption of a personal Deity working miracles is, in fact, excluded by Hume's argument, and although Mr. Mill apparently overlooks the fact, Hume has not only anticipated, but refuted the reasoning that is based upon it." The refutation is as follows:—

Though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be in this case almighty, it does not upon that become a whit more probable ; since it is impossible to know the attributes or actions of such a being otherwise than by the experiences which we have of his productions in the usual course of Nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered."

Now upon this we observe that Hume must mean by the uniform experience which we are never to gainsay, either our own personal experience or the experience of the race which has become common property and a type of what may be expected. If the former is meant, then his argument lies open to the *reductio ad absurdum* of writers like Dr. Whately* and Dr. Murray,† and it may be shown that we are thereby precluded from believing anything of which we have no experience. If the latter be meant, we do not see how, if the ordinary phenomena of nature form the rule, cases of preternatural interposition do not form the exception in the experience of mankind. It is easy to point to a mass of supernatural occurrences irreducible to law which we cannot ignore as an integral part of human testimony : it is not as though a solitary miracle was on its trial. We appeal then to the vast stream of the preternatural, flowing, through all times and countries—in which our author looks so confidently to see Christian miracles drowned and swept away—to prove that miracles at least do not contradict universal experience. If Hume's distinction between "not conformable" and "contrary" to experience be insisted on, we would ask whether the phrase "contrary to experience" has any distinctive meaning except so far as it begs the question. What is contrary to a truth is untrue : you prejudice miracles by calling them contrary to experience. We have no wish to put miracles upon the same footing with ordinary events as to evidential requirements, but we cannot admit that the difference is more than one of degree. In Hume's own example, the Indian prince is allowed to believe in ice upon "very strong testimony," as not contrary, though not conformable to experience. But in what sense would a miracle be more contrary ? One might safely predicate that in any country hitherto discovered under similar physical con-

* "Historic Doubts."

† "Miracles." Irish Miscellany.

ditions, of the two the miracle would be the less strange. For see how completely the phenomenon of ice contradicts the analogy of the Indian's experience. Not only do the degrees of cold produce no thickening or hardening effect in the water, but, on the contrary, it is heat—cold's opposite—which covers the liquid mud of the morass with a skin, and makes it solid for his foot. With good reason then the Indian rejects the chance comers' marvellous tale; but the men dwell with him, and he comes to know them for what they are—men of integrity and sagacity, sound minds in sound bodies, nay, intensify these qualities to the highest degree of wisdom and sanctity, and the Indian will implicitly believe them, and most reasonably, whether they tell him that ice is the natural result of a certain degree of frost, or, again, that under suns as sultry as his own, God so willing, for high moral ends, the liquid sea has afforded a solid pathway to the foot of man. Hume's argument is all very well as an abstract formula; thus, "the miracle which somebody says he saw" may be fairly rejected if nothing more be known either of the witness or the miracle, and for the very reason that Hume gives—viz., that miracles are none or few, and lies many; but once take into consideration the character of the miracle and of the witness, and the "short and decisive method" falls to pieces.

Again, Hume is most unjust in reducing our belief in testimony to mere experience. We know our own nature, and through it attain to a knowledge of the nature of others; and we are aware that human nature simply cannot act without motives, and that in the long run the good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits. Thus we are sure that men such as the apostles could not combine to deceive us, and may safely accept Hume's challenge, and assert that the falsehood of such testimony either on the ground of mistake or deceit would be "more miraculous" than e.g. our Lord's resurrection, which is not impossible (*astante Deo*), nor, except when isolated from its context, improbable.

As to Hume's attempt to limit God's possibilities to his action according to the laws of nature, we reply that, granting for the moment that our experience has been so limited, yet, according to Hume's own distinction, what God can do for aught we know, but has not yet done, is only a phenomenon "not conformable" to our experience, but by no means "contrary" to it. It is not then a case in which we can afford to ignore "very strong testimony." Before we can assert a miracle, we must prove that there is God; but, given a God, the burden of proof is obviously shifted, as Mr. Mill implies in a passage we have already quoted. The *theist*, he

says, must have "*full proof*" that God's character is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question, in order to be justified in ignoring the evidence for a miracle. By what *experimentum crucis* has it been shown that God's ordinary non-interference with the chain of natural sequences is the result of a necessity of his nature so strong as not merely to enforce the rule but to bar the exception? On the other hand, the character and history of the first witnesses for Christianity do really eliminate from the category of tenable hypotheses to account for their testimony, all but one, viz., its substantial truth. There can be no doubt that Mr. Mill regarded Hume as having failed in his attempt to show that every one, theist or not, is justified in forming "a general intention never to lend any attention to the testimony to a miracle." Mr. Mill's words, as quoted by Mr. Fowler in his pamphlet, "*Mozley and Tyndal*," show this most clearly:—"My view of the general question is briefly this: that a miracle, considered merely as an extraordinary fact, is as susceptible of proof as other extraordinary facts. That as a miracle it cannot, in the strict sense of the word, be proved, because there never can be conclusive proof of its miraculous nature; but that to anyone who believes in an intelligent Creator and Ruler of the universe the moral probability that a given extraordinary event (supposed to be fully proved) is a miracle, may greatly outweigh the probability of its being the result of some unknown natural cause."

We must, however, confess, that in "*Theism*," the last of the three essays published after his death, Mr. Mill is both more complimentary to Hume and more hostile to miracles than in any of his earlier writings. Still we think he has not substantially reversed his former verdict. The case is far stronger against miracles now, he thinks, than it was in Hume's day, but even still, to his mind, it falls far short of what Hume believed his argument to be.

But, after all, did Mr. Mill understand Hume? We agree with Dr. Mozley that he did not.* But we do not think it matters whether he understood him or not; his object was to discount what truth there might lie at the bottom of what went by the name of Hume's principle. It was hardly possible that Mr. Mill should have enough sympathy to understand the narrow, lazy subjectivity of a mind like Hume's, a mind only positive in its hatred of what he called the "*impertinent solicitations*" of religion. Hume was essentially a sceptic, one who rests in doubt without any instinct to push beyond

* Lect. II. note 5.

it ; whereas Mr. Mill has always been haunted with the desire to substitute some new intellectual mansion for the old one he has destroyed. He could feel no attraction for what H. More calls "that lazy and melancholic saying" which breathes the very spirit of Hume's argument, and might serve as the sceptic's epitaph upon religion. "*Orbis magnus est et ævum longum, et error ac timor multum in hominibus possunt.*" *

One advantage we may certainly gain from reading Hume's famous essay : we are likely to bear more patiently even with such provoking writers as the author of "*Supernatural Religion.*" Hume stands, we think, upon a pedestal apart as the one man who has ventured to call the mighty mother a harlot, as he rebukes her for her "impertinent solicitations," and strikes her hand roughly from his sleeve. His contempt for religion equals his hatred, and, in spite of his keen polished style his polemic is often provokingly slipshod. What would be thought of a controversialist in these earnest days who, in a grave disquisition upon miracles, should assume that "absurd" and "miraculous" are synonymous, or should use the latter as a colloquialism ? And then the matchless cynicism of his affectation of zeal for religion, when he has left it, as he supposes, not a leg to stand upon :—"Our most holy religion is founded on *faith* not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure."

We are not indisposed to believe that Hume's argument will enjoy the immortality he prognosticated for it. It "will be useful (ad Gehennam) as long as the world endures," for it formularizes with point and vivacity the doubt and disinclination with which the great mass of mankind regard the next world. Whilst fairly reckoned it belongs to the number of those sceptical arguments of which Hume himself so finely says "that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism." †

In truth, the terms "impossible," "incredible," as applied to miracles, are simply scholastic expressions for the disgust which a scientific man, quâ scientific man, not unnaturally feels at the idea of the intrusion of an agent of indefinite power, towards the discounting and appreciation of which, though given an eternity of scientific progression, he can never hope to make the slightest approach. If the scientific man, instead of using technical words which he does not

* "The Immortality of the Soul," p. 140.

† Note N.

understand, would condescend to analyze his quarrel with miracles, he would find that when fairly stated it only amounted to the innocent truism, "a miracle is utterly unscientific," i.e. it cannot be reduced to a scientific formula, and its entertainment as an hypothesis has, in certain directions at certain times interfered with scientific progress, e.g. with medical science, in regard to a certain class of diseases too hastily ascribed to the devil. No doubt there is a neutral ground upon which theology and science must fight it out as to particular facts. Let the physicist deny the miracle as long as he can explain the phenomenon upon natural grounds. If truth gains neither theology nor science can be really losers. What we protest against is that the general question of the admissibility of miracles into court should be decided upon what may be called the scientific instinct, i.e. the instinctive hostility with which scientific men, like every other class or profession, feel towards an uncongenial intruder. The exclusion of miracles gratifies a sentiment and secures an advantage, the sentiment and the advantage being what we have described. The physicist is quite at liberty to advocate the claims both of the one and the other, but the terms "impossible" and "incredible" are preoccupied, and the physicist has no more right to divert them to his own purpose than the theologian to call an acid an alkali, or potash potassium. Fox-hunting is a noble sport, but it does not necessarily follow that to shoot a fox is a breach of the moral law: the practice of never giving alms is a safeguard against the chance of bestowing an alms unworthily, it is what some people come to who have been over-credulous, but it marks no progress in the science of life, is no result of the wisdom of experience, but simply the recoil of one who has burned his fingers. The physicist's aversion to miracles has as much of reason in it and no more.

In chapter iv., "The Age of Miracles," our author urges against the credibility of Christian miracles the superstitious character of the Jews and the early Christians. Now, we admit that the Jews, as a nation, were extremely addicted to superstition, under the influence of which they were often hurried into acts of extravagant fanaticism. We have instances of this in plenty both in sacred and profane history. The phenomena of Jewish superstition in the last era of Jewish history are by no means unfamiliar to us. We know its intensely carnal character, the ease with which it lent itself to political agitation, as in the case of the Egyptian impostor, who seduced and led out thirty thousand men to perish in the wilderness, men whom superstition had fevered and made

fanatics of, who grasped at impossibilities and achieved nothing, a raftload of wretched creatures, tossed hither and thither, buoyed up by false hopes, until the sea swallowed them. On the other hand, issuing out of the very corruption of superstition, we have a band of men, Jews indeed by birth, but presenting in many respects a marked contrast to the body of their countrymen. They are enthusiasts indeed but not fanatics. They are pierced with a sense of the incomparable value of spiritual things, yet, like good stewards, they make a prudent use of things temporal. They are tenderly compassionate for the woes of others, yet calm-eyed and hopeful amid the ruin of their national prosperity. Whilst acknowledging that here they have no abiding city, they lay the basis of a commonwealth which is to outlast the most vigorous of secular institutions, men who, carrying their lives in their hands in order to propagate their cause, yet never throw them away, but wear them out quietly to their last strand; every action of their lives showed that they were men whose judgment, whose sense of relative value was alive. That judgment had been convinced that their Master was what he professed to be, and convinced especially by the fact of His miraculous resurrection and ascension. Superstitious the early Christians were if it be superstitious to believe that God was very nigh to each one of them, that all things were in His hand. If to believe miracles is to be superstitious, no doubt the Apostles, who witnessed and reported our Lord's miracles, were superstitious. This is a charge none who report miracles can escape. In truth, the Jewish superstitions which our author uses against the trustworthiness of the first Christians, do but serve as a foil by which the single-minded sobriety of the authors of the New Testament is set off and established. They might have been Jewish fanatics stung into abortive exploits by the gadfly of superstition, what they had seen and handled of the word of life made them Christians, at once zealous and sober, keen and grave, the very types of trustworthiness.

In the last two chapters of Part I. the author of "Supernatural Religion" endeavours to show that there is nothing in the Gospel miracles, either as regards their character or the evidence upon which they rest, to prevent them from falling into what he calls "the permanent stream of miraculous pretension" pagan, rabbinical, ecclesiastical (ancient and modern). Accept (he exclaims), the common record of preternaturalism, and the miraculous evidences are swamped in a flood of kindred and conflicting absurdities; reject, with the common sense of the day, preternaturalism unattached or

unorthodox, and you must perforce give up Christian supernaturalism also. "Where is the god of Emath and of Arphad? where is the god of Sepharvaim, of Ava and of Arva? have they delivered Samaria out of my hand? Who are they among all the gods of the nations, that have delivered their country out of my hand?" We will try and discount such argument as we can discover. Christianity is committed to demoniacal possession and to witchcraft, both of which are absurd; that Christianity is committed at least to the former we grant, and Dean Milman's explanation of our Lord's language and action in the matter as a condescension to the Pharisees we had rather not characterize, but we look in vain from our author for some proof of its absurdity, some reasonable attempt to explain the records of possession otherwise. As to the so-called Pagan miracles, we have never met with any evidence for them deserving the name, although we see no difficulty in the common patristic view that God sometimes wrought miracles among the Gentiles as a testimony to virtue, or in vindication of the natural law.

It is curious to observe how closely, in this part of his polemic, our author follows the argument of Celsus, as quoted by Origen—the ancient writer, as was natural, advancing a little more confidently the superstitious horn; the modern, the sceptical horn of the same dilemma. "O light and truth," exclaims Celsus, "the Lord himself declared expressly, with his own voice, as your Scriptures testify, that others will come to you working like wonders, wicked magicians, and he names Satan as the contriver of these. And so he does not deny that there is nothing divine in them, and that they are the work of evil men. Truth compelling him, he has discovered at once his own art, and reproved the arts of others. Is it not atrocious, on the score of the same deeds, that one should be esteemed a god, the others magicians?"* And again (p. 94), after urging the return of Orpheus and Hercules from hell as parallels to our Lord's resurrection, "unless, indeed, ye deem *ecotic* relations inventions, and think ye have gotten a fine and credible catastrophe to your fable in the expiring cry upon the cross, the earthquake, and the darkness."

Origen, in his answer, points out that there is no evidence producible for these Pagan resurrections, but he nowhere assumes the unreality of preternatural events of a minor character. What he insists upon is, that Celsus, presuming upon a superficial resemblance, mixes up matters which, taken in the concrete, are quite distinct. "Wolves are not dogs, nor

* Origen cont. Cels., lib. ii. p. 89, ed. Spencer.

pigeons doves." He establishes the distinction of our Lord's miracles from other marvels by refusing to consider them merely under the aspect of their unnaturalness, dwelling rather (1) upon their connection as the fulfilment of a scheme of prophecy; (2) upon their beneficent and moral character; (3) upon their success as evidence. This line of controversy is the one ordinarily taken by the Fathers, as Dr. Mozley acknowledges (lect. 1, note 3). Whilst recognizing, as we do, the many excellences of his volume, we cannot but feel that Christian evidences are safer in their hands than in his. We think that his weak point all along has been, that in his anxiety to bring out the full stringency of the evidential claims of the miracle as such, he has allowed Christian miracles to stand stripped of their actual surroundings and so at an abnormal disadvantage. We grant him, willingly, that the argument from miracles has gained in "compactness" in his hands, and, indeed, in efficaciousness, so long as it is addressed to persons who are not "incommoded" either by a belief in diablerie, or by any knowledge of the character of its evidence; but we think it has not gained, but lost, in respect of real strength and honesty.

Origen not only has no fear of the "stream of preternatural pretension," but he appeals to it boldly. "Are demons to work miracles, and that divine and blessed nature to work none? Has human life sustained the worse, and found no place for the better? The same might be applied to things in general, wheresoever the inferior thing presents some likeness of the better, there to balance it is the better. And so from the works that are done by magicians we ought to gather that other marvels are wrought by the Divine power in the life of man. We must either deny both, or admitting the one, especially if it be the inferior, we must admit the superior. If a man should allow the marvels of magic, and not allow those of divine power, he would seem to be like a man who, admitting the existence of sophistical and probable reasoning, should deny the existence amongst mankind of other true and certain reasonings very different from sophisms." Although this argumentum ad hominem can hardly be applied to the author of "Supernatural Religion," still we can appeal against him to the "permanent stream of miraculous pretension," as, at least, a most eloquent and unbroken protest on the part of human nature against the impossibility (or incredibility) of miracles.

Except as regards non-naturalness—and even in this respect miracles like the resurrection stand apart—Christian miracles have simply no rivals. When our author urges that God

would never have chosen as his seal, as the authentication of his religion, one that was in such common use as the miracle, we answer that the bare miracle—i.e., the contravention of natural law—was never so chosen by Almighty God, but the miracle, united with a moral context, rendering it unique. After all, it is well to remember that the office of miracles is not to dispense with faith. They are not meant to render the truths of revelation “*evidenter vera*,” but at most “*evidenter credibilia*”—i.e., to bring home the duty of believing something which it is always possible to disbelieve, like the tenderest parent’s love, or the truest wife’s honour. There is only one miracle which is really meant to do what our author thinks that Christian miracles fail of their office in not doing, which will not merely elicit trust, but extort assent, and startle faith into sight, and that is the coming of the Son of Man in the clouds of heaven.

As regards ecclesiastical miracles, ancient and modern, we cannot but think that Dr. Mozley has taken up an indefensible position. As the author of “*Supernatural Religion*” points out, many of these miracles are supported by the strongest and most explicit testimony. Indeed, as we obviously cannot assume the inspiration of the Scripture narrative in the present controversy, we have no hesitation in saying that many ecclesiastical miracles rest upon far more complete and immediate testimony than several of those narrated in the Gospels. The argument from miracles would be far more effective in Dr. Mozley’s hands if he were not “incommoded” by the necessity, or at least the propriety, of denying the continuance of miracles after apostolic times, be the evidence for them what it may. To do Dr. Mozley justice, however, he loves Christianity more than he dislikes Rome, and sooner than abandon the miracles of Christ and his Apostles, he will even admit into court those of the Church. We hope to respond to this challenge at some future time, in an article upon the theory and evidence of Church miracles, especially those of more recent times. Of course, the author of “*Supernatural Religion*” has no more respect for Church miracles than he has for the miracles of Paganism; but he is glad to hamper Dr. Mozley with galling issues, and, if possible, to raise against Scripture miracles the spirit of anti-sacerdotalism, and the cry of no-Popery. We think he bids fair to succeed.

Our author’s theory is, that a belief in miracles is simply the result of superstitious excitement engendered by ignorance of the laws of nature; and in confirmation he points to the decrease in miraculous statistics since the middle ages, during which period much progress has been indubitably

made in the knowledge of the laws of nature. Although, "even at the present day a stray miracle is from time to time reported in outlying districts, where the ignorance and superstition which formerly produced so abundant a growth of them are not yet entirely dispelled." We fully admit that modern civilization is exceedingly hostile to the miracle, which retires before it into "outlying districts," very much as the large game of North America fall back before the more obtrusive signs of progress, its hum and rattle; nay, in its train some grotesque shadows depart also, which, for their own sake, need not be regretted. Take any secluded hamlet in the Tyrol or in Italy which has rejoiced from time immemorial in its miraculous Madonna, and has chronicled year by year cures and blessings of one sort or another which only the finger of God could have wrought, and let us—bold pioneers of progress as we are—pour along converging lines of iron road streams of modern civilization from its most favoured reservoirs, and we shall find, to our satisfaction or otherwise, as surely as the soap-factories and paper-mills stain the river and destroy the fish, that as the beer-shops and casinos multiply, and the murmur of the village swells into the roar and bustle of the town, there is a dearth of worshippers at the shrine, and miracles wax faint and few. We admit the fact—the only question is its cause. The cause we should ourselves assign is twofold—moral degeneration and mental distraction. That the pure of heart see God and find favour in his sight is a world-wide sentiment, of which the lowest form of worship contains some kind of acknowledgment, if it be only in the selection of the purest victims for its sacrifices; and the change which, after a few months of the civilizing process we have described, forces itself at once upon the notice of visitors who are able to compare the past condition of things with the present. The men used to be sober and orderly, at least one never saw them otherwise; and the women were madonna-like in their modesty of voice and demeanour. But now all this has disappeared. The women's manner has acquired a dash of boldness, if not coarseness, which makes them more at home with their civilized friends, who, the chances are, find them much improved, for at least they have ceased to be a sermon and a reproof. As evening draws on signs of civilization become more obtrusive, and drunken workmen stagger home in quite a natural manner, whilst the young folk of either sex squeal and scamper in the streets, which have lost in propriety if they have gained in light. But mental distraction is calculated to operate as powerfully and as inevitably. By mental distraction the occupation of

a man's mind by a multitude of objects, the result of the various business speculations opening out on all sides in the rising community. Under this influence men tend to become too anxious and too impatient to think of God and attend to the sacraments. It is not merely that the room of religion is thus as it were preoccupied ; to the husbandman and shepherd God is indeed a present God, the traditional lord of the springtide and the harvest, upon whose assistance he instinctively relies ; whereas, in this new world into which he has been suddenly launched, where everyone is struggling with and overreaching the other, God seems not to be, but only man. Thus miracles fail, because they are not given where they are not asked for, and this not merely because God has chosen to make prayer a condition for receiving such benefits, but also, we doubt not, because the whole scheme of the relations between the spiritual and material worlds requires that there should be some correspondence on the part of the recipient of the miracle with the worker or instrument of it. In the miracle at the Beautiful Gate did not the apostles say to the cripple, " Look on us," as the preliminary and condition of his cure ?

But is not education, it may be urged, at least a concurrent cause in the decrease in miracles ? We think not, except so far as it falls under the head of degeneration or distraction. Its share in the work of distraction is hardly appreciable, and, except in distinctly irreligious hands, it has no tendency to help on the cause of moral degeneration. Again, although in the wake of the factories and the casinos model schools do, in fact, spring up, yet, on the whole, the work is done before these come into operation.

It may plausibly be objected against what we have said as to the effect of moral degeneration upon miracles, that certain large Italian towns—Naples, for example—are excessively and openly licentious, and yet, nevertheless, are a habitat of the miracle. We reply, that wherever the Catholic religion has not ceased to be a reality, there, even in the worst places, are many pure souls living their own life untouched by the surrounding corruptions, and that in large towns this is to a much greater degree possible than in little simple places which have so much of their life in common. Of course, it is only in the sort of little place we have supposed that such a sudden influx of civilization could occur, and an opportunity be given of studying its phenomena. But even precluding from any such violent process, we cannot help thinking that civilization of the English type has a peculiar power of wearing down individual aspiration after spiritual things and reducing all to one

dead level of worldliness. It is our boast that each man, as we say, may live his own life; but, after all, there is something in the great wash of public opinion pervading with its almost divine omnipresence mansion and cottage, shop and cloister, which does more to assimilate us than if we all chattered every day of our lives in the same market-place, and had the cut of our garments regulated by the town council. Surely it is an especially English misery, real and not merely sentimental, which Wordsworth bewails with such intensity in his sonnet on the "Loss of Spiritual Life":—

The world is too much with us ; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers :
Little we see in nature that is ours ;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon !
This sea that bares her bosom to the moon,
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are upgathered now like sleeping flowers ;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune ;
It moves us not.—Great God ! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn ;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn,
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn.

If we were asked for the most perfect product of modern civilization, so far as the elimination of all belief in the supernatural goes, we should point not to Professor Tyndal but to the rough of our great manufacturing towns. He not unfrequently can read and write and cipher, but as to any knowledge of the laws of nature, as to the most elemental knowledge of the laws which regulate the machinery amongst which he has lived and worked,—when he has chosen to work,—all his life, he knows nothing. Compel him to enter a competitive examination with a Roman journeyman before a board of London University in any branch of elemental science or literature, he would be hopelessly floored. There would, however, be one point on which he would receive full marks, his competitor none; he would have shown that he had rendered his "mental soil" incapable of producing "the weed of superstition" which Professor Tyndal regards as one of the crowning results of science.* Education has left the Roman in possession of his belief in miracles, something very like an inverse process has banished it from the soul of the

* "Scientific Scraps."

Liverpool rough. Mr. Mansel thus argues with great truth and keenness that the progress of science makes rather for miracles than against them. "The fact of a work being done by human agency, places it as regards the future progress of science, in a totally different class from mere physical phenomena. The appearance of a comet, or the fall of an aerolite, may be reduced by the advance of science from a supposed supernatural to a natural occurrence, and this reduction furnishes a reasonable presumption that other phenomena of a like character will in time meet with a like explanation. But the reverse is the case with respect to those phenomena which are narrated as having been produced by *personal agency*. In proportion as the science of to-day surpasses that of former generations, so is the improbability that any man could have done in past times, by natural means, works which no skill of the present day is able to imitate. The two classes of phenomena rest in fact upon exactly opposite foundations. In order that natural occurrences, taking place without human agency, may wear the appearance of prodigies, it is necessary that the cause and manner of their production should be *unknown*; and every advance of science, from the unknown to the known, tends to lessen the number of such prodigies by referring them to natural causes, and *increases* the probability of a similar explanation of the remainder. But, on the other hand, in order that a man may perform marvellous acts by natural means, it is necessary that the cause and manner of their production should be *known* by the performer; and in this case every fresh advance of science from the unknown to the known diminishes the probability that what is unknown now could have been known in a former age. The effect, therefore, of scientific progress, as regards the scriptural miracles" (and we may add, a vast number of ecclesiastical miracles as well) "is gradually to eliminate the hypothesis which refers them to unknown natural causes." ("Aids to Faith," p. 14.)*

And now, having concluded the task undertaken in this article, and examined in detail the first part of "Supernatural Religion," we would say a word about the general character of our author's treatment of his subject. He comes before us in his exceedingly well-written introduction, as one keenly alive to the painful task which he has undertaken, impelled by no hostile feeling towards religion, but by a twofold energy, an ardent love of truth for its own sake, and an intense tremulous compassion for the sufferings and dangers of the victims of

* Ap. Mozley, notes, p. 119.

doubt. There is something in this announcement calculated to reassure many an anxious mind ; to inspire confidence that he will be treated with absolute fairness, nay, with tenderness, so far as consistent with fairness. It was owing to this almost pastoral sobriety of tone, no doubt, that some persons absurdly imagined that "*Supernatural Religion*" was written by a well-known Anglican bishop. The confiding sheep come up expecting, at worst, to be relieved of their fleeces—a somewhat troublesome operation, but in the main a wholesome one,—and they find that their shepherd, for the nonce, has united in his person the office of butcher and currier ; or, to change the simile, we are invited to sustain a delicate surgical operation, and are met with a point-blank discharge, from a big gun, of chain shot, old iron, stones, and every unpleasant thing that could be rammed into it. There is nowhere the slightest attempt to take into account, as, for instance, Mr. Mill has done, what may appear reasonable in the orthodox case. Orthodox arguments are unfairly isolated from their natural context, whilst sceptical arguments, which cannot keep their feet, fight upon their stumps, or, at least, cumber the ground. Every casual difference amongst the defenders of orthodoxy is brought out into high relief, and made capital of to the utmost. Thus it is that the logic, even where not formally faulty, as is often the case, is by no means of a high order. His favourite form of treating an argument with which he thinks he can afford to take a liberty, is to jerk it on to the stage,—not positively in a grotesque position, for there is nothing farcical in "*Supernatural Religion*"—but with just that touch of awkwardness which, before an uncritical audience, will dispense with the task of serious refutation. The style is good, and the author is master of the art so characteristic of much of the best writing of the present day of presenting a view or argument with almost schoolboy bluffness, in language which is crisp without being rough, and in periods which, studiously inartificial, are not without their careful music.

In spite of the statement in the preface that "the present work is the result of many years of earnest and patient investigation," we cannot persuade ourselves that the author is not young,—on the young side of thirty. We have two grounds for the opinion—the first is, that being merciless and unfair, he thinks himself eminently fair ; the second, that he thinks the heart has nothing to do with the reason, that susceptibility to the appeal which Christian evidences make to the heart must always be a weakness and a delusion. This is a young man's purism, which generally ceases after the first fierce exercise of his dialectic. There is something essentially young

in the way in which he takes Dr. Mozley to task for a momentary lapse here and there into the language of religious sentiment. He forgets that we have been born at the knees of the great Christian tradition which is something more than an argument reducible at once to mode and figure, for it is a history—the history of a growth of influences social and moral, as well as intellectual; influences to which the heart responds as well as the head. He has persuaded himself that in passing over to the party of unbelief, he has taken up the only position consistent with a love of truth; and yet, when he would persuade us to follow his example, he produces arguments which, even upon the narrow ground of his own choosing, are not conclusive, and in the documentary part of his work has used his considerable powers of research, not to get up both sides of the question, nor even to make himself ordinarily acquainted with the subject matter of criticism—the writings of the Fathers themselves—but simply to amass hostile testimony from the mines of German and Dutch rationalism. The mystery is how anyone, whether young or old, of our author's abilities, could find heart and patience to wade through such a mass of authorities, with such an infinitesimal exercise of independent criticism. He is certainly not one whom the critical *ἵθως* like a runaway horse, could have carried into the enemies' ranks. If the Agnostics ever held revivalist meetings after the fashion of Messrs. Sankey and Moody, one could have imagined that our author, in the agony of conversion, might possibly have undertaken the dreadful task, and afterwards felt bound to carry it out.

ART. II.—FAIR PLAY IN LITERATURE—WILLIAM AND ROBERT CHAMBERS.

1. *Chambers's Encyclopædia*. A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge for the People; illustrated with Maps and Wood Engravings. Revised edition, 10 vols. royal 8vo. W. & R. Chambers, London and Edinburgh, 1874.
2. *Cyclopædia of English Literature*, a History Critical and Biographical of British Authors from the earliest to the present time. Edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS. 2 vols. W. & R. Chambers, London and Edinburgh.
3. *The Book of Days*, a Miscellany of Popular Antiquities in connection with the Calendar. Edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS. 2 vols. W. & R. Chambers, London and Edinburgh.

AMID the petulant outburst of fanaticism which towards the end of last year seemed to be calling back into momentary life all those antiquated misrepresentations of Catholic belief and practice which were once an heir-loom in English literature, it was pleasant to find any evidence that the spirit of fair play had not yet died out among our countrymen. A love of justice which was proof against that fiery trial appeared to be deserving of all honour. We welcomed, therefore, with no ordinary satisfaction, as specially seasonable at such a time, the appearance of a new edition of a publication which had already enjoyed a very remarkable popularity, and the tone of which contrasted most honourably with the narrow bigotry to which we allude—the *Encyclopædia* of the Messrs. Chambers. And now after the strange revulsion of liberal feeling which thus suddenly startled our age, we feel it a duty to tender to the conductors of this able and learned publication our grateful acknowledgment of the frank and enlightened tone in which, both in the original work and in the revised issue which has just appeared, they have dealt with all matters affecting Catholic doctrine and history, and of the courage and independence with which they have shaken off the trammels of what may be truly called the “No-Popery Superstition” of their forefathers.

When this Journal was founded, now nearly forty years ago, that No-Popery Superstition was in full vigour, and more than one of our earliest essays was devoted to the subject. There was not a single department in elementary education, in popular literature, or in more serious learning, to which a Catholic could turn without pain.

Nor was his own personal sense of literary wrong unmixed with regret and pity for the unsuspecting victims of this misrepresentation among Protestants themselves. Reverencing and loving as his very life the principles and practices of the Church of his fathers, the English Catholic was indignant that that Church should be seen by others under the distorted lights and false colours which were all but universal in that literature which alone was accessible to his countrymen. Nevertheless this indignity encountered him at every turn. If he opened an elementary spelling-book, he found *Antichrist* defined to be *the Pope*.* If he consulted a more pretentious repository of information he learned that *Transubstantiation* was "the arch legerdemain trick of the Romish priests in converting the sacramental bread into the Deity."† The short catechisms of history which were then in universal use, trained little Protestants to lisp from childhood of the "errors of Popery,"‡ and to shrink with horror from the Gunpowder Plot as "a scheme of the Roman Catholics" to blow up both Houses of Parliament when the King, Lords, and Commons should be there assembled.§ In the compendiums of geography he was sneeringly informed that "the Pope's sons were called his nephews, and the system of enriching them nepotism."|| The more advanced school books of the same subject merely intensified the slander. The Geographies in use at that time, even in so important an institution as King's College School, were filled with allusions to "the foul idolatries of popery,"¶ and to its "system of deceit, imposture, and falsehood," gravely imputing to the Church that it "openly encouraged the commission of the grossest vices,"** and that "permissions to commit sin were publicly sold."†† The Grammars of Rhetoric selected as examples of the rhetorical figures such metaphors as "the polluted stream of Roman traditions"‡‡ or, as specimens of the humorous, such ribald mockery of Catholic practices of piety as Hudibras's§§ coarse catalogue of

Crosses, relics, crucifixes,
Beads, pictures, rosaries, and pixes ;
The tests of working out salvation
By mere mechanic operation.

Classical commentators interrupted their learned disquisitions to point out analogies of popery and heathenism. Editors of school texts mixed up with elementary criticism designed for mere

* Entick's Dictionary, art. Antichrist, stereotype ed.

† Encyclopædia Britannica, art. History, vol. viii. p. 604. A new edition was then in progress, from which this passage has been expunged, but which left other almost equally gross calumnies of Catholic doctrine untouched.

‡ Pinnock's Catechism of English History, p. 43.

§ Ibid.

|| Pinnock's Geography, p. 223.

¶ Arrowsmith's Geography, p. 163.

** Ibid.

†† Ibid., p. 164.

‡‡ Whately's Rhetoric, p. 122.

§§ Campbell's Rhetoric, p. 39.

beginners, tirades against Popes and churchmen, as enemies of classical learning and wholesale destroyers of ancient literature.* Logicians, in treating of fallacies, warned their readers against "ambiguities which have greatly favoured the Church of Rome."† Even grave jurists themselves forgot for a time the technicalities of the law, in order to declaim against "the sale of indulgences giving liberty to the wealthy to sin against danger,"‡ and to denounce "transubstantiation, communion in one kind, and the worship of saints and images," as a part of the "farrago of superstitious novelties engendered by the blindness and corruption of the monks."§

The same anti-Catholic tone pervaded the higher departments, history, literature, economic science, and even other more purely neutral fields of knowledge. The so-called "Libraries" "Miscellanies," and other serial collections which had just begun to be popular, were filled with mis-statements of fact, with unjust and offensive tirades against our religion, or with misrepresentations in the more covert but not less dangerous form of sneer and insinuation. Foremost among them were the Encyclopædias. The earliest English Encyclopædia, the predecessor and namesake of the subject of the present notice, that of Ephraim Chambers, gravely asserted that in that "happy period for sinners," the pontificate of Gregory VII., "crimes were rated, and their remission set up to auction"; that "in the Apostolic Chamber sins were taxed at a reasonable rate," since it "cost but ninety livres and a few ducats for crimes which people at this side the Alps punished with death."|| The Edinburgh Encyclopædia affirmed that in the mediæval church "the religion of Jesus Christ was nearly extinct;"¶ that its system "gave men a claim to the happiness of heaven without the cultivation of personal virtue;"** and that, "armed with a plenary indulgence, the sinner might transgress with impunity every statute of the decalogue, and every ordinance of the Church."†† The London Encyclopædia repeated almost in words the statement that in the mediæval church "true religion was almost entirely superseded by horrid superstition."‡‡ It gravely declared that the mere act of purchasing an indulgence was considered "a merit in itself sufficient to deserve eternal reward,"§§ and that "the most

* Prendeville's *Livy*, pp. 12, 13.

† Whately's *Logic*, p. 305.

‡ Blackstone's *Commentaries*, iv. p. 106.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 419. See "Prejudices of Early Education," *Dub. Rev.*, First Series, vol. v., and "Prejudices of our Popular Literature," *Ibid.*, vol. viii.

|| Chambers's (Ephraim) *Encyclopædia*, article *Indulgences*.

¶ *Vol.* viii. pp. 306, 311.

** *Ibid.*, p. 316.

†† *Ibid.*

‡‡ *Lond. Encyclopædia*, xvii. 648.

§§ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

atrocious sin might be committed with impunity for a few shillings.”* We have already seen that the *Encyclopædia Britannica* did not stop at describing transubstantiation as “the arch legerdemain trick of the Romish priesthood.” Such had been the formal statement of several successive editions. In an edition which was going through the press about the time when this journal was established, that disgraceful passage was in very shame suppressed, but the new edition still perpetuated a variety of hardly less offensive slanders. The charge of substituting the idolatrous worship of relics and images for that of the true God is repeated in terms.† It is declared in more than one form of words, that men were taught to hold themselves “dispensed from the obligation of upright and virtuous conduct by augmenting the riches of the clergy through donations to the Church,”‡ and to “purchase the pardon of their sins for money.”§ In an eighth edition of this *Encyclopædia*, published twenty years afterwards, the article History being entirely re-written, these grossly offensive calumnies ceased to disgrace our literature ; but even of this edition the most that can be said, and even this by no means without reserve, is, that it holds itself negatively in relation to the charges made by all its predecessors against the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church.

Such was the position of the Catholic Church in English literature, when, about fifteen years ago, a new *Encyclopædia* was undertaken by the Messrs. Chambers. The work was issued in successive parts, and was completed in the year 1868, since which time it has enjoyed an immense circulation, the sale of copies having exceeded fifty thousand. It does not enter into our present design to discuss in detail its literary and scientific merits ; but we cannot proceed in what is our direct purpose without rendering at least a passing tribute to its really extraordinary merit as a repertory of general information. It is an *Encyclopædia* in the largest sense, embracing every department of knowledge ; and while it is invariably popular in its form, and adapted, as far as the several subjects will admit, to the comprehension of all intelligent and educated persons, it nevertheless avoids the too common error of sacrificing to this object the still more essential quality of scientific precision and accuracy. When we state that the number of subjects treated under distinct heads exceeds 27,000, it will easily be understood that the treatment of each subject is confined within very moderate limits. But so admirable is the skill in selecting the essential points, so stern the severity with which unnecessary topics are excluded, so wonderful the art of condensation which is everywhere

* *Lond. Encyclopædia*, xvii. 648.

† *Encycl. Britannica*, vol. xi. p. 495, 7th ed.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*

exhibited, that after habitual use of the Encyclopædia for a very long time, and the fullest trial of its comprehensiveness under all the leading heads of information, we do not hesitate to say that we have found it, as a general rule, to contain on every subject, and every branch of each subject, almost everything that is needful to be known, except by those who desire to make that particular subject a special matter of professional study. To accomplish this in any degree for so vast a variety of subjects would be in itself no mean merit; but when we add that in very many of the subjects the treatment is so exhaustive as to satisfy the requirements of adepts in each particular department, and that in all the information is, as a rule, carefully carried down to the very date of publication, we feel it our duty to bestow a praise upon the editorial management to which few similar compilations in any language are entitled. In so wide a field of knowledge, the work is necessarily distributed among a vast variety of writers, each acting for himself, without concert with his fellows, and even without knowledge of the lines in which their labours run. To select well the persons who might be safely entrusted with each subject, to direct their labours, at least in a general way, to the same end, to bring them into harmony, or, at all events, to obviate any appreciable conflict of statement or of view, involves a degree of industry, acuteness, energy, knowledge, tact, and intelligence, of which few men indeed are possessed, and which hardly any one with whom we are acquainted has displayed in the same high degree as the editor of Chambers's Encyclopædia.

The publication of the successive volumes having occupied nearly ten years—years, moreover, singularly eventful and full of change in the world of politics, of science, and of letters,—a Supplement had become necessary long before the work had been brought to a close, and many topics which had sprung into existence, or at least into interest, during the interval, are treated in the Supplement with the same fulness and accuracy which distinguish the work itself. It is true that, like most of Messrs. Chambers's publications, the Encyclopædia is printed from stereotyped plates, and advantage was systematically taken of the successive impressions to keep the information fresh on all subjects which are affected by the progress of discovery or the march of events. But even with these periodical modifications, Messrs. Chambers tell us it is impossible to keep such a publication *au courant* with the advance of the time. It is found by experience that a work of this nature has an existence but of ten or twelve years; and the proprietors, in the year 1873, resolved on subjecting the Encyclopædia to a complete and systematic revision, in which every subject should be brought up to the standard of the time. In carrying out this design, the stereotype character of the work, which had told

favourably upon the successive issues of the original edition, has proved a serious impediment to the completeness and satisfactory character of the revision. As it has been necessary in the main to retain the stereotype plates, a completely new edition, in the strict sense of the word, has, of course, been impossible. It has proved impracticable to incorporate the Supplement with the work in alphabetical order ; and the new matter has only found a place by being substituted for what the progress of time has rendered obsolete. This is, of course, a great drawback, if not on the completeness of the work, at least on its availableness for ready use, and although it is to some extent met by the device of a copious alphabetical index, yet even with this resource the new issue of the Encyclopædia would be improperly described as a new edition, and falls far short of it in value for many of the practical purposes of reference. We are bound, nevertheless, to say that in most other respects the present reprint is fully entitled to be regarded as a new edition. Many of the articles are completely re-written ; and most of those on which time has rendered change desirable have been brought conscientiously up to the standard of the present time. We have tested this by actual trial in innumerable instances, and although a vigorous scrutiny may discover occasional oversights and omissions, we do not hesitate to say that in the main the work of revision has been thoroughly done, and that the newest and most accurate information on each subject has been incorporated in its proper place. We may add that this has been done with a completeness and comprehensiveness which would have been absolutely impossible under a new editor ; but this revision, having been entrusted to the same laborious hand by which the work itself was carried to a successful issue, has had the advantage of his great experience in the conduct of such an undertaking, of his knowledge of the best quarters in which to look for literary and scientific assistance, and above all, his familiarity with every part of the work which was entrusted to him for revision.

We have felt it our duty to say so much upon the general merits of Messrs. Chambers's Encyclopædia, and of the valuable revision of the work which has just been issued by them. But our main purpose in these pages, as will have been gathered from what we said at the beginning, is much more limited. It is simply to record our grateful sense of the just and impartial spirit in which, through the vast range of topics over which their work extends, these editors have dealt with every subject bearing upon the doctrine or discipline of the Catholic Church. This indeed, we are bound to say, is no novelty in the literary career of the Messrs. Chambers. The same spirit pervades all their publications ; and it is but, in the department of religion, another form of that deep sense of responsibility in letters which suggested to the same editors, in the interest of morality,

the preparation of an edition of our great Dramatist, purged of all coarseness and indelicacy which might unfit it for family reading. We fear it would be a mistake to ascribe it to any special sympathy with Catholic things, or with Catholic views of things. It is on their part the natural outcome of that spirit of justice and fair play which they adopted long since as the rule of their literary life, and which embraces all shades of opinion without distinction or preference. Mr. William Chambers, in the interesting Memoir of his brother, which is at the same time his own autobiography, is able to claim the credit of having declined from the first to pander to that religious and political bigotry which in his early career was dominant in English literature. "It is not my duty," he says, "to sit as critic on aims and efforts not unlike my own. There are different ways of doing things, and it may happen that one way is as good as another. All that need be said is that it has been a matter of congratulation that 'Chambers's Journal' owed nothing at its conception or in any part of its career to the special patronage of any party, sect, or individual, and the same thing may be confidently affirmed of the numerous publications of one kind or another which we were afterwards enabled to prepare and issue in furthering the cause we had espoused. It is something to say, with excusable pride, that in the whole proceedings of my brother and myself, we never courted the countenance or recommendation of any person or persons, or of any body of people, civil or religious; and after an experience of forty years, circumstances would seem to point to the conclusion that this has not been the worst besides being the least obsequious line of policy."* A long observation of the publications of this meritorious firm enables us to endorse, with hardly any limitation, this modest self-gratulation. The same spirit of fair play pervades all their other works, and all the various products of their press, serial and periodical. A few essays or tales may have occasionally, at rare intervals, found their way into the pages of the Journal, which grated offensively on Catholic sympathies; but the general tone of the "Journal," of the "Cyclopædia of Literature," the "Book of Days," the information for the people, the "Miscellany," and its kindred serials, is always, to say the least, neutral; in many questions of sacred æstheticism and religious art and ceremonial, it is reverent and respectful; and in subjects of higher and more solemn import it is often eminently sympathetic.

But it is of the Encyclopædia above all that this character is especially true. In accordance with the comprehensive plan of this work, it comprises among its miscellaneous contents what might almost be called a complete Theological Dictionary; and strange as

* Memoir of Robert Chambers, pp. 241-2.

this may appear to many of our readers, we will venture, after an examination by no means cursory, to promise that in this non-Catholic compilation they will find many subjects in polemics, in ritual, in ceremonial, in casuistry, in hermeneutics, in hagiography, in biblical and ecclesiastical archæology, carefully, though briefly, discussed and explained, for which they will search in vain in our own Church Dictionaries of no inconsiderable pretensions. And we can with equal confidence promise that they will uniformly find the Catholic view (which is generally presented in the form of explanation more than of argument) fairly stated; and although always put forward in the person of the Catholics themselves, and not in that of the editor of the Encyclopædia, yet invariably presented in a reverent tone. Even where these views are combated by arguments or representations on the non-Catholic side, the objections are suggested calmly and respectfully, and the reader is left to strike the balance of argument as may best approve itself to his own judgment.

These characteristics, however, will be best illustrated by a few examples, and we cannot commence better than with the subject of Indulgences, in regard to which we have seen the views which but a few years since were current in the literature of England. In the days to which we allude it was gravely affirmed that "permissions to commit sin were publicly sold"; that "crimes were rated and their remission set up to auction"; and that in the Apostolic Chamber "it cost but ninety livres and a few ducats, for crimes which people at this side of the Alps punished with death."

Now the article "Indulgence," in "Chambers's Encyclopædia," is a perfectly impartial exposition of the true Catholic belief upon this most important subject, detailing the origin of indulgences, explaining their nature and efficacy, and pointing out the conditions necessary in order to obtain them. Having laid down that an "indulgence, in Roman Catholic theology, means a remission, by Church authority, to a repentant sinner, of the *temporal* punishment which, in the Catholic theory, remains due after the sin and its eternal punishment have been remitted,"—the article proceeds to give the following historical account of the discipline in which the practice of indulgences had its origin:—

By the discipline of the first centuries, a severe course of penitential observance was exacted of all who fell into any grievous crime, especially apostasy, murder, and adultery, such sinners being excluded from Church communion for various periods, in some cases even till the hour of death. These penitential observances, which Protestants regard as purely disciplinary, were designed, according to the Catholic view, as an expiation, on the part of the penitent, for the *temporal* punishment which, after sin and the *eternal* punishment due to it have been remitted by God, still remains to be undergone; and some of the most acrimonious of the early contro-

versies, the Montanist and the Novatian, arose as to the power of the Church to relax these penitential observances, and to admit grievous sinners to communion. These ancient relaxations (of which they regard that referred to in 1 Cor. v. 5 and 2 Cor. ii. 10 as a type) are considered by Catholics as examples of the modern indulgence; and the practice which grew up in the 3rd and 4th centuries, and which even then was carried to great extremes, of granting such relaxations on the recommendation of martyrs or confessors, is held by Catholic theologians to be an illustration of that principle of vicarious atonement, according to which, in the theory of indulgences, the Church is supposed to supply, from the inexhaustible treasure of the merits of Christ, and of the "supererogatory" works of the saints, what may be wanting to the completeness of the atonement of the less perfect but yet truly penitent sinner to whom she grants the indulgence. That this practice of relaxation, whatever may have been its real import, was to be used according to the judgment of the bishop as to the disposition of the penitent, is expressly laid down by the Council of Ancyra in 308, and by that of Nice in 325. In all cases, however, the person granting the relaxation was to impose certain good works as a partial substitute for the penalty which had been relaxed; and among these works, which had at first been purely personal, came by degrees to be included money payments for certain religious or charitable objects, as the building of a church, or the foundation of a monastery or hospital.

The article reviews briefly the course of events during the later middle age, and details candidly, but in a tone of which no Catholic will complain, certain abuses which arose in the granting of indulgences, especially during the contest of the rival popes in the disastrous Schism of the West, down to the crisis which came

In the beginning of the 16th century, when, with a view to raising the funds necessary for the erection of the great church of St. Peter's at Rome, the Pope, Leo X., published a plenary indulgence, the principal condition for the gaining of which was a contribution to this work. Catholic historians contend that in itself such a condition was perfectly justifiable, and that, if duly explained to the people, it might be lawfully and even meritoriously complied with; but they admit that many of the preachers of the indulgence, in extolling its natural effects, went to indefensible extremes and that, even making the fullest allowance for exaggeration, it cannot be denied that grievous abuses both of doctrine and of practice were committed in Germany and in Switzerland. Hence the decree of the Council of Trent, while it affirms that the use of indulgences, as being "most salutary for the Christian people, and approved by the authority of councils, is to be retained in the Church," yet orders that, "in granting them, moderation be observed, lest, by excessive facility, discipline may be enervated." Upon the special instructions of this council, all the modern legislation on the subject of indulgences has been founded; but as the decree of the council does not explicitly declare what is the precise effect of an indulgence, it is further explained by Pope Pius VI., in his celebrated bull "*Auctorem Fidei*," that an

indulgence, received with due dispositions, remits not alone the canonical penance attached to certain crimes in this life, but also the temporal punishment which would await the penitent after death, to be endured by him in purgatory.

When we call to mind the views on this fertile subject of prejudice, to which alone the last generation of English readers had access, we cannot too highly appreciate the advantage to the cause of truth and justice which must result from the circulation among the fifty thousand purchasers of Chambers's *Encyclopædia* of a fair and intelligible *résumé* of the true Catholic belief ; and especially when the legitimate deductions from this statement are thus distinctly collected at the close.

From the above explanation, it will be gathered that Catholics do not understand by an indulgence a remission of sin, much less a permission to commit sin, or a promise of forgiveness of future sin. They contend, moreover, that since the benefit of an indulgence can only be enjoyed by a sinner who has repented of sin, and resolved to embrace a new life, the imputation of introducing laxity of principle and easy self-indulgence is entirely unwarranted. And although, for the most part, the good works which are required as the condition of obtaining indulgences may appear easy and even trivial, yet the one indispensable preliminary—sorrow for sin and sincere purpose of amendment—in itself involves the very highest effort of Christian virtue.

In the same spirit of fairness which we thus recognize in our own regard, the article concludes with a brief statement of the counter-exposition of indulgences given by Protestant controversialists.

On the subject of indulgences, Protestants are accustomed to quote the language used by popes in granting them, in opposition to the views put forth by Roman Catholics in defending them. And nothing is more common than for the popes in their bulls of jubilee, to grant *the most plenary and complete indulgence, pardon, and remission of all sins*, on certain conditions specified. And although this grant is made only to "the faithful who are truly penitent and have confessed," yet being limited to a certain period, as the year of jubilee, and to certain conditions, as saying certain prayers, visiting certain churches, wearing or kissing a scapular, or the like, it is argued that these cannot but acquire, in the estimation of the people, an importance which is very unfavourable to penitence, virtue, faith, and piety. It is likewise urged that the whole doctrine of indulgences is founded not only on an unwarranted assumption of power given to the church, but also on a doctrine of human works and merits inconsistent with what we are taught in Scripture as to the office of Christ as a Saviour.

Although it will be seen that the writer of these strictures fails in one point to take in the full nature of the conditions required

for every indulgence by whomsoever granted, there is nothing in them of which even the most sensitive Catholic need complain. The language is grave and inoffensive, the tone is perfectly respectful, and there is not a word or a sentiment in the section to wound the Christian charity which ought always to be the first characteristic of the inquiry after truth.

In like manner, under the head of *IMAGE-WORSHIP*, instead of the traditional tirade against "Romish idolatry," and "the substitution of the idolatrous worship of images and relics for that of the true God," we find a calm, and on the whole, impartial explanation of the origin and progress of the use of images in Christian worship. The absence of traces, in the New Testament and the writings of the apostolic age, of the use of pictures or statues in public or private worship, is observed; but it is added that Tertullian refers to the image of the Good Shepherd as graven in his day on chalices, and that "a very curious pagan caricature of Christianity, of the very same age, lately discovered scratched upon the wall of a room in the palace of the Cæsars, which rudely represents a man standing in the attitude of prayer, with outstretched hand, before a grotesque caricature of the crucifixion, and which bears the title, 'Alexamenus worships God,' has been recently alleged by Catholics as an additional indication of at least a certain use of images among the Christians of the second century. The tombs of the Christians in the Roman catacombs, many of which are of a date anterior to Constantine, frequently have graven upon them representations of the Dove, of the Cross, of the symbolical Fish, of the Ship, of Adam and Eve, of Moses striking the rock, of Jonas, of Daniel in the lions' den, of the apostles Peter and Paul, and above all, of the Good Shepherd; and those compartments of the catacombs which were used as chapels are often profusely decorated with sacred representations, the age of which, however, it is not easy to determine with accuracy." The progress of the practice, as the danger of abuse diminished through the downfall of paganism, and the conflicts which arose both in the East and West, through the Iconoclast controversy, are very well described; but the most important characteristic of the article is the care which is taken to define accurately the real teaching of the Catholic Church as to sacred images. We are told with strict impartiality that the Roman Catholic Church, through the decrees of the Council of Trent, disclaims the imputation, commonly made against Catholics, of the idolatrous worship of images, "as though a divinity dwelt in them, or as though we [Catholics] asked anything of them, or trusted in them, as the heathens did in their idols." It renews the Nicene distinction between *absolute* and *relative* worship; the latter of which alone—"whereby we worship Christ and the saints, who are the prototypes of these images"—it sanctions or permits; and it contends

for the great advantage, especially for the rude and unlearned people, to be drawn from the use of pictures and statues in the churches as "memorials of the sufferings and of the mercy of our Lord, as instructive records of the virtues of the saints, and exhortations to the imitation of their example, and as incentives to the love of God and to the practice of piety" (Sess. xxv. *On the Invocation of Saints*).

We turned with some interest, under the present exciting circumstances, to the article INFALLIBILITY. This article might, we think, be read with much advantage by many of those who have taken a part, and some a prominent part, in the present controversy. It explains, in simple and intelligible language, the nature of the infallibility claimed among Catholics, as well for the Church in general as for the Pope; details the controversies which have prevailed between the various parties as to the subject or seat of infallibility, indicating the points on which all have been agreed, and those on which opinion was left free; discusses very carefully the range of the claim of infallibility or the subject-matter to which it extends; and makes intelligible by a few very simple words what has proved throughout the controversy a bugbear to some and a mystery to others, the meaning of a Papal decree issued *ex cathedra*. All this, too, is carried down to the most recent date, embodying the decisions of the late Vatican Council.

We are tempted also, in view of existing controversies, to extract one or two passages from the article on the Temporal Power of the Pope, which appears to us perfectly fair and impartial, and eminently calculated to set at rest the alarm which it has been sought to create in the minds of the people. The article distinguishes carefully between two significations of the words which are constantly confused, and the interchange of which leads to much misapprehension,—the temporal sovereignty possessed by the Pope within his own so-called Papal States, and the power claimed by or for the Pope to direct, to control, to limit, to suspend, and, in extreme circumstances, even to take away altogether the temporal and civil authority of other sovereigns in their own dominions. Of the origin and nature of the Pope's temporal sovereignty, in the former sense, a summary history, both in this article and under the head PAPAL STATES, is given, as well as of the controversy as to its compatibility with his spiritual functions, which has arisen both in ancient and in modern times. On the latter point, we are told, "no formal and authoritative judgment of the Roman Church has been pronounced; but a strong and almost unanimous expression of opinion was tendered to the present Pope, Pius IX., in the form of letters and addresses from Bishops and others in every part of Catholic Christendom. The tenor of all these is nearly the same. They profess that the possession of temporal sovereignty is no essential part of the privi-

leges of the successor of S. Peter; but they also regard the possession of a sovereignty independent of any particular sovereign, as the means providentially established for the protection of the spiritual independence of the Pope, and of the free exercise of his functions as spiritual ruler of the Church. The contrary opinion held by some distinguished members of the Roman Church, although regarded with great disfavour, was not formally condemned by a doctrinal decision, nor was any action taken on it in the Vatican Council. The recent annexation of the city of Rome itself to the kingdom of Italy elicited a still stronger expression." We quote this as it stands of course, without going out of our way to consider how far it can really be maintained that no "doctrinal decision" has been promulgated by the Holy Father on his temporal sovereignty. But the most important portion of the article is that which regards the claim of the Pope to control the action of temporal sovereigns, within their own territory, in civil affairs. The distinction is laid down between *directive* and *coercive* power. The former, which Catholics are declared to be bound to hold as a necessary part of the Pope's spiritual supremacy, imports nothing more than that the Pope, as acknowledged supreme moral teacher, has a right *to instruct all* members of the Church, sovereigns as well as subjects, in the moral duties of their respective states of life. To deny this would be, in the Catholic view of the Pope's headship of the Church, to declare that temporal authority involves *no moral responsibility whatsoever*, and that sovereigns are entirely irresponsible in the exercise of the civil power. As to the right of the Pope to enforce this directive power by coercive measures, when sovereigns, in the exercise of the civil power, grievously violate moral duty, this also is declared to be, in the opinion of Catholics, "a natural concomitant of the spiritual primacy," provided always that the coercive measures be confined within the spiritual sphere and that they involve no civil penalties or other consequences of a temporal nature.

The really important question, however, is that which regards the power claimed for and by the mediæval Popes, and even by some of earlier date, of coercing kings by temporal penalties, and of punishing them, when refractory, by suspension, by deprivation, and even by the transfer of their subjects' allegiance to another sovereign. On this question the views of the several schools are briefly but impartially stated—the theory of the *direct* temporal power; Bellarmine's view of the *indirect* power; and, finally, the so-called "historical theory" of Fénelon, which has been elaborately developed by M. Gosselin in his very learned work, "*Pouvoir du Pape au Moyen Age*."

We must be content with a notice of the last named theory, according to which the Pope does not possess, whether by direct div

appointment or in virtue of the necessities of his spiritual office, any temporal authority whatever over other sovereigns. But he possesses the plenitude of that *spiritual* power which is required for the government of the Church, and he is empowered to enforce it, if necessary, by *spiritual penalties*, and especially by excommunication or deprivation of membership of the Church.

Now although excommunication, and such other penalties, of their own nature, are purely spiritual, yet the religious sentiment of the mediæval period, and the awe with which it regarded the authority of the Church, invested these penalties with certain temporal effects.

The article proceeds to illustrate this by examples in the laws of the several countries :—"The penalty of forfeiture of certain civil rights was attached by the law of England, in the case of private persons, to the spiritual censure of excommunication. The same penalty was applied by the laws of other countries to the sovereigns themselves; by the law of Spain in the sixth Council of Toledo in 638; that of France, as confessed by Charles the Bald, in 859; the law of England, under Edward the Confessor, and the so-called Saxon and Swabian codes of Germany. The last-named codes recognize in the Pope, in certain specified cases, the right to excommunicate the Emperor himself; and ordain that in case the Emperor should remain for twelve months without being absolved from the excommunication, he shall be deposed. In the appeal of the Saxon nobles to the Pope against Henry IV., this law is expressly referred to. The contemporary historians, Paul of Bernried, Lambert of Aschaffenburg, Nicholas Roselli, and others, describe it as the ground of the Emperor's deposition; and even Henry himself, without denying the force of the law, sought his defence solely in a denial of the charge of heresy which was imputed to him. The same spirit of the age is exhibited in the form of oath taken at the coronation of the sovereign in many countries, especially (although not exclusively) in those whose Kings—as Roger of Sicily, Peter III. of Aragon, Guiscard of Naples, Godfrey of Jerusalem, and John of England—had made their kingdoms feudatory to the See of Rome; by which the monarch swore to be the protector and defender of the sovereign Pontiff and the Holy Roman Church in all their necessities and utilities, and to guard and maintain their possessions, honours, and rights."

Hence it concludes :—

From these and similar indications of the public feeling of the mediæval time, the advocates of this theory of the temporal power infer that orthodoxy and obedience to the Pope, in all essential matters of faith and discipline, were by the consent, express or tacit, of sovereigns and of peoples, accepted as a condition of the tenure of supreme civil authority—a condition

similar in its character and objects to that which forms the basis of the limitation settlement of the succession to the English crown, to the heirs of the Princess Sophia of Hanover, "being Protestant." Hence they conclude that the function really exercised by the Popes in relation to heterodox or scandalously immoral sovereigns, or oppressors of the Church and Church liberties, was *in itself a spiritual one*, and that the civil consequences which it entailed of deprivation or deposition arose, not from the Church law, but *from the expressed or understood international civil law of the age*. This notion of the origin and nature of the Pope's power over sovereigns and states may be regarded as the view now commonly received, and it may help to a better understanding of some points of the controversy regarding the celebrated Syllabus. It may be added, that this view is not confined to Catholic writers, but is held by Leibnitz, Pfeffel, Eichhorn, Voigt, Frederick Hurter (while still a Protestant), and others.

Such is the exposition of Fénelon's theory of the temporal power. We are by no means intending to express concurrence with that theory, nor are we certain that it is "the view now commonly received" among Catholics. But the summary appears to us to be perfectly fair, and to put forward all the leading principles of the theory with their full force.

At the same time the impartiality, which is the fundamental law of the publication, is carefully maintained. The article having thus explained one doctrine advocated by many excellent Catholics, does not fail to subjoin on the other side:—

On the other hand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this theory with the language used by the Popes themselves in enforcing their claim to temporal authority, and with the arguments upon which they rest that claim. Nor can it be denied that whatever is said of the cases of the exercise of such a power which occurred in the 12th and 13th centuries, the power continued to be claimed and to be exercised down to and even after the Reformation, when it would be idle to suppose that any such public understanding, if it had existed in the middle ages, had not been revoked, if not by all, at least by those nations which had revolted from the Roman Church.

The same impartial spirit will be recognised in the treatment of every important religious controversy throughout the Encyclopædia. In all, so far as we have been, after a most careful scrutiny, able to observe, the Catholic view is uniformly stated with substantial accuracy, and in most cases care is taken to note and to disclaim, on the part of Catholics, the popular misapprehensions of the opinions of their Church, which have commonly prevailed among English Protestants. As an instance of this may be noted the article on the INVOCATION OF SAINTS AND ANGELS, which details not only the doctrine of the Catholic Church, but also the history of the practice in the several ages, and the present

use in the various Christian communions of the East and West, with very remarkable candour and impartiality. This is equally observable in the subject of PURGATORY, from the discussion of which all the vulgar prejudices and prepossessions of the older controversy are entirely eliminated; the subject being thoroughly investigated in all its bearings, as well upon the ancient religions and the primeval traditions which have left their traces on them all, as upon the discussions which modern religious divisions have developed. The Catholic notion of "Transubstantiation" in like-manner, which, as we saw, was wont to be the subject of contemptuous scoff or shallow declamation, is explained in language at once precise and popularly intelligible, and the philosophical as well as the theological aspect of the question is briefly presented. And having pointed out that the arguments in favour of the doctrine are drawn from Scripture and tradition, and those on the opposite side mainly from the philosophical difficulties which are involved in it, the article enters briefly but interestingly into the general principles of the philosophical questions involved in the controversy, as to the possibility of transubstantiation on purely physical considerations, and observes that the celebrated Leibnitz has not only entered into this at great length, and in many portions of his works, into this discussion, but professes to prove by strict philosophical principles—by the consideration of the properties of matter, of substance, of space, extension, and the like—that the essential principle of a body may exist in many places at the same time, nay, under distinct and far distant species (Leibnitz's "*Deutsche Schriften*," i. pp. 283-4).

We might in the same way illustrate the spirit of "fair play in literature" from the articles on the Mass, on the Blessed Virgin Mary, on the several sacraments, on tradition, on fasting, and the various other leading topics of Catholic controversy. It is even more gratifying to find the minor controverted topics, such as Holy Water, Incense, the use of Lights in Worship, Lent, Pilgrimages, Sanctuary, &c., discussed in the same candid and reverent spirit, and with equally impartial consideration for the Catholic view of the doctrines or practices which are severally involved therein. We might give examples from each and all of these subjects; but we prefer to transcribe as a sample of the practical value of the work for Catholic purposes, an article which involves but little of direct controversy, but which, nevertheless, has acquired from recent events no inconsiderable interest—that on CONCORDATS:—

CONCORDAT (Lat. *concordatum*, "a thing agreed on"), although sometimes used of purely secular treaties, is now almost exclusively employed to designate a compact on ecclesiastical affairs between the Pope, as head of the Roman Catholic Church, and the temporal ruler of a particular kingdom or state. Concordats commonly relate to things which are neither purely

spiritual, as faith, the sacraments, or worship, nor purely temporal, as civil rights, taxation, &c., but mixed matters, regarding which each power makes certain claims, in regard of which the action of the two powers can with difficulty be dissociated ; and in which, therefore, in the hope of harmonious co-operation for the public good, each is willing to cede to the other a portion of its peculiar right. Concordats are of two kinds—the first in the form of a treaty, to which both the contracting powers are formally consenting parties ; the second, in which the terms are concerted by both, or, at least, are mutually accepted, but are published only by one, most commonly by the Pope, in the form of a bull, reciting the enactments which result from the agreement. This difference is only in form. In both it is a settled doctrine of Roman Catholic canonists, and especially of those of the Ultramontane school, that the Pope never absolutely cedes purely spiritual powers. Thus, in the presentation to bishoprics, while the king “nominated” or “elected,” the Pope always reserved to himself the power of “canonical institution.”

A still more useful portion of the article is a brief, but comprehensive account of the various concordats of annual and modern times :—

“We shall briefly enumerate the most important concordats. (1.) *Concordats with Germany.*—The earliest subject of negotiation between church and state in Germany was the mode of electing the popes, to which subject may be referred the compact of Otho I. with John XII., and the constitution of Leo VIII. ; but the well-known concordat of Worms in 1123, regarding investitures, is commonly regarded as the first concordat strictly so called. Similar agreements took place on the question of the *Regalia* (q. v.), between the Roman see and the emperors Otho IV., Frederic II., and Rudolph of Hapsburg. A more comprehensive compact on church matters is that of which the foundation was laid at Constance in 1418, and which was subsequently modified, by the “Frankfort” or “Princes’ Concordat,” by the concordat of Aschaffenburg, and by that of Vienna ; which last, although practically disregarded by Joseph II. and Leopold, continued in use till the suppression of the Empire of Germany in 1803. Its place was supplied, under Pius VII. and his immediate successors, by separate concordats with Bavaria, 1817 ; Prussia, 1821 ; Baden, Würtemberg, and other minor states, 1818 ; Hanover, 1824 ; Saxony, 1827 ; and the Netherlands in the same year.”

The most important of modern concordats, that with Austria, is described more minutely. We learn that the last German concordat was that concluded at Vienna, August 18, 1855. The chief articles were that the Pope should have direct communication with the bishops, clergy, and people, and archbishops and bishops with their clergy and their flocks, and the right to govern their sees according to the canonical law. Education was placed entirely under the control of the church. The bishops were to settle what

books should be used. The chief inspector of schools was to be chosen by the emperor from among the individuals selected by the bishops. The government bound itself to prevent the dissemination of books pointed out as dangerous to religion by the bishops or archbishops. All questions of marriage, except in so far as they might involve civil consequences, were reserved exclusively to the ecclesiastical courts. Priests guilty of crimes were to be tried in the temporal courts ; but the bishop was to be duly notified of the fact, and convicted priests were to be imprisoned apart in a monastery or other ecclesiastical building. The emperor was to choose bishops, but with the advice of the existing bishops and archbishops. The church might acquire new property, but once acquired, it could not be sold or mortgaged without the consent of both pope and emperor. This concordat was set aside in 1868 in all the dominions of the Emperor of Austria.

The other concordats with European kingdoms were as follows :—

"(2.) *With France*.—The Pragmatic Sanction, ascribed to St. Louis, but really of later date, has some of the characteristics of a concordat ; but the first proper concordat is that of Francis I. with Leo X. in 1515 and 1516, which continued in force, although with more than one conflict of the two powers, till the Revolution. In re-establishing the church in France, Napoleon Bonaparte, as first consul, concluded with Pius VII., through the agency of Cardinal Gonsalvi, the celebrated concordat of 1801 ; which he afterwards compelled the pope, then a captive at Fontainebleau, to modify by a new act in 1814. Both were ignored at the Restoration ; but an attempt to produce a substitute in 1817, and again in 1819, led to no practical change. (3.) *With Italy*.—In Italy, an agreement regulating the election of bishops was concluded with Nice and Savoy by Nicholas V. in 1451 ; and a formal concordat was made with Sardinia by Benedict XIV. in 1740. The ecclesiastical affairs of Naples were anciently regulated by the terms of what was called the *Monarchia Sicula* ; but a formal concordat was concluded with Charles III. by the same pope in 1741, and a new concordat was made by Pius VII. in 1818. (4.) *With Spain*.—Charles V. concluded a concordat for his Spanish kingdom with Adrian VI. and Clement VII. ; and a further concordat was made by Clement XII. and Philip V. in 1737. (5.) *With Portugal* :—Benedict XIV. made a concordat with Portugal in 1741.

Without dwelling on the value of such a body of facts, for their own sake, we regard it as matter of congratulation that a medium of information on this and all similar subjects connected with religion should be accessible to Catholics, as well as to Protestants, in which the desired information may be sought without danger of undue bias of the truth, or of offence in the manner of conveying it.

Nor is it to this class of subjects only that the observation applies. historical, biographical, and miscellaneous subjects are

treated with equal impartiality and equal consideration for the requirements of Christian peace. The lives of the most remarkable saints are told briefly, but reverently, and although without avowal of assent on the narrator's part, yet with full appreciation of the sentiment of the believer. There is no slurring over of miracles and legendary narratives; but the reader is uniformly reminded that the narrative is given as that of the Catholic authorities; and when occasion requires, a counter-statement is appended, the reader being left at liberty to form his judgment between them, or to pursue his investigation further, with the aid of the lights supplied by both.

It is gratifying in times when we are threatened with a renewal of the acrimony of the older controversies, to find a neutral field in which the Catholic student may range without offence to his religious sensibilities, and without peril to his religious convictions; and we can hardly regret that circumstances have delayed until now the notice of this valuable publication, which we have long contemplated. We cordially concur in the high estimate which competent writers have formed of its literary and scientific value; but it has a special claim on our grateful acknowledgment, for the just and generous candour with which it has flung aside the narrow and unworthy prejudices which were traditional in English literature for many generations, and of which our religion had long been the recognized butt and the all but unfriended victim.

ART. III.—BISHOP FESSLER ON INFALLIBILITY.

The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes: a Controversial Reply to Dr. Schulte. By JOSEPH FESSLER, late Bishop of St. Polten, in Austria. Translated by AMBROSE ST. JOHN, M.A., of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. London: Burns & Oates.

A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. By J. H. NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory.

IN the volume presented by F. St. John to the English reader, Mgr. Fessler performed with triumphant success a work, which urgently needed doing, and which none but he had thought of taking in hand. The e as of 1 Va
Council had made up their mind befo

against its definitions whatever they might be, as incompatible with due civil allegiance. "I will give the reason," says Cardinal Manning ("Vatican Decrees, &c.," p. 19), "why it has been so confidently asserted that the Council touched the civil powers. It is because certain persons, a year before the Council met, resolved to say so. They wrote the book 'Janus' to prove it; they published circulars before and during the Council to reassert it. They first prophesied that the Council would interfere with the civil powers, and now they write scientific history to prove that it has done so." Nor have they only written "scientific" history, but also "scientific" theology; under which latter head the chief offender has been that Professor Schulte, whom Mgr. Fessler took in hand. And the monstrous perversion of the Vatican Definition which the Professor has found it necessary to perpetrate, is the clearest of proofs how utterly baseless and unfounded is his allegation. "The question at issue," says the Bishop at starting (pp. 3, 4) "is whether the definition de fide of the Vatican Council upon the Infallible teaching office of the Roman Pontiff extends to *all the different expressions which a Pope may ever casually have uttered*, either as Briefs or otherwise, and *even to acts of the Popes*; or whether this de fide definition extends solely to those utterances of Popes in past as well as future times, wherein all the notes, prescribed as belonging to definition on matters of faith, combine." Indeed, the extravagance of Dr. Schulte's statements, as authentically exhibited by the Bishop, almost surpasses belief. He maintains (p. 119) that all penal enactments against heretics are so many Papal definitions *ex cathedrâ*; for, says he, "they refer to the propagation of the Faith." Nay, according to him, the Vatican Definition teaches that "every expression in the laws issued by the Pope, even when merely introductory, a declaration of the intention of punishing, the words of the judgments, the penal sentences passed, nay, even the motives leading to the issuing of such laws, must *all* be looked upon as infallible utterances of the Pope *ex cathedrâ*" (p. 127).

We should really be tempted to regard Dr. Schulte as a conscious and deliberate liar in so travestying the Catholic dogma, did we not know from other sources how amazing are the misconceptions which have prevailed. In the controversy with Mr. Gladstone, attention has more than once been called to a statement made by F. Graty before his death:—

I combated an inspired infallibility; the Council's Decree rejects inspired infallibility. I combated a personal infallibility; the Decree gives but an

official infallibility. Writers of a school which I thought excessive were undesirous of a limitation to infallibility *ex cathedrâ* as being too narrow ; and the Decree gives but infallibility *ex cathedrâ*. I almost feared a scientific infallibility, a political and governmental infallibility ; and the Decree gives but doctrinal infallibility in matters of faith and morals.

F. Gratry then was actually under the impression, that a certain "excessive school" of his coreligionists desired a definition, which should declare the Pope infallible, when not even speaking "officially"; which should declare him infallible in matters of secular science, secular politics, secular government, irrelevant to faith and morals ; infallible (we suppose) on the merits and demerits of representative government, or of ironclad ships, or of free trade.* If so loyally disposed a Catholic as F. Gratry held such wild notions of what was going on around him, it is possible that even Dr. Schulte may have been sincere in his astounding misapprehension of the Vatican pronouncements.

Nor could it be hoped that the extravagance of Dr. Schulte's statements would suffice for their refutation. On the contrary, when the Professor's pamphlet appeared, "there was a burst of admiration from all the 'free-thinking' journals of Austria and imperial Germany. One Vienna newspaper, the "Press," declared that all the attacks which had been hitherto directed against the doctrine of Infallibility were but as the prickings of a pin in comparison with the terrible blows dealt by the mace of Dr. Schulte" (p. xiii). The mischief which was being done was incalculable ; and incalculable therefore the service performed by Mgr. Fessler, in exposing the Professor's monstrous sophistries.

Among the most effective characteristics of Mgr. Fessler's treatise is, that he so resolutely and persistently pins down his opponent to the point really at issue. Dr. Schulte and his party are compelled by their position to admit, that down to the moment of the Vatican Definition, Catholics were in no respect committed to any doctrine incompatible with due civil allegiance. The Bishop fixes his attention relentlessly on this all-important condition of the controversy. Had he undertaken to show that Catholic doctrine *as a whole* involves

* As we find that this REVIEW has sometimes been supposed to advocate a doctrine similar to that mentioned by F. Gratry, we may be allowed to reprint a note, which will be found in p. 93 of our number for July, 1864 :—"No one pretends, that either political action or philosophical speculation is directly under the Church's authority : but both are indirectly under it. The politician in his political capacity is bound to defer to the Church, so far as his measures affect the welfare of souls ; and the philosopher in his speculative capacity, so far as his speculations affect revealed doctrine."

no disparagement to the just claims of Cæsar,—he would have been obliged to write volumes, and to enter on a number of delicate and difficult questions which at last admit fair difference of opinion. The completeness and crushingness of his victory is mainly due to the carefulness and circumspection with which he has avoided this snare. For instance, as to the Syllabus. “*Before the Vatican Council was summoned, a Catholic was bound to pay submission and deference to the Syllabus*” (p. 6); and Dr. Schulte therefore can derive no argument whatever from the Syllabus, until he has shown that the Vatican Definition invested it with new authority. Again in p. 4. There is a certain “straightforward obedience and true submission, which a Catholic ought to pay to the directions and definitions of the Pope”; but then “it was not the Vatican Council that first introduced” “this obligation.” Then there are theologians who have “defended the thesis, that the Church’s infallibility extended even to general laws of the Church upon matters of discipline”: but this opinion “was in existence long before the Vatican Council, and is neither confirmed nor rejected by the Definition of the Council” (pp. 126, 7); nor can it therefore be adduced by Dr. Schulte in support of his argument.

It is no *other* infallibility then which the Council has defined, but only infallibility in the Pope’s *ex cathedrâ* definitions. But in order to an *ex cathedrâ* definition—such is the Bishop’s substantial argument—it in no way suffices that the Pope shall issue (even officially) some public declaration, ever so closely mixed up with faith and morals: it is necessary further, that he give sufficient indication of intending to oblige the interior assent of Catholics. And even when he does give such indication—or in other words when he issues an *ex cathedrâ* Act—it is the doctrine defined, and that alone, which Catholics are required to accept: preambles, arguments, obiter dicta, all these are external to the defining intent, and external therefore to the obligation of belief. Still more evidently are excluded from the sphere of defined infallibility “all those matters, which commonly form the subject of ecclesiastical processes; as for instance marriage questions, benefice questions, patronage questions, church-building questions, &c.” (p. 43). By help of such simple explanations, which are included in the very alphabet of Catholic theology, the Bishop has triumphantly overthrown the whole of Dr. Schulte’s pretentious edifice.

There are but two particulars on which we are disposed to dissent from the Bishop’s polemic. The first of these is his treatment of the “*Unam Sanctam*” from p. 66 to p. 70.

We will not here consider the true intention of this famous Bull: because we wrote at length on the subject in our last number from p. 201 to p. 208, and because we shall again revert to it in another article of the present. But even were we to grant that Boniface VIII. did not define *ex cathedrâ* anything more than the Pope's supremacy in matters purely spiritual, we still do not think that this fact would be the best answer to Dr. Schulte. In the first place such a reply leaves open the retort, that at all events those Catholics who *do* otherwise interpret the Bull, are (on Mgr. Fessler's own admission) compelled by the Vatican Definition to be disloyal citizens. But in the second place and still more importantly, such a reply turns on a technicality, which Protestants will never understand; and which moreover will confirm them in their impression, that Catholics must resort to quibbling and sophistry, in order to reconcile acceptance of the Vatican Decrees with due civil allegiance. We are confident that the one answer, likely to prevail in the long run, is the answer set forth by Cardinal Manning with such singular lucidity and power. Remarkably enough he agrees with the Bishop (which for our part we confess we cannot) in his view of what is defined by the Bull; and yet he refuses to make this view his ground of defence against Mr. Gladstone.* He rests his position on the straightforward and impregnable ground, that every single circumstance has now been changed which "rendered the Pontifical Acts of S. Gregory VII. and Innocent IV. legitimate, just, and right"; and that Pius IX. has no such right to exercise authority over the present German or Austrian or English Empire, as Boniface VIII. had over the several kingdoms of united Catholic Christendom. But more on this in another article of our number.

The second particular, in which we cannot sympathize with Mgr. Fessler's polemic, is his treatment of the Brief "*Multiplices inter.*" In that Brief Pius IX. condemns the proposition, that "Popes have overstepped the limits of their power and usurped the rights of princes"; and Dr. Schulte considers it accordingly to be (on Vatican principles) an infallibly defined doctrine, that no Pope has ever overstepped the limits of his power or usurped the rights of any prince. Now Mgr. Fessler admits (p. 11), that if in this Brief any one proposition had been condemned as *heretical*, he would have admitted the *ex cathedrâ* character of such condemnation; and he grounds his

* "All Catholics are bound to assent to the doctrines declared" in the body of the Bull; "for though they are not here defined, yet they are certainly true" ("Vatican Decrees," &c., p. 64).

case therefore on the fact, that "heresy" is only one of many censures pronounced "in globo" on the contents of the book. But as the Bishop does not of course deny the Pope's power of condemning *ex cathedra* propositions taken "in globo," Dr. Schulte might with some show of reason demur seriously to this reply. On the other hand the Professor's own position is on the very surface untenable. It is quite incredible that, in the mere course of condemning a book (whether *ex cathedra* or otherwise), the Pope should have intended to define incidentally, and as it were by one stroke of his pen, the vast proposition, that during the whole course of Christian history no one Pope has ever once usurped the rights of any one prince. In our view, the true answer to him is undoubtedly that given by F. Newman, in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk (p. 88). It is quite a mistake to suppose that, whenever some proposition is condemned *ex cathedra*, its contradictory is thereby defined as a true theological statement. The proposition is often censured, merely *in the sense in which the condemned writer uses it*. Now the Lima priest, here condemned, included among the rights of Catholic princes that of deposing bishops, determining marriage impediments, &c. &c. When then the proposition is condemned that the Pope has usurped the rights of princes, what is meant is the "so-called rights of princes" which were really the rights of the Church. It is a great excellence of F. Newman's pamphlet, that he has so largely brought this consideration to bear on condemned propositions.*

At last however—even if our criticisms be well founded—two isolated particulars constitute a very small deduction from the otherwise unreserved admiration, with which we regard Mgr. Fessler's onslaught on his opponent. As F. St. John truly says, "with extraordinary labour and patience he has met and refuted one by one" "all the stock objections and erroneous representations" current in the Döllingerite camp. To do this is the direct purpose of his treatise. It was a work, which urgently needed to be done; and which could not have been done more triumphantly, nor with better tact and temper, than it has been by the Bishop. In Germany, where the need of it was so urgent, its success has been proportionate to that need. Directly or indirectly, large multitudes of German Catholics have probably been preserved by it from apostatizing. In particular it seems to have exercised a

* We must admit with regret that, having to write concerning the *Syllabus* immediately on its appearance, we did not sufficiently bear this principle in mind. See our comment on this very proposition in our number for April 1865, p. 482.

singularly powerful effect on the mind of no less a person than Mgr. Hefele; whose Pastoral Letter, in publishing the Vatican Definition, was full of references to it (p. x). It is gratifying to add, that the Holy Father himself, in the course of a Brief concerned otherwise with local diocesan affairs, honoured Mgr. Fessler with the following richly deserved eulogy :

“ We esteem it a very opportune and useful thing to have beaten back the audacity of Professor Schulte, inciting as he does the secular powers against the dogma of Papal Infallibility, as defined by the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. For it is a matter, the true meaning of which not all men, and especially not all laymen, have a thoroughly clear understanding of, and the truth, when lucidly set forth, is wont to expel from properly constituted minds opinions which men perhaps have drunk in with their mother’s milk, to confirm others in a right mind, and fortify them against insidious attacks. Wherefore, if you continue to refute figments of this kind, you will deserve well of our most holy religion, and of all Christian people, in that, like a good pastor, you withdraw them from poisoned pastures. We make known to you, then, the great pleasure you have given Us, both by reason of the book which you have presented to Us, as well as by reason of your most affectionate letters; and We pray that you may receive a rich reward for your deference to Our authority and devotion towards Ourselves.”

All Catholics are in full mutual accord, on the great principles laid down by Mgr. Fessler against the monstrous “figments” to which the Holy Father refers. At the same time we need hardly remind our readers, that there are one or two questions of domestic controversy concerning Papal infallibility, which are by no means without importance. The Bishop has from time to time incidentally touched on these questions, as in fact was inevitable; and it will be more satisfactory therefore, if we consider more particularly the ground which he has taken up thereon. Indeed such consideration is a kind of duty; because we think that some of his expressions might very naturally be taken in a sense, which other parts of his volume show to have been entirely alien from his intention.

(1.) The first particular however to which we would refer, is not one on which the Bishop has fallen into any obscurity or ambiguity of expression at all. We must express our gratification at having his warrant for a doctrine, on which we have always ourselves laid much stress, and of which we expect that as time goes on it will be more and more found to

be one of great practical importance. We refer to the doctrine, that true interior assent is due from every loyal Catholic to various utterances, which are not strictly infallible. We set forth the grounds of our opinion on this head last July (pp. 3-10); * and our only present concern with it is its endorsement by Mgr. Fessler.

For reasons which we shall consider before we conclude, the Bishop does not consider it "an established fact" (p. 5), that the issuing of the Syllabus was an *ex cathedrâ* Act. Nevertheless (p. 6) in the Bishop's view a Catholic is "bound to pay it obedience and submission." And we are thus led to inquire, of what *kind* is this "obedience and submission"? is it the obedience of "obsequious silence," or the obedience of interior assent? † He expressly answers this question at p. 61, note.

What should be the way in which a Catholic should conduct himself as regards these propositions of the Papal Brief, "*Multiplices inter*," June 10, 1851, and also as regards the Syllabus, No. xxiii. (even if they are not doctrinal definitions), see above, 9 (3), and compare Ballerini, "*De Vi ac Ratione Primatûs Romanorum Pontificum*," Veronæ, 1766, cap. xv. § 10.

It is of course plain, that whatever authority the Bishop ascribes to the Syllabus-condemnation of prop. xxiii., he ascribes equally to the Syllabus-condemnation of the other seventy-nine propositions. In conformity then with the Bishop's reference, we turn at once to Ballerini. These are Ballerini's words, the italics being our own.

* We may insert the following extract from what we there said :—"Some persons have found it difficult to understand, what kind of assent it is which can possibly be due, to a judgment not strictly infallible. We have on former occasions given various instances to illustrate its character. Thus, a youth of fourteen years old is being instructed by his father, to whom he has every reason for looking up, in the facts and principles of history; he accepts the whole instruction with unqualified assent, nor does the very thought of its being erroneous in any particular so much as enter his mind. Again, I feel ill, and send for a physician of first-rate eminence, with whose integrity I am intimately acquainted. 'Your case is distressing,' he says, 'but very simple. You have a rheumatic fever; there is no doubt about the matter.' I must be very strangely constituted, if I do not yield firm intellectual assent to this judgment. And considering the intimate relation which exists between the Holy Ghost and the Church, where is the difficulty of supposing, that even those judgments of hers, which are not strictly infallible, are nevertheless watched over with such constant Divine supervision, that the one course of orthodoxy and security lies in humbly assenting to their truth?"

† In July 1874 we argued (p. 7) that no obedience to any teaching Act of the Church can possibly be such as she claims, except the obedience of interior acceptance and assent.

A few remarks must now incidentally be made, on the causes which lead some men to *accuse of error* those Pontifical decrees which brand certain propositions in globo with various censures, if some among such propositions appear to them to be true, and to have been uttered by pious and holy men. But *how idle is such an objection*, any one will readily perceive who considers the peculiar nature of such decrees. For since the censures are many, and many propositions are condemned together in globo and respectively,—in order that the *justice and truth* of the proscription be manifest, it is not necessary that every censure should apply to every proposition, but it suffices if any one censure apply to this or that proposition. . . . Moreover, among the various censures, not all imply falsehood or heresy, but temerity, offence to pious ears, equivocalness, scandal, a captious sense, &c. &c. ; which notes may *justly* be applied to propositions *in some sense true*, but which are *justly condemned by the Church* . . . in such a way that the *true sense* is not on that account to be understood as condemned, which they can bear by a sound interpretation, and in which they have been accepted by pious and holy men. If on this head any one wishes to see fuller remarks, which *most abundantly vindicate from error* the above Pontifical decrees, let him consult Melchior Canus, de Locis, 1, 12 c. 10. Compare also the second dissertation of Cardinal Noris . . . where he shows that the very same propositions and words have been in different senses at one time approved at another condemned by the Church, without any *prejudice to her infallibility* thence arising.*

Mgr. Fessler then considers, that “the way in which a Catholic should conduct himself as regards” the propositions contained in the Syllabus, is to take for granted that those propositions *deserve* condemnation in that sense in which they have *incurred* it. But on what ground does he consider this duty to rest? To understand this, we must look back at the “9 (3)” to which he has referred. That paragraph runs as follows.

Here, in order that we may better understand the subject, it will be well to compare what we are now saying with what is said in the third chapter

* Ballerini's last words surely make it undeniable, that he accounts the Pope *infallible* in all such censures. But Mgr. Fessler was very naturally misled as to Ballerini's meaning, by that theologian's unguarded words in the earlier part of his chapter (n. 37) ; which read as though he confined infallibility to the condemnation of *heretical* tenets.

From one or two expressions of Mgr. Fessler, we are inclined to suspect that he holds a doctrine, which would abundantly explain his reluctance to regard the issuing of the Syllabus as an *ex cathedrâ* Act. He seems to think, that whenever a proposition is condemned *ex cathedrâ*, its contradictory is thereby pronounced to be infallibly true. For our part we heartily follow the opinion, held (as has just been seen) by Ballerini, and which F. Newman so successfully applies. The *ex cathedrâ* censure of a proposition often means no more, than that the proposition is censurable in the particular sense in which the condemned writer has used it.

of the Vatican definition *de fide* ; where it is expressly taught that the Pope possesses the highest power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, "not only in matters of faith and morals, but also in matters of the discipline and government of the Church extended over the whole *orbis terrarum*." . . . Thus there are here distinguished four classes of matters as belonging to the province of things ecclesiastical, which fall under the supreme power of the Pope :

- I. Matters of faith.
- II. Matters of morals.
- III. Matters of discipline.
- IV. Matters of government.

In all these matters the faithful owe a true obedience to the Pope (p. 44).

According to Mgr. Fessler then—at least we do not see how his words can possibly be interpreted otherwise—part of the "true obedience" which "the faithful owe to the Pope" is, that they shall hold every proposition recited in the *Syllabus* to have been justly censured, as understood in the sense in which it has been condemned. Moreover we think that the note of Mgr. Fessler's which we have cited has a special claim on attention, because it has every appearance of having been inserted on a revision of the treatise—perhaps at the suggestion of his censors—to prevent possible misapprehension of his meaning.

(2) We now come to the mention of another doctrine, which we have ourselves always accounted of primary moment, and especially in times like these ; and which nevertheless Mgr. Fessler might on a superficial reading be mistakenly supposed to deny. "Infallibility" says Cardinal Manning ("Vatican Decrees, &c.," pp. 167, 8) "extends directly to the whole matter of revealed truth ; and indirectly to all truths which, though not revealed, are in such contact with revelation, that the Deposit of faith and morals cannot be guarded, expounded, and defended, without an infallible discernment of such unrevealed truths." "This extension of the Church's infallibility," he adds, "is, by the unanimous teaching of all theologians, at least theologically certain ; and in the judgment of the majority of theologians certain by the certainty of faith." In illustration of this doctrine, we may cite Cardinal Antonelli's letter to Count Daru, dated March 9th, 1870, of which we gave a translation in July, 1870, and which has most serviceably been republished by our admirable contemporary the "*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*." Had the Council been enabled to reassemble, a definition (it appears) would have been proposed, pronouncing (under sanction of anathema) that the Church's infallibility "extends not only to the Deposit of Faith, but to all that is necessary for the preservation of

such Deposit." And Cardinal Antonelli, while making the obvious remark that the proposed canon may possibly receive some modification from the Episcopate, nevertheless declares that it is in itself, no more, than "the exposition of the Church's maxims and fundamental principles; principles repeated over and over again in the Acts of former General Councils." *

Now here and there Mgr. Fessler seems on the surface to deny this doctrine. Thus twice in p. 53. "The Pope in his doctrinal utterances only speaks what he finds to be *already part of the truth revealed by God.*" "Assuredly no infallible doctrine will ever be pronounced, which is not *part of the truth revealed by God.* Were the contrary of this possible, then would God have forsaken His Church." It is plain however for two different reasons, that the Bishop intended no such denial. In the first place he mentions (p. 92) the "*Auctorem fidei,*" as being most indubitably a dogmatic Bull. Yet Pius VI. in that Bull (not to mention other of his decisions) defines, that S. Thomas and S. Bonaventure were not on a certain theme so deficient in accuracy and balance of mind, as the Pistoian Synod had alleged:† a proposition which is most certainly no "*part of the truth revealed by God,*" according to the more obvious sense of that expression. Then secondly Mgr. Fessler by no means thinks it certain (p. 92) that the issuing of the Syllabus was not an *ex cathedrâ* Act; and considers it abundantly possible, that the Pope may issue a fresh declaration, which shall give it that character without dispute. But (as is most evident) there is more than one error therein cited, of which no one will dream of alleging that its contradictory is a revealed truth.

The explanation of Mgr. Fessler's ambiguous language is doubtless to be derived from a circumstance, remarked by F. Franzelin in his scholion on infallibility, of which we gave a

* Accordingly Pius IX. has defined as follows :

"*Ecclesia, ex potestate sibi a divino suo Auctore commissâ, non solum jus sed officium præsertim habet, non tolerandi sed proscribendi ac damnandi omnes errores, si ita fidei integritas et animarum salus postulaverint. Et omni philosopho qui Ecclesiæ filius esse velit, et etiam philosophiæ, officium incumbit nihil unquam dicere contra ea quæ Ecclesia docet, et ea retractare de quibus eos Ecclesia monuerit. Sententiam autem, quæ contrarium edocet, omnino erroneam et ipsi fidei Ecclesiæ ejusque auctoritati vel maxime injuriosam esse, edicimus et declaramus.*"—Apostolic Letter, "Gravissimas inter," Dec. 11th, 1862.

† "In eo quod subjungit, sanctos Thomam et Bonaventuram sic in tuendis adversus summos homines mendicantium institutis versatos esse, ut in eorum defensionibus minor æstus accuratio major desideranda fuisset—scandalosa, in sanctissimos doctores injuriosa, impiis damnatorum auctorum contumeliis favens" (prop. 81).

translation in July, 1871. F. Franzelin says (p. 263) that the term "the Deposit" is sometimes used in a stricter, but sometimes also in a wider sense; as including "truths even not in themselves revealed, in so far as they are in contact with revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter." It is in this wider sense doubtless, that Mgr. Fessler uses the term "revealed truth"; and the same consideration explains the language of the Swiss Bishops, cited by the Editor in p. 63.* When it is remembered that even so well informed a Catholic as F. Gratry thought there were Catholics who desired the definition of a "scientific, political, and governmental infallibility"—it will be at once seen, how vitally important it is for good Catholics to do, what Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops have done; to insist on the truth, that the Pope is no otherwise infallible, than in his guardianship of what was once for all taught by the Apostles as revealed truth.†

(3.) We next come to a somewhat cognate ambiguity. In p. 11, while denying that the "Multiplices inter" is a dogmatic definition, the Bishop admits that he would have thought otherwise, if any one proposition had therein been declared "heretical": but since the word "heresy" is but one of various censures pronounced "in globo" on the contents of the condemned work, he thinks there is no proof of the Brief's *ex cathedrâ* character. In like manner, if we rightly understand him, he thinks that if eighty *heretical* propositions had been sent round (designated as such) to the Bishops, under circumstances in every other respect similar to those of the Syllabus—there would have been no possible doubt, that the issuing of such imaginary Syllabus would have been an *ex cathedrâ* Act.‡ These expressions suggest the notion, that

* So F. Newman, who quotes (p. 125) the Swiss Bishops' Pastoral with hearty sympathy, yet regards the Pope as infallible in "his dogmatic condemnation of particular books, which of course are foreign to the Depositum" (p. 118). Moreover he says in effect, that the Pope can teach infallibly whatever has a "necessary connection with dogmatic truth" (p. 116).

† We argued last July (pp. 14—19) that there is no part of the Vatican Definition, which implies ever so distantly the limitation of infallibility to the strict Deposit. We would offer a friendly remonstrance to F. St. John, on his having unintentionally incurred a risk of inducing some reader to think otherwise, by a little inadvertence of his. He has allowed the two words "de fide" to slip into what purports to be a literal recital of the Definition (p. 40). These words would intimately affect its whole bearing.

‡ As the Bishop's words are not quite clear, we subjoin the whole passage. "The Syllabus," he says, "as its title shows, is nothing but a collection of those errors of the age that we live in, which Pope Pius in earlier Rescripts of different dates has declared to be errors, and which accordingly he has

Mgr. Fessler doubted the Pope's competence to pronounce *ex cathedrâ* any censure less severe than "heretical." We might have been sure beforehand that so loyally intentioned a writer as Mgr. Fessler could not deliberately have intended such a tenet; and the notion is at once disproved, by the two circumstances to which we have referred. The "*Auctorem fidei*" swarms (as one may say) with such minor censures; and the Bishop speaks of it as most indisputably and even most obviously infallible. Again the errors recited in the *Syllabus* may, in his opinion, indubitably be at any time condemned *ex cathedrâ*; though most certainly they could not all be condemned as "heretical." What the Bishop intends to say then, is simply this: that the mere fact of a Pope pronouncing some given tenet "heretical," suffices to show that he is speaking *ex cathedrâ*; whereas his mere pronouncement of minor or "in globo" censures, does *not* suffice to prove the *ex cathedrâ* character of his pronouncement. Whether this view of Mgr. Fessler's be well grounded, is a question which we shall consider under our next head.

(4.) There was no more essential part of the Bishop's controversial labours, than to urge (against Dr. Schulte) that Catholics account no official declaration of a Pope to be *ex cathedrâ*, unless there be sufficient indication of his having intended therein to oblige their interior assent. But with great respect we venture to express our opinion, that in stating this essential proposition, he has inadvertently *over-stated* it. He is not content with saying that the Pope must give *sufficient indication* of his intention to oblige, but adds (p. 51) that he must

condemned. The condemnation of errors, according to the traditional practice of the Church, is made in various forms: sometimes they are condemned as heretical; sometimes as savouring of heresy; sometimes as schismatic; sometimes simply as erroneous, or false; sometimes as dangerous, or scandalous, or perverse; sometimes as leading to heresy, or to schism, or to disobedience to ecclesiastical superiors. When a particular doctrine has been condemned by the Pope as heretical in the way designated by the doctrinal definition of the Vatican Council, speaking of the Infallible teaching office of the Pope;—then, indeed, there can be no doubt that we have under these circumstances an utterance of the Pope *ex cathedrâ*. But as in the *Syllabus*, through the whole catalogue of eighty propositions, designated generally in the title as 'Errors' (*Syllabus errorum*), there is nothing to show, as was pointed out above, under what category of condemned propositions, according to old ecclesiastical usage, a particular error falls, we are compelled to have recourse to the records or sources, in which the particular propositions of the *Syllabus* have been on previous occasions condemned by Popes, in order to learn whether it is condemned simply as erroneous, or whether it has some other designation, and notably whether it has been condemned as heretical" (pp. 6, 7). After our best consideration of these words, we cannot ascribe to them any other sense than that given in the text.

"*express* his intention" in the defining Act itself. Yet this is not his deliberate and formed opinion; for he says distinctly (p. 70) that "it serves as a sure mark of a dogmatic definition, when the opposite doctrine is branded by the Pope as heretical." Of course a Pope again and again may pronounce some tenet to be heretical, without *expressing* his intention to oblige interior assent. In fact the very Definition to which the Bishop refers in p. 71, is a case in point; viz. Boniface VIII.'s condemnation of the Manichean tenet as being "false and heretical," that "there are two principles." We should be the very last to deny that Boniface VIII. pronounced this *ex cathedrâ*: what we are pointing out is, that he spoke *ex cathedrâ* without *expressing* any such intention.

But if the Pope's condemnation of any tenet as heretical suffices to show that he is speaking *ex cathedrâ*,—surely by parity of reasoning he equally shows himself to speak *ex cathedrâ*, if he declares that this or that tenet is "erroneous," or "scandalous," or the like; or if he pronounces a number of censures "in globo." One out of many such instances will be Alexander VII.'s Constitution of September 7th, 1665, reprobating certain lax propositions in moral theology. He "condemns and prohibits" these propositions, branding on them certain censures "in globo"; while the precept nevertheless which he *explicitly* imposes on the Catholic flock, is by no means that it shall interiorly regard their condemnation as just, but merely that it shall not "reduce them to practice." No one thinks of doubting that this Constitution was published *ex cathedrâ*; and yet the fact of its being so published is by no means expressed in the Constitution itself.

This consideration seems to land us in Dr. Murray's proposition (*de Ecclesiâ*, d. 20, n. 115), that if the Pope ever officially pronounces some proposition to be "heretical," "scandalous," &c., or some other to be "revealed," "certain," &c., "by this very fact and from the nature of the case he is addressing the Universal Church," and defining infallibly. But in truth the whole body of theologians go even beyond this, by the universal consent with which they account S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian as containing an *ex cathedrâ* exposition of the Faith. Hardly any Pontifical utterance can be named, which has been so prominently pronounced to be *ex cathedrâ* by theologians of every school. In the great Gallican controversy of two centuries back, its *ex cathedrâ* character was the chief fixed point around which the battle raged. "S. Leo's Letter was *ex cathedrâ*," said the Gallicans, "and yet observe that the Council of Chalcedon re-examined it." "No doubt it was *ex cathedrâ*,"

answered their opponents, "but the Council did not re-examine it in any sense which implied its fallibility." Bellarmine is the only exception we ever heard of to the unanimity of theologians on this head. As to the other Ultramontanes, it is the more remarkable that they should so persistently assume its *ex cathedrâ* character, because they might have relieved themselves from much controversial difficulty by calling this into question. For those who may not otherwise have access to it, we will mention that we printed it in our number of April, 1868, pp. 492—497. They will see that it does not hint ever so distantly at any intention of obliging the assent of Catholics. Again, though S. Leo of course calls Eutyches a heretic, he nowhere *says* that it would be heretical or unsound to dissent from that grand dogmatic exposition which he was engaged in defining. The Letter was known to be *ex cathedrâ*, not by any *intrinsic* indication, but from extrinsic circumstances alone.

In some respects a still more significant instance of what we are maintaining, is one on which we have often insisted; the "Mirari vos." Its language does not contain the remotest hint that it was intended *ex cathedrâ*. Yet its author Gregory XVI. declared subsequently in so many words to the whole Catholic Episcopate, that he had, in that earlier Encyclical, "according to the authority given him," "defined" "the Catholic doctrine" concerning the obedience of subjects, indifferentism, liberty of conscience, &c. &c.: moreover that this is the doctrine "which alone it is lawful to follow"; and which, "according to the duty of his office," he had "proclaimed to the whole Christian flock." This fact was most evident from the first: but (as we set forth in January, 1865) it was proved, not by any expressions contained in the Encyclical itself, but only by a series of *extrinsic* indications; by the Letter sent to Lamennais in company with the Encyclical; by the Pope's Letters to various French Bishops; &c. &c.

We gave several other instances in point, in July 1870, pp. 204—206. But we need not proceed further on this topic, as we have so often treated it on earlier occasions.* Nor can we better express what seems to us the truth on the cog-

* There is a passage in p. 44, which would seem to show more clearly than any other, how far Mgr. Fessler is from deliberately intending his full statement of p. 51, as to the necessity (in order to an *ex cathedrâ* definition) of the Pope expressly *stating* that he defines *ex cathedrâ*. These are the words:

"As doctrinal definitions comprehend doctrines respecting the faith as well as doctrines respecting morals, it will often happen in the nature of things that definitions on the latter of these two subjects, viz. morals, will

nisableness of *ex cathedrâ* Acts as such, than in Mgr. Fessler's own words:

I find that in this case, *as in a hundred others*, we can fully rely on the notes which have been given, for they are really good and sound notes; but yet, notwithstanding this, the application of these notes to particular cases may have its difficulties. It is the business of the science of theology to support the different views which may be taken of this question by such arguments as it has at its command, and probably in this way to bring it to pass that the right view should become the generally received view. Should this not take place, then the authoritative decision on the matter may at any time follow (pp. 5, 6).

(5.) There is another statement of the Bishop's, which may be misunderstood by those who do not observe the context in which it occurs. Dr. Schulte, as has been seen, maintains that all "penal enactments against heretics," that "all the different expressions which a Pope may even casually have uttered either in Briefs or otherwise," nay that "all his official Acts" are so many *ex cathedrâ* definitions. "As was to be expected," therefore, says the Bishop (pp. 52, 53), "Dr. Schulte naturally finds a great number of Papal *ex cathedrâ* utterances; I, in accordance with the theological Faculty, find only a few." Dr. Schulte and the Döllingerites maintain invidiously that, according to the Vatican Decree, the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ* almost or quite as often as he officially opens his mouth: whereas all Catholics agree in holding, that doctrinal definitions constitute but a comparatively small portion of his official utterances. But there may be an extreme view on the other side, as well as on Dr. Schulte's. We once heard of some one (we forget whom), asserting, that Pius IX., during the whole of his long Pontificate, has only spoken three times *ex cathedrâ*: viz. in defining the Immaculate Conception, and in confirming the two Vatican Constitutions. No such extravagant statement as this is so much as contemplated by Mgr. Fessler. Not only he implies (p. 93) that the "*Quantâ curâ*" was *ex cathedrâ*; but by saying (p. 92) that "*many of the documents*" on which the Syllabus was founded "*are not utterances ex cathedrâ*," he implies of course that several of them *are* such utterances. But to see

be issued to the universal Church, *in the form of a command or prohibition from the Pope.*"

But we cannot help suspecting that there is some mistranslation here. For in p. 127 the Bishop seems to *separate* himself from "those theologians, who defended the thesis, that the Church's infallibility extends even to general laws of the Church upon matters of discipline."

F. Newman on the other hand (pp. 119, 120) advocates this thesis and explains it very clearly.

his full doctrine on the subject, we will cite a paragraph from the well-known address to the Holy Father, presented by the Bishops in 1867, and to which Mgr. Fessler's signature is appended with that of the rest.

Never has your voice been silent. You have accounted it to belong to your supreme office to proclaim eternal verities ; to smite with the sword of your Apostolic utterance the errors of the time, which threaten to overthrow the natural and supernatural order of things, and the very foundations of ecclesiastical and civil power ; to dispel the darkness which perverse and novel teachings have shed over men's souls ; and to declare, persuade to, and approve all that is needful and wholesome to the individual, to the Christian family, and to civil society : so that at length all may attain to know what it is which every Catholic is bound to (oportet) hold, retain, and profess. For which exceeding great care we render and shall ever render to your Holiness the deepest thanks ; and, believing that Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius, therefore, whatsoever you have spoken, confirmed, and pronounced for the safe custody of the Deposit, we likewise speak, confirm, and pronounce ; and with one voice and one mind we reject everything which, as being opposed to Divine faith, the salvation of souls, and the good of human society, you have judged fit to reprove and reject. For that is firmly and deeply established in our conviction, which the Fathers at Florence defined in their decree on union, that the Roman Pontiff "is the Vicar of Christ, head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians." *

Mgr. Fessler then held, in common with his episcopal brethren, that Pius IX.'s "voice" might be said figuratively "never to have been silent," so frequent had he been in "smiting with the sword of his Apostolic utterance the errors of the time" ; that in those utterances "Peter had spoken by the mouth of Pius" "for the safe custody of the Deposit" ; and that, by means of them, "all may attain to know what it is that every Catholic is bound to hold, retain, and profess."

As regards then this particular statement of Mgr. Fessler's which concerns the comparative paucity of *ex cathedrâ* definitions, it is the reader's exclusive fault if it be misunderstood. But as regards the three earlier statements which we have ventured to criticise, we cannot but think that the case is otherwise. If we supposed indeed that the intention of this volume had been to pronounce on those questions concerning infallibility which have been agitated among Catholics, we certainly could not attach to it any value : but it would be doing the good Bishop extreme injustice to entertain any such supposition. In his very title-page he calls his treatise "A Controversial Reply to Dr. Schulte." He expressly states at starting (pp. 3, 4) what throughout has been in his mind "*the question*

* See the original in Cardinal Manning's "Petri Privilegium," i. p. 122.

at issue": viz. whether on the one hand infallibility has been ascribed by the Vatican Council to every casual expression of a Pope, or whether it has been ascribed only to those utterances wherein the notes, mentioned by the Council itself, are found to combine. He is dealing throughout with an opponent, who had put forth an absolutely incredible tissue of misstatements on the purport of the Vatican Definitions; and it was not to be expected that, in exposing these intolerable falsehoods, Mgr. Fessler would trouble himself to consider carefully the comparatively minute points of difference between Catholic and Catholic. Indeed, to say the truth, he does not impress us as having ever examined these points of difference with any kind of care; contending as he was on a far larger scale, in defence of what is common Catholic ground. On *this latter* ground he has justly earned imperishable gratitude from children of the Church, and hearty gratulation from the common Father of all the faithful: and sorry indeed should we be, if anything we have said were taken as implying, that we do not heartily unite in that gratitude, and submissively sympathize with that gratulation.

We must not however conclude our review of this volume, without saying a few words on the question raised in it concerning the authority of the Syllabus: and the rather, because F. Newman, in his recent "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," holds with Mgr. Fessler (but much more confidently) that the issue of that Syllabus was no *ex cathedrâ* Act. We cannot think that the question is of any great immediate practical importance; because both the writers hold as strongly as we do, that Catholics are bound to regard the eighty propositions as justly condemned in the sense intended by the Pope. Still as we have from the first expressed the very opinion now assailed, we are in some sense called upon, either openly to abandon it, or openly to give our reasons for retaining it. With very great respect for the two eminent writers in question, we must nevertheless frankly say that their arguments have failed to convince us. And as their positions are essentially different from each other, we must begin by explaining what it is which they respectively maintain.

According to Mgr. Fessler, as has been seen, "the way in which a Catholic should conduct himself as regards" the propositions of the Syllabus, is that in virtue of "the true obedience" which he "owes to the Pope" he should take for granted that they have been justly condemned. The Bishop adds however, that as yet there is no sufficient evidence of the Pope having issued the Syllabus *ex cathedrâ*.

As to F. Newman—we are here concerned of course only with that part of his letter which speaks of the Syllabus; and we would refer to our article on “Mr. Gladstone and his Catholic Critics,” for such general remarks as we have to make on his admirable and most powerful treatise. He begins his remarks on the Syllabus by pointing out (p. 78) that the condemnation of propositions “militating” in one way or other “against the Catholic Faith” and censurable therefore in various grades, was no invention of Pius IX., but has been practised from the Council of Constance downwards by successive Popes. He adds that the Syllabus is simply “a collection of such erroneous propositions, as Pius IX. had condemned” from the beginning of his Pontificate down to that period. The Syllabus itself however, he adds (p. 79), is no “official Act” of the Pope’s: “it is nothing more than the digest of certain errors, made by an anonymous writer.” It is *the documents on which it is founded* which are “authoritative” (p. 82); which are utterances of “the Apostolic Voice” (ib.).

Take a parallel case, *mutatis mutandis*: Counsel’s opinion being asked on a point of law, he goes to his law books, writes down his answer, and, as authority, refers his client to 23 George III., c. 5, s. 11; 11 Victoria. c. 12, s. 19, and to *Thomas v. Smith*, *Att.-Gen. v. Roberts*, and *Jones v. Owen*. Who would say that that sheet of foolscap had force of law, when it was nothing more than a list of references to the Statutes of the Realm, or Judge’s decisions, *in which the Law’s voice really was found?* (p. 83.)

The Syllabus itself has no dogmatic force; it addresses us, not in its separate portions, but as a whole, and is to be received from the Pope by an act of obedience, not of faith: that obedience being shown by having recourse to the original and *authoritative* documents, (Allocutions and the like,) to which the Syllabus pointedly refers.” (pp. 81, 2.)

It is in the original documents then, according to F. Newman, that is to be found “the law’s” true “voice”; the declarations which really oblige a Catholic’s belief. In short. Pius IX. has condemned *ex cathedrâ* eighty propositions, just as other Popes have condemned *ex cathedrâ* other censurable propositions. But the Syllabus has fulfilled its whole authoritative function, when it has referred us to certain Pontifical documents, as containing one and all some *ex cathedrâ* condemnation. If we wish to know what that condemnation is, we must refer to those documents themselves.

To our mind nothing can be more intelligible than this view; nor can we see that it is in any way inconsistent with a spirit of the frankest and most loyal submission to the Pope’s teaching authority. We only say that we cannot accept it. Not-

withstanding the authority of Mgr. Fessler and F. Newman, we still venture to hold with much confidence that the issuing of the Syllabus was an *ex cathedrâ* Act. As far as we can see, there would be no difference in practice between the working of F. Newman's view and our own, except these two. (1) In considering the sense in which any given proposition has been condemned,—we should indeed heartily agree with him that the context of the original document is a most important 'guide—but we should also hold, whereas he would deny, that the wording of the proposition in the Syllabus has an important authority of its own. Then (2) such declarations of the Syllabus as that "all Catholics are bound (*debent*) to hold most firmly" a certain doctrine concerning the Pope's civil principedom,—are in his view no Pontifical utterances at all, whereas we regard them as declarations *ex cathedrâ*. As we have already said, we are far from considering this issue as one of much immediate practical importance; and we will content ourselves therefore with sketching briefly the reasons, which appear to us conclusive for our own opinion.

Remarkably enough, neither Mgr. Fessler nor F. Newman has referred to Pius IX.'s oral address, pronounced on June 17th, 1867, to the Bishops assembled from all parts of Christendom to celebrate the Centenary. "In your presence" he said to them "I now confirm the Encyclical '*Quantâ curâ*,' and also the Syllabus; and again place them before you as a rule of teaching." * We are the rather surprised at Mgr. Fessler's not referring to this, because of his language (p. 92) about the importance of some "fresh declaration being made on the subject by the Holy See." Surely here was just such a declaration. However our own contention is of course, that there was no need of any fresh declaration; for that the matter was abundantly plain from the first.

(1.) For what purpose did the Holy Father send the Syllabus to the Episcopate? In order that all the faithful might be taught by their Bishops to avoid the errors there recited. No other answer can imaginably be given to the question. But if so, by commanding its issue he was "defining a doctrine concerning faith or morals, to be held by the Universal Church": viz. the doctrine, that the errors therein recited are condemnable. In other words he was speaking *ex cathedrâ*.

* In July, 1867 (p. 209) we gave this address, as the journals reported it at the time. The words which related to the Encyclical and Syllabus were there given with some unimportant difference of wording; and we believe that what appears in the text is the genuine report.

Since the above first went to press, F. Newman has published his Appendix; in which (p. 147) he does refer to the Holy Father's declaration.

F. Newman objects (p. 79) that the Syllabus "has no mark or seal put upon it, which gives it a direct relation to the Pope"; but we would submit, that the mere fact of its transmission by his command was the most unmistakable of marks and seals. Surely it is altogether inadmissible to suppose, that the Pope can order a list of errors to be published for the Church's instruction, without at the same time assuring her that it is the right list which he is sending about and not some wrong one. Surely it is no more permissible to suppose, that he can command a list of errors to be promulgated throughout the Church without duly authenticating them as errors, than that he can sign a dogmatic Bull without making himself responsible for its contents. Both suppositions alike are possible physically; but we would submit that both alike are impossible theologically.

(2.) Then consider—what F. Newman indeed mentions—the extraordinary *reach* of the Syllabus: the number, heterogeneity, systematic arrangement of the catalogued errors. The document is not less than an elaborate and all-sided protest, against the whole predominant spirit of contemporary thought and contemporary political action. It is surely quite incredible that the Pope should issue so vast (in some sense unprecedently vast) a teaching Act, in any other capacity than as pastor and teacher of all Christians putting forth his supreme Apostolical authority.

(3.) F. Newman says that it is a catalogue or index, made indeed by the Pope's command, but for the contents of which the Pope is not responsible. Now it seems to us, that the very facts to which F. Newman draws attention, tell with their full force, not on his side but on ours. Take e.g. the 77th proposition, that

"It is no longer expedient that the Catholic Religion should be established to the exclusion of all others." When we turn to the Allocution, which is the ground of its being put into the Syllabus, what do we find there? First, that the Pope was speaking, not of States universally, but of one particular State, Spain, definitely Spain; secondly, he was not speaking of the proposition in question directly, or dogmatically, or separately, but was protesting against the breach in many ways of the Concordat on the part of the Spanish Government; further, that he was not referring to any theological work containing it, nor contemplating any proposition; nor, on the other hand, using any word of condemnation at all, nor using any harsher terms of the Government in question than those of "his wonder and bitterness." (pp. 84, 85.)

It is absolutely incredible, that a mere index-compiler would take such a liberty as this; that he would venture to

build so intense a pronouncement as the condemnation of the 77th proposition, on such an Allocution as F. Newman quite truly describes. Or had an index-compiler been so audacious as to do this, the Pope assuredly (instead of sanctioning such a procedure) would have most severely reprimanded him. On the other hand nothing is more easily intelligible, than that the Holy Father himself, on looking back at the Acts of his Pontificate, should have fixed his attention on this Allocution, as on one of the innumerable instances in which the Holy See has consistently protested against breaking up the religious unity of a State wherever it existed; and that he should accordingly have formulated *ex cathedrâ* the doctrine implied by such protest.

Again, what index-maker would have been permitted to insert a clause, that Catholics are bound to "a most firm" acceptance of a certain doctrine, concerning the Pope's civil principedom?

(4.) But further, not only the Allocution just mentioned, but several of the original documents are not in any sense teaching Acts. Several then of the eighty propositions, if they were not condemned in the Syllabus, have never been condemned at all. But this is opposed to F. Newman's fundamental principle, that "the Syllabus is a collection of such erroneous propositions as" the present Pope "has condemned during his Pontificate" (p. 78).

As we just now pointed out, it is most intelligible for the Pope to declare *ex cathedrâ* that he has previously condemned those errors; because he has *implicitly* condemned them, by avowedly acting on the doctrine opposed to them as on the one exclusively true Catholic doctrine. But this is very different from saying that he has condemned them formally in some teaching Act; and he cannot have intended to say this, because the very documents to which he refers the Bishops prove the contrary.

(5.) When the "*Quantâ curâ*" and Syllabus first appeared, they were universally treated as one integral Act; and the only question raised was, whether the said Act were or were not *ex cathedrâ*. As we pointed out at the time, the main body of French Bishops loudly pronounced for the affirmative answer to this question; and the Cardinal-Vicar of Rome, addressing under the Pope's own eye the Pope's own diocese, exhorted the faithful to receive the Encyclical and Syllabus as "the very word of God." Of no single Bishop throughout Christendom was the voice heard on the other side. We still think, as we thought then, that the Holy Father's silence under such circumstances was conclusive of his intention.

(6.) Of late no doubt several eminent writers, even among those who regard the Syllabus-censures as infallibly pronounced, consider nevertheless that their authority rests on entirely different ground from that of the "*Quantâ curâ*." We for our part follow the late F. Schrader, the well-known Jesuit theologian, in adhering to the earlier view. F. Newman indeed (pp. 82, 3) thinks that "the only connection between the Encyclical and Syllabus is one external to them both; the connection of time and organ." But we follow F. Schrader in holding, that there is a close internal connection between the two. Pius IX., towards the commencement of the "*Quantâ curâ*," says that, since the beginning of his Pontificate, he has been occupied with successively condemning "the chief errors of this our most unhappy age"; and he adds, that he is now going to condemn *other* errors, "*which spring forth from the said errors as from a fountain.*" The errors hitherto condemned have been the evil "fountain": the errors condemned in the "*Quantâ curâ*" are the evil streams thence issuing. In company with so express a declaration, there comes to every Bishop Cardinal Antonelli's letter. This letter repeats the statement of the "*Quantâ curâ*," that from the beginning of his reign the Pope has not ceased to condemn the chief errors of this our most unhappy age; and then adds, that the Cardinal is commanded by the Pope to send round to the Bishops a Syllabus of those errors, "*on this occasion and at this time*" in which he also sends them the "*Quantâ curâ*."* What is the obvious inference? The Pope sends them a Syllabus of errors already condemned by him, as supplementary to his condemnation of those *further* errors which *issue* from the former. The Bishops were to have in their hands one *ex cathedrâ* Act, exhibiting the whole mass of anti-Catholic falsehood which he had denounced from the beginning of his Pontificate.

F. Schrader mentions a fact, which seems to us conclusive on this head. A work of his, called "The Pope and Modern Ideas," appeared very shortly before the publication of the Encyclical and Syllabus. In less than a month after the publication of those documents, the Pope's Latin Secretary wrote to F. Schrader by the Pope's command a letter of approbation. In this letter Mgr. Mercurelli spoke of "*the recent Encyclical*," in which shortly after [the appearance

* F. Newman ends his homely paraphrase of the Cardinal's letter (p. 83) with the words "so I send you both at once." But the letter itself, quoted by F. Newman in his note, shows that *by the Pope's order* "both" were to be "sent at once."

of your book] those errors, which had been otherwise and at various times separately condemned, have now again been condemned jointly" (Schrader, "*De Theologiâ generatim*," p. 138, note). The Pope's Secretary then, in an official Letter written by the Pope's command, includes the Syllabus as part of the Pope's "recent Encyclical."

In terminating our remarks on the Syllabus, we willingly make one admission. In doing so, we have to retract an opinion which we have often expressed; but we think we are obliged to retract it, by the dicta of various considerable Catholic authorities both at home and abroad. Our admission is, that no Catholic as such can as yet be under an *obligation* of accepting the Syllabus, in any more stringent way than as Mgr. Fessler accepts it. According to his doctrine (as has been shown above) "a Catholic is bound to pay obedience and submission to the Syllabus"; he is required, in virtue of the "obedience" which he "owes the Pope," to take for granted that the eighty propositions have been justly condemned; but he is not required to regard them as *infallibly* condemned, or condemned at all in any such sense, as that their contradictions, if understood according to the ordinary use of language, are thereby necessarily ruled to be true.

ART. IV.—THE USE AND ABUSE OF RITUAL.

The Contemporary Review for October, 1874.—Article I.

MR. GLADSTONE'S article in the October number of the "*Contemporary Review*" would be pleasant reading on a pleasant subject, were it not for one unhappily notorious passage, which is as much out of place in the midst of its agreeable surroundings as a wasp in the heart of a nectarine. The distinguished author has descanted with great effect on the æsthetical anomalies which our unpoetical countrymen are apt to originate or to tolerate; but we greatly doubt whether he could have found a better instance of such incongruities than that which he himself has supplied, by associating a tirade against Popery with an elegant and scholarlike essay on ritual. Striking as is the contrast in point of style and tone, it is, if

possible, still more violent in point of subject. The Catholic Church is surely the very home of ritual religion. That especial type of divine worship which Mr. Gladstone so happily describes as resulting from the marriage of the inward spirit with the outward form, disappeared from this country with the ancient religion, and has been partially restored only as that religion has come to be better understood among us. It was the Oxford revival of 1833 which indirectly contributed to the movement in favour of a more elaborate and ornate ceremonial than had previously been thought compatible with the teaching and spirit of the Established Church. We say "indirectly," because by the original authors of that movement the importance of ceremonial religion was never advocated, except as a theory. They felt that work had to be done, in the first instance, of far greater moment than any which related to externals; and that to contend for those externals in any such way as might aggravate the unpopularity of the doctrines they desired to enforce, would have been as mischievous as it was useless. Nothing can be conceived less ornate than the early morning service at St. Mary's, largely as it was attended; and even when Dr. Newman had things more his own way at Littlemore, he made no material innovations on the practice of the churches around him. The same is true of Mr. Keble, who by this act of forbearance must have exercised a restraint upon his Catholic sympathies. Dr. Pusey has always disavowed any strong interest in the ritual movement; and Mr. Palmer, another of the Tractarian leaders, had no bias in the same direction. It was left to the disciples of the school to follow out a line of ecclesiastical reform for which they were more fitted than for the learned researches of their teachers, and accordingly it was said that, even in Oxford, curates would venture on certain changes in the service of the Church from which their rectors prudently abstained. In London, however, which was sufficiently far from the scene of action to admit of what in Oxford was impracticable, an attempt was made to improve the character of public worship, which it is needless to say had been extensively accommodated to the ideas and habits of the modern world. Of this attempt, and of its immediate as well as of its remoter effects, we shall speak presently, and, in the mean time, with the aid of the distinguished author of the article under review, proceed to draw out the principle on which ritual religion is founded.

The instinct of propriety which leads to the investiture of principles in an appropriate and significant external form, is universally recognized in all our social relations, and ought to be consulted more especially in those which bind us to the

invisible world, in proportion as these latter stand in greater need of extrinsic assistance. The ceremonial of courts, the uniforms of soldiers, the habiliments of the judicial office, and even the badges and banners of Masonic or benefit societies, are all of them, as Mr. Gladstone well observes; so many popular concessions to this instinct. Nor is it the principle of order or propriety alone which is recognized in our social system. That system involves also a clear recognition of the principle of symbolism. Thus it is that we use white in the marriage ceremony to denote purity, and black in times of mourning to express sorrow; ring the joy bells in token of festivity, and muffled peals at funerals; darken the windows when a corpse is in the house, and celebrate national victories by brilliant illuminations. Thus, again, it is that the red flag is an emblem of danger, or that the presence of the Sovereign in her palace is proclaimed to the world by the imperial standard which floats over it. These various appeals to the eye of the observer tell their tale with a power which words cannot command. They address the intellect through the imagination, and thus vivify its convictions. In fact, the whole theory of ceremonial religion is wrapped up in the well-known lines,—

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quæ sint oculis subjecta fidelibus.

Such an enlistment of the poetry of our nature on the side of religion is one of the benefits which the Catholic Church has conferred on the world, and which those who undertook to reform her three centuries ago, were senseless enough to despise. Instead of the ancient and authorized type of divine worship, they introduced one as dull and prosaic as its predecessor had been graceful and beautiful, and transformed the earthly court of the great King into a store house of pulpits and pews. One might have supposed that there were no difficulties in the way of getting the mass of mankind to realize the truths of the invisible world, and that the walk of Faith is so simple and easy as to warrant us in leaving those whom we desire to pursue it, not only without any help to guide them on their way, but with everything to render it unattractive at the very time when the goal should be before their eyes.

Nothing proves more clearly that the instinct in question has a deep foundation in human nature, than the virulence with which the enemies of the Catholic Church have always fastened on some one or other of her ceremonial practices, and looked upon the resumption of such arrangements as the first step to the restoration of the obnoxious religion. The surplice in England and the organ in Scotland have been at different

times the objects of popular abhorrence, rising even to the level of frenzy. It is curious to observe how readily those who are under the influence of this domineering instinct fall almost unconsciously into the use of language which leads the world to suppose that they regard it with disdain. At one time they talk loudly about the frivolity and puerility of practices which at another they are ready to move heaven and earth to put down. They either know, or act as if they knew, that these practices are neither frivolous nor puerile, but are founded on a principle which they themselves recognize in every department of life. When the attempt was first made, between thirty and forty years ago, to introduce a mere modicum of ritual into a certain proprietary chapel in London, the convulsion which it occasioned among the nervous spirits of the time was something so ludicrous as almost to defy belief. We happen to be in a position to record some of these exhibitions of Protestant alarm, and we do so with the double object of illustrating the point immediately before us, and of contrasting with the present wonderful development of ceremonial in the Anglican Church the inhospitality of its first reception. The introduction of collecting-bags instead of plates at the offertory, was the occasion of a formal remonstrance, on the part of an Anglican dignitary, against a practice which he did not hesitate to denounce as the thin edge of the Popish wedge. In vain did the authorities of the chapel rejoin that their object was to encourage the evangelical rule of secret almsgiving. All would not do. A dish the congregation must have, and a dish they got; and, provided that this dish became the ultimate recipient of the bags, the clergy were told that the objection would be withdrawn. Little did they expect that the dish itself would become the occasion of scandal. A few days later, however, the minister of the chapel received a summons to his bishop, who held in his hand a letter complaining that the aforesaid minister fixed his eyes so intently on the alms-dish that the congregation were inclined to believe that he was paying it an act of idolatrous worship. Other objections to which the same administration was exposed, turned very mainly on the point of symbolism. Lighted candles on the communion-table at morning service were protected by the hazy state of the London atmosphere. But flowers were tolerated only so long as their colour had no reference to the subject of the day. There was one practice, indeed, among the changes introduced into the chapel in question which, strange to say, passed off with little or no remark, although it is now included among the innovations on the received type of public worship which are most obnoxious to the Protestant mind; we mean the central position of the officiating clergyman in the celebration of the

communion service. The archbishops and bishops of the Established Church, in a pastoral letter lately issued from Lambeth, contend that this practice has no especial significance. Yet, surely, it was abandoned at the time of the Reformation because it served to keep up in the popular mind the sacrificial idea of the Holy Eucharist. Whether it actually conveyed this idea to the minds of objectors, is very doubtful. We are more inclined to think that the people at first objected to it as an act of disrespect to themselves, as if the officiating clergyman were gratuitously turning his back on them. Be this as it may, the Reformers were probably right, according to their view of the case, in making the change; for, although there be an exception in the Roman basilicas when the priest consecrates with his face towards the people, the general practice is, undoubtedly, calculated to convey the impression of a more significant act than that which would be suggested by the performance of the rite at the north end of the table.

Yet, if the opposition which ritual religion encountered on its revival be an evidence of its intimate connection in the public mind of England with the religion of olden time, the marvellous advance which it has made during the last quarter of a century is a no less significant proof of the hold which that religion still retains on the intelligent and educated classes of the community. It is very true that the clergy who are engaged in the ritual movement are compelled to fortify themselves against the suspicion of a desire to reintroduce the Catholic religion by vehement protestations to the contrary. Still the movement goes on; and, as we believe that it is on the whole serviceable to the Catholic cause, and have no wish to doubt the good faith of its promoters, we may well leave them to take the course which they consider best calculated to further it.

Mr. Gladstone appears to us to shrink from avowing in so many words that ritual is far worse than useless, if it be not the visible expression of generally-received doctrine. He lays it down in the earlier part of his essay, that its chief end is to satisfy the apostolic precept which requires that all things in the Church of God should be ordered with decency. But this account of the matter would be sufficiently met by a far less amount of ritual than is now claimed and than Mr. Gladstone himself, if we mistake not, would desire. It would in fact be satisfied by little more than a careful correction of irregularities and negligences which had crept into the celebration of divine service in the Church of England half a century ago. Later on, while admitting that there is an accidental connection between ritual and doctrine, Mr. Gladstone argues against the absolute necessity of this connection from the example of the

Lutheran churches on the Continent and the sectaries nearer home. Here we are tempted to think that he sacrifices principle to policy. Such an argument is no doubt well fitted to pacify the public mind under existing circumstances, but can it be colourably sustained? The moment ritual passes beyond the line of decency and order, it must either represent something real, or it involves the very essence of the theatrical. This reality, moreover, must be in the minds of the spectators as well as of the actors in the ceremonial, and we may add should be borne out by the general belief of the Church. Nothing can be imagined more justly offensive in the eyes of the uninstructed observer than a series of genuflections, inclinations, changes of position, and other such deviations from the steady uniformity which he has been accustomed to associate with the idea of divine worship. The Catholic Church herself has too often cause to lament this misapprehension of her ceremonial on the part of strangers, who come to our churches as mere idle critics. But she can well afford to sustain the burthen of the objection since she is supported by the precedents of tradition and the practice of the whole Catholic world in adhering to that invariable rite in which she has invested the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. It is a very different thing, too, whether the objectors be her own members, to whom she is under an obligation of avoiding scandal, or those who are present at her worship merely by sufferance. How is it, in short, where these external observances express neither the dogmatic belief of the Church in which they are practised, nor the habitual convictions of the majority of her members?

It has surprised, we had almost said provoked us, to observe how, with the view of conciliating opponents, the supporters of recent innovations in ritual have unblushingly disclaimed any connection between these changes and the realities which they obviously symbolize. Not only Mr. Gladstone, but, as we have already observed, the assembled archbishops and bishops of the Established Church, have fallen into this line of temporizing policy. We were, if possible, even more amazed to find that the counsel of an eminent ritualist had been instructed to plead, on a recent occasion, before the Court of Arches, that no symbolical meaning is implied by the act of lighting candles in broad day. The very reverse of all this is true of Catholic ceremonial, every part of which is expressive of some great truth. In the Catholic Church, ritual is a help to faith, on the principle that what is received by the ear may be sustained by the eye. The ceremonial of the Mass is a perpetual sermon on the Eucharist; and, in its totality, and the variety of details

of which it is made up, conveys an impression of the greatness of the Action it represents, even to the more intelligent of those who do not attach any distinct idea to its various parts.

The ritual of the Catholic Church implies the expression, or rather the consecration, of four great principles. It recognizes in the first place the dedication to the direct service of the Creator of whatever is most precious in His works, or in the products of man's ingenuity. Nothing is created without an end, and the more precious the work the nobler is the end for which it is destined. No one but an infidel could plausibly maintain that the highest use of gold, silver, or precious stones is to minister to the purposes of luxury or vanity; or that artificers have been endowed with the power of investing these products of nature with forms of exquisite beauty, in order merely to adapt them more perfectly to such transitory and sordid uses. The destination which the Church finds for the ingenious labours of man, she finds also for the productive instincts of those inferior animals whose operations are turned to account in the same direction. The bee and the silkworm play a great part in the manufacture of those objects which bring credit on the rational agents who found on them the results of their artistic skill. The labours of mother-bee are accordingly commemorated by the Church on Holy Saturday, and those of the little worm who is the first spinner of the silk which embellishes the sanctuary on festive occasions, would no doubt have received a similar distinction had a like favourable occasion been presented. All these productions and arts find their providential destiny in the Church. Gold and silver are wrought into chalices and monstrances; diamonds and rubies find their appropriate place in the immediate neighbourhood of the Blessed Sacrament, while the bee and the silkworm help towards the honour of their Creator by furnishing the materials of the splendour which faintly symbolizes His glory in this world of shadows. The remaining three principles to which the external worship of the Church bears witness, are indicated by the provisions of her ceremonial. The first of this latter class is the reverence of the Blessed Sacrament. The care with which this primary duty is enforced and expressed is known to those only who have made a careful study of the rubrics. A number of rules which in the eyes of those who do not understand them would wear the appearance of frivolity, will be found on examination to be directed to this object. Among these may be mentioned especially all such as provide against the loss or desecration of the smallest atom of the sacred species. The same is of course the purpose of those repeated genuflections or inclinations which excite the silly

criticisms of the ignorant spectator. In fact, the scrupulously careful and reverent provisions of the rubrics to those who have no correct idea of the doctrine they embody and illustrate, are like the movements of a dance in the eyes of observers who are stone deaf to the music which prompts them. Another principle which is constantly kept in view in the ritual of Catholic worship, is that of the reverence due to those who are engaged in it. The degree of approximation in which the celebrant and ministers respectively stand towards the Blessed Sacrament is the same with that of their several orders in the Church, and regulates the different gradations of ceremonial respect with which they are treated in the great act of public worship, and relatively also in its less solemn acts. It is thus that the Church keeps up her witness to that rule of respect for authority which is fast dying out of the world. The same is true with regard to the representation which Catholic ceremonial makes of the duty of Christian love and fellowship, which shall be the last of the four specified principles to which the Church does public homage before the world. In the frequency with which the celebrant in Holy Mass turns away from the work in which he is engaged to address the people in the words of pastoral affection, one is reminded of our Blessed Redeemer's threefold withdrawal from close intercourse with His Eternal Father in the Garden of Agony in order that He might cheer the hearts of His disciples. In the interchange of the kiss of peace between the celebrant and his chief minister, the ministers with one another, and afterwards with the clergy, we have a witness to the love which should subsist between the servants of that Lord who first loved them and laid down His life for them. It is worthy of remark that the Church, with her usual consideration, makes none of these ritual illustrations absolutely indispensable except those which are universally practicable. The reverence of the Blessed Sacrament demands that the chalice and patten should always be of precious metal, or at least of that into the composition of which some precious metal enters. An altar-stone is likewise essential, though it may be inserted in a wooden table. Had the latter provision of the Church been generally known and borne in mind, the controversy on stone altars by which the minds of Anglicans were at one time so seriously disturbed, would never have been raised. The Holy Sacrifice has frequently been offered in the humblest dwellings of the poor, and on tables which, at other times, might be lawfully converted to domestic uses; and with such sacrifices our Lord, as we may believe, has been as well pleased as with those which have been offered on altars of marble and in vessels of gold. There are houses of Religious

novices in which High Mass is not celebrated from one year's end to that of another. But in the essential provisions of ceremonial the Church allows no latitude and tolerates no exception. S. Ignatius of Loyola, than whom none could lay a less urgent stress on what may be called the luxuries of public worship, is imperative in requiring of his ordained subjects the most scrupulous attention to the duty of rubrical exactitude.

In thus defining the use of ritual religion, the Church has entered her silent protest against its abuse. If there be one thing more hateful to her than another, it is that very spirit of formalism and excessive care for externals which is one of the most hackneyed of the popular charges against her. This prejudice is not to be wondered at, considering that she is chiefly known to the critical world by those great public celebrations which form the exception to her more habitual modes of worship. The temporary cessation of the Holy Week services at Rome, however lamentable as involving a partial eclipse of the Church's outward splendour, is not without its providential compensation in proving to the world that the king's daughter is none the less glorious within because stripped for the moment of her vesture of varieties. The leading form which the abuse of ritual is apt to assume is the practice of attributing an exaggerated importance to anything in religion which is purely external. But it will have appeared also from what has been said, that all the ceremonies of the Catholic Church are eminently characterized by the note of reality. Not one of them is superfluous or introduced simply for effect. There is accordingly as little reason for calling them theatrical as for saying that they are needlessly multiplied. The essence of the theatrical is show without reality. If the ceremonies of the Church be effective, it is simply because they are real; they resemble the vesture of nature, which is so beautiful in its impression on the eye that we are tempted to think its only purpose is to delight our senses and recreate our spirits. Such, no doubt, is eminently its effect; but there is not a combination of scenery which satisfies the idea of the picturesque, not a colour in the petal of a flower or the plumage of a tropical bird which does not answer some purpose more immediate than that of illustrating the glory of the Creator, and the beauty of His heavenly palace in the sight of a thankless world. In the same way the Council of Trent assigns the edification of those who assist at the offices of the Church as a reason, secondary to that of their diviner use, for rendering them beautiful and attractive. We desire to speak with all possible consideration of the recent revival of ceremonial religion in the Church of

England, and are far from joining in that indiscriminate condemnation of its promoters which some of their extravagances are certainly calculated to provoke. But it is hardly possible from the nature of the case that they should not be in danger of one or both of those serious abuses to which we have just adverted. The natural force of reaction from the state of neglect which during a long period of religious indifference had crept into the worship of the Established Church would issue, in spite of attempts to prevent it, in an exaggerated estimate of the importance of ritual. We must bend a stick strongly in the opposite direction to that into which it had swerved before we can expect it to settle in its normal position. Again, it is not surprising that ritual should have outrun the limits of doctrine, which is far more difficult to establish than itself. Hence the ritualists, to use a familiar illustration, have put the cart before the horse, and sought to ground doctrine on ritual, instead of leaving ritual to grow out of doctrine.

What is to be the end of this wonderful movement in the Church of England? Wonderful indeed it is when we consider the rapidity and extent of its growth, and the untowardness of the soil and climate in which it has flourished. As to the argument which represents it as independent of Roman influences, and supposes that it will stop short of Roman results, we cannot but regard such a mode of reasoning as too evidently interested to be either plausible or creditable. The rubrics of the Prayer-book are strained if not violated in order to justify the new practices; the voice of living authority is unheeded, and its mandates defied in order to find a place for them. It is to our churches that ritualists must have recourse for their ceremonial arrangements; our magazines to which they resort for their altar breads, thuribles, vestments, and other appurtenances of divine worship; our treatises which they consult for the details of a ritual which finds no recognition in their own. It is equally unreasonable to contend that the movement has no tendency to favour the progress of Roman Catholicity in this country. It was once said by an acute observer of human nature, "If a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the laws of a nation." We might say also, Give us the externals of a nation's worship, and we will tell you its religion. This truth was fully appreciated by the Reformers of the sixteenth century, and will sooner or later become apparent to the Reformers of the nineteenth. They are doing for us a work which we could never have done for ourselves; the work of accustoming the English mind to the true Catholic type of worship. They are doing, with all the advantages of a

favourable prestige, what we can but slowly effect against the tide of an adverse prejudice. The future of English religion is a great question, and for many reasons a painful and alarming one, and we fall back with comfort on the thought that its response does not rest with us. But as to that limited portion of the ground which is covered by the subject under consideration, the ultimate issue is at once easier to foresee and pleasanter to contemplate. The ritual movement, though it may stay, will never satisfy the spiritual cravings of the more earnest among its promoters. It is manifestly paving the way not for the consolidation but for the dissolution of that Establishment in which it exists as a thoroughly uncongenial element. When its work shall have been accomplished, one of two events may be expected to follow. Some of the party will adopt the wiser course of submission to the Catholic Church ; while others will seek to form an independent communion, which, however true its doctrine and venerable its practices, will exhibit the essential characteristics of a sect. There was at one time another hypothesis—of all the most repulsive to Catholic reason—that of a corporate union with the Catholic Church. But this dream has now at all events been dispelled by Mr. Gladstone, and others who have made common cause with him against the Vatican Council. We will end with the expression of an anxious hope that, whenever the inevitable crisis may arise, we Catholics of England may be found to have so far improved our opportunities as to be adequate to the duties which so serious an addition to our responsibilities must of necessity bring with it.

ART. V.—SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.

Supernatural Religion: an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.
In 2 volumes. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1874.

"*Supernatural Religion.*" By Professor LIGHTFOOT. Article I. In the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1874.

A Reply. By the Author of "*Supernatural Religion*," in the *Fortnightly Review* for January, 1875.

"*Supernatural Religion.*" By Professor LIGHTFOOT. Article II.: "On the Silence of Eusebius," in the *Contemporary Review* for January, 1875.

"*Supernatural Religion.*" By Professor LIGHTFOOT. Article III.: "On the Ignatian Epistles."

SOME time since we expressed our judgment on the critical value of the book which stands at the head of this article, and when we have done examining the account which it gives of the historical evidence for the four Gospels, our readers will be able to judge of the reasons for our opinion. Meantime, without repeating what we have said already, we may begin by pointing out the position which the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" holds with regard to German critics on the negative side. Their names appear often enough in his pages—oftener, perhaps, than in those of any other work which has ever come before the English public; and although the crowd of references which he has copied from others indicates neither learning nor labour of his own, it does mark his respect for the labour and the learning of Germany. Yet the contrast between him and the German critics to whom he constantly appeals can hardly be exaggerated. The latter, however they may fail in soundness of judgment, or impartiality, or consistency, are for the most part competent scholars: they address themselves to a learned audience, and they write with the fear of opponents, who are familiar with the subject, before their eyes. If they are driven into extravagant theorising, this is precisely because they are aware of the facts which they have to meet and reduce at all costs into harmony with their conclusions. The author of "*Supernatural Religion*" pursues an easier path, and journeys on to his conclusions without meeting many obstacles on the way. When passages by early writers are in question, he settles the whole matter at the outset by a false translation, in the happy unconsciousness all the while that he is setting the most elementary rules of Greek and Latin grammar at defiance. He

is equally ready to invent facts, to quote manuscripts against the very readings which they contain, to indulge in long discussions which abound in irrelevant matter while they never touch the chief difficulty which he is bound to face. All this explains the confidence and even the plausibility of his reasoning, for it is reasoning which proceeds on premises which he has constructed for himself. It enables us further to understand the success of his book. Most of his readers know little or nothing about the matter of which he treats; they are ready to take the facts as he gives them; they are pleased by the absence of subtle theory, by the show of simplicity and of common sense; in short, they are charmed to find criticism so easy, and do not stop to inquire whether the book is the work of a critic at all.

The want of competent knowledge explains another peculiarity in the position of the author. It is not only that he reaches his conclusions more easily than the leaders of the sceptical school; he outstrips them in the conclusions which he reaches. On particular points he maintains theories, some of them refuted long since, and abandoned even by the Tübingen school, some of them inconsistent with each other; and on the whole matter he arrives at conclusions in comparison with which the tenets of the most sceptical among the German critics are moderate and cautious. These conclusions he sums up in clear and straightforward terms. "After having exhausted," he says (vol. ii. p. 248), "the literature and the testimony bearing on the point, we have not found a single distinct trace of any one" of the synoptic Gospels, "during the first century and a half after the death of Jesus. Only once during the whole of that period do we find any tradition even that any one of our evangelists composed a Gospel at all; and that tradition, so far from favouring our synoptics, is fatal to the claims of the first and second." In page 387 of the same volume he asserts that during the same period "there is no certain trace even of the existence of the Gospel" ascribed to S. John. This is his thesis, and we propose to test the reasons on which he grounds it by examining, briefly of course, and without pretence of completeness, the historical evidence for the authenticity of the Gospels. A few words will suffice to explain the details of our plan, and its fitness for conveying an adequate idea of the book which we are reviewing.

But first of all we must lay down a principle which is obvious in itself, but which needs to be stated none the less because it has been obscured by the Protestant theology. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament never were intended, and in the early Church they never were accepted, as the one authoritative standard of doctrine. Our Lord committed His Church to the

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teaching not of a book but of His apostles; and they in turn provided for a succession of faithful men, who were to continue the tradition of their oral teaching. The New Testament then had a definite authority as the inspired record of Christ's life and of apostolic doctrine, but the Scripture never was the sole rule of faith: the private interpretation of its books was not a rule of faith at all for the individual Christian. It is because of this, because the Church had in Tradition a source of doctrine by the side of Scripture, that the canon of the New Testament has a history of its own and has undergone a gradual development which we are able to trace in its successive stages. S. Irenæus, with all his reverence for the New Testament, contemplates a state of things in which the apostles might have provided for the continuance of the faith without leaving any writings,* and speaks of barbarous nations which had accepted and retained the teaching and the traditions of the Church without ability to read the Scriptures.† Moreover, for centuries after his time the Church was content to tolerate great differences of opinion with regard to the authenticity and the authority of a few among the books which found their place at last in the canon of the New Testament, and the first Œcumenical Council met and separated without settling or even discussing these questions.

Now it is true that there is no trace in the whole history of the Church of any doubts within her pale about the authenticity and authority of the four Gospels; still it is essential to keep in mind the principle which we have just stated if we wish to weigh accurately the historical evidence for the Gospels themselves. Tradition and the Gospels constitute the twofold authority for Christ's life and teaching; and hence we find that the appeal to the latter has varied from age to age, alike in its nature and in its frequency. Thus while the actual disciples of the apostles were still living and working in the Church, there was little of formal appeal to the Gospels as inspired documents: the very use of the Gospels is far less frequent and far less distinct than in later times. The Gospels came into greater prominence and were separated more clearly from uncanonical books, when the generation which had seen the apostles passed away; and a generation later, in her conflict with Gnostic heretics, who denied her claims and repudiated her teaching, the Church appealed to the Gospels as the title-deeds of her inheritance, and gave full and ultimate expression to her belief in their divine authority.

Taking this principle for granted, we shall divide the history of the evidence for the canonical Gospels into three periods. We shall set out from the testimonies of the Fathers in con-

* Iren., iii. 4, 1.

† Ib. 2.

flict with Gnosticism, that is to say of S. Irenæus, of Clement of Alexandria, and of Tertullian. We shall see how much this evidence involves, and how far it is confirmed by the little which remains to us of writers, whether within or without the Church, who lived a little earlier in the same generation. We shall pass from them to the time of S. Justin Martyr, (140—167) an age when the Church could point no longer to men who had conversed with the Apostles, and when, as if by natural consequence, we obtain the earliest notice that the Gospels were read publicly in the Churches. We shall conclude by examining the traces of the existence and the evidence for the authenticity of the Gospels in the writings which have come down to us from the disciples of the Apostles themselves. The apostolic Fathers wrote with the living words of the Apostles "ringing in their ears,"* and they had little motive for reference to their writings. Their evidence for the authority of the Gospels is neither full nor complete, still if we examine it carefully, if we consider it as history compels us to do, in its inseparable connection with the later tradition, we shall find that this evidence does not fail to be sufficient, because it is fragmentary and indirect.

In following this plan we shall consider the statements of "Supernatural Religion" so far only as they run counter to our own argument. In this way we give the best security that we are not selecting incidental mistakes while leaving the main theory of the book untouched. The mistakes with which the book abounds are enough to ruin its pretensions were they made ever so much by the way. But we prefer to forego, at least in the body of this article, any animadversions on blunders which do not immediately affect the argument, and we have the further satisfaction of knowing that our mode of treating the subject is different from that which Professor Lightfoot has marked out for himself in the thorough exposure which he has made of "Supernatural Religion" in the *Contemporary Review*. Here and there we shall have to refer to his articles, and to the reply which his opponent has made in the "Fortnightly."

The book before us does not deny that in the last decade of the second century our Gospels were acknowledged and received, but it does not betray the faintest notion of the weight which the testimony of the Fathers who wrote at that time carries with it. Our author says little on the evidence of S. Irenæus, who wrote the greater part of his

* Iren., iii. 3, 3.

book against heretics before 190, except that he gives a long extract in which that Father insists that there are but four Gospels, and appeals to the four winds, to the four regions of the world, and to the four faces of the Cherubim, in support of his statement.* Now the mystical reasons which Irenæus gives for the fourfold number of the Gospels, do but serve to show how absolutely the authority of the four Gospels was to him a first principle placed beyond all possibility of dispute, at least within the Church, by an immemorial tradition. "Nay, so certain," he says, "is the authority of the Gospels that even the heretics themselves bear witness in their behalf."† He is unable to imagine a time when the Church was without four gospels. "It is impossible," he tells us, "that the number of the Gospels should be greater or less than it is," and he finds this number foreshadowed in the order of Nature, and in the covenants of Grace which God has made with his creatures.‡ The use which Irenæus makes of the Gospels, and the mode in which he cites them are proof that their authority had been acknowledged time out of mind within the Church. His quotations from the Gospels amount according to Tischendorf's estimate to about four hundred, and of these some eighty are taken from the Gospel of S. John.§ He attributes to them a verbal inspiration: || he classes them in express terms with the rest of the Scriptures.¶ It is needless to point out that this separation of the canonical gospels from other writings must have been a work of time, for our argument is not merely that S. Irenæus witnesses to the Existence of the Gospels, not even that he takes for granted their authority and their inspiration, but further that he speaks of them as books collected and set apart, as composing the one "Gospel which is fourfold but bound together by one spirit."** Further, if time was needed before the Gospels could be thus set apart and regarded as forming a single gospel, much more was time needed before the New Testament could be looked upon as a whole, before its books could be classified, before this classification could become so familiar that S. Irenæus might refer to it without need to explain his meaning; yet all this was complete some time before 190, when S. Irenæus wrote. Just as the Jews divided their sacred writings into the Law and the Prophets, so S. Irenæus alludes to the division of the New Testament Scriptures into two parts (*εὐαγγελικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικά*)†† as they relate more

* Iren., iii. 11, 8.

† Iren., iii. 11, 7.

‡ Iren., loc. cit. 8.

§ Tischendorf Origin of the Gospels, Eng. transl., p. 35.

|| Iren., iii. 16, 2.

¶ ii. 27, 2.

** iii. 11, 8.

†† i. 3, 6.

immediately to our Lord or to His apostles. In short, in S. Irenæus we find the canon of the New Testament universally recognized, and the greater number of the books which had a place in it fixed beyond dispute. It is true that there was still doubt within the Catholic Church, not of course as to the authority and authenticity of the Gospels, but as to that of some among the books which form part of our New Testament. This, instead of weakening the evidence for the Gospels, supplies a strong argument in their favour. The books of the New Testament which were not, so far as we know, recognized by S. Irenæus, were still the subject of doubt in the time of Eusebius, nay, it is not till the close of the fourth century that their place in the New Testament was fixed beyond dispute. So slow, so gradual, was the growth of the canon. Yet the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" asks us to believe that there is no trace even of the existence of our Gospels down to 180, and then that at most ten years later their divine authority, their origin, their place in a new testament, equal in authority to the old, is assumed as a first principle by S. Irenæus. This theory is peculiar to himself. No German critics venture to put such a tax upon our credulity, and no critic at all would commit himself to such a hopeless absurdity.

This is not all. S. Irenæus was brought up in Asia Minor, the very place in which S. John was supposed to have written his gospel, and he had listened in his youth to the teaching of S. Polycarp, who, as he tells us, was the disciple of S. John. We cannot fix the exact date at which Irenæus knew Polycarp, but we know from his own words that S. Irenæus was old enough to understand S. Polycarp's discourses, to treasure them up, to remember them accurately, and to make them the rule of his own doctrine. We know, further, that S. Polycarp used to enlarge on his remembrance of S. John and of his sayings, and to relate what he had heard from other disciples of Christ.* If we suppose that in his youth S. Irenæus had never heard of S. John's Gospel, that he had never heard Polycarp allude to it, his position becomes unintelligible, he must have been able to remember a time when the fourth gospel was unknown to him, its doctrine, if he had known nothing before except uncanonical gospels, or perhaps our synoptics must have made a revolution in his religious ideas, and he must have been struck by the fact that S. Polycarp, S. John's disciple, knew nothing of his fourth gospel or its mysterious teaching, that he himself had heard nothing of it during a month spent in S. John's country, and

* See the Fragment of Irenæus, apud Euseb. H. E., v. 20.

amidst the generation which had known that Apostle. In spite of all this, when he came to write he asserted the absolute impossibility that the number of the gospels should be more or less than four. So unconscious was he that he had advanced beyond the doctrines of S. Polycarp, that he reminds a friend, who had lapsed into the Gnostic heresy, of his master's teaching, to which they had listened together in their youth, and tries to recall him to the memory and to the faith of the ancient saint. This difficulty has been keenly felt on the sceptical side, and to escape from it, some have ventured on the hypothesis that S. Polycarp was not the disciple of S. John at all. This is to escape one difficulty by falling into another, for the connection of S. Polycarp with S. John is attested by S. Polycarp's own words as reported by S. Irenæus who heard them. It is fair to add that more moderate critics even in the Tübingen school have declined to carry their scepticism so far as this. With all their opposition to the authenticity of the fourth Gospel they shrink from defending their theory by an open breach with historical fact.

There is another point at which S. Irenæus touches the apostolic age. He frequently quotes the sayings of men who belonged to an age which was already past. Sometimes he adduces one of these ancient authorities, sometimes several of them together. He speaks of them as "superior to himself," "better than himself," as "men of the old time," as men who "had gone before." Sometimes he describes them more fully as "presbyters (or ancients), disciples of the apostles"; or, again, he speaks of a "presbyter who heard from those who had seen the apostles."* Long before S. Irenæus, Papias, the companion of S. Polycarp, collected traditions from these "presbyters" in a book which S. Irenæus uses. It has been conjectured by Tischendorf, by Westcott, and by other critics that Irenæus derived the dicta of these "presbyters" which he alleges, from the lost work of Papias. Be that as it may, it is certain that Irenæus uses the word "presbyter" to denote a man of Christian antiquity, that it indicates in him and in other Fathers what has been well called an "historic old age."† Now, S. Irenæus does not bring these "presbyters" forward as vouchers for the authenticity of the Gospels. It never occurs to him that historical evidence was either demanded or needed for the authorship of our Gospels. But we can extract from

* See Routh, *Rel. Sacr.*, i. p. 47, seq., where the passages in Irenæus relating to these presbyters are collected.

† By Rothe in his *Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche*, where the whole subject is discussed, p. 417, seq. That *πρεσβύτερος* may refer to age, not to office is clear from Clem. Rom. i. 3 et 21.

these "presbyters" evidence for the authenticity of the fourth gospel, which is all the stronger just because it is given indirectly. In the fifth book (c. 33, 8) Irenæus relates a tradition of the "presbyters who had seen John, the disciple of the Lord," with regard to the millennium; then he quotes, for the same purpose, Papias, who had heard John, and proceeding from the millennium to the vision of God which is to follow it; he recurs in c. 36 to the presbyters, and cites from them an interpretation which they gave of a verse in S. John's Gospel. The author of "Supernatural Religion" spends several pages* in considering this argument, and he meets it in a manner which we are obliged to call characteristic. He mistakes an infinitive for an indicative, he aggravates this mistake by turning a present into a future, and having thus transformed the sentence in question, he argues that the exposition of S. John which belongs to the presbyters belongs to Irenæus himself. Having thus secured his ground he goes on to rate Westcott and Tischendorf in the severest language, because they had not anticipated him in this extraordinary blunder, while to do him justice he had provided sufficiently for their reputation by quoting the Greek of S. Irenæus in a foot note. We had intended to repeat it here when we found that Professor Lightfoot's clear exposition of the whole matter saved us this necessity. The author has tried to defend himself in a reply which he has made in the *Fortnightly*, and he has taken shelter under the authority of various German critics. The most charitable thing we can say of this defence is that the learned author has made another confusion. The critics whom he names deny that Irenæus is quoting Papias, not that he is quoting the Presbyters. The former they have a right to do, the latter they do not do, and, knowing the elements of Greek grammar, could not do.

We have dwelt at some length on the testimony of Irenæus, and we must dismiss that of his contemporaries, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, in a few words. Clement quotes several uncanonical gospels,† and if we knew him only from extracts, we might believe with the author of "Supernatural Religion" that he quotes the Gospel according to the Hebrews "as an authority" with quite the same respect as the other Gospels (p. 427, vol. 1). The fact stands thus:—Clement was not like Irenæus in direct conflict with Gnostics, who introduced a multitude of apocryphal Scriptures. He has not the same

* S. R., ii. p. 326, seq.

† We have given their names with the references in an article on "Gnosticism and the Rule of Faith in S. Irenæus." DUBLIN REVIEW, January of this year, p. 89.

motive for caution. He quotes uncanonical gospels as sources of tradition, and one of them, at least, with the formula "it is written." But he was far removed from doubt as to the paramount authority of the four Gospels. When the Gnostic Cassian alleged a passage from the "Gospel according to the Egyptians," Clement's reply is simple and ready. "This is not in the four Gospels which have been handed down to us."* He, too, carries us back into a higher antiquity. He, too, quotes a tradition of "the Presbyters who were from the beginning" (παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνέκαθεν πρεσβυτέρων), not be it remembered for the authenticity of the Gospels, he does not hint at any need for proof on this head, but for their historical order and the special purpose with which each was written.†

Tertullian (160—220) furnishes one kind of evidence for the Gospels which Irenæus and Clement, who wrote in Greek, could not give. We learn from him that there were in his time several Latin translations of the New Testament‡ in common use. One of these versions enjoyed a special authority, so that Tertullian, in quoting the beginning of S. John's Gospel, has to explain that he is deviating from the common interpretation.§ Elsewhere, when he had deserted the Church, he attacks a particular rendering in this version for having introduced a misconception among Christians.|| The author of "Supernatural Religion" tells us a good deal when it suits his argument about the slow multiplication of manuscripts in ancient times.¶ Here we have not a manuscript, but several translations of the New Testament, or rather perhaps one translation which had undergone several recensions familiar to the Church of Africa. This argument has been discussed on all sides in investigations of the history of the canon, and it is surprising to find a writer who makes ostentation of putting his readers in full possession of the facts, passing it over without remark.**

This, then, is the testimony of the Fathers at the close of the second century. Irenæus speaks for Asia Minor and Gaul; Tertullian for Africa and Rome; Clement for Alexandria. They regard the authority of the four Gospels as fixed and certain; they add the witness of an earlier age to their own, and the evidence which they furnish may be fairly taken as a

* Strom. iii. 13, p. 553, ed. Potter.

† Apud Euseb., vi. 14.

§ Adv. Prax., 5.

¶ S. R., ii. p. 140.

‡ Adv. Marc., ii. 9.

|| Monog., 11.

** Of course the old Latin version is an evidence for the Gospels which falls within the period which our author has marked out for himself.

sample of evidence which they withhold, because they have no thought of giving evidence at all. We proceed to the fragments and the brief writings which remain from our first period between 190 and 160, and come into closer combat with "Supernatural Religion."

We begin with an epistle addressed by the churches of Vienne and Lyons to the churches of Asia Minor, in the year 177. It was written possibly by S. Irenæus himself, certainly under his eye, for when it was written he had been for some time a Presbyter of the Church at Lyons, and was about to become its Bishop. Considering this, it would be strange if this epistle contained no reference to our Gospels, and at the same time a certain reference to an apocryphal one. However, our author is free to chose his own thesis, and we shall let him state it in his own words. "The letter," he says, "speaks of a certain Vettius Epagathus, whose life was so austere that, although a young man, he shared in the testimony (*μαρτυρία*) of the elder Zacharias. *He had walked of a truth in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless*, and was eager in kind offices,* &c. Westcott claims the clause which we have marked in italics as an obvious reference to S. Luke's Gospels, where the identical words are applied to the same person, viz. Zacharias. However, according to the author of "Supernatural Religion," "no written source is indicated" "therefore the allusion cannot in any case be ascribed to one particular gospel to the exclusion of others no longer extant." Moreover, Tischendorf and Hilgenfeld are agreed that the reference to Zacharias indicates acquaintance with a gospel different from our third, *i.e.*, with some older form of the Protevangelium Jacobi. After three or four pages of discussion on this point, the conclusion is stated thus, "It follows clearly, *and few venture to doubt the fact*, that the allusion in the epistle is to a gospel different to ours, and not to our third Synoptic at all."† Later on, we are informed that there is no ground for supposing that the epistle makes any use of S. John's Gospel.‡ Now, we "venture to doubt" these facts. The modern authorities quoted reduce themselves to one, for Tischendorf does not enter upon the question: he merely gives Hilgenfeld's opinion that there is a reference to the Protevangelium Jacobi, and expresses his agreement. This makes our case easy. Hilgenfeld is a critic of great name, perhaps the

* S. R., ii. p. 201. The letter is given by Euseb., H. E., v. 1. The quotation from St. Luke occurs in v. 1, 9.

† S. R., ii. p. 204.

‡ Ib., p. 381.

very greatest amongst those who deny the authenticity of all the Gospels. Yet not only does he doubt the "facts" as given in "Supernatural Religion," but he, asserts as beyond all doubt, that the very passages in the epistle which are so contemptuously set aside by the author of "Supernatural Religion" are clear references to the third and fourth Gospels. Further, nobody as we shall see can pretend to maintain that there is a reference to the Protevangelium Jacobi, unless first of all he admits a reference to S. Luke. Finally, we shall complete our refutation by showing that there is no reference to this Protevangelium at all.

First, then, the testimony of Zacharias is taken word for word from S. Luke i. 6, * nor is there anything like it in the Protevangelium from beginning to end. Our opponent objects that there is no express reference to S. Luke. True, but neither is there any express reference to the Protevangelium. He goes on to say that, according to the epistle, Vettius Epagathus was "more full of the spirit than Zacharias" (τὸ πνεῦμα πλείον τοῦ Ζαχαρίου), and that "such an unnecessary and invidious comparison would scarcely have been made had the writer known our Gospel and regarded it as inspired." Here we have a marvellous instance of mistranslation; but let that pass. The letter says that Epagathus had the "Paraclete within him to a greater extent than Zacharias." There is nothing invidious in preferring a Christian martyr to Zacharias, who lived under the old law, and the whole point of comparison depends upon an implied allusion to S. Luke's words "Zacharias was filled with the Holy Spirit" (i. 67). The references to S. John are just as certain. "That which was spoken by our Lord," we read (i. 15) "was fulfilled; a time will come in which everyone who slays you will think that he offers a service to God." This agrees almost verbally with the words of Christ, found in S. John (xvi. 2) and nowhere else, "the hour cometh that everyone who slays you will think that he offers a service to God." There is a further allusion to S. John's Gospel in the description of a martyr's sufferings (§ 22), in the midst of which he was "bedewed by the heavenly stream of the water of life which issues from the breast of Christ." This use of the Gospels would be made more certain if it were not absolutely certain as it is, by the fact that quotations occur in the same epistle from the Acts of the Apostles, and one of the

* Allowing of course for the changes of number and tense which the writer has to make in order to introduce St. Luke's words into his own sentence.

Pastoral Epistles for both of which there is less early evidence than for the Gospels.

Hilgenfeld is practically the only modern critic to whom our author appeals on this matter, and we find him passing judgment as follows:—"In this epistle," he says, "we see besides the Gospel of Luke (here he refers to the very passage we have been discussing) and of John (here again he gives the same references which we have given above), the Acts of the Apostles, the Pauline epistles, and the Apocalypse, in ecclesiastical use, this last being quoted as Scripture."* Scholten,† another favourite authority of our author, says the same thing, and with the same confidence; nor are we aware that any critic who has discussed the matter decides differently. What becomes of the "*few* who venture to doubt" that there is no allusion to S. Luke's Gospel?

Our author himself is committed unaware to the same conclusion. He follows Hilgenfeld‡ in holding that there is also an "allusion" to the Protevangelium Jacobi. But why does Hilgenfeld believe in this allusion? The epistle mentions, as he thinks, the "martyrdom" of Zacharias. Now, an allusion to the "martyrdom" of a Zacharias would prove nothing; but the Zacharias of the epistle must, he proceeds, be the father of S. John the Baptist, because there is "verbal agreement" between the description of him in the epistle and that of Zacharias in Luke i. 6; and the martyrdom of this Zacharias is mentioned only in the Protevangelium. We have but to remember that Zacharias and Vettius are compared with respect not to their death but to their lives; and that *μαρτυρία* often means no more than testimony, and, in particular, a testimony or text of Scripture; § and the allusion to the Protevangelium or to any fact peculiar to it, disappears. But anyhow (and this we make our chief point) no one can pretend that there is an allusion to the Protevangelium, unless first of all he admits a distinct reference to S. Luke.

This ought to suffice as a specimen of the criticism in "Supernatural Religion." We have plenty more to offer, but we shall give them more summarily. We may see in this single instance the way in which the author goes to work. He cannot have read the Protevangelium; he cannot have had more

* Hilgenfeld, *Kanon und Kritik des N. T.*, p. 31, seq.

† Scholten *Ältesten Zeugnisse*, p. 110, seq.

‡ *Evangelien Justins der Clementinischen Homilien und Marcions*, p. 155, and *Kanon und Kritik*, p. 11, n. 1.

§ E.g., in Euseb. *H. E.*, ii. 39, 16. Epiphan. *Haer.* xlii., p. 375, ed. Petavius.

than a superficial acquaintance with the commonest even of the sceptical books which he quotes. Nor does it occur to him that criticism should proceed on fixed principles, and he takes one doubtful word as evidence for the use of an Apocryphal Gospel, while he refuses anything short of a reference by name and a quotation exact in every syllable as indicating the use of a canonical one. Probably he saw the reference to Hilgenfeld in Tischendorf's little book. He arrived without thought at his conclusion, and expanded it with habitual facility into three or four pages.

A fragment has come down to us from the year 170 or thereabouts which is invested with peculiar interest because it is the only formal list of New Testament books which has survived among the fragments of early Christian literature. It was discovered by Muratori, and printed by him as a specimen of corrupt Latinity in the year 1740. Gradually critics awoke to the importance of this fragment for the history of the canon, and it has been re-edited, examined, and discussed by a multitude of critics. "The mass of critics," we are told in "Supernatural Religion," "with very little independent consideration, have concluded the fragment to have been written towards the end of the second century."* This is a severe judgment on men who have edited the fragment and weighed every word of it. How much "consideration" has our author himself given to the matter? He asserts that, to his knowledge, "no thoroughly competent judge has since (Muratori's time) expressed any opinion" on the age of the manuscript, although as any one of the recent books which he quotes would have told him, Tregelles, perhaps the first textual critic of the day, has examined the manuscript, reproduced it in facsimile, and passed a definite judgment on its age, agreeing substantially with that of Muratori.† He presents us with a list of authorities on the subject so obviously inaccurate that it is utterly worthless;‡ he translates the Latin word "ideo"§ "certainly," and he

* S. R., ii. p. 244, seq.

† See E. G. Tregelles himself, *Canon Muratorianus*. Oxford, 1867, p. 3, and Hesse, *Murator. Fragment*, 1873, p. 11.

‡ E.g. He divides the authorities whom he quotes into two classes. (1.) Those who place the fragment towards the close of the second century. (2.) Those who would date it even earlier. Davidson and Scholten stand in the first class. Hesse in the second. Yet Davidson (*Introduction to N. T.* p. 7) and Scholten (*Ältesten Zeugnisse*, p. 127) suggest 180 as the date, which agrees with Hesse's judgment (*Murator. Fragment*, p. 48), that the author of the fragment "wrote before Irenæus, Clement and Tertullian." Routh, Westcott, Tregelles, are also classed inaccurately.

§ S. R., ii. p. 243.

indulges in a variety of inconsistent arguments which we shall expose presently. Keeping this in view, if we are to go by authority, we prefer to side with "the mass of critics" at the cost of differing from the author of "*Supernatural Religion*." But we mean to discuss the matter on its merits without undue deference to them or to him.

The manuscript is imperfect at the beginning; the first complete sentence opens with the words "*third*, the book of the Gospel according to Luke." It describes the nature and origin of our third Gospel: then it proceeds to the "*fourth Gospel*," viz. that according to S. John, and describes its origin. It enumerates the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen epistles of S. Paul, the Epistles of S. Jude, and two (or more probably three) epistles of S. John, and his Apocalypse. Besides these it speaks of an Apocalypse of Peter, the canonical authority of which was doubted by some, of the Shepherd of Hermas, which had no canonical authority at all, and lastly, of various heretical forgeries which were to be rigorously excluded.

Here we have a clear recognition of our four Gospels. No doubt the first part of the fragment is wanting, and the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" insists that only two gospels are named, viz., those of SS. Luke and John. It is certain, however, that the Church had, at the time the fragment was written, four gospels, for S. Luke's is described as "*the third*," S. John's as "*the fourth*." Critics do not venture to doubt that Matthew and Mark were the other two, and this not from lack of "*independent judgment*," but because they know something of the history of Canon. There have been many uncanonical and many heretical gospels; but who ever heard, who, except the author of "*Supernatural Religion*," ever imagined a time when the Church received the Acts of the Apostles, all the epistles of S. Paul except that to the Hebrews, the Apocalypse of S. John, several of the Catholic epistles, the Gospels of SS. Luke and John, and then to complete the number of four, and to the rigid exclusion of all others, two uncanonical gospels? We remark further that the writer of the fragment puts the New Testament writings on the same level as the Old; * and he shows clearly that he is giving not his own judgment but the use of the Catholic Church.†

* Thus it is said of the Gospels, that though they began (the history of Christ) in different ways, "this makes no difference to the faith of believers, since all things in all the Gospels are set forth by the one guiding spirit."

† This is plain, when the fragment speaks either of doubtful or heretical books. Thus it is said that the Epistles of John and of Jude are "*retained in the Catholic*" (Church) while the forgeries of the Marcionites "*cannot be received into the Catholic Church*."

The chief question remains, At what date was the fragment written? Many useless conjectures have been made as to its author; and attempts have been made on various sides and from various motives to put it earlier or later than the evidence warrants, though, as far as we are aware, no one except Dr. Donaldson and the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" has ever thought it "probable that the fragment was not written till an advanced period of the third century." Let us look at the fragment itself. It maintains that the "*Shepherd of Hermas*" ought indeed to be read, but cannot be accounted a book of Scripture, because "*Hermas wrote it very lately in our in our times, in the city of Rome, while his brother, Pius the bishop, was sitting on the chair of the Roman Church.*" Pius was bishop of Rome from 139 to 155. The fragment speaks of a book composed under this Pontificate as written "*very lately.*" Our author reminds us that the fragment does but contrast his own times with the Apostolic Age, and that we must not press his words. But, first, the fragment is not content with alleging that Hermas wrote "*in our times,*" he says, also, that he wrote "*very lately,*" and he does not make any vague contrast, but he specifies the time at which it was composed. Next, if we imagine with "*Supernatural Religion*" that the fragment itself dates from a late period in the third century (say 270?), it could not possibly contrast the Pontificate of Pius with the Apostolic Age as something very recent, and this for the simple reason that Hermas, so far from belonging to the same time as the writer of the fragment, must have lived far nearer to that of the Apostles. It is far more possible for Volkmar,* who places the fragment about 190, to argue from the contrast intended between the Apostolic Age and the date of Hermas, though even he does not meet the force of the word "*nuperrime.*" He left it for writers like the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" to exaggerate and caricature his theory till it lost the semblance of plausibility.

Internal marks are all in favour of the date which we have assigned to the fragment, *i.e.*, about 170. The list of books corresponds closely to those which were recognized by Irenæus twenty years later, and the fragment only differs from him so far as it implies that the Church's canon of the New Testament was less complete than in his time; again, it does not use the word "*new testament,*" which had become familiar in Tertullian's again, it does not even, like Irenæus and others, divide the books afterwards known as the New Testament, into

* In his edition of Credner's *Geschichte des Kanon.* Anhang, p. 359, seq.

"Gospels and Apostolic writings," though this division suits his purpose so exactly that he could hardly have failed to use it had it been already current. Again, all the heretics mentioned in the Fragment point to an early date. The list of books is evidently drawn up in protest against the Apocryphal books, forged in the interests of Basilides, Valentinus, Marcion, and the Montanists, nor is there an allusion to later controversies. This is hardly what we should look for in writing which belongs to a late period in the third century, though the difficulty does not seem to have struck the author of "Supernatural Religion." He does indeed produce two instances of phraseology inconsistent, as he thinks, with the early date which he claims for the fragment. Pius, he argues, again appealing to Dr. Donaldson, is represented as occupying "the chair" of the Roman church, and this expression is quite unprecedented in the second century, or till a much later date. Dr. Donaldson might have spared himself the trouble of producing this argument. Not only is "cathedra" or chair used in this technical sense by Tertullian,* but it occurs in the Clementine Homilies.† Again he borrows from Tregelles a quotation from Tertullian about the first and second coming of Christ, and insists that because the fragment also speaks of the same comings, though in language widely different, this is another sign of late origin.‡ We may safely leave this "argument" and another theory of Dr. Donaldson about the interpretation of a passage in the fragment to refute themselves, and state our own conclusion. The fragment tells its own tale. It was written not long after 155, i.e., a time which we may place approximately with many eminent critics who defend and who deny the authenticity of the Gospels about 170.§ The fragment proves that our four Gospels were received within the whole Catholic Church at that date, as at once authentic and inspired. The writer may

* Praescript, c. 36.

† Ep. Clem. ad Jacob, 2. κλήμεντα τοῦτον ἐπίσκοπον ὁμῖν χειροτονῶ, ὃ τῇν ἐμὴν τῶν λόγων πιστεύω καθέδραν. Hilgenfeld puts the Clem. Homilies at a date earlier than that which we claim for the Muratorian Fragment. See his Apostol. Väter, p. 301.

‡ We may add that similar language about the two advents of Christ is found before the year 170 in Justin, Apol. 1, 52, p. 120 in Otto's ed. Tregelles of course makes the quotation only to show "how common such phraseology" was. In his Canon Murator. p. 36.

§ Westcott on the Canon, p. 236. Credner sur Geschichte des Kanons, p. 82, seq. Geschichte des Kanons, p. 167. (In the latter place Credner says "the fragment may have been composed about 170, anyhow at the end of the second century). Harnack quoted by Luthardt, Johanneische Ursprung de Vierten Evangeliums, p. 45. Hesse, Muratorische Fragment, p. 46 (where he suggests, 168—176).

deserve little credit when he relates the circumstances under which S. John wrote his Gospel, but he has a right to be heard when he speaks of the authority of the Gospels in the Church at his own time, and on this, the one point which concerns us here, his evidence is clear and explicit.

We have dwelt at some length on the Epistle of the French churches and the Muratorian canon, and we are obliged to pass lightly over the testimonies of individual Fathers for the authority of the Gospels during our first period. Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch (about 180), quotes the Gospel of John, and speaks of it as inspired,* and not only so, but he classes the Gospels together and compares them with the books of the Old Testament. "The writings," he says, "of the prophets and of Gospels are found to be in harmony, because all the inspired men have spoken by one spirit of God."† This last passage is ignored in the book before us, though the fact Theophilus attributes inspiration to St. John's Gospel, and to one of the pastoral epistles while his recognition of St. Matthew's gospel is no less clear though less explicit, is proof conclusive that he used the Catholic canon, and that his gospels were those contained in it. Similar evidence may be collected from the fragment of a lost book by Apollinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis, on the paschal feast. The authenticity of this fragment is admitted on all sides and by all critics, in spite of the doubts entertained by Tillemont; and the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" is not likely to turn the tide of opinion by arguments which Tillemont certainly would not have used,‡ or by quoting Routh for the very opinion which he contradicts.§

* Theoph. ad Autol. ii. 22, p. 120, in Otto's ed.

† Ib., iii. 12, p. 218.

‡ E.g. On the authority of Dr. Donaldson, the only writer of this century among the multitude who have discussed the fragment of Apollinaris, whom our author quotes for his own view, we are told that the testimony of the Paschal Chronicle, in which the fragment of Apollinaris is preserved, is "worth almost nothing" (S. R., ii. p. 190). Now if we cannot depend on the Paschal Chronicle for a fragment which bears every mark of authenticity, much less can we trust it when it mentions the particular year in which a book was written. This Paschal Chronicle informs us that Theodotion's version of the Old Testament was written about the year 184. There are very grave reasons for supposing that Theodotion wrote much earlier. However, the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" has an object for accepting the later date, and (ii. p. 212) he produces the testimony of the Chronicle without any indication that it is "worth almost nothing."

§ Routh, *Rel. Sacr.*, i. p. 167, is quoted as one of the "most orthodox apologists who see little ground" for accepting the fragment of Apollinaris as genuine. On the contrary, Routh says that he sees nothing in the fragments "which forbids us to accept them as the work of Apollinaris," adding,

Once more: Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, complains in a letter to Soter, Bishop of Rome (168-176), that his own epistles had been falsified by heretics, and adds that he cannot wonder at this, since they have treated even the "Scriptures of the Lord" (τῶν κυριακῶν γραφῶν) in the same way.* Dr. Westcott claims this as a recognition of the New Testament; but this it appears is really discreditable in "any critic, even though an apologist," and "there is no means of proving" that Dionysius referred to "*evangelical works*," "much less to our Gospels" (S. R., ii. p. 165). Here we have only room to quote a sentence from Credner, a critic against whom a great part of Westcott's book is directed, and who is distinguished for his "clear and thoughtful mode of reasoning" (S. R., i. p. 401). He gives his judgment thus (p. 52):—"Dionysius, about the year 170, gives to the Gospels the significant title of *γραφὰι κυριακαί*, an expression of frequent occurrence in the literature of the time;" and he goes on to prove this by references to Irenæus † (ii. 35, 4). Indeed a little knowledge of the history of the canon would have convinced our author that *γραφὰι κυριακαί* can only refer to New Testament writings, principally perhaps to the Gospels; and the Gospels of a Catholic bishop, in the year 170, could be no other than those which were universally recognized, as we have seen already, in the Church of that time.

There is, however, one writer in this period of whom we must speak at greater length. Nearly twenty pages in "*Supernatural Religion*" are devoted to Tatian, the disciple of S. Justin Martyr. He is the bridge between our first and our second period; for we shall have to refer to him when we come to treat of Justin, his master, and we wish to establish our position with regard to his testimony once for all. After the death of Justin, between 170-175, he wrote an oration against the Greeks, and in it he makes use of S. John's Gospel. Afterwards he lapsed into the heresy of the Encratites, and probably after his fall he composed a Diatessaron, or harmony of our four Gospels. The first part of our statement is generally admitted, and nothing but the fact that we are answering "*Supernatural Religion*" obliges us to make it good. The second was con-

"The author of the preface (i.e. to the Paschal Chronicle) deserves the same credence as the other writers of the same age, on whose authority we receive many books of the ancients which are not mentioned by Eusebius." He quotes Gallandius as agreeing with him.

* Euseb., iv. 23, 12.

† Credner, Beiträge, i. p. 52. We may add the analogy of *κυριακή ἡμέρα* and the *λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*, H. E., iii. 39, 1. Ziegler, Irenæus, p. 100, interprets the *γραφὰι κυριακαί*, as signifying gospels, and refers for the sense of the word to the same passage of Irenæus.

tested for a long time, though, as we hope to show, on insufficient grounds. We shall take these two points in order.

First, as to Tatian's use of S. John; and here our task, if irksome, is at least easy. Tatian is discoursing on the darkness of man's heart, "and this," he says, "is the sense of the declaration 'the darkness doth not comprehend the light.' " * He is exhorting the Greeks to leave the service of demons for that of the true God, and he gives this reason—"All things (have been made) by Him, and without Him nothing has been made." † This surely is plain proof; and besides these there are other phrases which we may fairly attribute to the influence of our fourth Gospel, now that we have established the fact of its use by Tatian. Thus we read, "God is a spirit" ‡ (words found in S. John and nowhere else); and again, "God was in the beginning, but we have received it that the beginning is the power of the Word." § Our first two examples are clearer than many undoubted patristic citations, and the author of "Supernatural Religion" produces nothing which even looks like a parallel from any source other than S. John's Gospel. He insists upon minute verbal discrepancies, and he labours to show that the context in which Tatian places S. John's words and the meaning he gives them, differ from their place and their context in S. John's Gospel. The same argument would prove that Tertullian used Gospels different from ours; but we need not travel beyond the short "Address" of Tatian himself. In chapter 15 we find a verse of the eighth Psalm quoted thus:—"A call through repentance has been given to them [i.e. to men], according to the word which says 'since they have been made a little less than the angels.'" Here the context and meaning of the Psalm are not preserved very carefully. Are we to infer that Tatian did not know our book of Psalms, and was really quoting some apocryphal writing? One objection remains, and it rests on an ignorance of Greek, as the argument of which we have just disposed rests on an ignorance of Tatian. We are reminded that, even if Tatian quotes the fourth Gospel, there is no sign that he regarded it as authoritative. Now he quotes a verse from the first chapter of S. John with a special formula; he calls it τὸ εἰρημένον. This formula occurs often, and in different parts, of the New Testament, and it always serves to introduce a quotation from the Scriptures. Tatian, then, not only quotes S. John's Gospel, but he quotes it as a recognized authority.

Next, as to his Diatessaron. According to our author, there

* Tatian, Orat. 13, p. 60, ed. Otto.

† Ib. 4, p. 18.

‡ Ib. 19, p. 88.

§ Ib. 5, p. 20.

is no means of determining what it was. Many called it the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Victor of Capua speaks of it as the Diapente. Theodoret, who had seen it, implies that it was not a mere harmony of our Gospels. Syriac writers confused it with the Diatessaron of Ammonius. This is hopeless confusion, but it is confusion which arises from the uncritical and indiscriminating way in which the author of "Supernatural Religion" treats historical authorities. Let us try to arrange the evidence, and then to pass judgment upon it.

Eusebius,* the oldest authority, states that Tatian "having made, I know not how, a certain collection and combination of the Gospels, called this the Diatessaron." Eusebius had not seen it, and he did not know how Tatian arranged the Gospels, but he was certain that it was our Gospels which he arranged.† The evidence of Eusebius is confirmed by the fact that no four Gospels except ours were ever separated from others and regarded as the four, and by the knowledge which we have that Tatian was familiar with the Gospel of S. John. The next authority is Epiphanius. He, like Eusebius, had no personal knowledge of the Diatessaron, but his account deserves much less consideration, not only because of his inferiority to Eusebius in learning and accuracy, but also because, while Eusebius gives his evidence with clearness and confidence, Epiphanius does but profess to repeat a vague rumour. "The Diatessaron," he tells us, "which some call the Gospel according to the Hebrews, is said to have been made by him."‡ We italicise the word *some* because the author of "Supernatural Religion" in the heat of his argument transforms it into "many," and, as if this were not enough, assumes, without the faintest proof, that these persons "must have read" Tatian's work; till at last, from the vague words of Epiphanius, "some" "call (it) the Gospel according to the Hebrews," he extracts the very definite judgment "many" (!) "distinctly and correctly" (!!) called it "the Gospel according to the Hebrews." § Our third authority is Theodoret; || perhaps the most important of all. He was Bishop of Cyrus, in Syria. He found that the Catholics of his diocese used Tatian's Diatessaron, regarding it as a useful compendium. Theodoret, who was specially learned in the history of heresies, knew the bad reputation of Tatian; he collected two hundred copies of the book,

* Euseb. H. E., iv. 29, 16.

† If Eusebius had been in doubt as to the Gospels which Tatian used, he would have said that he did not know whence, i.e. from what sources (ὅθεν οἷδ' ὁρῶμεν, as in H. E., iii. 36, 11), Tatian composed his Harmony, nor would he have stated categorically that Tatian made it from "the Gospels."

‡ Epiphani. Hær., xlv. 1.

§ S. R., ii. pp. 158-160.

|| Theodor. Hær. Fab., i. 20.

found upon examination that it omitted the genealogies which traced our Lord's descent to David, and finally prohibited this Diatessaron and introduced the full records of the Gospels instead. Observe, Theodoret knew the book well; he calls it the Diatessaron, and, anxious as he was to find fault, he does not say a syllable about its being compiled from apocryphal Gospels. If ever there was a strong argument from silence, it is this. And further, Theodoret distinctly implies that Tatian's Diatessaron was made from our Gospels, for he speaks of the heretic as having "*cut out* the genealogies and all which related to our Lord's birth from the seed of David according to the flesh." It is urged that the name of Diatessaron is uncertain, because Victor of Capua in the sixth century calls it Diapente. Victor is a late writer, and he had not seen Tatian's Harmony. But the author of "Supernatural Religion" does not, and consistently with his argument could not, quote Victor's words in full. They are these:—"I have learned from the history of Eusebius that Tatian compiled one Gospel out of the four. . . . to which he gave the title Diapente."* Thus Victor contradicts himself; and his statement, on which our author builds, is neither more nor less than a slip of the pen. Thus there is every reason to believe that Tatian compiled his Harmony from the Gospels. The oldest and the most accurate authority tells us that he actually did so. His statement is confirmed by Theodoret, who had seen and examined the Diatessaron; and there is nothing to set on the other side except the lapsus of a late Latin writer, and the fact that "some," we do not know who, called the Diatessaron the Gospel according to the Hebrews. And this probably because of a real resemblance between the two. Both the Gospel and the Diatessaron omitted the genealogies.

So much for Greek and Latin authorities. But besides all this, Tatian's Diatessaron was translated at an early date into Syriac; for it was used and commented on by S. Ephraem, who knew no Greek, and who died in 378. This Syriac translation clenches our proof that Tatian's Diatessaron was made from our Gospels, for it began with the first verse of S. John. We owe this knowledge to a very learned Syriac writer, Ephraem Barsalibi, whose evidence is important, although he lived in the last part of the twelfth century; for he was well acquainted with S. Ephraem's commentary on Tatian.† The

* The words occur in Victor's preface to the Harmony of the Gospels. The last edition is by Ranke—"Novum Testamentum ex m'scripto Victoris Capuani. Marburgi et Lipsiæ: 1868."

† Assemani, Bibliothec. Orient., ii. p. 159, where Barsalibi says that

Syriac writers, if we believe "Supernatural Religion," confused the Harmony of Tatian with that made by Ammonius in the middle of the third century. Some did so, no doubt, but not Ephraem Barsalibi, for he expressly distinguishes the one from the other.*

In "Supernatural Religion" this Syriac evidence is dismissed with the remark that "all critics are agreed that no important deduction can be derived from it." We could produce a list of eminent critics who are very far from agreeing to anything of the kind. Hilgenfeld, in his Introduction to the New Testament, considers it carefully, and frankly admits that the theory of Credner, which is repeated with the addition of mistakes which are original, by "Supernatural Religion," has been met with weighty reasons on the opposite side by Daniel. Far from making light of the Syriac evidence, he points out, as we have done, that it is impossible to suppose that Barsalibi, like other Syriac writers, confused the Harmony with that of Ammonius, and he states the result of his examination thus: "All this puts before us a harmony which began with John i. 1, including the Gospels of Matthew, Luke, John, and without doubt that of Mark also (omitting, of course, the Genealogies)." He admits every point for which orthodox critics have contended, except that he thinks Tatian "perhaps" inserted in his Harmony additions from the Gospel according to the Hebrews.† We will not refer the author to Semisch, to Daniel, or even to Meyer; the first two are "apologetic critics," the third believes in S. John's Gospel. But Hilgenfeld deserves his respect, and he may learn from him to be less confident and more accurate for the future. Anyhow Hilgenfeld would have saved him from quoting Victor's slip as decisive proof that the "ecclesiastical theory" on Tatian's Diatessaron is incorrect, or from the extraordinary inferences he has built on Epiphanius, or from his hopeless confusion about the Syriac writers.

Tatian's evidence has a double value, for it shows that the Gospels were received without as well as within the Church.

Ephraem commented on the Diatessaron of Tatian, which opened with the first verse of S. John. Assemani, ii. 157, where Barsalibi shows his own acquaintance with this commentary of S. Ephraem.

* Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, tom. ii. pp. 159, 160.

† Hilgenfeld, *Einleitung in das N. Testament*, p. 75, seq. It has appeared since "Supernatural Religion," but this does not excuse the author in his mis-statement about all critics being agreed as to the worthlessness of the Syriac evidence. Semisch, *Tatiani Diatessaron*, 1856; Meyer, *Commentary on S. John*, 5th ed. p. 12; Bleek, *Introduction to the N. Testament* (Eng. Transl.), 1869, p. 246, regard it as conclusive.

Nor were the Encratites the only heretics who availed themselves of the canonical Gospels. S. John's Gospel was in especial esteem among the great sect of the Gnostics known as the Valentinians. Heracleon, the most illustrious member of Valentine's school, wrote a commentary on S. John, large fragments of which have been preserved by Origen.* In these fragments the authenticity of the Gospel is assumed throughout; indeed Heracleon bases his tenets on a perverted interpretation of single words spoken by Christ and recorded by S. John. The shifts to which he betakes himself in trying to elude the natural meaning of the words, and the trouble which he took in writing an exposition, are evidence enough that he admitted its apostolic origin. Clement of Alexandria quotes an exposition by the same heresiarch of a verse in S. Luke.† What was the date of Heracleon? Heinrici thinks he has shown that he wrote his commentary on S. John between 140 and 160.‡ Hilgenfeld and Lipsius § place the time of his greatest activity about 170. We cannot argue the matter out within the limits of an article, still less can we follow "Supernatural Religion" through its dreary waste of bad reasoning and bad Greek on this point. We will take the date as it is given by Hilgenfeld and Lipsius, and with the testimony of the Valentinians, we bring our examination of the first period to a close.

S. Justin Martyr is the principal authority in our second period, for he is the only writer who falls within it, who has left us works which are still preserved. He was born in Samaria, embraced Christianity about 137,|| and died in 167. Three of his works remain; two of them are apologies for the Christian religion addressed to the heathen; the third is a dialogue with the Jew Trypho, in which Justin sets himself to establish the truth of Christianity against the Jews. There has been considerable dispute of late as to the time at which these works were composed, and again, for the sake of brevity, we accept the date assigned by our adversaries, and place them between 147 and 160.¶

The titles of Justin's books show that they were not intended primarily for Christian readers. He did indeed write against the heresy of Marcion, but this book has perished. In those

* They are collected in Grabe's *Spicilegium Patrum*, ii. p. 85.

† Strom. iv. 9, p. 595.

‡ Valentinianische Gnos. is und die H. Schrift., 1875, p. 14.

§ See Hilgenfeld, *Einleitung*, p. 49.

This is the date given by Maranus de *Apologetis*, sæci. ii. pars iii. c. 1. Tillemont and others have placed his conversion earlier.

¶ S. R., i. p. 289, seq.

which remain, he does not, and he could not, have argued from the authority of the Gospels, which were unknown to the heathen emperor and senate to whom he directed his Apologies, and despised by the Jews, whom he tried to persuade by his Dialogue. He does not even enumerate the Gospels, or mention any one of our Gospels clearly and by name. However, he states expressly that he used written records of our Lord's life. Sometimes he tells us that he is quoting these records, and besides this he relates a great number of Christ's deeds, and words, which are evidently taken from them. The question then is this: Were these records our Gospels? and as we go on we shall show how important the question is for the whole controversy on the origin of the Gospels. It occupies close upon two hundred pages in "Supernatural Religion," and the author concludes his discussion with the remark that "Justin cannot be cited to prove" the "very existence" of the Synoptic Gospels,* while as to that of S. John, far from showing the slightest acquaintance with it, he offers "presumptive testimony" against its "apostolic origin."† We have not two hundred pages at our command, but we hope to show that Justin knew and acknowledged all of our Gospels, and to examine the arguments of "Supernatural Religion" by the way. The question turns on the account which Justin gives of his records, on the similarity or dissimilarity of Christ's life, as he relates it, with the history in our Gospels, and lastly on a comparison of his quotations with the text of these Gospels.

To begin with the account which Justin gives of his records. He calls them generally the "Memoirs of the Apostles" (*ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων*). This title was in all likelihood of his own devising, for it does not occur elsewhere in Christian literature. He uses it first in the apology addressed to the Roman Emperor, and it seems to be an attempt to put the word "gospel" into tolerable Greek, and make it intelligible to educated Pagans. These "Memoirs" were not *about* the Apostles: on the contrary, Justin says that they were composed *by* the "Apostles [of Christ] and by those who followed them,"‡ and that they contained the whole history of Christ (Apol. 1, 83, p. 86). Further, the common name for these memoirs was "Gospels," for Justin describes them as the "Memoirs which are called Gospels."§ In conclusion these Gospels were read throughout the whole Church in the Christian assemblies. This appears from the first apology in which Justin gives the Emperor an account of

* S. R., i. p. 432.
Dial. 103, page 354 in Otto's ed.

† S. R., ii. p. 316.
§ Apol. 1. 66, p. 156.

Christian worship and particularly of the celebration of the Eucharist. "On the day called Sunday," he says, "all who live in cities or in the country assemble together [notice the general terms which are employed,] and the memoirs of the Apostles [that is, as we have seen, the Gospels] or the writings of the Prophets are read as long as time permits."* These "Memoirs" then were called Gospels, and they were written by the Apostles and those who followed them. This description answers exactly to our Gospels: two of them are the work of the Apostles Matthew and John, and two of apostolic men, Mark and Luke. It answers to nothing else. We have no proof that there was any one Gospel in Justin's time, except the canonical ones which professed to be the work of an Apostle. The Gospel according to Peter is mentioned for the first time about the year 190,† and Serapion, Bishop of Antioch, to whom we owe our information about it, speaks of it in terms which are perfectly consistent with a belief that the forgery was still recent. Moreover, if Justin's Gospels were not ours, we want proof that there was in his time a collection of Gospels, differing from our present ones yet attributed to the Apostles and their followers, and separated in such a way from other records of the same kind that they could be regarded as one writing, and called "*the Gospel*." For Justin's language tallies exactly with that of a later age, when, by the admission even of "Supernatural Religion," our Gospels were fully acknowledged. Like Tertullian, he speaks of Gospels "composed by the Apostles and their followers." Like Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria, he looks upon the Gospels as one, and calls them "*the Gospel*."‡

Let us see what our author has to say on the other side. He urges that Justin speaks of memoirs written by "*the Apostles*," invariably using the article which refers the memoirs to the collective body of the Apostles.§ This proves too much, for he also mentions "*the writings of the Prophets*," though he certainly did not imagine that they were written by the collective body of the Prophets. Next he says that many "*spurious writings, bearing the names of the Apostles and their followers, were in circulation in the early Church*." However, he does not produce any proof that any spurious Gospel was ascribed to an apostle till a generation after Justin's time, and as for those ascribed to followers of the Apostles, he names but one, and he quotes, to show its existence, we presume, in the early Church, a decree of Pope Gelasius, towards the close of the fifth century.

* Apol. 1. 67, p. 158.

† Dial. 100, p. 340.

‡ Euseb. H. E., vi. 12.

§ S. R., i. p. 297.

He does not attempt to show that any of these spurious Gospels were put together and regarded as one. This is a strange specimen of critical reasoning, and he completes it by informing us that the words "which are called Gospels" are "a manifest interpolation in Justin's text." We need hardly say that this alteration of his rests on mere conjecture, for the MSS. have the words, and they are exactly in Justin's manner.* It does not follow that if the Memoirs were commonly called Gospels, Justin would have generally used this name, because "memoir" as used for records of Christ's life, is an expression peculiar to Justin; so that in any case his term is a singular one. And as to the argument to which our author betakes himself, viz., there is an instance of a gloss which has crept into the text of another work by Justin, therefore this is a gloss, it does not call for any formal reply. An editor who treated the text of *Æschylus* on this principle would not gain much credit by his pains.

We have not done yet. These Gospels written by the Apostles and their followers were, as Justin observes, read upon Sundays in the Christian assemblies. Their authority was so high that they were read like the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Indeed, Justin mentions the reading of the Gospels first, and that of the prophetic books second. Hence, on our author's theory, we are driven to this supposition: In Justin's time Gospels attributed to the Apostles and their followers were universally read and acknowledged in the Church; immediately after Justin's death these Gospels were rejected and their very existence forgotten. At the very same time four other Gospels, also attributed to the Apostles and their followers, came into favour. They were adopted by every Catholic Christian in every part of the world, and among others by Justin's own disciple Tatian, who put them together in the form of a harmony. So sudden and yet so complete was the substitution that Irenæus, who at Justin's death was a man of twenty or twenty-five, considered it the height of heretical audacity to reject any one of the Gospels which the Church had received since the beginning.

"Supernatural Religion" endeavours to show that other works were read in the churches which failed to obtain a place in the Canon. So far as his facts are correct they strengthen our position. Justin's Gospels were publicly read on Sundays, and that as an habitual act of Christian worship. The epistle of the Roman Bishop Clement was read, not, as our author tells us, "in most churches" (this would be ἐν ταῖς πλείοσιν ἐκκλησίαις)

* See Semisch. *Denkwürdigkeiten des Martyrer Justinus*, p. 93, n. 1.

but in "very many churches."* The Apocalypse of Peter was read in the Church of one country, and only on one day of the year.† The "Shepherd of Hermas" also was read "in churches," i.e. in some churches.‡ And what followed from this partial use of these writings in the Church? Simply this; that Eusebius does not dare to exclude them absolutely from the Canon. He classes them as "doubtful" books, and this though his own judgment was opposed to them.§ If Justin's Gospels were different, this universal reception would have given them a place in the Canon. Most certainly, if they had failed to obtain this, they would have had their place among the "doubtful" books. Yet all his Gospels, according to "Supernatural Religion" (even if the Gospel according to the Hebrews was among them, all but one) disappeared utterly or were rejected as absolutely heretical; and the instances adduced to explain this difficulty make it more inexplicable.

We have now to compare the history of Christ as it is given by Justin with the accounts in our Gospels. Justin's references to the life and teaching of Christ are very numerous, and often he descends into minute detail. He gives the history of the infancy at very great length; he describes the baptism and the temptation, the preaching and the death of John the Baptist, the confession of Peter, the mission of the Apostles, the institution of the Eucharist, the agony of Christ in the garden, His passion and death, His burial, His resurrection and ascension. Besides this, he reports a vast number of our Lord's sayings uttered on a great variety of occasions and to a great variety of persons. There is a difficulty in accepting the theory of "Supernatural Religion," and supposing that Justin took the materials of his history from the Gospel according to the Hebrews or from the "Gospel according to Peter." Putting aside other objections which are decisive in themselves, it is enough to say that the Gospel according to the Hebrews was received by the Ebionites, many of whom denied our Lord's miraculous birth,|| and contained no account of Christ's infancy. Yet this is the very point on which the "Memoirs" of Justin were most explicit. As for the "Gospel according to Peter," we know little about it except that it was Docetic, i.e., it denied the reality of our Lord's human nature. But we have stated already how emphatically Justin asserts the reality of

* ἐν πλείστοις ἐκκλησίαις. Euseb. H. E., iii. 16.

† Sozomen. H. E., vii. 19.

‡ Euseb. H. E., iii. 3.

§ Epiphanius, Hær., xxx. 13 et 14. Hilgenfeld shows that this omission was common to all recensions of this Gospel. See his *Novum Test. extra Canonem*, Fascic. ult. p. 19.

|| Euseb. H. E., vi. 12.

our Lord's human birth, and on Christ's sufferings (a subject equally distasteful to the Docetæ) he enlarges with a precision and minuteness which has no parallel except in the history of the infancy.

We proceed to a closer comparison between the facts in Christ's life, as given by Justin, and the narration in our Gospels. We must refer our readers who wish to examine the question thoroughly to Credner's tables of the Gospel history, as it can be extracted from Justin; and here we can only state the results of our own investigation. We have counted one hundred and thirty-six distinct statements made by Justin with regard to our Lord's life. It is, of course, a little hard to settle what is to be reckoned as a distinct statement, but we have done our best to make the calculation impartially. Further, Justin gives sixty sayings of our Lord. Of these one hundred and thirty-six facts, one hundred and sixteen occur substantially in our Gospels. Of the sixty sayings, all are found there in substance except two. Thus the proportion between the cases in which Justin agrees with our Gospels compared with those in which he diverges from them are as 174 to 22. These additions or divergences, moreover, are for the most part exceedingly slight. A few seem to be inferences from our Gospel text; others to be lapses of memory; the rest probably were drawn from tradition. In "*Supernatural Religion*" this substantial coincidence between the Memoirs of Justin and our Gospels is not even hinted at. Yet surely it is a formidable difficulty to those who maintain that his "*Memoirs*" were not our Gospels. It would be possible to suppose, though there is no real analogy for the supposition, that Justin used a single Gospel different from ours, yet relating almost precisely the same events as, say, our S. Matthew. But this hypothesis, unlikely as it is, will not meet the requirements of the case. Justin, as we have seen already, used more Gospels than one. If they were other than ours, then we must imagine that he used several Gospels different from and yet in the matter they contained corresponding almost exactly to ours—a theory which is, we do not say not unlikely, but impossible.

So far we have been tracing the general parallelism between the Gospel history in Justin's Memoirs and our Gospels. We have still to show that Justin bears the impress left by an acquaintance with each, and this done, we may fairly consider the accumulation of proof complete. This impress may be traced in Justin's mention of facts peculiar to each of our Gospels, in repetition of their peculiar phraseology, and to a considerable extent in verbal agreement with them.

Beginning with S. Matthew, we find in Justin a number

of facts about the history of Christ which are contained in S. Matthew's Gospel, and nowhere else in the canonical Gospels. The mere abstract of these coincidences occupies several pages in the work of Semisch on the Memoirs of Justin; and as this agreement is not contested or indeed mentioned by "Supernatural Religion," we need not prove it at length.* Our author does, however, commit himself to a definite statement which we propose to verify. "The peculiarities of language of our Synoptic Gospels," he says, "are entirely wanting in Justin."† He asks his readers to compare Credner on the point; and though an assertion so utterly ignorant does not surprise us in "Supernatural Religion," it certainly would be astonishing to find it in Credner. This writer did, indeed, commit himself to the theory that Justin's Memoirs were not our Gospels, and he has supplied "Supernatural Religion" with nearly every fact which he uses in argument on the point; but he was a man of real learning, and certainly incapable of the blunders which are scattered broadcast in the pages of "Supernatural Religion." On turning to Credner, we find his statement to be simply that, in particular sections of Justin's narration, the peculiar phraseology of our Gospels does not exist. And now as to the fact. Let us compare Justin's language with that of the first Synoptic Gospel. Matthew alone, of all New Testament writers, uses the expression "kingdom of heaven" (*βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*): it recurs eleven times in Justin,‡ He alone speaks of the "heavenly Father" (*ὁ πατὴρ ὁ οὐράνιος*): the same phrase recurs three times in Justin.§ S. Matthew uses no less than three times a very peculiar Greek expression to describe the healing miracles of Christ. He speaks of Him as "healing every disease and every infirmity" (*θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν*).|| Of the word for "infirmity" there is no other instance in the New Testament, while the adjective from which it is derived has in the rest of its books a meaning widely different. Even in the entire Septuagint the collocation of the three principal words (*θεραπεύειν μαλακίαν καὶ νόσον*) does not occur; yet this peculiar phrase is repeated by Justin;¶ and even Hilgenfeld, in an early work directed against the very identity of Justin's Memoirs with our Gospels, which we are trying to establish, threw down his arms when he came to

* Semisch, p. 96, seq.

† S. R., i. p. 432, n. 4.

‡ Apol. 1, 15, pp. 36, 38, and 40; and 1, 16, p. 44; 1, 61, p. 144. Dial. 1. 51, p. 168 (twice); ib. 76, p. 260; ib. 105, p. 358; ib. 120, p. 406; ib. 140, p. 464.

§ Apol. 1, 15, p. 38 and p. 40. Dial. 96, p. 332.

|| Matt. iv. 23, ix. 35, x. 1.

¶ Apol. 1, 31, p. 80.

this coincidence, and acknowledged that the recurrence of "such a singular expression" in Justin must be regarded as a reminiscence of Matthew's Gospel.* Again, there are phrases which are found in all of the Synoptics, but still are characteristic of Matthew because of their frequency in his Gospel. Such are "the Father in heaven" (ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς), and a peculiar use of the Greek word προσερχεσθαι; and each of these peculiarities is repeated four times in Justin.† Other instances might be added, but we have given more than enough to test our author's assertion that "the peculiarities of the language of our Synoptical Gospels are entirely wanting in Justin," and to exhibit his own acquaintance with Justin in its true light.

We have some comments to make on another dictum of "Supernatural Religion" before we give instances of verbal quotation from S. Matthew. The author assumes that, when Justin directly professes to quote from his Memoirs, "accuracy may be expected."‡ Is this so? With some of the ante-Nicene Fathers, who beyond all question acknowledged the authority of the Gospels, inaccurate quotation is habitual.§ Our author forgets that the Fathers lived before there were any printed books; and while he speaks strongly of their "inaccuracy" and "want of critical judgment," he virtually attributes to them all the accuracy of modern critics whenever it suits his purpose to do so. But, indeed, there is no need to reason from analogy as to the amount of accuracy we may expect from Justin when he quotes his Memoirs. He quotes the classics; he quotes the Old Testament in the Septuagint version. In the Apologies we find a citation from the Timæus of Plato, || another from Plato's Republic, ¶ a third from the Memorabilia of Xenophon.** All these quotations are clearly and evidently made from memory; for Justin alters unconsciously the sense of the authors whom he quotes, and makes a variety of marked changes

* Hilgenfeld, *Evangel, Justin's, Clementin. Hom. und Marcions*, p. 275, note 1.

† The former, *Apol.* 1, 15, p. 40; *ib.* 13, p. 42 and p. 44; *Dial.* 101, p. 344; the latter, *Apol.* 1, 16, p. 42; *ib.* 17, p. 44; *Dial.* 103, p. 352; *ib.* 125, p. 422.

‡ *S. R.*, i. p. 348.

§ See the careful chapter on this part of the subject in Semisch, p. 218, seq. The epistle of Clement of Rome abounds in quotations from the Old Testament quite as free as Justin's citations from the Gospels. Rönisch, in his recent work on the "New Testament of Tertullian," begins by stating as a familiar fact that Tertullian often does not keep to the words of Scripture. The liberty which Clement of Alexandria takes in quoting Scripture is notorious.

|| *Apol.* 11, 10, p. 192. ¶ *Apol.* 1, 3, p. 8. ** *Apol.* 11, 119, p. 41.

in their language. As to the Old Testament, Justin quotes over and over again from one of its books words which really occur in another; * he puts together and welds into a continuous quotation passages which really occur in different chapters, nay, in different books of the Old Testament.† He quotes verses in reversed order,‡ he abbreviates the sense,§ adds and changes words,|| sometimes unconsciously alters facts;¶ he allows himself these liberties even when he introduces his quotations with the solemn formula "it is written." Inaccuracies of this kind occur even in the Dialogue where Justin is arguing with Jews, and had special motives for care in quoting the Old Testament. We have given but a few instances out of a vast number collected by Semisch, who has proved that each variety of inaccurate quotations which "apologetic critics" assume in Justin's quotations from our Gospels finds an exact parallel in his quotations from the Old Testament. Yet there is no allusion to these facts in "Supernatural Religion," and our author dismisses with contempt the "threadbare" assertion that Justin quoted his Gospels from memory. An assertion which is important and true cannot be "threadbare." If Justin trusted to his memory in quoting Plato to the heathen, and the prophets to the Jews, we may be sure he was not at greater pains to be accurate when he quoted the Gospels to those who knew little about them and cared less. One word more, and we shall have submitted the theory that Justin quoted the Gospels, and quoted them from memory, to the most rigid verification. Justin, in professing to give the words of our Lord, gives them in forms which vary more or less from each other; and this of itself is a sufficient indication that he took small pains to quote exactly. Let the reader bear this in mind, and then consider the following facts.

There are nine passages in Justin which agree, some quite, all nearly word for word, with our Gospel of S. Matthew. We shall give one instance. "Our Christ," we read in the Dialogue, "declared upon earth at that time to those who said that Elias must come before the Christ—Elias indeed will come, and will restore all things; but I say to you that Elias has come already and they did not know him, but they did to him whatsoever they willed. And it is written, *then the disciples understood that He spoke to them about John the Baptist.*"** We sub-

* Apol. 1, 35, p. 90; ib. 51, p. 120; ib. 53, p. 124. Dial. 14, p. 52; ib. 49, p. 160.

† Apol. 1, 52, p. 122. ‡ Apol. 1, 38, p. 94. § Apol. 1, 44, p. 104.

|| Apol. 1, 48, p. 114.

¶ Apol. 1, 60, p. 140.

** Dial. 49, p. 162, cf. Matt. xvii. 11, seq. The other instances occur in the Apology, 1, 15, p. 38, cf. Matt. ix. 13; 1. 16, p. 44, cf. Matt. vii. 19.

join the commentary of Credner, and in doing so, we take a critic who has been the most powerful opponent of the position which we maintain. Discussing the last clause of this passage, which is introduced with the formula "and it is written," he says, "These words can only come from our Matthew, with whom they are in verbal agreement, for it is utterly improbable that a remark of such a special nature should have been made in identically the same way by two persons distinct from and independent of each other."* Over and above the direct coincidences between Justin and our first Gospel, there are other hardly less striking proofs that he had read our S. Matthew. It is well known that our first Gospel quotes passages from the Old Testament which are not to be found exactly as they are quoted, either in the Hebrew text or the Septuagint. In five or six instances these peculiarities of Matthew's citation reappear in Justin. As he gives them, they are not to be found in the Hebrew or the Septuagint, or in other books of the New Testament. He must therefore have taken them second-hand from S. Matthew.†

How does our author deal with these facts? He passes over the striking similarity in quotations from the Old Testament without alluding to it, and this though it has been mentioned and discussed by critics of every school—by Credner, Semisch, Hilgenfeld; even by writers like De Wette, who have only devoted a few pages to Justin in their general "Introductions" to the New Testament. Next as to the strong instance of agreement which overcame even Credner, he contends that "it is absurd to say that Justin quotes loosely the important part of his passage, and then about a few words at the close pretends to be so particularly careful." No one will think this absurd who observes that it is just when Justin comes to the words at the close, that he makes an express appeal to his written document. Thirdly, our author never gives any enumeration or any connected view of the passages where Justin's text resembles that of Matthew. He deals separately with the instances of Justin's quotations from Matthew, given by Tischendorf, and with others given by De Wette, each of whom has treated of Justin's use of our Gospels within the compass of a few pages, and he ignores

1, 17, p. 44, cf. Matt. xxii. 21; and in the Dial. 49, p. 160, cf. Matt. iii. 11, 12; 51, p. 168, cf. Matt. xi. 14; 76, p. 260, cf. Matt. viii. 11; 105, p. 358, cf. Matt. v. 20; 107, p. 362, cf. Matt. xii. 39.

* Credner, Beiträge, i. p. 237.

† The most striking instances are the quotations from Micheas in Apol. 1, 34, p. 86, seq. cf. Matt. ii. 6; from Zacharias (Justin has Sophonias by mistake), Apol. 1, 35, p. 90, cf. Matt. xxi. 5; from Jeremias, Dial. 78, p. 270, cf. Matt. ii. 18.

the standard work of Semisch,* in which all the coincidences between Justin and S. Matthew are enumerated and classified. Lastly, he has a way of his own for dealing with the few cases which he does consider. For example, Justin quotes almost word for word as it is found in S. Matthew, the saying of our Lord, “(They) shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast into the outer darkness.”† In two other places‡ the quotation recurs, only in these last Justin has transposed the order of the words, so that we have “from the west and from the east,” instead of “from the east and from the west.” One would have thought this proof at once that Justin used Matthew, and that his method of quotation is inexact. So an “apologetic critic” might have supposed. Not so “*Supernatural Religion*.” The slight transposition in the order proves that Justin is not quoting our Gospels. But what are we to say of the third instance where the agreement with Matthew is complete? “*Supernatural Religion*” denies the agreement. In all three places, he tells us, Justin makes his quotation in the same form, and diverges in precisely the same way from the text of S. Matthew. This statement will surprise any one who refers to S. Justin. However our author is ready with his reasons. “In some MSS.,” he says, “Dial. 76 omits ‘from the west’ altogether”: this omission “gave the opportunity for adjusting the text of some [other] MSS. according to orthodox views”; i.e. the text of Justin was brought into harmony with the text of S. Matthew; but here, too, “there is no doubt” that Justin wrote “they shall come from the west and from the east”; persisting for the third time in his variation from S. Matthew. Finally, after this display of critical learning, our author congratulates himself on having disposed of the resemblance to S. Matthew in the passage. Now there are but two manuscripts of Justin’s Dialogue.§ Both contain the words just as we have given them,

* The treatment of Semisch in “*Supernatural Religion*” is an example of the superficial way in which the book has been compiled. Semisch wrote in 1848 an elaborate work on Justin’s Memoirs. The learning and thoroughness of Semisch are admitted even by Hilgenfeld, his bitter opponent; yet in “*Supernatural Religion*” Semisch is mentioned only in a few lines; his main arguments are passed by; while a formal answer is made to Tischendorf and De Wette, neither of whom has treated of Justin in any special work.

† Dial. 76, p. 260, cf. Matt. viii. 11, 12.

‡ Ib. 120, p. 406; ib. 140, p. 464.

§ See the Prolegomena in Otto’s edition, p. xix. In the printed edition of Maranus the words “from the west,” from Dial. 76, were omitted by a slip in the Greek, while they kept their place in the Latin translation on the opposite page, and our author has confused the printed edition of Maranus with the

and just as they are in Matthew. The manuscripts of Justin, which omit the words from "the west," the other MSS, which have been adjusted to orthodox views, the true "reading" preserved, we suppose, in a third family of MSS., are due, one and all to our author's imagination, and we congratulate him on a feat of criticism in which he has surpassed himself.

Our second Gospel contains only about twenty-four verses peculiar to itself. Even these have left their mark in Justin's narrative. Antiquity was unanimous in the belief that S. Mark wrote and composed his Gospel from the discourses of S. Peter; so Papias tells us, who is earlier than Justin; and Tertullian says expressly, "[The Gospel] which Mark put forth is affirmed to be the work of Peter, whose interpreter Mark was."* Justin mentions the memoirs (or Gospel) of Peter thus:—He speaks of the fact that Christ "changed the name of Peter, one of His apostles," and of "this being written in his (Peter's) Memoirs, along with a notice that Christ changed the names of two others, who were brethren and sons of Zebedee, unto Boanerges, that is, sons of thunder."† These two facts are found together in Mark's Gospel,‡ and they are not found at all anywhere else. Even the interpretation of the name Boanerges is given by Justin in the precise words of Mark.

From S. Luke Justin has adopted several characteristic phrases,§ an additional confutation of our author's statement that "the peculiarities of language of our Synoptic Gospels are *entirely* wanting in Justin." There are moreover a number of facts from the Gospel history given by Justin which are peculiar to the Gospel of S. Luke among our Synoptics.|| Finally, Justin has six quotations, all clear and unmistakable, from S. Luke's text.¶

But we cannot leave the Synoptics without reminding the reader that Justin does not, except in one instance which we have given already, profess to quote any one of his Gospels

MSS. Credner, writing before the appearance of Otto's edition of 1847, follows very naturally the misprint of Maranus (Credner, Beiträge, i. p. 180). Hilgenfeld (Evangelien Justin's, &c., 1851, p. 192) gives the readings correctly. Of course neither Credner nor Hilgenfeld had heard of the MSS. invented by "Supernatural Religion."

* Tertull. adv. Marc., iv. 5. † Dial. 106, p. 360. ‡ Marc. iii. 16, seq.

§ Thus *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*, *ἑλίσσος*, as a designation of God; *ἐπισιιάζειν* (and *ἐρχεσθαι ἐπὶ*, for *ἐπὶρχεσθαι ἐπὶ* in) Luke (Apol. 1, 33, p. 86). Of course our point is not that these phrases are common to S. Luke and to Justin, but that both use them with reference to the Incarnation.

|| They are collected by Semisch, p. 134, seq.

¶ Apol. 1, 16, p. 42, from Luc. vi. 29; ib. 1, 19, p. 52, from Luc. xviii. 27; Dial. 76, p. 262, from Luc. x. 19; ib. 81, p. 284, from Luc. xx. 35; ib. 100, p. 342, from Luc. i. 35, seq.; ib. 105, p. 358, from Luc. xxiii. 46.

in particular. He quotes "the memoirs written by the Apostles," collectively. Hence if he unites passages from Matthew and Luke, this only confirms the theory that he uses our Gospels. Thus he tells us, "It is written in the Memoirs which, I say, were written by the Apostles and those who followed them, that his sweat poured down as it were heavy drops (ὥσεὶ θρόμβοι) while He prayed and said, If it is possible let this chalice pass from (me)."* The words of Christ are taken, with a slight transposition, from S. Matthew the Apostle; † the fact of the sweat from S. Luke, the follower of the Apostles. ‡ It is true that Justin says only ὥσεὶ θρόμβοι: Luke ὥσεὶ θρόμβοι αἵματος; but Weststein § showed long ago, by instances from medical writers, that θρόμβοι of itself means "drops of blood." Semisch || and Meyer ¶ have repeated the same assertion. Our author replies that if Luke had thought so he would not have added αἵματος.** This reply will satisfy no one who knows the Greek language, and of this we can furnish superabundant proof, which we consign for brevity's sake, to a foot-note. ††

After all, he continues, "a still more important point" remains. There is reason to believe that the incident of the bloody sweat was wanting in the early copies of Luke; it is not in the Vatican and Sinaitic MSS., though in the Sinaitic it has been "added by a later hand." ‡‡ Now the Sinaitic is probably, as our author himself assures us, our oldest MS. of the New Testament. It *does* contain the verse in S. Luke, and it is a later hand which has marked the passage as doubtful. §§ Our author uses the most contemptuous language of Tischendorf and Dr. Westcott. Could either of these two able scholars, "apologists" though they be, have committed a blunder like this?

Justin's main object in quoting the Gospels is to prove that the facts of Christ's life are the fulfilment of prophecy, and to illustrate the purity of His moral teaching. S. John's Gospel

* Dial. 103, p. 354.

† Matt. xxvi. 39.

‡ Luc. xxii. 44.

§ Ad loc. in his commentary on the New Testament. Amsterdam: 1751.

|| P. 146.

¶ Ad loc. in his commentary on S. Luke. Fifth edition: 1867.

** S. R., i. p. 334.

†† E.g. in the Septuagint the word for palm branches is *βατα*, which occurs in 1 Macc. xiii. 51. S. John xii. 13 uses the fuller form *βατα φοινίκων* in the same sense. Luc. i. 24 has *συλλαμβάνειν*, and in i. 31 *συλλαμβάνειν ἐν γαστρὶ*, both with the same meaning. Clem. Rom. 1, 23, in a quotation, has *σταφυλή παρισσηκυῖα*, for a "ripe grape," although *σταφυλή* expresses the ripeness by itself.

‡‡ S. R., i. p. 335.

§§ Any one may satisfy himself on this point by consulting the fac-simile of the MS. published by Tischendorf, or, in lieu of this, the reprints of the MS. edited by Tischendorf or Scrivener.

is ill adapted for the one end or the other. In comparison with the Synoptics, it gives few facts from Christ's life, while the discourses which it relates are mystical and theological rather than moral. There is nothing, therefore, to perplex us in the fact that Justin makes a sparing use of S. John. If, however, we keep in mind Justin's description of his *Memoirs*, and the fact that S. John's Gospel was a recognized authority with Tatian his disciple, we shall see that there are convincing reasons for the belief that our fourth Gospel was one of the memoirs which Justin used. True that the doctrine of the Word (Λόγος), so prominent in Justin, might have been derived from Philo; but then Justin seems at least to imply that it was contained in his *Memoirs* or Gospels,* and S. John's is the one early Gospel which, so far as our information goes, contained the doctrine of the Λόγος at all. Next Justin appeals to his "Memoirs" for the fact that this "Word" became Man,† a doctrine found, of course, substantially in S. John, but directly opposed to the teaching of Philo. Justin speaks of our Lord as "made flesh" (σαρκοποιηθείς),‡ which exactly recalls the remarkable expression "became flesh" (σὰρξ ἐγένετο) of S. John. Our author indeed argues that Justin's doctrine of the "Word" (Λόγος) cannot be derived from that of S. John, because he puts the Word "in a secondary position." So did many Fathers of the third century; yet they, we suppose, knew and accepted S. John's Gospel. He proceeds with an instance in proof that Justin's doctrine of the "Word" is "less advanced" than S. John's. Both Justin and Philo, he says, apply the term "God" (θεός) to the Word "without the article," in order to distinguish Him from God the Father, the absolute or supreme God (ὁ θεός).§ A most unfortunate instance! Justin calls the Word ὁ θεός (with the article) three times, || S. John never.¶ On the other hand, Origen,** in his commentary on the fourth Gospel, distinctly lays down the principle that wherever ὁ θεός (with the article) occurs in S. John, it must be referred to the Father. Thus our author is doubly wrong—wrong in the use of θεός which he attributes to Justin, and wrong again in supposing that this use of θεός, were it a fact, could prove anything against Justin's use of S. John.

* Dial. 105, p. 356.

† Loc. cit.

‡ Apol. 1, 32, p. 84.

§ S. R., i., p. 291.

|| Dial. 56, p. 184; ib. 75, p. 258; 113, p. 380.

¶ ὁ θεός μου, in the words of S. Thomas, John xx. 28, is not a real exception, since the article arises from the vocative form and the genitive which follows.

** Tom. ii. in Joann. 2.

We might illustrate further the connection between the language of S. John and that of Justin, but we pass from general similarities to two passages in Justin, where his use of the fourth Gospel is more definite and striking. The first, taken from the Apology, runs thus:—"Christ said, Unless ye be regenerated, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. But that it is impossible, that those who are once born should enter into the wombs of those who bore them, is plain to all."* Here we have "born again," instead of "born from above." But this is a misunderstanding common to the old Latin version and to the Vulgate, and it is a misunderstanding most natural, for it is suggested by the question of Nicodemus, which looks as if he had understood our Lord to speak of a new birth, not a birth from above. For the rest, this sentence of Justin can only come from his reminiscence of the conversation with Nicodemus. Our author objects that Justin has "Kingdom of Heaven," an expression peculiar to S. Matthew, instead of the "Kingdom of God," as it stands in S. John. We will answer our author in his own words. "Tertullian," he says, in a passage where it is his object to underrate his accuracy, as it is his object here to overrate that of Justin, "in professing to quote Luke, evidently does so from memory" (we thought this was a "threadbare" theory), "and approximates his Gospel to Matthew, with which Gospel, like most of the Fathers, he was better acquainted."† We substitute Justin for Tertullian, and do so with good right, for while Tertullian is, Justin is not, professing to quote any document. Our second instance is this. Justin gives the words of S. John Baptist, "I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying."‡ These words are found in S. John, but not in the Synoptics or in any other early Gospel.

In conclusion Justin refers expressly not more than seven times to his Memoirs. In five his quotations agree with the canonical text as closely as one Greek MS. of the Gospels with another. The sixth is a summary of words found in S. Matthew, exhibiting a slight inaccuracy. In the seventh case Justin diverges more decidedly from our present text. But the text of our Gospel is very uncertain, and we have independent grounds for treating his variation as neither more nor less than a various reading.§ However it has given our

* Apol. 1, 61, p. 144.

† S. R., ii. p. 100.

‡ Dial. 88, p. 308. John i. 20. *ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ὁ Χριστός*. V. 23, *ἐγὼ φωνὴ βοῶντος*. Justin puts the two sayings together, connecting them by *ἀλλά*.

§ See Westcott, On the Canon, p. 154, seq., where the passages are discussed with great ability.

author an opportunity, which he has used, for another blunder.

This may suffice as a sketch of the positive grounds for believing that Justin used our Gospels, and it only remains to consider the principal objections raised by the author of "*Supernatural Religion*." The first rests upon the fact which is undeniable, that Justin presents us with a number of details not to be found in our canonical Gospels. In itself the objection goes for nothing. Like the later Fathers, Justin adds details from tradition to the Gospel narrative, as when he speaks of a cave in Bethlehem as the scene of our Saviour's birth, or makes Arabia the native land of the Magi; and again, like the later Fathers, he repeats the Gospel narrative in a loose and inaccurate way, though this occurs only in matters of detail. Before his objection has any weight, our author must prove that Justin drew these additions from his *Memoirs*, and he does address himself to this task. Justin, he says, excludes tradition as a source of the Gospel history, for he declares that his *Memoirs* contained "everything concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ."* We reply Justin only means to say that his *Memoirs* contain generally the whole history of Christ, and Semisch has shown by a number of instances that his words cannot be pressed further. We will add an instance of our own with which our author ought to be familiar. The Muratorian fragment, after an express recognition of S. Luke's Gospel, speaks of S. John as describing "*all* the marvels of the Lord"; yet there are but two "*marvels*" in the whole history of Christ up to the date of His passion, out of all those which are recorded by S. Matthew and S. Luke, which are mentioned by S. John. Our author has another argument in store. Justin, he says, *appeals to his Memoirs* for the fact that a fire was kindled in the Jordan at Christ's baptism, a fact nowhere found in our Gospels, but contained in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. He quotes the following sentence from Justin:† "*As Jesus went into the water, a fire also was kindled in the Jordan: and when He came out of the water the Holy Spirit, like a dove, flew upon Him, as the Apostles of this very Christ of ours wrote. . . . and at the same time a voice came from the heavens . . . , . . Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee.*" He continues, "It is in the highest degree arbitrary and absurd to affirm that Justin intends to limit the appeal to the testimony of the Apostles" to the fact that the Spirit descended like a dove upon Christ, even if, "in the strictest grammatical necessity there may be no absolute necessity to

* S. R., i. p. 304.

† S. R., i. p. 322.

extend it further." Unfortunately all this confident reasoning rests on a grammatical blunder; and upon a mistranslation of Justin. The Greek text of Justin is specially constructed to limit the "quotation from the memoirs" to the single fact that the Holy Ghost descended like a dove. This is what he says: "When Jesus had gone down to the water, there was both a fire kindled in the Jordan" (a direct clause giving Justin's own statement), "and as He came up from the water the Apostles of this very Christ of ours have written that the Holy Spirit like a dove flew upon Him" (an indirect clause, giving the testimony of the Apostles Matthew and John); and then after an interval of three pages (in Otto's edition), and without reference to the Memoirs, Justin adds, "At the same time a voice came from heaven, mentioned by David in prophecy, Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee."* The reader will observe the sharp and careful way in which Justin changes his construction, marking with the greatest clearness what he does, and what he does not quote from the Memoirs of the Apostles. He will notice that Justin makes a mistake about the words of the voice from heaven, because he confuses it with the words of the psalm; and he will conclude with Grabe: "Justin, by the very construction of his words, seems to have indicated, as if with special care, that the words 'the Apostles wrote,' refer to the latter part of the sentence, viz. to the descent of the dove."†

There is no other case in which, even according to "Supernatural Religion," Justin refers to his Memoirs for any striking fact of Christ's life‡ which is not found in our Gospels; and we may proceed to sum up the evidence for identifying the one with the other. The description which Justin gives of his Memoirs fits the canonical Gospels and excludes all others. Their universal use in the Church points to the same conclusion. The narrative of Christ's life in Justin is in striking agreement with that in our Gospels. Justin's language is taken from that of the Gospel text. He relates facts which show an acquaintance with each of our Gospels taken singly; his language bears the separate impress of three at least out of the four. Whenever he makes an express appeal to his Memoirs, his quotations coincide almost verbally with the text of our Gospels, and the objections which are made against an identification of the one with the other strengthen the position they are intended to overturn.

* Dial. 88, p. 306.

† Grabe, Spicileg. Patr. i. p. 19.

‡ Justin repeats the words of the heavenly voice, "To-day have I begotten thee" (Dial. 103, p. 352); and it is well worth notice that he does so without express reference to his Memoirs, while he does appeal to them for the colloquy of the Lord with Satan which is contained in our Gospels.

The course of the controversy on Justin's *Memoirs* and the investigation which has been brought to bear on the subject illustrates the strength of our position. "Supernatural Religion" copies assertions confuted over and over again, and adds nothing except a tone of confidence which is almost and blunders which are quite his own. With men of competent knowledge it is otherwise. Hilgenfeld and Keim are certainly among the most celebrated advocates of the false criticism which has striven to undermine the historical evidence for the authenticity of the Gospels; but while they hold their original position on the main point, they have been obliged to give way with respect to Justin. In 1850 Hilgenfeld, in an elaborate work, admitted that Justin used a recension of S. Matthew's Gospel, and that he made some distinct but inconsiderable use of our S. Luke, adding that his use of S. John was "in the highest degree improbable."* In 1867 he admitted as beyond doubt that Justin used all our Synoptic Gospels,† a matter which was by that time regarded as a settled question, even in the Tübingen school.‡ In 1875, in his last and most elaborate work, he assumes Justin's use of our synoptics, and confesses that it is "hard to deny" his use of S. John's Gospel.§ Keim, in 1867, considers the use of S. John in Justin absolutely certain.||

Justin then gives the judgment of the whole Church in our second period (140–160), and witnesses to the universal reception of the Gospels at that time. But as in our first period, so in our second, we can add to the testimonies of the Church that of sects in hostility to it. This part of the subject occupies 150 pages in "Supernatural Religion," and we cannot examine it in detail. But we may mention two principal facts, and give a compendium of the evidence for them.

The first of these concerns Valentinus, and it has special reference to his use of S. John. We have seen already that this Gospel was a favourite authority with the Valentinian sect. Here we ascend to Valentinus himself. He was born about 100. After teaching in Egypt and Cyprus he came to Rome, about 140, and died some twenty years later.¶

* *Evangelien Justins*, &c., p. 304. † *Kanon und Kritik des N. T.*, p. 25.

‡ See Zeller, *Vorträge*, 1865, p. 294; at least with respect to Justin's use of Matthew and Luke.

§ *Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 66. He still maintains that Justin made use of uncanonical writings as well. We have no interest in denying this. We only insist that the *Memoirs* which were read in the Christian assemblies were our four Gospels, neither more nor less.

|| Keim, *History of Jesus of Nazareth*, English translation, i. p. 186.

¶ Lipsius, *Die Quellen der Aeltesten Ketzergeschichte neu untersucht*, 1875, p. 258. Much has been written of late on the chronology of Gnosticism. The two great authorities are Harnack, the advocate of early, and

We maintain that, like his followers, Valentinus acknowledged the four Gospels, and that, like them, he made special use of S. John. Our reasons are these. (1.) Tertullian tells us that heretics in reality reject Scripture, either openly like Marcion, by rejecting or mutilating its text, or like Valentinus secretly, by perverting its sense. Of Valentinus he speaks thus: "If Valentinus seems to use the entire document (i.e. all the scriptural books received in the Church), (still) with a mind no less crafty than that of Marcion, he laid violent hands upon the truth. For Marcion openly and plainly used the knife, not the pen, since he mutilated the Scriptures to suit his doctrine. But Valentinus spared [the sacred text], since he did not devise scriptures to fit his doctrine, but invented a doctrine which was fitted into the Scriptures. And yet he took away more and added more [than Marcion], since he took away the proper meanings of the words, and added systems of things [i.e. phantastic æon systems] which do not appear."* This is plain testimony, as Dr. Westcott saw, that Valentinus received the Scriptures of the Church, and the Gospels among them, and it is strong testimony, for Tertullian gives it against his will, since he is trying to show the enmity of heretics to Scripture. Our author totally misunderstands the context, and this is not wonderful, for he never read it, as will presently appear. He actually translates the simple Latin words "*si Valentinus integro instrumento uti videtur,*" "if Valentinus uses the whole instrument *as it seems!*"† that is, he confuses between "*uti,*" "that," and "*uti,*" "to use," or rather he thinks that *uti* may bear both meanings at once, and this in a chapter where (of course without ground) he charges Tischendorf with "deliberate falsification," with "unpardonable calculation upon the ignorance of his readers"; ‡ and Dr. Westcott with "audacity, extraordinary statements, &c. &c." (2.) Apart from external testimony, we have internal evidence of the most convincing kind that Valentinus used S. John's Gospel. Among his thirty æons, we find the names Father (Πατήρ), Grace (χάρις), only-begotten (Μονογενής), Truth (Ἀλήθεια), Word (Λόγος), Life (Ζωή), Man (Ἄνθρωπος), Paraclete (Παρακλητός); and he called his whole æon system the "Fulness" (Πλήρωμα).§ These words are

Lipsius, of late dates. To economize space, and at the same time to avoid all appearance of arguing on mere assumption, we take the dates of Valentinus and Marcion from the latter authority.

* Tertull. Præscript. 38.

† S. R., ii. 74.

‡ Ib. p. 56. Scholten (Aeltesten Zeugnisse, p. 67), who seems to have taken the words of Tertullian second-hand from some Introduction to Scripture, commits the same error, an error neither singular nor surprising in him, and, as might have been expected, faithfully reproduced by the author of "Supernatural Religion."

§ Iren., i. 11, 1, where all the names taken from the first chapter of S. John, except "only-begotten" and "grace," are given. Even these however are distinctly implied, as even Scholten does not venture to deny.

all from S. John. All but one occur in the first few verses of his Gospel, and it is self-evident that either the writer of the fourth Gospel took them from S. John, or else vice versa. It is perfectly credible that Valentinus borrowed them from S. John; it was the way of his school to take detached words from the Gospels, and to build their phantastic doctrines upon them; and we know that S. John's was the favourite Gospel with his followers. On the other hand the words have a plain and simple meaning, and an obvious connection in our Gospel. And when German critics have been driven to affirm that the words were due to Valentinus in the first instance, and were adopted by S. John, we can only regard this as a desperate attempt to escape the pressure of fact. Our author has not to face this alternative. He tells us magisterially that there "is no just ground for asserting that the terminology (of Valentinus) is derived from the fourth Gospel, the whole having been in current use long before."* No doubt "Grace," for example, is a word to be found in a thousand books; but where did Valentinus get this extraordinary collocation, "Father," "Grace," "Truth," "Word," "only-begotten," "Life," "Man," "Fulness," "Paraclete," except from his use of S. John?

Our second testimony is from Marcion, founder of another great Gnostic school. He was at the head of his sect not later than 144. He accused all the Apostles except S. Paul of corrupting Christianity by Judaism.† He knew the Gospels of Matthew and John, and he rejected them, not because he disputed their authenticity, but because he rejected the authority of their authors. This is the account Tertullian gives,‡ and it is plain that Tertullian describes Marcion's procedure from a knowledge of his writings. Thus in his very rejection of the first and fourth Gospels, he yields his witness to their authenticity. However, he retained the Gospel of S. Luke on account of its connection with S. Paul. Even that he could not afford to keep unaltered. He maintained that Judaism was the religion of a lower and an evil God; and hence he cut out the passages which did not fit this view. The Tübingen school held at one time that Marcion's Luke was the true original, that it was not he who mutilated, but the Church which interpolated. We know with tolerable certainty the portions of our Luke retained by Marcion, and on close examination it was found that Marcion's Gospel could not represent the original text, and the Tübingen critics themselves made a formal retreat from their position. "The old view," says Dr. Davidson, (and we could not quote a more extreme opponent of the authenticity of the Gospels,) on the nature of Marcion's Gospel, "will not again be seriously disturbed."§

* S. R., ii. p. 372.

† Iren., iii. 12, 12.

‡ Adv. Marc. iv. 1-6; De Carne Christi, c. 2.

§ Davidson, Introduction to the New Testament, vol. ii. p. 51.

However, our author has attempted to disturb it, and a summary of the reasons for regarding Marcion's Luke as a mutilation of the original text will show with what success. The reasons are—(1) the testimony of Irenæus and Tertullian. The former is at least an unprejudiced witness, for although he is contending against the Valentinians rather than Marcion, still he singles out the latter for one special reproach, and declares "he alone dared openly to mutilate the Scriptures."* In "Supernatural Religion" this evidence is met by a mistranslation of Tertullian, exposed already by Professor Lightfoot. There is another mistranslation on this one point, for our author mistakes the imperative "aufer" for the indicative "aufert,"† alters the sense accordingly, and indulges in confident argument on the strength of it, adding a modest and appropriate sentence on the falsehood, "lightness, and inaccuracy of Tertullian." (2) If we take Marcion's text for the original, no motive can be assigned for the interpolation. On the other hand, if our Luke is the original, the most evident causes can be assigned for the mutilation of Marcion; e. g. he omitted a large number of passages referring to Christ's human birth which he denied, to Christ as the fulfilment of the law, or to the Jews as the chosen people. Our author argues that some of these passages are thoroughly Pauline, and must therefore have been welcome to Marcion, as if Marcion's doctrine that the God who gave the Jewish law was an imperfect, nay an evil being, had been identical with the doctrine of S. Paul. (3) Marcion has left the mark of the knife in his text of S. Luke, for his omissions have made some parts of it unintelligible. Let us take one instance out of several. Marcion's Gospel opens thus :‡ "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, &c. (Luc. iii. 1), Jesus went down to Capharnaum, a city of Galilee, and He was teaching them on the Sabbath days" (Luc. iv. 31). In our Luke the word "went down" (κατήλθεν) has a plain meaning. It describes the descent of Christ from Nazareth, which has just been mentioned, to Capharnaum, which lay lower down on the shore of the Lake of Tiberias; but what sense can it have in Marcion's text, when all reference to Nazareth is cut away, and these words form the beginning of the Gospel? He no doubt made it mean "descended from heaven"; but had he been the original author he would not have mentioned an event so extraordinary in this abrupt and unintelligible way, and still less would he have finished the verse with the matter of fact sequel, "and He was teaching in their Synagogues on the Sabbath days." Even Baur felt that this was an insuperable

* Iren., i. 27, 4.

† S. R., ii. p. 100.

‡ We refer the reader to the table of Marcion's Gospel, as given by De Wette, Introduction to N. T., Engl. transl., p. 3, seq.; or in Hilgenfeld, Evangelien Justini, &c., p. 441.

difficulty, and we confess we looked with some curiosity for the solution in "Supernatural Religion." Its author does not solve the difficulty, for he does not see it. It is not necessary, he says, for us to discuss the sense in which the word "came down" (κατέλθεν) was interpreted, since it is used in Luke. Of course. But the point is that this word makes good sense in our text of Luke, none in Marcion's. With this striking specimen of "criticism," we bring the subject to an end, and state the results which follow from investigation of Christian literature in our second period (140—160).

Our inquiry has led us within forty years of S. John's death. He lived, S. Irenæus tells us, into the reign of Trajan (98—117), and he is said to have written his Gospel late in life. Now in the very generation which had known him, in a church ruled and guided by his disciples, we find his Gospel, and with it the three Synoptics, universally received and acknowledged. Further, we have brought testimonies from the two great heresies of the time, that of the Marcionites and the Valentinians. It is only want of space which has kept us from stating at length the testimony given to our Gospels by a third and very different order of heretics, viz. the Ebionites. Amidst these testimonies not a single voice is heard to question the authenticity of the Gospels on historic grounds.* Unless there is counter evidence, such an accumulation of early evidence ought to be convincing. We shall now see that it is confirmed by the fragments of literature which have come down to us from the disciples of the Apostles themselves.

Papias, our first authority in this period, wrote an "Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord." In "Supernatural Religion" this work is assigned to the year 150, or thereabouts,† and we need not dispute the date. In any case, we may fitly place Papias in this our earliest period, for he made it the business of his life to collect traditions from the disciples of the Apostles; and it is in the very words of one among these disciples, "John the Presbyter," that he describes the origin of S. Mark's Gospel. "This," Papias writes, "the Presbyter used to say: Mark being the interpreter (or secretary) of Peter, wrote accurately but not in order the sayings and doings of Christ, which he remembered. For he neither heard the Lord nor followed Him; but afterwards, as I said, he followed Peter, who gave his instructions as occasion required, but without

* The Alogi, the only early heretics who denied that the fourth Gospel was written by St. John furnish most striking proof of its authenticity. They attributed both the Apocalypse and the Gospel to Cerinthus, i.e. to the time of S. John.—Epiphani. Hær., 41, 3. They are almost certainly the same heretics alluded to, but not named, by Iren., iii. 11, 9.

† S. R., i. p. 449.

intending to set the oracles * of the Lord in order. Thus, Mark committed no error in writing down some things just as he remembered them."† This looks like a description of our second Gospel from a disciple of the Apostles. John the Presbyter, like all the later Fathers, ascribes it ultimately to Peter. However, our author is confident that Papias is not describing our Mark, but another record of Christ's life, which also went under S. Mark's name. Let us see what this theory involves. We must believe that in the generation after Papias, a spurious work, ascribed to Mark, was received universally in the Church. This our author sees; but he fails to see that this is the least part of the difficulty. We must also believe that Irenæus, the disciple of Polycarp, who was the friend of Papias, not only received a false Mark in place of the true one, but also supposed that the false Mark was the one used by Papias, and then clothed this false Mark in the dress which belonged to the original gospel, and attributed this latter in its turn to the preaching of Peter. Again, we must believe that Eusebius, who knew the work of Papias, and carefully notes that he related a story contained in the Gospel according to the Hebrews,‡ was blind to the fact that the Mark of Papias was different from ours, and transferred the statement of Papias about his Mark to our second Gospel. Such a theory ought to rest on strong evidence, and the only evidence produced is this. Papias, we are told, says of his Mark that he did not write "in order," while our second Gospel is in order as good as that of the other synoptics. Now, our synoptics differ in their arrangement. Authorities in ancient and modern times have taken, some one, some another Gospel as representing the true chronological sequence; and supposing John the Presbyter preferred Matthew's order to Mark's, this is rather slight ground for assuming that his Mark was other than ours. But, indeed, we need not betake ourselves even to a supposition as permissible as this. Matthew and Luke begin Christ's history with His birth. Luke lays particular stress on the fact that he has "followed all things from *the beginning*" and set them "in order." Mark, on the contrary, omits all the early history of Christ and all His longer discourses. This exactly fits in with the statement of Papias, that Mark did not write "in order" (ἐν τάξει), and with his explanation of his own words, that Mark wrote "*some things* [ἐνία] out of all that our Lord had said and done."

As to S. Matthew, Papias says that he "wrote the oracles in the Hebrew dialect, and each interpreted them as he was able." Here again our author insists that this cannot apply to our Matthew,

* λογίων. There is some MS. authority for λόγων; but S. R., i. p. 453, n. 2, gives λογίων. The author translates as if he read λόγων.

† Euseb. H.E., iii. 39, 15.

‡ Euseb. H.E., iii. 39, 16.

since Papias speaks of "oracles" (λόγια), i.e. of a collection of discourses by our Lord. Such a collection has perished without leaving a trace of its existence; and the objections which we have made to his theory on S. Mark, tell almost equally against his theory on S. Matthew. He insists that "there is no linguistic precedent for straining the expression (λόγια), as used at that period, to mean anything beyond a collection of sayings of Jesus."* Now, (1) S. Paul† used the expression "oracles of God" (λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ), to signify the Old Testament, which surely contains "doings as well as sayings." (2) Papias evidently uses the word in the same sense, for, after saying that Mark "did not write the words or deeds of Christ in order," he explains this by the fact that S. Peter, whom S. Mark heard, did not "make a record in order of the oracles of the Lord." Here, "oracles of the Lord" is used as an equivalent for the sayings and doings of Christ. Again, Papias called his own work the "Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord"; yet we have undoubted information that it contained actions as well as discourses of Christ.‡ (3) S. Irenæus§ calls our present Gospels by this very name λόγια. Nor is it only the "most thorough apologists" who are guilty of straining the word λόγια to make it apply to the Gospel,|| though this is the impression left by our author. The interpretation which we have given is common to critics who represent every shade of opinion.¶

In short, we must accept the testimony of John the Presbyter, a disciple of the Apostles themselves, for our second Gospel, and that of Papias, who took such special pains to follow these Apostolic men in all that regarded our Lord, for the first, unless it is the "function of criticism" to disregard insuperable difficulties and construct incredible hypotheses under the pretext of meeting difficulties which can be explained easily and do not call for any desperate remedy.

Professor Lightfoot, in the January number of the *Contemporary*, has demolished the fallacy of "Supernatural Religion" that Papias cannot have used S. John's Gospel, because Eusebius does not say he did. It did not fall in with the plan of that historian to collect testimonies for any one of the canonical Gospels. He regarded their authority as fixed and certain from the first; and with respect to them he quotes early writers only when they relate facts of historical interest about the circumstances under which our Gospels were composed. However, Eusebius did not regard the whole canon of

* S. R., i. 469.

† Rom. iii. 2.

‡ Euseb., iii. 39, 16.

§ Iren., Proem. 1, et 1, 8, 1.

|| S. R., i. p. 468.

¶ Eg. Meyer, in the Introduction to his Commentary on S. Matthew, p. 12, quotes a long list of names for our interpretation of the word λόγια, and among them of Baur and Hilgenfeld.

the New Testament as fixed beyond dispute, and he collects ancient evidence for the Catholic Epistles, for the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. Now, he tells us that Papias acknowledged the First Epistles of S. John and of S. Peter ; * and we know from another source that he made use of the Apocalypse.† These facts are important for the origin of the Gospels in two ways. First, because there are, notoriously, the strongest grounds of internal evidence for assigning the First Epistle and the Gospel of S. John to the same author. They agree in doctrine and phraseology ; so that if Papias knew and received the one, we may conclude with the highest probability that he knew and received the other. Next, the abler critics of the destructive school have striven to divide the Christians at the time of Papias into a Pauline party, a Petrine party, &c. They represent the different books of the New Testament as fabricated in the interest of these parties, and they insist that all our four Gospels could not be received till these differences were softened down and forgotten, and the opposing parties merged in the Catholic Church. This theory is necessary to the negative position ; for, unless there is positive reason to the contrary, we have evident right to take the fuller statements of Irenæus, e. g., on the authority of the Gospels as completing the fragmentary notices of an earlier age. But it is shattered to pieces by the knowledge we have of Papias ; for he received the Epistles of S. John, of S. Peter, and of the Apocalypse, each of which, on the hypothesis of our opponents, was the manifesto of three conflicting sects.

There is, however, one difficulty which we have not touched. Papias says that " Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew dialect [i. e. in Aramæan], and each interpreted them as he was able."‡ What security have we, it may be asked, that our Greek Matthew is a genuine reproduction of the original ? We cannot dwell here upon the testimony of S. Jerome, who had copied out the original Matthew,§ but we observe that when Papias wrote there must have been an authorized Greek translation ; for he speaks of the time when every one interpreted it for himself as past. And we proceed to prove that the received Greek text of Matthew in the time of Papias, and before it, was the same as ours. The " Epistle of Barnabas " cannot be placed later than 120 A. D., while the majority of critics place it much earlier.|| It contains

* Euseb., iii. 39, 16.

† See *Fragm. viii.* of Papias in Routh's *Rel. Sacr.*, i. p. 15.

‡ Euseb. *H. E.*, iii. 39, 16.

§ We must refer, for the character of the Hebrew Matthew and its relations to the Greek text on the one hand, and the Gospel according to the Hebrews on the other, to the clear and accurate account in Meyer, *Commentary on S. Matthew*, p. 16, seq.

|| Baur (*Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte*) assigns it to the

three distinct allusions to words or facts which occur in our text of S. Matthew. And in a fourth place it quotes the words of our Gospel with the formula, "it is written."* The last passage in the Epistle stands thus: "Let us take heed, lest we should be found, as it is written, many called, but few chosen." Hilgenfeld† admitted that the allusions to our first Gospel made its use by the author of the Epistle probable; but the original Greek of the last passage, where words, found in S. Matthew, and in him alone, are distinctly and formally quoted as Scripture, had perished; and Hilgenfeld,‡ with a multitude of other critics, suggested that the formula, "as it is written," was an interpolation. Some years after, Tischendorf discovered the original Greek of the whole Epistle, and not only so, but the Greek text, which he found was contained in the Sinaitic codex, one of the two most ancient and valuable MSS. in existence. There in the original Greek stood the very formula in dispute, viz. "as it is written"; and Hilgenfeld has had to print it in his own edition of Barnabas. Thus the cause is finished at last, and we have the certainty that as early as 120 our first Gospel ranked as "Scripture." How is this met in "Supernatural Religion"? First, we are told that one of the allusions to Matthew's text is an interpolation.§ Of course, the assumption is purely gratuitous; it will be time to consider it when it is adopted by any single critic who possesses scholarship enough to edit the Greek text of Barnabas. Next, as to the crucial passage, our author urges that Matthew cannot have had canonical authority at that time. In other words, he starts with a theory that there is no early evidence for the Gospels; if facts tell against him, so much the worse for the facts.|| Lastly, he insists that it is 4 Esdras, not S. Matthew, which the Apostle quotes as Scripture. Let the reader judge. The words of Esdras¶ are, "Many were created, but few will be saved"; of Matthew, "For many are called, but few chosen"; of Barnabas, "Many [are] called, but few chosen." And let him remember that while our author considers that the slightest divergence in a supposed quotation from our Gospels is sufficient to disprove it, he takes words of Barnabas as a quotation of a text from Esdras, to which they have scarcely the most remote resemblance.

Up to this point in the period of the Apostolic Fathers we have

reign of Hadrian. But Hilgenfeld, *N.T. extra Canonem*, Fascic. ii. p. 12, to the close of the first century. And so the majority of critics, as may be seen from Riggenbach *Brief des Barnabas*, 1873.

* Barnab. Epist. c. 5, cf. Matt. ix. 13; c. 7, cf. Matt. xxvii. 34; c. 12, cf. Matt. xxii. 43, seq.; and lastly c. 4 with Matt. xxii. 14.

† Hilgenfeld, *Apost. Väter*, p. 50.

‡ Hilgenfeld, *Apostolische Väter*, p. 48, n. 4. An explanation substantially the same had been given before by Credner, *Beiträge*, i. p. 28.

§ S. R., i. p. 255, seq.

|| *Ib.* p. 243.

¶ 4 Esdras viii. 3.

been occupied with testimonies for the two first Gospels. We conclude with a testimony for the fourth, and a testimony of peculiar importance, because it comes from S. Ignatius, who was a contemporary of S. John, and who wrote but a few years after his death, from Asia Minor, the very country in which, according to the early and uniform tradition of the Church, S. John composed his Gospel. There is, of course, a preliminary question as to the authenticity of the Ignatian epistles in the Medicean text; but this we have discussed in a previous number of this REVIEW, and given, as we believe, convincing reasons for accepting them as the work of S. Ignatius. We are perfectly willing to revise our conclusions, and consider new objections. But any one who reads in the *Contemporary* for February Professor Lightfoot's article on the treatment of this question by "Supernatural Religion," will see that its author has not the most elementary knowledge of the matter in hand. There is hardly a statement in the pages which he devotes to the subject which does not rest upon an historical blunder. He is not acquainted even with the arguments against the authenticity of the epistles; and now, after its annihilation by Professor Lightfoot, we may disregard this part of his book altogether. We take for granted the authenticity of the Epistles, and consider only their bearing upon S. John's Gospel. S. Ignatius has no occasion to quote it expressly. The memory of S. John's teaching was fresh in the memory of his disciples; but he does show that he was familiar with it, and his own language is coloured by the terminology of the Gospel. First, we find in the Epistles marked resemblances to the language and theology of S. John, which prove little one by one, but which are striking when found together in letters which are very brief, abrupt, and without connected theology of their own. Thus S. Ignatius speaks of our Lord as the "eternal Word" (Λόγος)* as "the *only* son" of God† (like the Μονογενής of S. John); of the devil as "the ruler of this age,"‡ (ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου like the ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου in S. John); of the "water which is living and speaks in him,"§—in indirect allusion to Christ's words in St. John, "He would have given thee living water,"—"the water which I will give him will be in him a fountain of water springing up to life eternal."|| Next, there are two places where the connection with the fourth Gospel is much more definite. "The spirit," S. Ignatius says, "is not deceived, being from God, for he knows whence he comes and whither he goes."¶ We give the

* Ad Magnes, 8.

† Ad Rom. inser.

‡ Ad Rom. 7.

§ Ib.

|| John iv. 10 et 14.

¶ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐ πλανᾶται ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὄν. οἶδεν γὰρ πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει; Ad Phil. vii. cf. τὸ πνεῦμα θεοῦ θίλει πνεῖ. . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει.—John iii. 8. οἶδα πόθεν ἦλθον καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγω.—Ib. viii. 14.

Greek in a note, because the verbal coincidence with John iii. 8, viii. 14, puts the source of the sentence in S. Ignatius beyond reasonable doubt. Again, S. Ignatius exclaims, "I take no pleasure in food of corruption. . . . I wish the bread of God, which is the *flesh* (σάρξ) of Jesus Christ . . . and the drink of God, his blood, which is love incorruptible and perennial life."* This short sentence touches the sixth chapter of S. John in no less than three points. It contrasts the "bread of God" with the "food of corruption," answering to the "food which perishes"† in S. John. Next he declares that the bread of God is the flesh (σάρξ) of Christ, a most remarkable coincidence, for while S. Paul and the Synoptics speak of bread as the "body" (σῶμα) of Christ, S. John alone calls it His "flesh."‡ Lastly, S. Ignatius like S. John says this flesh of Christ is eternal life. Our author§ ignores the contrast in S. John and S. Ignatius between the bread of corruption and the bread of life, and does not perceive that S. John is the only New Testament writer who, like Ignatius, calls bread the *flesh* (σάρξ) of Christ; so that he misses the chief point of the resemblance. He argues further that the "passages" bearing a resemblance to S. John's Gospel are not found in the Syriac text, a statement which is irrelevant and false at once; irrelevant, because the Syriac version is but an epitome of the Greek text, and false, because the principal passage, that which we have just considered, is found in the Syriac text.|| In conclusion, we must add that this use of the fourth Gospel in S. Ignatius is confirmed by the fact that Polycarp, who wrote but a few months later, shows his knowledge of S. John's First Epistle,¶ the authorship of which is bound up inseparably with that of the Gospel. And the reader must remember that "Apologists" are not alone in asserting, and asserting with confidence, the use of S. John's Gospel in the Ignatian epistles. Westcott and Tischendorf are the only names given in "Supernatural Religion," and the second-hand references, which are heaped together without object on most other occasions, are scanty enough here. We will quote three recent critics of great celebrity who ought to be impartial, for they deny the authenticity both of the Gospels and the Epistles. "The whole theology of the Ignatian epistles," says Hilgenfeld,** "is founded upon the fourth Gospel."†† Lipsius and Keim‡‡ say the same thing.

* Ad Rom. 7. We take the reading least favourable to our argument, as given by Zahn, Ignatius von Antiochien, p. 348.

† John vi. 27.

‡ Ib. 51.

§ Vid. S. R., ii.

|| Cureton, Corpus Ignatianum, p. 52.

¶ Pol. ad Phil. 7; cf. 1 John iv. 3.

** Hilgenfeld, Einleitung in das N.T., p. 73, n. 1.

†† Lipsius, in Niedner's Zeitschrift für Histor. Theol. for 1856, No. 1, p. 73.

‡‡ Keim, Jesus of Nazara, Engl. transl., p. 184. He speaks of the use of S. John in the Ignatian epistles as generally admitted.

This evidence for S. John's Gospel comes to us from the country in which he lived and wrote ; it comes to us from the circle of his disciples, and it dates from a few years after his death. And we may fairly take it as the completion and the confirmation of later testimony. We found, at the end of the second century, the Gospels universally acknowledged in the Church, and their authenticity regarded as too certain to need explicit proof. We have seen that the Fathers of this time were in close connection with the disciples of the Apostles, and hand down the testimony of these Apostolic men to the authenticity of the Gospels in a way which disarms suspicion, because they do so incidentally, and without any thought of defending the authority of the Gospels. In our second period, just when the generation which had conversed with the Apostles had died out, and one main source of tradition for the facts of Christ's life was dried up, we have seen the Gospels read and acknowledged in the Churches—taking, in other words, their natural place as authorities for the history of Christ. We have the right to demand some positive ground for setting this evidence aside ; and instead of this, we have found clear traces of the Gospels in the fragmentary literature of our first period, and we have carried up our evidence for S. John's Gospels within a few years of the Apostle's death.

We can only allude in passing to the fact, that the critics of the negative school have acknowledged, in effect, the force of this testimony, by the very efforts which they have made to break it. They have felt that its strength lies in the union of the witnesses with each other, in the fact that S. Irenæus, for instance, claimed to hold the same faith and to be in communion with the same Church as S. Justin and S. Polycarp ; and in the difficulty of supposing that the Gospels read in the Church during the youth of S. Irenæus were different from those read in the same Church when S. Irenæus had reached middle life. One baseless theory after another has been devised to separate the Church of 140 from the Church of 190 ; and all these theories are wrecked on the simple fact that S. Irenæus was the reverent and the conservative disciple of S. Polycarp, the disciple of the Apostles. Again, the evidence for the fourth Gospel carries special weight, because it comes from Asia Minor, the very country where it was said to have been written. To escape this, the theory has been devised that S. John never was in Asia Minor at all—a theory in such glaring contradiction with assured history, that it was opposed when first put forward even by the critics whose cause it was meant to serve ; and now, when it has been revived from the oblivion into which it had fallen, has met with similar opposition. Recent discoveries have added to the perplexities of sceptical criticism. It was impossible, we were told, that the Epistle of Barnabas should quote the first Gospel as Scripture. The ori-

ginal Greek has come to light, and there the quotation from S. Matthew stands. It was equally impossible that the Clementine Homilies should make use of S. John. The concluding portion of those homilies, wanting before, has been obtained since, and the use of S. John is acknowledged by the most determined opponents of that Gospel.

Finally, it is the nature of historical evidence to rest on an accumulation of probabilities ; and if the author of "*Supernatural Religion*" seems to assume that we depend entirely on the Gospels for the facts of Christ's life, this is but one among his many fallacies. No one disputes the fact that S. Paul appeals to living witnesses, the principal of them known to himself, for the crowning miracle of the resurrection. No one doubts that the main facts of Christ's history are contained in undoubted writings of the Apostolic Fathers ; and if the Gospels were forged late in the second century, this historical testimony to the facts of Christ's life would have to be met and explained. More than this, in the very generation which had seen and known Christ, belief in the supernatural facts of Christ's life had become the basis of a definite theology. For the moment we will accept the data of the destructive criticism. We turn to the books of the New Testament, which we may still consider ancient Christian documents even after the "latest critical researches," and we place them at the dates to which they are assigned by Hilgenfeld, the latest authority on his side. S. John was the disciple of Christ, and in the Apocalypse which he wrote,* he represents his Master as the "Word of God," as the "First and the Last," as the "beginning of the creation of God." S. Paul wrote at least four epistles, and in them he makes the death and resurrection of Christ the centre of his faith. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews wrote but thirty years after the death of our Lord ; † yet he speaks of Him as the radiance of God's glory, as of One by whom the worlds were made, as the God whom the angels adore. Such was the theology of the Christian Church within thirty years of Christ's death, and it rests manifestly upon a belief in the supernatural facts of Christ's life, certain and habitual in the minds of those who had seen and known Him.

But we cannot attempt to discuss the supernatural origin of Christianity within the limits of an article. We undertook to show that the attack upon the authenticity of the Gospels in the book before us is worthless, and we leave our case in the hands of those who believe in grammar and in history. "The functions of a critic, when rightly exercised," we are told by our author, are of the highest importance ; and while we agree with him in this, we have

* Hilgenfeld, *Einleitung in das N.T.*, p. 447, seq.

† *Ib.* p. 388.

ventured to examine his work from another point of view. We have inquired, not whether he has exercised rightly the functions of a critic, but whether he has the preliminary knowledge which would entitle him to pass any opinion whatever on critical questions. We have ventured further to decide this question in the negative, and not, as we think, without ample reason. We expect a critic who examines the testimonies in the Fathers for the Gospels to show at least a moderate acquaintance with Latin and Greek—the languages in which the Fathers write. But so rude is our author's knowledge of Latin that he translates "*Si Valentinus integro instrumento uti videtur*," "If Valentinus, as it seems, uses the whole instrument" (vid. supr. p. 397); he translates the imperative "*aufer*" as if it were the indicative avert (vid. p. 111), and he turns "*Lucam videtur Marcion elegisse quem cæderet*" into "*Marcion seems to have chosen Luke, which he mutilates*" (vid. p. 399); and on each of these mistranslations he grounds important arguments. As for his Greek, he takes a sentence in Basilides as clear and easy as any in the *Delectus*, and after he has mistranslated one word, and turned a singular into a plural, and an active into a passive, he complains naturally enough, of the consequent obscurity in the sense. He thinks that *Ἰησοῦς ἔφη ἐπεῖν* means "Jesus said,"* and *ἐν' ἑσχάτων τῶν ἡμερῶν*, "at the last of the days."† Hence it is not surprising that we have found him resting his most important argument with regard to Justin upon one grammatical blunder (see above, p. 394), and an argument about Irenæus to which he appends a charge of deliberate falsification against Tischendorf upon another (see p. 364). The same ignorance of Greek leads him to an important misstatement about Tatian (see p. 375), and very novel conclusions on the chronology of

* Basilides says very simply, "When then it was necessary that we, the children of God, should be revealed, about whom creation groaned and was in travail, expecting the revelation, the Gospel came into the world, and passed through every principality and power and dominion, and every name which is named."—*Philosoph.* vii. 25. The Greek is given thus in *S. R.*, ii. p. 46:—*ἐπεὶ οὖν εἶδε ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, φησὶν, ἡμᾶς τὰ τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ, περὶ ὧν ἰστίναξε, φησὶν, ἡ κτίσις καὶ ὥδινεν ἀπεκδεχομένη τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν, ἤλθεν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ διήλθε διὰ πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ κυριότητος καὶ παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου*, and rendered, "When, therefore, it was necessary to reveal [here *S. R.* mistakes a passive for an active] us who are children of God in expectation of which revelation, he says, the creation groaneth and travaileth [here *S. R.* makes the neuter plural *περὶ ὧν* agree with the singular feminine *περιῆς*], and came through [here he suggests as an alternative rendering for *διήλθε*, prevailed over, which is of course impossible] every principality, &c." Basilides is describing the ascent of "the Son of Man" through the lines of æons into the world, and his work.

† *S. R.*, ii. p. 257.

Gnosticism. Again, a critic who treats of MSS. ought to know what they are, and what they contain. But, as we have seen, our author misquotes the Sinaitic MS. where its reading is familiar even to those who have little acquaintance with textual criticism (see p. 391). He shows equal ignorance about the MS. of the Muratorian fragment (p. 369), and as for Justin he contrives in the same breath to invent MSS. which do not exist, and to misquote those which do (p. 389). The same lack of Greek, added to a habit of copying references in haste, betrays him into a variety of mistakes on the history of theology in general and of the canon in particular. We have seen his curious misunderstanding about the *Protevangelium Jacobi* (p. 366, seq.), and about the public use of uncanonical scriptures in the early Church (p. 382). We have seen him disprove Justin's acquaintance with the fourth Gospel by an argument which is false to begin with, and which would prove, were it ever so true, that the fourth Gospel was unknown to Origen, who wrote a commentary on it (p. 392). We could have shown further, had space allowed, that our author's acquaintance, e.g. with the First Epistle of Clement, is equal to his knowledge of the *Protevangelium Jacobi*. Modern authorities fare just as hardly in his hands. Petavius, Routh, Anger, Credner, and a host of others, are alleged for statements which they contradict. He constantly mistakes an opinion admitted by critics of the most destructive tendencies for a gratuitous assertion of "Apologists" (see pp. 364, 366, 378, 402), and when he comes, for example, to Marcion's gospel, to Valentinus, to the use of S. John in the Ignatian epistles, he is not familiar enough with the literature of the question to comprehend the points at issue. He compensates for this want of knowledge by boldness of conjecture.* At the present day the fashion of conjectural emendation is happily dying out, but it has still full course in the pages of "*Supernatural Religion*." If Barnabas quotes S. Matthew, the words he suggests are interpolated (see p. 404); if Ptolemæus the Gnostic quotes S. John, or if Justin calls his "Memoirs" gospels, the same theory is made to serve (p. 382). We need hardly say that it would be vain to look for consistency of principle in such a writer. The reader has seen that our author will accept no quotation from the Gospels which varies ever so slightly from our present text; but this scepticism gives place on occasion to extreme credulity. We gave an instance of this in treating of the epistle ascribed to Barnabas. It is one out of many.

Our author has pleaded that incidental mistakes cannot but occur in a work so extended as his; and we need not consider

* S. R., ii. p. 48, seq.

this defence, for we have confined ourselves to such as affect the main argument. When, however, he urges the strain of the labour in which he has been engaged, we are obliged to answer that few books on the subject show less trace of serious labour. For instance, the tables of Justin's quotations bear the look of labour, no doubt, till we know that they have been given already by Credner and Hilgenfeld. Blunders set in the moment our author ventures on anything beyond a servile repetition of his German authorities. He does indeed retort with a charge against his critic, Professor Lightfoot, which we can but apply to ourselves, and plead guilty. He complains that in Professor Lightfoot's review "the functions of higher criticism do not rise above the correction of a schoolboy's exercise." To a great extent this is true. If our author ignores grammar in the fervour of his argument, it is necessary to remind him of those grammatical laws which are accepted by "independent critics" and "apologists" alike.

It seems thankless labour to examine such a book in such detail. After it has been torn to shreds, the question on the origin of the Gospels remains where it was, for the German critics most hostile to Christianity would be the first to smile at the vehement but ignorant zeal of their admirer, and it would be unjust to make any comparison between them and him. We can only hope that in spite of the distraction occasioned by the blunders of "*Supernatural Religion*," we have been able to indicate some positive arguments for the authenticity of the Gospels. In any case it is necessary to understand the scepticism of the country in which we live. The book before us has had circulation almost unexampled, considering its size and its subject-matter. The free-thinking press and Mr. Matthew Arnold have extolled its accurate learning. We have thought it worth while to test the "learning" of the book in question, and (may we add?) of those on whom its "learning" has made so favourable an impression.

ART. VI.—THE PROTESTATION OF 1789, AND THE IRISH CATHOLIC OATH.

Vaticanism : An Answer to Replies and Reproofs. By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. London : Murray,

A WRITER, signing himself "An Irish Catholic," soon after the publication of "*Vaticanism*," wrote a letter to the *Spectator*, in which he contested, in the first instance, Mr. Gladstone's statements concerning the connection between the Protestation signed by certain English Catholics in 1789, and the Act for the Relief of the Catholics of England passed by the Parliament of 1790-1. He undertook to show that Mr. Gladstone had misrepresented not only the doctrine held by the Catholics of England, but the spirit in which Parliament legislated for their relief, and the principles of policy upon which the Ministers of the Crown acted in their regard. The proofs which he gave in support of his case were so considerable that the *Spectator* did not hesitate to say, in its issue containing the letter, that of March 13:—

We call attention to a very interesting letter in another column, by "An Irish Catholic," which certainly seems to show that Mr. Gladstone has been misled in supposing that the relieving Act of 1791 was obtained in any degree by the Roman Catholic repudiation of the Pope's infallibility. Apparently, the whole controversy was quite as well understood then as now, only that our leading statesmen were at that time quite without fear of the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility, while now they look upon it with terror and dismay. It is quite clear that Mr. Gladstone has fallen into serious errors in that part of his historical disquisition.

Mr. Gladstone was, however, silent on the subject, and has since remained silent, while a cheap edition of "*Vaticanism*" has been issued and circulated by tens of thousands, containing, without correction or qualification, all the mis-statements of fact which had been exposed, and all the violent accusations against the See of Rome and the Catholics of England which had been based upon those mis-statements of fact. An animated and prolonged controversy ensued in the columns of the *Spectator*, several correspondents of that journal disputing minor details of the case advanced by "an Irish Catholic," but none of them even pretending to deny the larger grounds

on which he had challenged Mr. Gladstone's charges. In the course of this controversy, having done such justice as he could to the honourable and candid manner in which the Catholics of England acted towards Parliament in 1791, and to the generous and considerate spirit in which Parliament and Government regarded their claims and their conscience, he felt it to be his duty to treat certain circumstances connected with the history of the oath contained in the Irish Catholic Relief Act of 1793, and certain imputations made by Mr. Gladstone against the Irish Bishops and the See of Rome in connection with that oath. There has been no attempt as yet made to controvert any important part of the long and detailed statement made by him on this part of the case, in publishing which the *Spectator* recurred to the controversy in the following terms:—

We shall probably sum up the view of almost all impartial readers of this discussion, when we say that "An Irish Catholic" seems to us to have reduced the historical justification of Mr. Gladstone's accusation to very insignificant limits indeed. He has, we think, finally disposed of the assertion that, except in one instance, there was at any time any authorized, public, or official renunciation by the Catholics of either kingdom, in exchange for civil or political privileges, of the right to hold the dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope. He has shown that in that one instance, when the English Vicars-Apostolic, whether in haste, or error, or wile, did no doubt commit themselves to what seems to us a deliberate renunciation of the right, they publicly withdrew from that position *before* the advantage which they had hoped to derive from it had been gained, and that both the Irish and English Catholic authorities repeatedly and publicly avowed doctrines inconsistent with it; and that ever afterwards the English and Irish statesmen took the very sound view that while guarantees for the loyalty of Catholics were very desirable, they cared but little about the actual doctrine officially held by Catholics as to Infallibility, and nothing at all as to the possibility of any future development of that doctrine.

It is desirable, we think, that at least the main outlines of this controversy should be placed upon record in the pages of the DUBLIN REVIEW. Mr. Gladstone has had many and illustrious adversaries in the field of theology; but none, so far as we are aware, except the writer of these letters, on that ground on which it might well be presumed he could hardly fall into any very gross error—that of political history, the course and policy of legislation in the two islands concerning Catholics before and since the Union, and the motives and conditions which had weight with the minds of his predecessors in the office of Prime Minister, Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Wellington,

in both projecting and conducting such legislation. It is not possible that we should reprint the entire series of letters, five in number, in which "An Irish Catholic" stated and maintained his position. We could not fairly do so without reprinting also the letters, seven or eight in number, which appeared on the other side; but we shall give very fully his statement of the case concerning the Protestation of 1789, and concerning the Irish oath of 1793, and a brief summary of the discussion in relation to one or two other important points. The letters have been revised by the writer, curtailed where it was possible, in one particular only expanded. In a letter signed "Fair Play," which appeared in the *Spectator* of March 20, it was complained that the summary of Mr. Gladstone's statements from "Vaticanism," which "An Irish Catholic" undertook to controvert, had been somewhat inaccurately drawn. The writer has substituted in the version which we publish for the necessarily contracted abstract of the principal points which appeared in his first letter to the *Spectator*, a full *résumé* of Mr. Gladstone's statements, as nearly as possible in his own words; and he has added a few sentences to connect these passages with the letter as it originally appeared. The almost inconceivable inaccuracy of Mr. Gladstone's statements is indeed made much more manifest when they are given in all their vehemence of assertion, and apparent amplitude of detail, alongside of the simple and undeniable facts of history. It was not possible to give, in the space of a letter to the *Spectator*, several documentary proofs, to which the writer referred, which are not very easily accessible, and which he justly regards as evidence of high importance in the case; such as the Encyclical letter of the Vicars-Apostolic in 1791, the terms of the oath which they condemned, and of that which Parliament substituted. These we append to his first letter, which follows:—

It is time that the history of the "Declaration and Protestation signed by the English Catholic Dissenters in 1789" should be a little cleared up. If you will afford me space for the purpose, I will undertake to show that Mr. Gladstone has been betrayed into making a series of statements relative to that document absolutely unfounded and directly opposed to fact. Let me say at once, that I yield to no one in respect for Mr. Gladstone's sincerity, veracity, and honour; but in this matter I think it is impossible to acquit him of very grave negligence, or, as I prefer to think, somewhat rash credulity. It is hard, of course, to expect from him, or from any person not a Catholic, and not trained in theological studies, consummate accuracy in describing the proceedings of the Council of Constance or the Council of the Vatican; but it might reasonably be supposed that

he could not utter at least half a dozen egregious misstatements in relating the history of an Act of Parliament, from which an hour's study of "Hansard" and the Statute-book would have preserved him.

Mr. Gladstone asserts that "this very important document" (the Protestation of the English Catholic Dissenters) "brought about the passing of the great English Relief Act of 1791;" that "this Protestation was in the strictest sense a representative and binding document; that it was signed by 241 priests, including all the Vicars-Apostolic, by all the clergy and laity in England of any note; and in 1789, at a general meeting of the English Catholics in London, it was subscribed by every person present;" that the subscribers to it declared "they acknowledge no Infallibility in the Pope;" that "thus we have, on the part of the entire body of which Archbishop Manning is now the head, a direct, literal, and unconditional rejection of the cardinal tenet which he tells us has always been believed by his Church, and was an article * of divine faith before as well as after 1870. Nor was it," Mr. Gladstone continues, "that the Protestation and the relief coincided in time. The protesters explicitly set forth that the penal laws against them were founded on the doctrines imputed to them, and they asked and obtained the relief on the express ground that they renounced and condemned the doctrines." He proceeds to say that "the Act of 1791 for England was followed by that of 1793 for Ireland;" and that "the oath inserted in this Act is founded upon the declaration of 1757, and embodies a large portion of it, including the words, 'It is not an article of the Catholic faith, neither am I thereby required to believe or profess that the Pope is infallible.'" In reference to this oath Mr. Gladstone then cites what he calls "a Synodical Declaration of the Irish Bishops, which," he thinks, "constitutes, perhaps, the most salient point of the whole of this singular history." He says:—

"On the 26th of February, 1810, those Bishops declared 'that the said oath, and the promises, declarations, abjurations, and protestations therein contained are, notoriously, to the Roman Catholic Church at large, become a part of the Roman Catholic religion, as taught by us the Bishops, and received and maintained by the Roman Catholic Churches in Ireland; and as such are approved and sanctioned by the other Roman Catholic Churches.'"

Mr. Gladstone interprets this declaration as follows:—"We were told in Ireland that Papal Infallibility was no part of the Catholic Faith, and never could be made a part of it, and that the impossibility of incorporating it in their religion was notorious to the Roman Catholic Church at large, and was become part of their religion, and this not only in Ireland,

* Here is a very serious misquotation by Mr. Gladstone. Archbishop Manning did not use the word "article"; he used the word "doctrine" (Vatican Decrees, p. 15). Mr. Gladstone pretends to some theological scholarship, and might be expected to know the difference of meaning of the two words, which is as marked in English (e.g., the Thirty-nine Articles, the Articles of War, &c.) as in Latin.

but throughout the world." Previously he says, referring to the Protestation, "we were told in England, by the Anglo-Roman bishops, clergy, and laity, that they rejected the tenet of the Pope's Infallibility;" and he concludes—

"These are the declarations, which reach in effect from 1661 to 1810; and it is in the light of these declarations that the evidence of Dr. Doyle in 1826, and the declarations of the English and Irish prelates of the Papal communion shortly afterwards, are to be read. Here, then, is an extraordinary fulness and clearness of evidence, reaching over nearly two centuries: given by and on behalf of millions of men: given in documents patent to all the world: perfectly well known to the See and Court of Rome, as we know expressly with respect to nearly the most important of all these assurances, namely, the actual and direct repudiation of infallibility in 1788-9. So that either that See and Court had at the last-named date, and at the date of the Synod of 1810, abandoned the dream of enforcing infallibility on the Church, or else by wilful silence they were guilty of practising upon the British Crown one of the blackest frauds recorded in history."

It was by means of such declarations principally, Mr. Gladstone avers, that Catholics "obtained the remission of the penal laws, and admission to full civil equality." And here, I assume, he refers to the motives which influenced the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel in proposing the Act of 1829, which conceded full civil equality. But speaking later, more particularly with reference to the Protestation, whose history I am now especially considering, in connection with the Act of 1791, he reverts to it as exhibiting "the belief which in 1788-9 the whole body of the Roman Catholics of England assured Mr. Pitt that they held;" and, closing this part of his case, he exclaims, "Let us learn which of the resources of theological skill will avail to bring together these innovations" (the acts of the Vatican Council) "and the *semper eadem* of which I am, I fear, but writing the lamentable epitaph."

It needs no prophet's gift to say that hand of man has not written and will not write the epitaph of any attribute of the Church of God; nor does it need any even ordinary theological skill to disperse Mr. Gladstone's most confident assertions, and so make a clear, simple, and easy end of this arm of his argument. In order to do so it will suffice to cite little more than the Statute Book, the proceedings of Parliament, the correspondence and the declarations of his predecessors, the great statesmen and ministers of the Crown, who, from time to time, considered the claims of the Roman Catholics of the three kingdoms with a view to the repeal of Statutes which Mr. Pitt, in his place in Parliament, declared to be "disgraceful." Mr. Pitt's own words remain to prove that, so far from regarding the Protestation as "a representative and binding document," he knew perfectly well the majority of the Catholics of England in 1788-9 believed in the Infallibility of the Pope; and that he expressly advised the Crown and Parliament to legislate for the relief of those who did so believe. If Mr. Gladstone will only take the trouble of referring to the debates on

the Relief Bill of 1791 in the 28th and 29th volumes of "Hansard," he will find that in all the statements he has made concerning the Protestation he is more or less, and in the majority and more important of them, absolutely mistaken. He will find that Parliament was in no sense influenced, as he asserts, by the declaration contained in that paper concerning the infallibility of the Pope, but advisedly and avowedly gave relief in the Act to those—the great majority—who refused to take any oath limiting the spiritual power of the Pope, as well as to those who were willing to take an oath in the terms of the Protestation. He will find that at the instance of the Anglican Bishop of St. David's the passage which he quotes disavowing acknowledgment of the Pope's Infallibility was struck out of the oath proposed by the Bill as it came from the Commons; and that, in a word, no such oath was ever imposed by the English Parliament or taken by English Catholics. So far is it from being true that the English Bishops, clergy, and laity rejected the Pope's Infallibility in 1791 in order to get relief from Parliament, the truth is that they petitioned and otherwise moved Parliament in 1791 not to give them relief under any delusion as to their true doctrines; and all the English Vicars-Apostolic, in two Encyclical Letters, one dated October 21, 1789, and another January 19, 1791, condemned the oath which disavowed the doctrine of Infallibility, and urged their people to demand the rejection of any Bill imposing such an oath.

Mr. Gladstone may, however, suppose that the question of Infallibility was insufficiently considered in 1791, and that Parliament then took a leap in the dark. If he will refer to "Hansard," he will find that the topic of Infallibility and that of the Pope's influence on civil allegiance were as much in the air of public debate then as they have been since he published his "Expostulation." Mr. Fox, in his downright way, goes straight to the point. He says:—

"It was said by some that the Pope was infallible, by others that the Church and Council were infallible, but none had ever contended that that House was infallible; they might subject men to fines and penalties for being better than themselves, at all events, only for differing from them on the mode of worshipping the Deity" ("Hansard," vol. xxviii., c. 1363).

It is to be observed that Mr. Fox was here dealing with the question as to whether the advantages of the Bill should be limited to the minority of protesting Catholic Dissenters, who still adhered to the Protestation, or extended to the majority of English Catholics, who repudiated the proceedings based upon that document, and refused to take the oath disavowing Papal Infallibility in its terms.

It is unfortunate that we do not possess a full report of Mr. Burke's speech, but the sentence, which you will allow me to quote, describing a passage from it, is for every reason worthy of Mr. Gladstone's attention. Mr. Grattan said of Mr. Burke that he not merely "knew everything"

and "saw everything," but that he "foresaw everything." Great as is my veneration for the genius of the greatest of my countrymen, I could not have imagined that in 1791 he would have stigmatized by anticipation the main argument of the "Expostulation." Mr. Burke, as "Hansard's" reporter says,—

"Was likewise very successful in his irony upon the doctrine that much was to be feared from the Pope's power to release Papists from all allegiance to government, and every other scruple of conscience by his dispensing and absolving power" (Vol. xxviii. c. 1372).

Mr. Pitt was Prime Minister in 1791, and not the least astounding of Mr. Gladstone's statements is that in which he asserts that the Protestation embodied "the belief which in 1788-9 the whole body of the Roman Catholics of England assured Mr. Pitt that they held." Mr. Pitt, on the contrary, openly stated, in his place in Parliament, that he was perfectly well aware that the Protestation only conveyed the sentiments of a party of the Catholics of England. He declared that he was averse to drawing a hard-and-fast line between the two descriptions of Roman Catholics, and argued that, if the Bill were to pass in its then shape, it would be necessary to repeal certain of the Penal laws, in order to do equal justice to all Catholics, whether they were Ultramontane or Protesting Dissenters. Here are his very words:—

"It would be proper to repeal those statutes, if the present Bill or any measure of the kind passed, because in that case, if relief of the nature proposed by his honourable and learned friend who had made the motion was granted to one description of Roman Catholics, and the statutes to which he had alluded were suffered to remain unrepealed, it would have something like the effect of re-enacting them, as it would appear that the Legislature, apprised as they had been of their existence, thought that the other description of Roman Catholics merited to have such disgraceful statutes remain in force against them" ("Hansard," vol. xxviii., c. 1374.)

The Bill, however, went to the House of Lords as a Bill to relieve Protestant Catholic Dissenters only, and with the objectionable oath attached to it, but apparently qualified by the addition of some words recognizing the Pope's Infallibility in spirituals. I have not been able to discover what those words were, but the Archbishop of Canterbury, though, as I gather from his speech, disposed to support the Bill, objected to the form of the oath, on the score that it did not sufficiently define the limit of Infallibility. His Grace said:—

"To the oath there was one obvious objection, that though it denied the Infallibility of the Pope except in matters of spiritual doctrine, it was certainly clear that whoever was admitted to be infallible in points of doctrine was admitted to be infallible in declaring what was doctrine, so that the restriction that was intended as to the influence of the Pope in temporal matters might be overcome if he himself chose to declare that such matters were not temporal, but spiritual." ("Hansard," vol. xxix., c. 667.)

Thus so far is it from being true that any deception was practised on Parliament, the very question of the object and limit of Infallibility was plainly brought before the House, much as it might be if Parliament were now legislating in the full light of the Vatican Council.

By far the most remarkable speech in either House was that of the Bishop of St. David's, Dr. Horsley. To that high-minded prelate the Catholics of England are indebted for a frank, manly, and complete vindication of the grounds upon which they opposed the Bill, and for an argument against the oath disavowing Infallibility so convincing, that in committee the measure was enlarged so as to include all Catholics, the reference to Infallibility altogether omitted, and the Irish oath of the Act of 1773 substituted for that which had come up from the Commons. I have stated that the majority of the English Catholics protested against the anti-Infallibilist clause of the oath. Bishop Horsley refers to this as a notorious fact. He says:—"Now, my Lords, it is, I believe, a well-known fact that a very great number—I believe I should be correct if I were to say a great majority—of the Roman Catholics scruple to the terms in which the oath is unfortunately drawn, and declare they cannot bring themselves to take it,"—and he fully justifies their doing so. He goes further,—he wonders that Catholics can be found of such a spirit as to be willing to take the oath. "I believe," he says, "the gentlemen of the Catholic Committee who declare themselves ready to take the oath, will see some difficulty in particular parts of it when they consider the full import of certain terms." Happily Bishop Horsley's entire speech is given by "Hansard." Mr. Gladstone might have expected to have found some notice of such a speech and such a debate in Mr. Charles Butler's "Memoirs," to which he refers as a standard authority. Not a word of it. But, be it remembered, Mr. Charles Butler was secretary to the Catholic Committee to which Bishop Horsley so pointedly referred, and was the prime mover in their least creditable proceedings. The art of cooking Catholic history so as to suit the taste of the age is by no means an original invention of Lord Acton. It appertains to the gentlemen of that school in all generations.

But the question remains,—Was the Protestation signed, as Mr. Gladstone asserts, by the four English Vicars-Apostolic and a great number of Catholics? and did it declare, "We acknowledge no infallibility of the Pope"? It was so signed, and it did so declare. It was a very great mistake, but it was instantly, amply, openly repented of and atoned for. The proceedings in Parliament suffice to show that the great majority of the English Catholics would not consent to purchase any civil liberty on such terms. The four Vicars-Apostolic, immediately after the Protestation was published, on October 21, 1789, solemnly condemned the oath proposed to be founded upon it (the oath of the Protestant Catholic Dissenters); in this condemnation the Bishops of Ireland and Scotland agreed: and it was promptly confirmed by the Holy See. So that, though there was a great mistake, there was no deception of Parliament, and no fraud upon the Crown. On

January 19, 1791, the Vicars-Apostolic, in a letter to all the faithful of their respective districts, on the eve of the introduction of the Bill into Parliament, renewed their condemnation of the oath; called upon all good Catholics to petition Parliament not to pass any measure containing such an oath; and expressly repudiated the name "Protesting Catholic Dissenters," a name surely as offensive to Catholic ears as I suppose the name "Romanizing Protestant Ritualists" would be to members of the Church of England nowadays. It is mentioned by one of the speakers in the House of Lords that copies of the condemnation and objections to the Bill were generally circulated among members of both Houses. It is plain from their speeches that the great leaders on both sides of the House were fully informed as to the issues involved. Mr. Gladstone throughout argues as if the Protestation emanated from some adequate authority in the Catholic Church. He has overlooked Mr. Butler's statement that it was drawn up by Lord Stanhope, who (so Mr. Butler says) did not even consult any Catholic of his acquaintance as to its terms. It is in its form and verbiage an essentially Protestant document. In particular, the statement concerning Infallibility is brought in, as it were, inadvertently and gratuitously, and without direct reference to the charge to which the paragraph containing it purports to reply. My own belief is that those who signed the paper, on trust or at random, did not at the moment discern the difference between saying that they did not "acknowledge" Infallibility, and saying, what all Catholics did and could safely say before 1870, that it was not a defined "article of faith." But, as I have already stated, the error was promptly and manfully atoned for. Our Catholic politics are, I am afraid, often very stupid, but I think it cannot be denied that they are always fairly straightforward.

I submit that, under the circumstances, it is rather an abuse of terms to treat such a paper as the Protestation as, "in the strictest sense, a representative and binding document" upon the Catholics of this country; and that it is something more than an abuse of terms to say that the Catholics of England "asked and obtained relief" in 1791 "on the express ground that they renounced and condemned the doctrine," or that the Protestation was, "on the part of the entire body of which Archbishop Manning is now the head, a direct, literal, and unconditional rejection of the cardinal tenet" of Infallibility; or that Mr. Pitt ever received or believed, or in the least degree concerned himself about any assurance on the subject; or that the See of Rome or the Catholics of England ever abandoned the hope that the doctrine of Infallibility would one day be defined, or were wilfully silent as to their belief in it, and so guilty of "one of the blackest frauds recorded in history."

I cannot close this letter without saying in all sincerity that I wish the task had not fallen to my hand of exposing Mr. Gladstone's sin in this matter. I have that sense of his immortal labours for the good of my country, vainly spent as they may seem for the present day to have been on an ingrate generation,—I have that true knowledge of the heroic

zeal with which he gave all his genius, capacity, and influence to the service of Ireland in those years of his glory—that it has been a great pain to me to have to say what I have said. But I have also that confidence in his magnanimity and love of truth, that I feel sure he will thank me if I have succeeded, as I hope I have, in showing that he has in haste made a mistake which it can only be to his honour to correct, in uttering a charge of such a cruel character against the memory of men, who, though they erred for a moment through “a blunder of the sudden,” did not hesitate, at the risk of public obloquy and continuous civil outlawry, to avow their unpopular principles,—so approving themselves both honest Englishmen and orthodox Catholics.

We have now to quote the text in full of the Encyclical Letter of the Vicars-Apostolic in 1791. It will be observed that it refers to and confirms the censures uttered by a previous Encyclical issued in 1789. Its date and one of its paragraphs show that it was issued on the eve of the meeting of Parliament with every circumstance of publicity, so as to prevent the Government and Legislature from being misled by the supposition that the party who had got up the Protestation, and who were supporting the Bill for the Relief of Catholic Protesting Dissenters, in any sense represented the Episcopal body or the majority of the Catholics of England; and accordingly they propose that Parliament should be petitioned by all good Catholics in the opposite sense.

ENCYCLICAL LETTER.

CHARLES, BISHOP OF RAMA,

Vicar-Apostolic of the Western District;

WILLIAM, BISHOP OF ACANTHOS,

Vicar-Apostolic of the Northern District;

AND

JOHN, BISHOP OF CENTURIA,

Vicar-Apostolic of the Southern District;

TO ALL THE FAITHFUL, CLERGY AND LAITY, OF THOSE RESPECTIVE DISTRICTS:

WE think it necessary to lay before you the following articles and determinations.

1st. We are informed that the Catholic Committee have given in, or intends to give in, a bill, containing an oath, to be presented to Parliament, in order to be sanctioned by the legislature, and the oath to be tendered to the Catholics of this kingdom.

2ndly. The four Apostolical Vicars, by an Encyclical Letter dated October 21, 1789, condemned an oath, proposed at that time to be presented to Parliament, and which oath they also declared unlawful to be

taken. Their condemnation of that oath was confirmed by the Apostolic See, and sanctioned also by the Bishops of Ireland and Scotland.

3rdly. Some alteration has been made by the Catholic Committee in that condemned oath ; but, as far as we have learned, of no moment ; consequently the altered oath remains liable to the censure fixed on the former oath.

4thly. The four Apostolical Vicars, in the above-mentioned Encyclical Letter, declared, that *none of the faithful, clergy or laity, ought to take any new oath, or sign any new declaration, in doctrinal matters, or subscribe any new instrument wherein the interests of religion are concerned, without the previous approbation of their respective bishop, and they required submission to those determinations.* The altered oath has not been approved by us, and therefore cannot be lawfully or conscientiously taken by any of the faithful of our districts.

5thly. We further declare that the assembly of the Catholic Committee has no right or authority to determine on the lawfulness of oaths, declarations, or other instruments whatsoever containing doctrinal matters ; but that this authority resides in the bishops, they being, by divine institution, the spiritual governors in the Church of Christ, and the guardians of religion.

In consequence likewise of the preceding observations, we condemn, in the fullest manner, the attempt of offering to Parliament an oath, including doctrinal matters, to be there sanctioned, which has not been approved by us : and, if such attempt be made, we earnestly exhort the Catholics of our respective districts to oppose it, and hinder its being carried into execution ; and for that purpose to present a Protestation, or Counter-petition, or to adopt whatever other legal and prudent measure may be judged best.

Finally, we also declare that, conformably to the letter written to the Catholic Committee by the four Apostolical Vicars, October 21, 1789, we totally disapprove of the appellation of *Protesting Catholic Dissenters* given us in the bill, and of three provisos therein contained, and expressed in the said letter of the four Apostolical Vicars.

We shall here conclude, with expressing to you our hopes that you have rejected with detestation some late publications, and that you will beware of others which may appear hereafter. Of those that have been published, some are schismatical, scandalous, inflammatory, and insulting to the supreme head of the Church, the Vicar of Jesus Christ.

✠ CHARLES RAMATEN, V.A.

✠ WILLIAM ACANTHEN, V.A.

✠ JOHN CENTURIEN, V.A.

London, Jan. 19, 1791.

This is the oath proposed in the Bill as introduced by Mr. Mitford in the House of Commons :—

“I, *A. B.*, do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to— Majesty——, and I do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience before God and the world, that our sovereign —— is lawful and rightful —— of this realm, and of all other —— Majesty's dominions thereunto belonging : and I do solemnly and sincerely declare, that I do believe in my conscience, that not any descendants of the person who pretended to be Prince of Wales, during the life of the late King James the Second, and after his decease pretended to be, and took upon himself the style and title of King of England, by the name of James the Third, or of Scotland by the name

of James the Eighth, or the style and title of King of Great Britain, hath any right or title whatsoever to the crown of this realm, or any dominions thereunto belonging ; and I do renounce, refuse, and abjure, any allegiance or obedience to any of them : and I do swear, that I will bear faith and true allegiance to — Majesty — and — will defend to the utmost of my power, against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against — person, crown, or dignity ; and I will do my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to — Majesty — and — successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which I shall know to be against — ; and I do faithfully and fully promise, to the utmost of my power, to support, maintain and defend the succession of the crown against the descendants of the said James, and against all other persons whatsoever ; which succession, by an Act intitled, ‘An Act for the further limitation of the Crown, and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject,’ is, and stands limited to the Princess Sophia, Electress and Duchess Dowager of Hanover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants : and I do swear, that I do, from my heart, abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated by the Pope, or by authority of the See of Rome, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other persons whomsoever ; and I do protest and declare, and do solemnly swear it to be my most firm and sincere opinion, belief, and persuasion, that neither the Pope, nor any Prelate or Priest, nor any assembly of Prelates or Priests, nor any Ecclesiastical Power whatsoever, can absolve the subjects of this realm, or any of them, from their allegiance to his said Majesty ; and that no foreign Church, Prelate, or Priest, or assembly of Prelates or Priests, or ecclesiastical power whatsoever, hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction or authority whatsoever within this realm, that can, directly or indirectly, affect or interfere with the independence, sovereignty, laws, constitution, or government thereof, or the rights, liberties, persons, or properties of the people of the said realm, or any of them : and that no person can be absolved from any sin, nor any sin whatever be forgiven at the pleasure of any Pope, or of any priest, or of any person whomsoever ; but that sorrow for past offences, resolution to avoid future guilt, and atonement to God and the injured neighbour, are indispensably requisite to obtain forgiveness of sin : and that no breach of faith with, or injury to, or hostility against any person whomsoever, can ever be justified by reason, or under pretence, that such person is an heretic or an infidel : and that neither the Pope, nor any Prelate, nor any Priest, nor any assembly of Prelates or Priests, nor any ecclesiastical power whatever, can, at any time, dispense with or absolve me from the obligations of this oath, or of any other oath, or of any compact whatsoever ; and I do also, in my conscience, declare, and solemnly swear, that I acknowledge no infallibility in the Pope ; and all these things I do plainly and sincerely declare, acknowledge, and swear, according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and ordinary sense of the same words, without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever : and I do make the aforesaid protestation, declaration, recognition, acknowledgment, abjuration, renunciation, promise and oath, heartily, willingly, and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian.” “So help me God.”

This is the oath embodied in the Act as it actually passed, on the motion of Bishop Horsley :—

“I, A. B., do hereby declare, That I do profess the Roman Catholic religion.”

"I, A. B., do sincerely promise and swear, That I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King George the Third, and him will defend to the utmost of my power against all conspiracies and attempts whatever that shall be made against his person, crown, or dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to his Majesty, his heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which may be formed against him or them; And I do faithfully promise to maintain, support and defend, to the utmost of my power, the succession of the crown; which succession, by an act, intituled, 'An Act for the further limitation of the Crown and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject,' is and stands limited to the Princess Sophia Electress and Duchess Dowager of Hanover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants; hereby utterly renouncing and abjuring any obedience or allegiance unto any other person claiming or pretending a right to the Crown of these realms; And I do swear, that I do reject and detest, as an unchristian and impious position, that it is lawful to murder or destroy any person or persons whatsoever, for or under pretence of their being hereticks or infidels; and also that unchristian and impious principle, that faith is not to be kept with hereticks or infidels: And I further declare, that it is not an article of my faith, and that I do renounce, reject, and abjure the opinion, that Princes excommunicated by the Pope and Council, or any authority of the See of Rome, or by any authority whatsoever, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any person whatsoever: And I do promise, that I will not hold, maintain, or abet any opinion, or any other opinions contrary to what is expressed in this declaration: And I do declare, that I do not believe, that the Pope of Rome, or any other foreign prince, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have, any temporal or civil jurisdiction, power, superiority, or pre-eminence, directly or indirectly, within this realm: And I do solemnly, in the presence of God, profess, testify, and declare that I do make this declaration, and every part thereof, in the plain and ordinary sense of the words of this oath, without any evasion, equivocation, or mental reservation whatever; and without any dispensation already granted by the Pope, or any authority of the See of Rome, or any person whatever; and without thinking that I am or can be acquitted before God or man, or absolved of this declaration, or any part thereof, although the Pope or any other person whatsoever shall dispense with or annul the same, or declare that it was null, or void." "So help me God."

On comparing these two oaths, it will be seen that the grand difference between them is the absolute omission of any reference whatsoever to Infallibility in the second. The terms of the second oath, with regard to murder of excommunicated princes, foreign jurisdiction, faith with heretics, are more simple and succinct, less outrageously tautological than those of the first. But about Infallibility there is not one word in the second oath, while in the first oath it appears in the very terms of the Protestation.

To illustrate "An Irish Catholic's" statement that in the Protestation itself the passage concerning Infallibility "is brought in as it were inadvertently and gratuitously, and without direct reference to the charge to which the paragraph containing it purports to reply," it will be well perhaps to quote the

paragraph referred to. It should be premised that each clause of the Protestation purports to deal with a number of the charges in regard to doctrine or practice then commonly made against Catholics. The allusion to Infallibility is, it will be observed, brought in incidentally, and as if the meaning intended to be conveyed were "we acknowledge no *such* Infallibility in the Pope." If it were meant to disclaim such a momentous doctrine, men familiar with the Gallican controversy that had been raging for the previous century, would not have done so in this accidental and parenthetical way. But, awkward as the blunder of signing such a paper undoubtedly was, the subsequent action of the Vicars-Apostolic and the omission of the Infallibility clause of the oath by Parliament, prove how sincerely in earnest the majority of the Catholics of England were on the subject. This is the clause of the Protestation :—

We have also been accused of holding, as a principle of our religion, that implicit obedience is due from us to the orders and decrees of Popes and General Councils; and that, therefore, if the Pope, or any General Council, should, for the good of the Church, command us to take up arms against government, or by any means to subvert the laws and liberties of this country, or to exterminate persons of a different persuasion from us, we (it is asserted by our accusers) hold ourselves bound to obey such orders or decrees, on pain of eternal fire.

Whereas we positively deny, that we owe any such obedience to the Pope and General Council, or to either of them, and we believe that no act that is in itself immoral or dishonest can ever be justified by or under colour that it is done either for the good of the Church, or in obedience to any ecclesiastical power whatever. We acknowledge no Infallibility in the Pope; and we neither apprehend nor believe, that our disobedience to any such orders or decrees (should any such be given or made) could subject us to any punishment whatever. And we hold and insist, that the Catholic Church has no power that can, directly or indirectly, prejudice the rights of Protestants, inasmuch as it is strictly confined to the refusing to them a participation in her sacraments and other religious privileges of her communion, which no Church (as we conceive) can be expected to give to those out of her pale, and which no person out of her pale will, we suppose, ever require.

And we do solemnly declare, that no Church, nor any Prelate, nor any Priest, nor any Assembly of Prelates or Priests, nor any Ecclesiastical Power whatever, hath, have, or ought to have any jurisdiction or authority whatsoever within this realm, that can, directly or indirectly, affect or interfere with the independence, sovereignty, laws, constitution or government thereof; or the rights, liberties, persons or properties of the people of the said realm, or of any of them, save only and except by the authority of Parliament; and that any such assumption of power would be an usurpation.

In a letter signed "An Outsider," which appeared in the *Spectator* of March 20, the description of the title of the Protestation, and several other details of "An Irish Cat

statement, were questioned. The following paragraph contains the gist of this letter :—

“An Irish Catholic” begins his letter by a patent misstatement. He writes, “It is time that the history of the ‘Declaration and Protestation signed by the English Protesting Catholic Dissenters in 1789, should be a little cleared up.” The Protestation of 1789 did not emanate from any body so denominated.

It is a document on parchment—to be found at the British Museum, numbered “Add. MSS. 5,416 A”—and beginning thus: “We whose names are hereunto subscribed, *Catholics of England*, do freely, voluntarily, and of our own accord make the following solemn Declaration and Protestation.” Amongst its articles is this one: “We acknowledge no Infallibility in the Pope.” To this Declaration are affixed names of Catholics of all parts of England, but the point to note is that the *four Vicars-Apostolic* have signed it. The document, therefore, does contain an emphatic repudiation of Infallibility, and is put forward as a solemn declaration of their creed by the Roman Catholic community, as represented by its legitimate organs. The allegation of “An Irish Catholic” that it emanated from a spurious body, termed “Protesting Catholic Dissenters,” is without foundation. The real state of the case is this. Subsequently to the Protestation—against which no dissent on the part of the Holy See was expressed—a Bill of Relief was introduced and a form of Oath was drafted in consultation with the Episcopal Heads of the Roman Catholic body. After the concurrence of these Heads in the form of Oath, they received from Rome instructions in a contrary sense, which prohibitory instructions had reference to the terms in which the Pope’s *jurisdiction* was disavowed in it. But on no occasion of *official* authority, neither in the Protestation nor in the Act of Parliament, is any mention made of Protesting Catholic Dissenters; and to insinuate, therefore, that the former document emanated from an unauthorized body, is a grave error.

To this letter “An Irish Catholic” replied in the following words :—

I quoted the heading from p. 9 of a collection of documents entitled “Declaration and Protestation of the Roman Catholics of England, to which is added the Correspondence of their Committee, and an Encyclical Letter from their Vicars-Apostolic,” published by Stockdale in 1812. There the document is headed “The Declaration and Protestation signed by the English Catholic Dissenters in 1789, with the names of those who signed it.” The editor was evidently a sincere and zealous Protestant, and he published his little collection for the purpose of doing as much damage as he could to the Catholics of that day. But it was a time of different tactics from those of the present, and accordingly, instead of telling the public, as Mr. Gladstone does, that the Protestation is “in the strictest sense a representative and binding document,” he

says in his preface, "It is not without the deepest regret that historical fidelity compels me to record that after this solemn declaration, so advisedly signed by their names, the greater part of the Catholics withdrew their signatures, which they had deliberately and solemnly affixed to the Protest, in passive obedience to the fiat of their Vicars-Apostolic." And he exclaims, "Surely this is matter of deep reflection for the Protestant reader," then being called upon to emancipate people who thus repudiated the position that they were represented and bound by this remarkable document. Touching this point, your correspondent again asserts, "On no occasion of *official* authority, neither in the Protestation nor in the Act of Parliament, is any mention made of Protesting Catholic Dissenters; and to insinuate, therefore, that the former document emanated from an unauthorized body is a grave error." In the collection already cited there is, on the contrary, a very official document indeed, the Address to the Catholics of England of the Committee who undertook to get the Protestation signed for its author, Lord Stanhope. They say (p. 34), "The prominent feature of the protestation and the oath certainly is their introducing to the notice of our laws, and that in a very marked and pointed manner, of a description of persons wholly unknown to them before, the protesting Catholic Dissenters"; and they go on to add "that the description is both accurate and pointed, and that by far the greatest part, if not the whole body of the English Catholics, fall under it. The description," they continue, "is contained in the preamble of the Act. It recites that 'by divers laws now in force among Papists, or persons professing the Popish religion, divers persons, who, according to the laws now in being, are within the description of Papists, or persons professing the Popish religion, do not hold and have protested against such pernicious doctrines, although they continue to dissent in certain points of faith from the Church of England, and are therefore called *Protesting Catholic Dissenters*, and that such persons are willing solemnly to protest against and declare that they do not hold such pernicious doctrines.'" The Committee were premature, however, in using the word "Act," for, as I have shown in my first letter, the Bill was enlarged in the House of Lords by striking out both the words "Protesting Catholic Dissenters" and the clause in the oath disavowing acknowledgement of the Infallibility of the Pope. But the Bill, as it passed the House of Commons, was "a Bill to relieve upon conditions and under restrictions persons called 'Protesting Catholic Dissenters' from certain penalties and disabilities to which Papists, or persons professing the Popish religion, are by law subject." Its heads are printed at p. 61 of the same collection. I may as well close this part of the case now by simply stating that in no oath imposed upon Roman Catholics by any Act of the Parliament of England, or of Great Britain, or of the United Kingdom, are the words "Infallibility of the Pope," or any equivalent words, so much as named. Accordingly, such statements as that "the Roman Catholic community in this realm solemnly disowne

the doctrine of Infallibility," and that there was "an oath every Catholic was made to take," in which "he was made to swear that the Infallibility of the Pope was no part of his creed," are statements not merely inaccurate, but the very opposite of fact, Parliament having been, and not once only, urged to legislate in that sense, and having, as I have already proved, deliberately declined to do so. The Irish Oath of 1793, no doubt, declared that the Papal Infallibility was not an "article of faith"; and as I have already said, it is a plain matter of fact that no Catholic could swear it was "an article of faith" before 1870; but as to "disowning" and "repudiating" the doctrine, which is quite another affair, I claim to have proved, on the best possible evidence, that "a very great majority" of the Catholics of England absolutely refused in 1791 to disown or repudiate the doctrine of Infallibility on oath, as they conceived they would do, if they were to take the oath originally proposed by the Bill, which ran in these terms:—"I do also in my conscience believe and solemnly swear that I acknowledge no Infallibility in the Pope." I repeat now, in the most specific terms, my statement that, neither in the oath of 1778, nor that of 1791, nor that of the Scotch Act of 1793, nor that of the great general Act of 1829, is the Papal Infallibility so much as named. Parliament, in its wisdom, struck out in 1829 even the clause of the Irish Act of 1793 declaring that Infallibility is not an article of faith; but maintained a clause binding Catholics not to use any power or privilege they were to obtain by the Act for the purpose of subverting the Protestant Church Establishment. I could understand Mr. Gladstone in a very casuistical mood of mind hesitating as to whether Irish Catholic Members, who had at some time taken this oath of 1829, should be called upon to support him in disestablishing the Irish Church, which it was designed to protect; but I cannot understand how he can bring himself to believe that we are to continue to be bound to the end of time by the terms of an oath concerning Infallibility, which Parliament, before admitting Catholics to sit in it, of its own good-will and in its wisdom abrogated and repealed, and which, in any case, never bore the construction he puts upon them; or, on the other hand, by the statements of a Protestation, written by a Protestant, and indignantly repudiated by the Catholic hierarchy and people when they saw how it was construed, and what sort of legislation was proposed to be founded upon it. Your correspondent's statement, that "no dissent on the part of the Holy See was expressed" against the Protestation, and that "after the concurrence of the Heads [*i.e.* Vicars-Apostolic] in the form of the oath, they received from Rome instructions in a contrary sense," are mere assertions and assumptions. He has not an atom of evidence to prove them. But here is evidence that tells quite the other way. In the Encyclical Letter of 1791, the Vicars-Apostolic refer to what happened in 1789 thus:—"The four Apostolical Vicars, by an Encyclical Letter dated October 21, 1789, condemned an oath proposed at that time to be presented to Parliament, and

which oath they also declared unlawful to be taken. Their condemnation of that oath was confirmed by the Apostolic See, and sanctioned also by the Bishops of Ireland and Scotland."

In his next letter "An Irish Catholic" proceeded to consider the Irish Oath of 1793, in connection more particularly with the Resolution of the Irish Bishops in 1810, which Mr. Gladstone had drawn attention to as "the most salient point of the whole of this singular history," and with the changes made in that oath in 1829, when the declaration that Infallibility is not an article of Faith was omitted, but a declaration carefully settled instead, binding Catholics not to use any power they might become possessed of to injure the Protestant Religion or Church Establishment. This is his letter slightly abridged:—

The Infallibility of the Pope is the most ancient and accepted tradition of the Irish Church. Antiquarian science has hardly rendered a greater service to religious truth in my country than Dr. Graves's fine proof that the transcript of the well-known canon of S. Patrick in the "*Liber Armachanus*" is at least a thousand years old. It is our just pride that we have always been in the strictest sense of the word a Papist Church. The Statute Law did its utmost to confirm our predilection. It invariably designated us "Papists" and our religion "Popery." I think it may be fairly said that we might at any time have had peace from at least the severer species of persecution, retaining any ritual and system of divinity we pleased, provided we had only agreed to renounce the teaching and governing authority of the Pope. And so when the Penal Laws came to be in great measure repealed in Ireland, in 1793, it was to this point that the leaders of the Protestant ascendancy addressed their especial attention. The Irish Catholics were eager to concede all that they conscientiously could to satisfy the prejudices of a Parliament to which their claims were presented by such men as Mr. Grattan, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. George Knox, and whose privileges, even then menaced with extinction, they were anxious to perpetuate. Mr. Knox, on the second reading of the Relief Bill, moved, in conformity with the Catholic petition, that Catholics should be admitted to seats in Parliament. Mr. Grattan many years afterwards alluded to this incident in the House of Commons in these words:—"On the day that the Irish Parliament rejected the Catholic Petition, on that day she passed the Union. Many good and pious reasons she gave, and she lies there with her many good and her pious reasons." The goodness and piety of the Irish Parliament were at that time typified by Dr. Duigenan. One would need to combine the characteristic qualities of the three great Protestant champions of the present day to attain to an estimate of Dr. Duigenan's character. Add to the immovable solidity of Mr. Newdegate's principles the vigilant exuberance of Mr. Whalley's energies, and the

racy resources of Dr. Kenealy's rhetoric, and a somewhat rude image of Dr. Duigenan is the result. To Dr. Duigenan the Irish Parliament delegated the task of compounding the Catholic oath. Dr. Duigenan knew perfectly well that the Irish Catholics would never renounce the doctrine of the Pope's Infallibility. He knew, too—I rather think he had been born a Catholic—that they might be made to declare it was not “an article of faith,”—and for one legally sufficient reason, at all events, which I have before repeated, that no Catholic could, until 1870, declare upon oath that the Pope's Infallibility was “an article of faith” in the strict Parliamentary sense of those terms. The debates in the English Parliament two years before had distinctly defined the line beyond which legislation could not pass, nor was it to be imagined that the Irish Catholics would agree to accept a declaration which the handful of English Catholics had manfully refused. I think I may venture to claim that in these difficult and complicated circumstances we acted with conspicuous candour and sincerity. We took every possible pains not to deceive the Parliament which hated and feared us so mortally, and which we would, despite itself, have saved. The memorable pastoral of Archbishop Troy, which F. Newman quotes, was issued on February 2nd, 1793. Mr. Hobart obtained leave to bring in the Bill for the relief of the Irish Roman Catholics on the 4th. It was not read a first time until the 18th. Parliament had therefore brought under its purview, at the very moment when it was proceeding to legislate, an exact account of the then state of Catholic doctrine on the subject of Infallibility, issued by the most prominent ecclesiastic in Ireland. These are Dr. Troy's words, as F. Newman quotes them :—

“ ‘Many Catholics contend that the Pope, when teaching the universal Church, as their supreme visible head and pastor, as successor to S. Peter, and heir to the promises of special assistance made to him by Jesus Christ, is infallible ; and that his decrees and decisions in that capacity are to be respected as rules of faith, when they are dogmatical or confined to doctrinal points of faith and morals. Others deny this, and require the expressed or tacit acquiescence of the Church, assembled or dispersed, to stamp infallibility on his dogmatical decrees. *Until the Church shall decide upon this question of the Schools*, either opinion may be adopted by individual Catholics, without any breach of Catholic communion or peace. The Catholics of Ireland have lately declared that it is not an article of the Catholic faith, nor are they thereby required to believe or profess that the Pope is infallible, without adopting or abjuring either of the recited opinions which are open to discussion, *while the Church continues silent about them.*’ ”

The lines which I have italicised suffice to show that the Irish Catholics gave no pledge to the Irish Parliament, as Mr. Gladstone endeavours to believe that they did, when the oath of 1793 was framed, which could in any way bind their own consciences, not to say the supreme authority of the Church, in regard to the ultimate decision of the long-pending controversy on this doctrine. There is another very remarkable passage in

Archbishop Troy's pastoral, which appears to have escaped F. Newman's attention, but which I take leave to quote, because it fully confirms the account I have given of the proceedings of the English Parliament in 1791, and because it supplies a further and very touching proof of the unbending Ultramontaniam of the majority of the English Catholics in those days. He says :—

“ The disavowal of the Pope's Infallibility, as an opinion made a part of an oath proposed to the English Catholics by private authority in 1791. A great majority of them objected to that and other clauses of the oath, while others of rank and respectability adopted the whole. The British Legislature did not avail itself of this division to reject the petition of the English Catholics, but with a liberality and magnanimity to be ever remembered with most lively gratitude by all his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects, generously substituted the oath which the Irish Catholics had approved and taken since the year 1773, in place of the newly-proposed one in England, that had caused an alarming division in the Catholic body of that kingdom.”

There is a further reason why I should ask you to consider very carefully the sense of this remarkable passage. Dr. Troy had no doubt an object in directing the attention of the leaders of the Irish Parliament to the “ magnanimity and liberality ” with which the British Parliament had acted towards the English Catholics two years before, and with which, I may add, it was in that very year proceeding to legislate for the Scotch Catholics. But while the British Parliament was guided in the way of wisdom and charity by great statesmen and benevolent prelates, the Irish Parliament allowed its policy in matters of conscience to be dictated by Dr. Duigenan. The contrast had its effect. From that time forth there was an influential, if not a very numerous body of the Irish Catholics who favoured the project of the Union. Every one who knows anything of our history knows something of the communications which passed between that party, of which Dr. Troy was the most conspicuous member, and Mr. Pitt, through Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh, at the time of the Union. I do not desire to be understood as asserting that there was any agreement in regard to the topic of infallibility between those who represented the Irish Catholics in such negotiations at that time, and the statesmen who later became the executors of Mr. Pitt's projected Irish policy. But I think I am at least warranted in laying some stress on the undoubted historical fact that in every serious proposal for the further relief of the Catholics of the United Kingdom between the date of the Union and the passing of the Act of 1829, it will be found that the Infallibility clause of the Irish Act of 1793 (though taken as a truism at the time) was nevertheless, for reasons sufficient to move the minds of statesmen, allowed to drop quietly out of each suggested amendment of the Catholic oath, until it was finally and for ever obliterated in 1829.

I am now to consider the resolution of the Irish Bishops in 1810—the resolution of a meeting held in Archbishop Troy's house, and I believe

under his presidency—in regard to which I have to complain that Mr. Gladstone has torn the passage he has quoted, not merely from the context of the sixteen resolutions which precede and follow it, but from the concluding sentences of the resolution itself, which would suffice to show that not the question of Papal Infallibility, but an even more serious question, agitated and absorbed the mind of the Synod. It was a moment of terrible anxiety and panic throughout the Catholic Church, throughout the British Empire. Napoleon's power had reached its utmost height. He had just added Illyria, Austrian Galicia, the Pontifical States to the territories of the Empire. He was proceeding to annex Hanover to his brother Jerome's kingdom of Westphalia. Poland, Holland, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Rhenish Provinces were governed by kings or viceroys of his family. He had apparently annihilated the power of Prussia. He confidently expected, and it was expected in England as an almost inevitable calamity, that Spain and Portugal would before summer be swept clear of the British Army. It was the time in which the London Corporation, in a petition to Parliament, accused Sir Arthur Wellesley of the "rashness, ostentation, and useless valour" which he had displayed in the battle of Talavera. The Pope was a close prisoner, not merely deprived of his States, but cut off from all communication with the College of Cardinals and the Churches of the world. The four Gallican Articles had just been proclaimed part of the public law of the French Empire. The divorce of Josephine was proceeding. An immeasurably more powerful despot than Henry VIII. seemed to the minds of men to be pursuing the same path, with the Vicar of Christ absolutely within his power. It is curious to remember that at this supreme moment of its destiny, though the principal reason alleged by Napoleon for his detention of the Pope was the friendship of his Holiness for England, the protection he had awarded a British Minister, the fact that he would persist in blessing and praying for heretics whom he ought rather to curse and excommunicate, nevertheless England was, in the winter of 1809-10, in just as great a panic about the Pope as about Napoleon. No one in England believed in the sublime and indomitable firmness of Pius VII. It was confidently calculated that he must succumb, and that his influence as head of the Catholic Church would then become an integral part of the power of France. An invasion of Ireland was anticipated as the next enterprise to Napoleon's hand after he had driven Lord Wellington to his ships,—and not without reason, for his correspondence contains the directions to General Clarke to prepare plans for an invasion of Ireland in 1811; and Clarke, an Irishman himself, well acquainted with Wolfe Tone's brilliant and skilful schemes, was admirably qualified for the task. Even Mr. Grattan, when introducing the Catholic Petition in the House of Commons, soon after the Irish Bishops passed the resolution, of which Mr. Gladstone has quoted the first sentences, was so appalled by the prospect as to exclaim:—

"Let me suppose the Pope to be made by Bonaparte, to be a French subject, and to nominate by his direction Catholic Bishops for Ireland.

If under that circumstance an invasion should happen, what would be our situation, with French troops and French bishops in our country?"

I will now quote the resolution of the Irish Bishops in full. Here is the part of it that Mr. Gladstone gives :—

"That said Oath, and the promises, declarations, abjurations, and protestations therein contained are, notoriously, to the Roman Catholic Church at large, become a part of the Roman Catholic religion, as taught by us the Bishops, and received and maintained by the Roman Catholic Churches in Ireland; and as such are approved and sanctioned by the other Roman Catholic Churches."

Here is the part of it that Mr. Gladstone does not give :—

"So that it appears to us utterly impossible that any way is left to any foreign authority whereby the allegiance of Irish Catholics can be assailed, unless by that, which God avert! of open invasion, in which extreme supposition, as we will persevere by God's grace to do our duty, so we have certain hope that every true son of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland will eagerly prove how well his religion can stand with the most heroic allegiance."

Can there be a doubt in the mind of any man who reads this resolution in its entirety, in the light of the time in which it was written, having regard to those to whom it was addressed, that its one paramount object was to make a profession of unhesitating, unqualified allegiance, in view of the dangers that menaced the State? But it will be objected that the resolution says the oath of 1793 had become a part of the Roman Catholic religion as taught by the Bishops. The phraseology of this clause of the resolution is certainly agitated and ambiguous. A Synod of Irish Bishops could no more make an oath taken out of an Act of Parliament a part of the Catholic religion, than the Parliament of Great Britain could bind the British Empire by a resolution. This I may assume to be notorious to all educated persons, and especially to Mr. Gladstone, who still seems to doubt whether even a General Council can add to the defined dogmas of the Church. I say it in no spirit of irreverence, but the prevailing panic seems to me to have somewhat unsettled the etymology of the King's English among the gravest personages. I can no more justify these terms of the Irish Bishops in their strict sense, than I can justify the criticism of the Corporation of London on the tactical qualities displayed by Sir Arthur Wellesley at Talavera. At a time when even Mr. Grattan's language grew confused, it may be imagined in what hotch-potch Lord Castlereagh expressed himself. But after all, is not the real question at issue,—What did the Irish Bishops teach concerning the doctrine of the Pope's Infallibility, as referred to in the oath of 1793? I have stated their teaching in 1793, when the oath was being settled, on Archbishop Troy's authority. Archbishop Troy was present at the meeting of 1810. Could any statesman of the time imagine that the doctrine of the Irish Bishops in regard to the Pope's Infallibility differed in 1810 from what it was in 1793? I make bold to say, having read the debates in both Houses with some care, in

the course of which, not the second resolution merely, but the whole series of sixteen, were carefully analyzed and considered (I would refer Mr. Gladstone in particular to Lord Erskine's very remarkable speech), that the topic of Infallibility was never so much as touched upon. What the statesmen of that time really wanted was to get some security that the Pope would not, to repeat Mr. Grattan's phrase, nominate "French Bishops." In order to obviate this danger they wished the Irish Bishops at once to give the King the right of veto, if not of nomination. The Irish Bishops refused point-blank to consider any question concerning the supreme prerogative of the Sovereign Pontiff while he was a prisoner, or even to recognize any briefs purporting to come from him on such a subject, until they had evidence that he was in the enjoyment of his absolute freedom. They were very much condemned at the time for standing so stoutly by the Pope when he was in such a hopeless strait. No one dreamed of supposing, as Mr. Gladstone seems to do, that they were taking advantage of such an occasion to disavow any part of the respect due to his Chair.

I pass from the resolution of 1810 to the assurances said to have been given by Dr. Doyle and other prelates in evidence before the House of Lords in 1825. I feel that I press unduly upon your space, but I can afford to be very brief upon this point. The House of Lords examined four Irish prelates in 1825 — Archbishop Curtis, Archbishop Murray, Archbishop Kelly, and Bishop Doyle. There was not a question addressed to the three Archbishops having any relation, direct or indirect, to the question of Infallibility. Dr. Doyle was asked (p. 387) "what was meant by the Infallibility of the Pope, and he replied :—

"There are so many divines who have written on the subject, and they have given such very long definitions of it, that I should do much better by referring your Lordships to them than by giving a definition myself. Melchior Cano has a long treatise on the Infallibility of the Pope."

Again, when asked about the Gallican Liberties, he says (p. 509) :—

I cannot say to your Lordships that the Gallican Liberties, as such, were ever formally received or acknowledged in our country, but the substance of the doctrine taught in them is held by a great number of our divines."

Can any one read such questions and such answers and suppose that Parliament was seriously seeking and receiving assurances and guarantees on the subject of Papal Infallibility? Some hasty expressions of Dr. Doyle have been quoted in the course of this controversy. It is not a part of my task either to vindicate or to condemn his language. But I may be excused for calling attention to his true view of the authority of the Pope in matters of faith, expressed on a sufficiently serious occasion, in relation to a declaration of Mr. Robinson, then (1824) Chancellor of the Exchequer, afterwards Lord Ripon, in favour of a reunion of the English and Roman Churches :—

I myself am probably one of the most moderate divines in the Empire ; certainly I would wish, with the Apostle, to be separated for a time from Christ for my brethren, either Protestant or Catholic ; but I would, with the grace of God, suffer death a thousand times, were it possible, rather than assent to anything regarding faith which would not be approved of by the Successor of Peter. I am sure, I am certain, that the Pope is the Head of the Universal Church, and that the rejection of his just authority is ruinous to religion.”*

I will now close the proofs I have offered in contradiction of Mr. Gladstone's main charge by a somewhat large statement, which, if I have not spent much pains in vain, will, however, remain uncorrected. I say, then, that if the whole correspondence on Catholic affairs that passed with Ministers of the Crown from the time of Mr. Pitt to the time of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel be read through, there will be found no apology, no undertaking, no assurance, no serious allusion even to the subject of Infallibility. So utterly unfounded and opposed to fact is the assertion that we deceived the Crown and Legislature in any way as to this doctrine, by statement, suggestion of what was false, suppression of what was true, or by silence. I refer Mr. Gladstone particularly to the series of memoranda by Dean Philpotts, who was the Duke of Wellington's principal adviser on matters of doctrine, in 1827 and 1828. Their spirit may be expressed in a sentence,—“Renounce doctrinal declarations against Popery ; get instead a pledge to maintain the Church Establishment.” So it was that the clause in the Irish Act of 1793 by common consent quietly vanished in 1829. I need hardly say that after the great victory of the Clare election, the Catholics of Ireland were not much in the mood to conclude a capitulation on the question as to whether the Infallibility of the Pope was to be regarded as a doctrine or as an article. I say it in no vaunting spirit, that we should never have treated at that moment on such terms. We had marched into the Constitution with drums beating and colours flying ; and it is to the immortal fame of the English nation that when the contest of centuries so came to a sudden and a manly end, we were received with more than the honours of war. I thank you with all my heart for having allowed me to vindicate in your pages the good faith and fair fame of the Catholics of both kingdoms by clearing up these somewhat obscure passages of our common history.

The following is the Irish Catholic Oath of 1793, generally known as Dr. Duigenan's oath, taken after the ordinary declaration of allegiance.

“I, *A. B.* do hereby declare, that I do profess the Roman Catholic religion. I, *A. B.* do swear, that I do abjure, condemn, and detest, as un-christian and impious, the principle that it is lawful to murder, destroy, or any ways injure any person whatsoever, for or under the pretence of being an heretic ; and I do declare solemnly before God, that I believe that no act in itself unjust, immoral, or wicked, can ever be justified or excused by, or under pretence, or colour, that it was done either for the

* Fitzpatrick's “Life of Dr. Doyle,” vol. i. p. 334.

good of the Church, or in obedience to any ecclesiastical power whatsoever. I also declare, that it is not an article of the Catholic faith, neither am I thereby required to believe or profess, that the Pope is Infallible, or that I am bound to obey any order in its own nature immoral, though the Pope or any ecclesiastical power should issue or direct such order; but, on the contrary, I hold, that it would be sinful in me to pay any respect or obedience thereto; I further declare, that I do not believe that any sin whatsoever committed by me can be forgiven at the mere will of any Pope, or any Priest, or of any person whatsoever; but that sincere sorrow for past sins, a firm and sincere resolution to avoid future guilt, and to atone to God, are previous and indispensable requisites to establish a well-founded expectation of forgiveness; and that any person who receives absolution without these previous requisites, so far from obtaining thereby any remission of his sins, incurs the additional guilt of violating a sacrament; and I do swear, that I will defend to the utmost of my power, the settlement and arrangement of property in this country, as established by the laws now in being; I do hereby disclaim, disavow, and solemnly abjure any intention to subvert the present Church Establishment, for the purpose of substituting a Catholic Establishment in its stead; and I do solemnly swear, that I will not exercise any privilege, to which I am or may become entitled, to disturb and weaken the Protestant religion and Protestant Government in this Kingdom.

"So help me God."

We subjoin the Oath of the Act of 1829, which was taken by Catholics on all public occasions upon which testimony of allegiance was required, until by an Act of the present reign an oath containing no reference to religious doctrines, and common to all Her Majesty's subjects, was substituted.

"I, A. B., do sincerely promise and swear, That I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King George the Fourth, and will defend him to the utmost of my power against all conspiracies and attempts whatever, which shall be made against his person, crown, or dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to his Majesty, his heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which may be formed against him or them: and I do faithfully promise to maintain, support, and defend to the utmost of my power, the succession of the crown, which succession, by an act, intituled 'An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject,' is and stands limited to the Princess Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants; hereby utterly renouncing and abjuring any obedience or allegiance unto any other person claiming or pretending a right to the crown of this realm: and I do further declare, that it is not an article of my faith, and that I do renounce, reject, and abjure the opinion, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, or any other authority of the See of Rome, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or by any person whatsoever; and I do declare, that I do not believe that the Pope of Rome, or any other foreign prince, prelate, person, state or potentate, hath or ought to have any temporal or civil jurisdiction, power, superiority or pre-eminence, directly or indirectly, within this realm. I do swear, that I will defend to the utmost of my power the settlement of property within this realm, as established by the laws: and I do hereby disclaim, disavow, and solemnly abjure any intention to subvert the pre-

sent church establishment as settled by law within this realm : and I do solemnly swear, that I never will exercise any privilege to which I am or may become entitled, to disturb or weaken the Protestant religion or Protestant government in the United Kingdom : and I do solemnly, in the presence of God, profess, testify and declare, that I do make this declaration, and every part thereof, in the plain and ordinary sense of the words of this oath, without any evasion, equivocation, or mental reservation whatsoever. So help me God."

In the first of these oaths it will be observed that the intention of subverting the Protestant Church Establishment in order to set up a Catholic establishment is abjured. This is the only respect in which the oath of 1829 is made at once more stringent and more general. The oath of 1829 is an oath abjuring the purpose of disestablishing the Protestant Church for any purpose or under any circumstances.

There is only one additional point in the controversy to which space and time will allow us to allude. In a letter written to the editor of the *Spectator* by a writer signing himself "C," a reference was made to a passage cited by Mr. Gladstone from a pamphlet by Bishop Baines, and it was argued that the Infallibility of which statesmen are now apprehensive is a different kind of Infallibility from that contemplated in the early part of the century. On these points "An Irish Catholic" replied as follows :—

Your correspondent asks how can I account for Bishop Baines's statement in 1824, as quoted by Mr. Gladstone,—“In England or Ireland I do not believe that any Catholic maintains the Infallibility of the Pope.” I have simply to say, as to Dr. Baines, that he was a person of notoriously peculiar opinions, and, moreover, of a very eccentric and extravagant way of expressing them. The expression quoted was very nearly as absurd in the time of Bishop Milner as it would be in the time of Cardinal Manning. Dr. Baines and Dr. Milner were contemporaries, and Dr. Milner was not only an English Vicar-Apostolic, but was agent for the Irish Bishops. He had, therefore, peculiar opportunities of knowing the true mind of the Episcopate in those days ; and he said, with all the publicity and solemnity attaching to a Pastoral (your correspondent will find the passage cited in Dean Philpott's letter* proving that the English Catholics of 1824 were flagrantly Infallibilist) :—“There is not a single prelate in England or Ireland who is not firmly resolved to reject the four Articles of the Gallican Church, commonly called the Gallican Liberties. We are very far from finding fault with the partisans of the Articles, but we think we see in these Articles the germ of all the present mischief, and to be brief, we are determined not to subscribe to the Articles.” Your correspondent speaks at the commencement of his letter of Infallibility in a Gallican

* “Letters to C. Butler,” p. 166. New Edition. J. Murray. 1866.

sense. He might as well speak of the Trinity in a Unitarian sense. The whole controversy of Ultramontane against Gallican, at last happily closed, with the pious and joyous consent of all Churches—of none more than the Gallican—has for nearly two centuries revolved round the fourth Gallican Article, “That the decisions of the Pope on points of faith are not infallible, unless they be attended with the consent of the Church,”—that is to say, that the Pope, *per se*, is not infallible at all. I shall not follow your correspondent in his attempt to connect other questions of Pontifical power with Infallibility. There would be no end to this discussion if I were to do so.

Your correspondent may ask me how he is to reconcile the words of the two Vicars-Apostolic. They cannot be reconciled. But Dr. Milner spoke with an authority which Dr. Baines had not, and his words were testimony against us with every Protestant champion of the day. They stand to testify that we did not deceive Parliament, which is Mr. Gladstone's main charge against us. All that can be said for Dr. Baines is that he is entitled to the excuse that partisans of peculiar opinions are often very credulous as to the extent to which their opinions obtain general acceptance. On the very eve of the Council of the Vatican it was the fashion to describe the supposed minority who believed in the Pope's Infallibility, and longed and strove for its definition, with an artful and copious variety of scornful and uncomely epithets. The Church spoke, and those then of its fold, who in this country would not hear it, may be counted on one's fingers. Or to take an illustration from an event of still later date, but of comparatively trivial and temporary moment,—how many men of great political wisdom, experience, and veracity are there in England who utterly denied the possibility of a Conservative reaction on the very eve of the election of last year? Yet that reaction was a great fact in the political order, and had the masses of the big English boroughs at its back.

ART. VII.—DAYS NEAR ROME.

Days near Rome. By AUGUSTUS J. C. HARE, Author of “Walks in Rome,” “Memorials of a Quiet Life,” &c. Two vols. Daldy, Isbister, & Co. 1875.

OF late years walking tours made to distances within the bounds of our own island, and such books as, notably, “The Strange Adventures of a Phaeton,” in which fictional characters are raised, so to speak, upon an exquisite diapering of English home-scenery matchlessly painted, have given fresh insight to the value of quality, rather than quantity, in travel.

It is high time that some such counterbalance should be found to the droves of seven-league-boot wearers, who having "done" Europe and America, are constrained to take yachting trips to New Zealand and the North Pole, by way of beating up some new languid interest. Let us hope that in the number of knots they sail, or the tons of coal they consume, the seven-leaguers find their reward. Very far removed must such delights prove to the joys of the thorough traveller, who makes every inch of ground his own, the scenes and events he has witnessed becoming stamped upon his mind, and part of his life-long possessions, and who really *knows* what he has seen and heard, because he has tested his senses by examination and research; comparing natural objects by some tincture, at least, of science; and the works of human creation by history and the principles of art.

It is in this spirit that Mr. Augustus Hare's latest volumes have been written, and as they treat of scenes of special and peculiar interest to Catholics, our readers will, perhaps, not be sorry to renew acquaintance with some that are well known and much loved, and to visit other spots, which few feet, besides his own, have trodden, though lying within easy reach of Rome. There are, no doubt, several good reasons for not visiting many of the places described by him, besides the momentous one—which often recurs—of unhealthiness. The usual run of travellers, of course, as naturally make for the great towns as a stag makes for the water, and are scarcely aware of sight-seeing beyond the known, well-trodden galleries of the guide-books. Couriers and servants, as a class, detest diverging from the stereotyped routes, studded with great hotels kept by their friends, upon whom they levy the current blackmail for bringing their masters blindfold to the net. As a class they detest everything approaching to indifferent food, short commons, hard lying; and a conspicuous absence of fellow-couriers, ladies'-maids, cards, and successful flirtations. It is their practice, consequently, to adorn the out-of-the-way districts, or anything off the main road, profusely with legends of brigands, murderous crimes, and malaria-fevers; and in nine cases out of ten their weapons strike home. A certain amount of hardship must necessarily be encountered in the mountain districts of Italy, and, as Mr. Hare observes, the only way to have what you like there is to like what you have, as it is useless to look for French cookery in the Abruzzi, or tea and toast amid the sepulchral cities of Etruria. He also advises the British traveller to be "genial, frank, modest, and unsuspicious"; in which case he will meet with every attention and unbounded kindness, though without the artificial deference

to which he is accustomed. Again, as he justly says, when the Englishman (or American) begins bargaining and accrediting his landlord with the wish to cheat him, the Italian retaliates by overcharging, because he has been aggrieved by suspicion.

If travellers give themselves airs, if they are too exacting in their demands, heedless of passing salutations, especially of the Abruzzi peasant, who always meets you with, "May God accompany you, may your return be happy"; above all, if they chatter in the churches during mass, as if they were at a London party, they must expect to be laughed at, despised, insulted, and occasionally robbed. *Non sono Cristiani, come noi altri* (they are not Christians, like us), is the national comment upon strangers who do not know how to behave themselves, and they are sure to be treated with contempt for they deserve nothing better (vol. i. p. 11).

For the small exercise of self-control—as we should think it—required to comply with these claims, an almost endless succession of solid pleasures may be enjoyed, for the neighbourhood of Rome and distances accessible from it, fall into groups of distinctly various interest. There are the drives or railway excursions to deserted or cyclopean cities, such as Ninfa, Cori, Sora, Arpino, and Aquino. There are the Ciminian Hills and Caprarola,—perhaps the crowning excursion in spring,—and the towns and monasteries hidden away in the glorious depths of the Volscian and Hernican mountains; where, buried in groves of evergreens that have never known the axe, or feasting the eye with every tint of purple, lilac, and blue, in the ranges of peaks and glimpses of plain, one can "forget the years," and live once more in the majestic stream of Roman rule and greatness, or in the greater greatness of mediæval faith. In the quaint mediæval cities and towns of these mountains an untold wealth of art and beauty lies buried, and in them alone, alas! we shall soon have to look for much of the beauty vanishing daily from Rome itself. Mr. Hare's testimony as a Protestant, antagonistic in many ways to the Church, and deeply aggrieved by the conversions in his own family, is worth noting at some length, as we find few art-loving voices raised so boldly and truthfully as his.

In Rome now the ancient characteristics have entirely perished, having been swept away in three years in a manner which sounds incredible. Not only has all trace of costume perished, together with the mediæval figures and splendid dresses which belonged to the Papal Court, and walked in the footsteps of crimson Cardinals; but all the gorgeous religious ceremonies, all the processions, and benedictions, and sermons preached by the shrines of the martyrs, have ceased to exist. The closing of so many convents and the robbery of the dowries of so many nuns (given on their entrance in the same sense in which a marriage portion is given) has not only

been an act of crying injustice in itself, which even the strongest Protestant must feel ; but while it has flooded the streets with starving, helpless, or infirm persons, who subsisted on the daily convent dole of coarse bread and soup, it has thrown thousands of helpless ladies, who believed themselves provided for during their lives (and by their own families), into a state of utter destitution, for the relief of which the miserable and irregularly-paid pension of a few pence a day appointed by the Government sounds a mere mockery. Many famous antiquarian memorials have disappeared. The Agger of Servius Tullius and the ruined Ponte Salara have been swept away. The trees on the Aventine and the woods of Monte Mario have been cut down. The villa Negroni-Massimo, the most beautiful of Roman gardens, with the grandest of old orange avenues, and glorious groves of cypresses amid which Horace was buried, a villa whose terraces dated from the time when it belonged to Mæcenas, replete with recollections of Vittoria Accorambuoni, of Donna Camilla Perretti, and of Alfieri,—has been ruthlessly and utterly ploughed up, so that not a trace of it is left. Even this is as nothing compared with the entire destruction of the beauty and charm of the buildings that remain. The baths of Caracalla, stripped of all their verdure and shrubs, and deprived alike of the tufted foliage amid which Shelley wrote, and of the flowery carpet which so greatly enhanced their lonely solemnity, are now a series of featureless walls standing in a gravelly waste, and possess no more attraction than the ruins of a London warehouse. The Coliseum, no longer “a garlanded ring,” is bereaved of everything which made it so lovely and picturesque, while botanists must for ever deplore the incomparable and strangely unique “Flora of the Coliseum,” which Signor Rosa has caused to be carefully annihilated, even the roots of the shrubs having been extracted by the firemen, though in pulling them out, more of the building has come down than five hundred years of time would have injured. In the Basilica of Constantine, the whole of the beautiful covering of shrubs with which nature had protected the vast arches, has been removed, and the rain, soaking into the upper surface, will soon bring them down. The early Christian porches of S. Prassede and S. Pudenziana, with their valuable terra cotta ornaments, have been so smeared with paint and yellow-wash as to be irrecongnisable ; the lion of the Santi Apostoli has disappeared altogether. In return for these destructions, Rome has been given—what ? Quantities of hideous false rockwork, painted brown, in all the public gardens ; a Paris cottage and a clock which goes by water, and the passages of the Capitol painted over with the most glaring scarlet and blue, so as utterly to destroy the repose and splendour of its ancient statues. Should the present state of things continue much longer, and especially should Signor Rosa remain in power, the whole beauty of Rome will have disappeared (vol. i. pp. 14-16).

It is well that the eye of the poet and artist, which pierces instinctively the outer crust of prejudice and vitiated opinion, seizing the truth, should thus discern something of the outer aspect of the destroying spirit now rampant in more than the holy places of Rome. The inner, more terrible destruction, it

is not of course given him to see; but we, *cives Romani*, and especially those among us whose happiness it has been to wander familiarly among the hills of our home, well know that under the Popes the promise was literally fulfilled, and the law of God and the interests of religion being regarded and cared for in the first place, other lesser, outward goods of reverence for ancient memorials were added. Tourists of all degrees and shades of belief have been impressed by the efforts of the Popes, even in the roughest and stormiest days of their rule, to preserve the classical remains of Rome untouched, while sustaining the original structures with consummate skill and at a large expense; while every memorial of a later date that told a story, or was connected with the great Roman families, whether extinct or not, was cherished with the most loving care. And in this, while they freely cracked their little jokes—sometimes keen-edged enough—about the swarms of Barberini bees, the iterance of “*Munificentia Pii*,” and the crops of triple tiaras on every building repaired, they were upheld by the Roman people. The fact has been thoroughly recognized that under the Popes art flourished and was royally entertained and recompensed, and that Rome was treated as the capital, and treasury, and home of poetic art for the whole world.

The death-giving Campagna—in its narrow, usual meaning of the green desolation surrounding Rome—is one of the first fascinations to visitors on leaving its walls. The insidious growth of malaria is as yet an inexplicable mystery. The idea, prevalent among the writers and tourists of the last century or century and a half, that it was traceable to the malgovernment of the Popes, has for some time been completely exploded. Unhappily, it has extended to the uplands as well as the marshy plains, lingers now as fatally in the villas of once healthful Tivoli as in the Pamfili and Borghese gardens in Rome, while it has stealthily crept on to many an upland town formerly thickly inhabited. One of the most characteristic views of the exquisite desolation of the malaria-stricken Roman plain is from a height beyond St. Paul’s, outside the walls, on the Ostia road. The blue waste of the Maremma (marsh) here ominously called *Campo-Morto*; with the great, still, glassy surface of the Stagno lake, literally breathing death, waving its sad plaint from tall cane-reeds, and covered with floating ranunculus as with a pall, makes the profoundest impression upon the mind. Far away rise the huge pine-tops of the forest of Fusano, and, as if stranded in the waste, the grey towers of Porto, and the campanile of the Isola Sacra, or sacred island, on whose sad, lonely shore

Dante pictures the souls waiting to be ferried into purgatory. Two thousand five hundred years ago, King Ancus Martius began to work the salt-mines near the Stagno; and pale, thin, unwholesome-looking labourers are working at them still.

The magnificent macchicolated tower of the castle of Ostia was the work of Sangallo, continued by him under Julius II. (della Rovere), then Cardinal Bishop of Ostia. The outer walls are entirely crusted with grand, pontifical coats of arms, and form indeed a complete epitome of history. The oak (robur) of the Rovere, the wreathed pillar of the Colonna, and many others, are to be traced; and when it is remembered that the Bishopric of Ostia is so ancient that it has been thought an Apostolic foundation, the records of its castle take a deeper interest in our eyes.* Ostia, too, heads the list of the seven Suffragan or Cardinal Bishoprics lying about Rome. The other six are Portus, Silva Candida, Sabina, Præneste, Tusculum, and Albanum. Beyond the little mediæval town, with its tiny cathedral, are the remains of a complete Roman city. The ruts are in the long, lava-paved chariot-ways, the small, brick-built houses and shops line the streets; a temple of Mithras, and richly-paved baths are open to the eye, and the ground is covered with fragments of costly marbles and glass, time-dyed to those splendid peacock-hues so dear to the antiquary's eye. This was the flourishing Ostia of Ancus Martius, once the great Roman seaport, and from its now weird and ghostly streets poured the chief conquering expeditions of the empire, among them that of Claudius to Britain. Other, dearer recollections of Ostia to us spring up from its being the death-place of S. Monica, and the spot where, when asked if she did not fear to be buried so far from her own city, she uttered those memorable words: "*Nothing is far to God, nor is it to be feared lest at the end of the world He should not recognize whence to raise me up.*" Two miles of desolate Campagna, poisonous towards evening with the marsh-vapour, which makes it absolutely fatal to any but a native to sleep at Ostia for a single night, lead to Castel Fusano, where the old Chigi palace stands, on the spot of Pliny's Laurentine villa. Mr. Hare's description of its loneliness must be given in his own words, for few travellers of late years have visited its Virgilian shades.

No road, no path even, leads to its portal; but all around is green turf, and it looks like the house where the enchanted princess went to sleep with all her attendants for five hundred years, and where she must be asleep

*The Bishop of Ostia ordains any Pope not yet a Priest at his election, and is Dean of the sacred college of Cardinals.

still. Round the house, at intervals, stand gigantic red vases, like Morgiana's oil-jars, filled with yuccas and aloes. All beyond is a vast expanse of wood, huge pines stretching their immense umbrellas over the lower trees: stupendous ilexes contorted by time into a thousand strange vagaries; bay trees bowed with age, and cork trees grey with lichen. And beneath these greater potentates such a wealth of beautiful shrubs as is almost indescribable,—arbutus, lentisk, phillyrea, tall Mediterranean heath, waving vast plumes of white blossom far overhead; sweet daphne, scenting all around with its pale pink blossoms; myrtle growing in thickets of its own; smilax and honeysuckle leaping from tree to tree, forming themselves into a thousand lovely wreaths; and beneath all, such a carpet of pink cyclamen that the air is heavy with its perfume. All the forest is delightful, and one cannot wander enough into its deep recesses, where some giant of the wood is reflected in a solitary pool, or where the trees reach overhead into long aisles like a vast cathedral (pp. 47-49).

Leaving the Roman plains and shore, where all this matchless beauty is haunted ever with disease and death, we turn our course towards the hills, where, in many of the towns, with care, pleasant arrangements for head-quarters and exploring may be made in the spring and summer months. It is wonderful, considering the self-denying daring of our countrymen and women in Switzerland and the Austrian Tyrol, that so very few people have made themselves at home in the Italian mountains, where, in addition to the magnificent evergreen forests and most exquisite views, a whole world of hidden art and history lies buried. We shall not linger—though we would fain do so, recalling the golden days of the past—in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome; at Frascati, Albano, Genzano, and Castel Gandolfo, on whose old terraces Pius IX. is no longer seen riding his white mule, followed by a group of scarlet cardinals, while the golden afternoon sunlight glanced between the ilexes on the picture-like procession. We cannot even wander in the “Gallerie,” those marvellous miles of green alley leading from the Alban lake towards Castel Gandolfo and Genzano, nor wait to gather narcissus and cyclamen under the shimmering laurels above Lake Nemi. We just glance into the “Galleria di Sotto,” or lower alley, in which ilexes, planted by Pope Urban VIII., or before his time, “lean together against the walls, as if in earnest conversation”; or, “faint from old age, are propped on stone pillars”; and then sternly resolve to pass farther afield.

Travellers formerly posting in state to Rome, with four, six, or even more horses, if, as it chanced with ourselves, it was a severe winter and the road from Siena was heavy with snow, will never forget the last post and halting-place—desolate La Storta—before coming to Rome. Following the main road

from La Storta for a while to Bracciano, there is seen across the fields a deep ravine, crowned with old walls and a tall tower,—all that remains of the mediæval town of Galera, a stronghold of the troublesome Princes of Orsini, and which is now one of the “lost cities of the Campagna.” The Colonnas took and utterly sacked it in 1485, when it gradually sank to the condition of a village, but is now given up to the bats and snakes, utterly desolate, by a more fatal enemy than the Colonnas.

Only a short time ago Galera had ninety inhabitants, now it has none. There is no one to live in the houses, no one to pray in the Church. Malaria reigns triumphant here, and keeps all human creatures at bay. Even the shepherd who comes down in the day to watch the goats who are scrambling about the broken walls, would pay with his life for passing the night here. It is a bewitched solitude, with the ghosts of the past in full possession. All is fast decaying: the town walls, some of which date from the eleventh century, are sliding over into the thickets of brambles. Above them rise the remains of the fine old Orsini castle, from which there is an unspeakably desolate view, the effect being enhanced by the knowledge that the strength of Galera has fallen beneath no human foe, but that a more powerful and invincible enemy has been found in the mysterious scourge of the Campagna (vol. i. pp. 145-6).

Not much farther on is the huge black lava castle of the Odescalchi at Bracciano, the finest mediæval castle in Italy. It was built by the Orsini as a lasting defence against their hereditary foes the Colonnas, and contains halls, galleries, staircases, hidden passages, and successions of dungeons, enough to furnish a goodly library of sensational novels. Its very aspect even strongly stirs the imagination, and it was this castle that Sir Walter Scott hurried off to see immediately after reaching Rome. It was bought by the Torlonias in a time of dire need in the Odescalchi family, but who so clung to their grand old home that they stipulated that if they were able to redeem it within a certain time, they should be allowed to reclaim it. The allotted time had nearly run out, and Torlonia had so entirely made sure of it as to spend a large sum of money upon it, when the old Princess Odescalchi died, and her fortune redeemed it for her family. It was this princess to whom, when given up by her physicians, and her family were gathered round her bed to assist at her death, the Pope sent a *panetello*, or tiny loaf, which he had prayed over and blessed, bidding her eat it, and perhaps live. She ate the *panetello*, sat up, and the next day went to the Vatican, quite recovered, to thank the Pope for saving her life.

Interests, too, of another kind, and a more ancient time, lie

thickly all about the Sabine hills. From Tivoli the drive is easy to Vico Varo, Horace's *Varia*, where blocks of the ancient masonry remain. Near it was *Rocca Giovane*, where the temple of *Vacuna*, the Sabine Victory, stood; and the famous *Mons Lucretilis* rises in front, upon which the poet's goats browsed safely in summer heat and winter cold. Here runs his favourite brook *Digentia*, and near the village of *Licenza* are easily found tiles, mosaics, tessellated floors, &c., remains of Horace's villa, given him by *Mæcenas*. A rough walk of a few miles leads up the narrow glen, at the end of which the "*Fons Blandusiæ*" rises; and with a Horace in his hand, the wayfarer can trace every feature of the scenes it describes, and verify the extraordinary accuracy and delicate appreciation of the courteous Roman gentleman with whom he has been familiar from his boyhood.

Mr. Hare judiciously recommends *Velletri* as a central point for excursions into the *Volscian* mountains, as it is on the *Naples Railway*, and has a comfortable inn. It will be remembered that the old *Volscian* inhabitants of *Velitræ* were removed to Rome and became the forefathers of the *Trasteverini*, and all the remains now at *Velletri* are mediæval. The *Palazzo Lancellotti* would of itself be a lion in any city; built by *Martino Longhi*, with those ideal open galleries, richly pillared, and enormous marble staircases and loggias, which seem to live only for us in *Turner's* paintings. *Velletri* and its neighbourhood are healthy and most charming in the spring; free from malaria, and full of verdure, flowers, and birds. Not far off is the old colony of *Alba Longa*, *Cori*, one of the thirty cities of the *Latin League* (493 B.C.), where there are exceedingly fine ancient remains. Among these, the two *Corinthian* pillars of the Temple of *Castor* and *Pollux*, and the beautiful *Doric* Temple of *Minerva*, *Raphael's* sketch of which still exists. Halfway up the hill is the beautiful old convent of *Santa Oliva*, whose shrine is in the crypt at *Anagni*. She was a holy maiden of *Cori*.

The apparition of our Lady to *Santa Oliva* was in 1521, and the story of this hidden local saint, one of the myriad to be met with in the mountain-sanctuaries of Italy, is full of interest. The cloister, with its double row of arches, contains a holy well of great age. *Norma* and the ancient *Norba*, ruined by *Lepidus* in the time of *Sulla*, are only between five and six miles from *Cori*. The walls of *Norba* are almost unique, and the blocks of stone often ten feet in length. The legend is delightful.

Our guide said that when the Deluge occurred it would have failed to make any impression upon *Norba*,—a very ancient city at that time, so strong

was it ; but here the rain which fell was made of lead, and the inhabitants, who were giants, were all destroyed, and every house, and all the temples of the ancient religion of that time, and only the walls remained, for they were so strong that even a leaden deluge could affect them" (vol. i. p. 231).

Norma, rising from its tremendous rock-precipices, and Ninfa, called by Gregorovius "the Pompeii of the Middle Ages," are both in their different ways matchless in beauty and weird interest ; Ninfa especially, as being one of the "lost cities" whose very desolation has turned to transporting loveliness.

Where the only inhabitants are roses and lilies,—where honeysuckle and jessamine fling their garlands through the windows of every house, and where the very altars of the churches are thrones for the flame-coloured valerian so encrusted in verdure is every building that the houses look like green mounds rising out of the plain. One tall tower stands near the entrance, and watches its reflection in the still waters of a pool white with lilies, and fringed with forget-me-nots. An inscription on the mill tells that it was built by one of the Gaetani, lord of the place, in 1765. The town must have been inhabited then, yet none can tell the story of its desertion. It has belonged to the Gaetani since the thirteenth century, and Pope Alexander III. was consecrated there (1159). Ninfa can never be rebuilt. Even the shepherds cannot dare to pass the night there. Death, garlanded with flowers, is death still. Gregory I., who built a church here in 1216, to "St. Mary of the myrtle branch" * dedicated it in vain. No sound will ever be heard but the hum of the myriad insects which float amongst the flower-possessed streets and houses, the croaking of the green frogs in the surrounding waters, and the everlasting sighing and rustling of the wind in the tall bulrushes (vol. i. p. 235-6).

But Gregorovius gives the most complete account of Ninfa, after his fanciful, graphic German manner, in his delightful "Lateinische Sommer."

"It causes an indescribable impression to enter this ivy town, to wander down the grassy, flowery streets, between the walls, where the wind plays in the leaves. All the streets are filled with flowers which seem to march in procession to the ruined churches. They climb on every tower, lie laughing in all the desolate windows, barricade every door, for within the houses reside elves, fairies, water-nymphs, and a thousand charming spirits of the fable world ; yellow marigolds, mallows, sweet narcissus ; grey-bearded thistles, who once dwelt here as monks ; white lilies, who were nuns in their lifetime ; wild roses, laurestinus, masticks, tall ferns, wreaths of climatis and bramble ; red foxgloves, looking like enchanted Saracens ; the fantastic caper-plant growing in the cliffs of the buildings ; sweet wall-flowers, myrtle, and fragrant mints, brilliant yellow broom, and dark ivy,

* Or grove, *Mirteto*.

which creeps over all the ruins, and falls over the walls in green cascades. The walls are still standing and encircle the town like a great ring, but they are everywhere thickly covered with ivy, the gates are no less barred and barricaded by the wild vine, ivy, and the bramble. Many squares and streets are still standing, with their houses covered with an ivy web ; the churches, the ruins of four or five of which remain, look very strange. How shall I paint a brown shattered bell-tower, with round windows, or windows divided by small pillars, with its fringe of the middle ages, formed of sharp-pointed tiles, and its romantic decorations of ivy and flowers swaying in the wind ; or the ruins of arched niches or the nave overhung with tapestries of flowers ? These churches are old, they belong to the eleventh or twelfth century, if not of an earlier date, for they are built in the simple, basilica style. From the walls, or perhaps an ivy-hung tribune old fresco paintings still look down, early Christians with palms in their hands, and instruments of martyrdom by their sides. Of many there is now nothing more visible than the hem of a robe, and the name in old Roman characters :—S. Xystus, S. Cesarius, and S. Laurentius. I went into the last of these churches. What a sight ! The mosaic of the pavement seemed now to be simulated by living flowers, and from the shrine where the bones of the saints once lay, the Indian vine waved joyously with its bluish⁴ red berries.”

From Cori, by an exquisite road through the Volscian mountains, Segni can be reached (as also by train from Ferentino), famous for the finest cyclopean walls in Italy. It was the frequent refuge of the Popes in stormy times, and Eugenius III., Alexander III., Lucius III., and Innocent III. spent great part of their pontificates at Segni. It disputes with Anagni the honour of being the birthplace of Innocent III. Sixtus V. created it a duchy, and it was given by Urban VIII. to his nephew, Cardinal Barberini. A lawsuit—an Italian lawsuit—of many centuries, between the Barberini and Sforza, was closed at the end of the last only in favour of the Duke Sforza-Cesarini, who is now also Duke of Segni. Gregorovius says of Segni :—

“ When I reached this spot where the cyclopean citadel of the Volscians stood in hoary antiquity on the lofty heights, the magnificence of its position took me by surprise ; it reminded me of the acropolis of some Sicilian mountain-town. The eye reaches over a wide-spread picture of provinces with their innumerable mountains and cities, each of which is full of its own historical or mythical memories. The panorama extends from Rome, visible in the plain, to Arpino, Cicero's paternal city, which stands out among the far blue mountains of the Neapolitan kingdom [then]. The air up there is fresh, almost sharp. The brown grasses, the wild roses, and the golden broom wave to and fro in it. The very spirit of antiquity and of the primæval wilderness, of a great, mighty, prehistoric age, seems to brood on these storm-worn cyclopean stones.

I scrambled farther over the rocks to reach the famous cyclopean walls; the arrangement of their unhewn stones is as perfectly preserved as if the builder had been at work but yesterday; here and there they are pierced by a small door of Etruscan appearance. At the end of one great line of wall still stands the huge cyclopean gate, in use at the present day. The hugeness of these grey walls, weather-stained by thousands of years, the growth of plants clinging to them, the mighty strength of the mountain on which the giant fabric rests, and the grandeur of nature which surrounds it, all combine to bring the mind into a state of feeling impossible to describe."

At Alatri also are magnificent cyclopean remains, with a cathedral and fine Gothic church, *Sta. Maria Maggiore*, with a rose-window, to vary the interest. At Ferentino there is also a most interesting Duomo, Lombard Gothic, with a splendid variegated *opus Alexandrinum* pavement, and the Bishop's palace close by, with a model staircase, a very artist's dream. Outside the walls is the well-known but seldom seen "Testament," of ancient Ferentinum, in which Quinctilius Priscus left all his property to his native town, with cakes and mead, money, and nut-scrambles, for the grown people, magistrates, and boys, on his birthday.*

From Alatri it is only an easy drive to Anagni, the old Hernican capital, a perfect feast of architectural curiosities and surprises; griffins, lions, loggias, and side staircases, Gothic windows and doors—as well as of artistic beauty and costume; the women all wearing the graceful white *panni*, or square head-gear, once so frequent in Rome, scarlet and blue-laced bodices, and carrying their great, classical, brazen water-vases on their heads. But Anagni speaks to the inner sense as well as to the eye, for in the wonderful, quaintest old Papal palace, with its great round-arched doorway, William of Nogaret imprisoned and insulted Boniface VIII., the famous Gaetani Pope of Dantean memory, when the haughty Colonnas raised the standard of France against him. The aged Pope was resting at Anagni from the summer heats, and was preparing to excommunicate the King of France, A.D. 1303 (Philip the Fair), when the Colonnas forced the gates, and the town rang with the cries of "*Vive le roi de France et meure Boniface!*" The aged Pope was the only man in the palace who remained calm and self-controlled. He put on S. Peter's stole, and his Papal tiara, and taking the keys of S. Peter in one hand and the crosier in the other, he sat down on the Pontifical throne and waited for death. The fierce barons poured in and sur-

* *Crustula et mulsum; sportulae, and nucum sparsiones.*

rounded him, heaped shame and reproach upon his head, and ordered him to abdicate. He only bade them take his head. They put him on a restive horse with his face to the tail, and led him away to prison; but when the ungrateful people of Anagni, who had abetted the forcing of the gates, saw that dreadful outrage, they rose up and rescued the aged Pontiff, who had always been their benefactor, and the Orsini were sent for from Rome to lead him back in triumph. Even Dante, with all his fiery Ghibellinism, shuddered at seeing the Vicar of Christ "subject to the fleur-de-lys," and insulted by living thieves, while the vinegar and gall were given afresh. But his singular and very Ghibelline account of the Pope gnawing the flesh from his own hands with rage, has been in later years wonderfully disproved; for, as will be remembered, when the coffin was opened and the cerecloth removed from the remains, after nearly five hundred years of burial, the hands were found entire, white, and exceedingly beautiful. The crosiers, both of Innocent III. and Boniface VIII., are to be seen in the sacristy; nor would it be easy to describe the feelings with which these memorials of so much history and such a course of momentous events are gazed upon and touched. About six miles from Anagni is Acuto, where the foundress of the order of nuns of the Precious Blood, Maria de Matthias, began her work, and lived till her death, in 1866. She was accustomed to preach, or rather to speak, to the country people for miles round, who flocked in thousands with delight to listen to her simple, practical addresses, and when she appeared, stilled all disturbance with "Hush! the great mother is going to speak to us!"

Wilder and wilder grows the mountain scenery, and more questionable the manners of the inhabitants towards Palestrina and the marvellous height of San Pietro, with its huge Colonna castle. All this line of country, in fact, may be called Colonna country for they owned Palestrina, San Pietro, Genazzano, Olevano, and Paliano. The Colonna Pope, Martin V., was born at Genazzano, and the great Stephen Colonna was murdered there in 1438. Genazzano is famous for its pilgrimage of "the Madonna of Good Offices," on the 25th of April, which is among the most wonderful of the picturesque sights of the world. Besides the extraordinary faith and devotion of the people, it is a perfect feast to the eye for colour and varied costume. Thither come representatives of all the mountain towns from far and near, and even the *Ciociari*, or sandal-wearing people, from *Ciociaria*, the sandalland, perhaps stretching as far as the classic, lovely Liris river, under the distant blue Neapolitan mountains. These

same sandal-people are looked upon with great contempt by the other mountaineers, and possibly, if they were met by defenceless wayfarers with money, these pilgrims would relieve them of their load without the least scruple. At Olevano (Olibanum) is the renowned Casa Baldi, or Albergo degli Artisti, owning a collection of albums beyond price, in which every artist who has ever stayed in the house has left his own portrait, painted by himself or some other artist. The views from Casa Baldi and all the country round are of extraordinary range and beauty. The various magnificent monasteries scattered about the Hernican hills alone would make a volume of interesting records. Casamari, given to the Cistercians in the twelfth century by Eugenius III., is pure Italian Gothic, and with its Norman arcaded archway and northern-featured church standing wholly solitary above the Amasena river, makes a striking impression upon the mind. It contains ample accommodation for three hundred monks, which was its usual complement, but now only thirty remain, who will probably be allowed to die out before this grand old house, like most of its companions, is seized by the Government. "Such a monastery," says Gregorovius, "is like a parchment chronicle, wherein the miniatures, like shadows, are animated with life." The wayfarer visiting the Hernican Hills and their hidden treasures, can sleep at the picture-like old city of Veroli (Verulæ), and thus get a glimpse of its Romanesque churches and marvellous stair-like streets, before going on through the savage mountain scenery to Trisulti, with its wood of primeval oaks, carpeted with lilies, and green with ferns, through which the path leads upward in the spring, through sheets of gentians, ranunculus, squills, and auriculas. Trisulti, says Mr. Hare, "has hitherto been one of the few great monasteries which have not been entirely plundered by the Sardinian Government, and forty monks remain here, leading a most useful and beneficent life, honoured by all the country round, the friends and helpers of the poor of the mountain villages in sickness or sorrow." And no one who does not know the poverty, the absolute minimum of food, clothing, and comforts to which these poor, industrious mountain people are reduced, can thoroughly appreciate what these great beneficent houses have been; combining, over and above their spiritual ministry, the temporal offices of our great landed properties, relief-giving unions, parsonages, and dispensaries, all in one, without the payment of a single penny tithe, rates, or dues. Trisulti was colonized by the Cistercians in A.D. 1208, and ever since the stream of charity has flowed unchecked, fertilizing these more than six hundred years with every form of well-doing, until the brutalizing rapacity of the

present Government choked it up, and will probably soon absorb the trickling rill that still yields its few drops of life.

Another great abbey, Farfa, now a mere name, and so lost out of the world that Mr. Hare had the greatest difficulty in even learning where it stood, was at length satisfactorily visited by him. It lies in the depths of the Sabine country, "the ideal Italy," in a region of woods carpeted with flowers, deep shady valleys, rich with figs and vines and olives, and watered by the crystal, rushing Farfarus. Truly a very idyll of the poet's spring, never so fully realized as in Italy. Farfa is reached through Poggio, Mirteto, and Montopoli, and has been a "holy place" since A.D. 550, when the Syrian hermit Lorenzo settled there, and built a hermitage. The hermitage gradually swelled to a Benedictine monastery, and finally became the second in magnificence in Italy. It became also a centre of learning, "and the 'Chronicle of Farfa,' compiled from its already decaying charters and records by Thomas the Presbyter, about 1092, and now preserved amongst the most valuable MSS. of the Vatican, has ever since been one of the most important works of reference for Church history."

The Abbot and a few monks only now remain, full of courtesy and kindness to any stranger that may be fortunate enough to visit the great monastery and fresco-covered church, with its rich carvings and opus-alexandrinum pavement, and the vast dome over the western door. Its choir-books, plated with gold and silver; its jewelled vestments, and priceless ciboriums have all been plundered. The chief part of the monastery is used as farm buildings, and Farfa will soon become a mere name stranded in the stream of past years. One more picture must be given from the Italian mountain monasteries, and then—though reluctantly, for not half our story is told—we must conclude.

Every one who has made even the most surface-visit to Rome, "doing" it with a Cook's ticket at so many churches and palaces a day, suburbs included, will cherish a life-long remembrance of the curling "long-swept wave" of Soracte, where that most majestic mountain "hangs pausing" before it descends to the rich green plain. If—best of all—seen capped with snow, from the Pamfili gardens, still less could it ever be forgotten. Formerly it was the great resort of the country round to the goddess Feronia, the Sabine Persephone, whose shrine Hannibal turned aside to plunder; but its interest to us is far rather as the site of several monasteries, and finally S. Silvestro, to be reached through the little town of S. Oreste, and much subsequent climbing. Sta. Lucia, Sta. Romana, and Sta. Maria delle Grazie, mostly now in ruins, stand first on the road.

There are only thirteen monks now at Sta. Maria delle Grazie, who live an active life of charity, and whose advice and instruction are widely sought by the country people round. There is little fear of their suppression, as they have scarcely any finances, and their humble dwellings on the bare crag, far from all human habitations, could not be sold for anything, and would be useless to the present Government. Those we saw were a grand group, an old venerable man of eighty-six, who had passed his life in these solitudes, a life so evidently given up to prayer, that his spirit seemed only half to belong to earth. We spoke to him of the change which was coming over the monastic life, but he did not murmur. "È la volontà di Dio"; only when he talked of the great poverty of the people from the present taxation, and of their reduced means of helping them, he lamented a little. He said the people came to him every day and asked why they had such sufferings to bear, that they had been quite happy before, and had never wished or sought for any change; and that he urged them to patience and prayer, and to the faith that though outward events might change, and earthly comforts be swept away, God, who led His children by mysterious teaching which we could not fathom, was Himself always the same (vol. ii. p. 47).

Exactly on the dizzy peak of the rock-piled summit, and on the site of the old Temple of Apollo, stands the deserted convent of S. Silvestro, just over the cell to which the Emperor Constantine came to seek the hermit Sylvester, and took him away, walking himself before his mule, to be raised to the Pontifical throne. The monastery was built round the cell and oratory of S. Sylvester by Carloman, the son of Charles Martel and uncle of Charlemagne, and much of it still remains within the buildings of 1500. The beautiful and touching frescoes, so religious in tone, are fading now, and have been much injured by the goat-herds who have taken shelter from the storms. The cell and bed of S. Sylvester are beneath the tribune cut out of the mountain itself, and the whole place is full of the deepest religious and historical interest. Looking down from these sheer precipices into the green Sabine gorges, and marking the whole scene, mapped out, as it were, to the eye, of the early Roman power, the lofty peak of Soracte seems to stand up as a boundary-point between the old world and the new, the past and the present time, the shadowed reign of an ever-present pagan worship of Nature, and the foundation of the visible kingdom of Christ in the West, by the settlement of His Vicars at Rome. Taking in at a rapid glance this wide range of mental prospect, though we deeply deplore the destruction of good, and especially the desolation of the "common people," who, whether in the mountain-villages of Italy or on the hill-sides of Galilee, ever "heard Christ gladly," yet we may surely stir up our faith to say, with the the old monk of

Sta. Maria, "It is God's will"; and to believe, with him, that through all the cruel phases of outward brutality in modern Italy, God is still watching the years, and in His own time will hear the prayers of His little ones and His poor, for the glorious, despoiled land of saints in which they dwell.

ART. VIII.—MR. GLADSTONE AND HIS CATHOLIC CRITICS.

The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance. By HENRY EDWARD ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER. London: Longman.

Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation Unravell'd. By BISHOP ULLATHORNE. London: Burns & Oates.

A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

Vaticanism: An Answer to Replies and Reproofs. By Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. London: Murray.

Postscript on Mr. Gladstone's Vaticanism. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

IN January we expressed our hope of placing before our readers in this number "a taste of the quality" of the three principal Catholic champions, whom Mr. Gladstone's "Expostulation" had brought into the field. To the amazement of all however, Mr. Gladstone appears in arms again, not only before we have had an opportunity of fulfilling our intention, but in time enough for us to give the best review we can of his new treatise. Our present concern therefore must be primarily with him; though, of course one of our principal objects will be to show, how completely he has failed to answer his three chief Catholic critics.

Those, we need not say, are Cardinal Manning, the Bishop of Birmingham, and F. Newman. As regards the last-named great writer indeed, we must frankly say that there are two or three passages of his pamphlet, containing statements with which we cannot concur; and two or three passages (the same or other) in which we cannot altogether sympathize with his tone: but no one of the three has spoken more nobly in behalf of the highest Catholic truths and interests, nor

grappled more closely and more successfully hand to hand with the common enemy. And there is one remark on his letter, which we are especially desirous of making at once. He rebukes us (p. 112) for our use in past time of the term "minimizers." Now this expression was only one feature in a controversy we were then carrying on, concerning the extent of the Church's infallibility; and we explained last July (pp. 9, 10) both the reasons which impelled us at the time to engage in that controversy, and also the reasons why there seems to us now no motive for actively pursuing it. We stated indeed our own impression that, thanks chiefly to the Definition of 1870 and its consequences, "well-meaning Catholics have seldom been more united with each other than at this moment, in a common intellectual subjection to the authority of the Holy See." But what we are now wishing to point out is, that we should never have dreamed of giving the name "minimistic" to such a treatise as F. Newman's. Nothing can be more alien from its spirit, than any tendency to deal grudgingly with the question whether this or that given Pontifical Act be *ex cathedrâ*. On one or two particulars indeed of comparatively small practical importance, we venture to be at issue with F. Newman under this head;* but we have hardly ever read a work, with which we felt generally more in sympathy on the point to which we here refer. And, looking as a whole at the three replies which we have named at the head of our article, we must say that Catholics

* On the Syllabus, for instance: but F. Newman holds that the various Acts from which it was compiled are doctrinally definitive; and this comes practically to much the same. In our article on Mgr. Fessler we have explained how it is, that we have not been converted by F. Newman to his view of the Syllabus.

On the Tridentine Capitula (p. 116) we should ourselves say that Tourneley and Amort have been guilty of a very serious oversight, in not observing that the Council itself expresses repeatedly and most distinctly the definitive authority of the Capitula. But F. Newman holds that "they are what is sometimes called by a catachresis '*proximum fidei*,'" and he would not therefore think of withholding from them his interior assent.

As to doctrinal minor censures, we think that we have nowhere seen what seems to us the exact truth on the matter so well hit off as by F. Newman. We italicize one or two clauses. These are his words:

"As to the condemnation of propositions all she tells us is, that the thesis condemned, when taken as a whole, or again when viewed in its context, is heretical, or blasphemous, or impious, or whatever other epithet she affixes to it. We have only to trust her so far as to allow ourselves to be warned against the thesis, or the work containing it. Theologians employ themselves in determining what precisely it is that is condemned in that thesis or treatise; and doubtless in most cases they do so with success; but that determination is not *de fide*; *all that is of faith* is that *there is in that thesis itself* which is noted, heresy or error, or other peccant matter, as the case may be, such

have on this occasion every reason to be proud of their chief representatives.

In his "Expostulation" (p. 9) Mr. Gladstone announced that "with theology as such he had nothing whatever to do"; but on the present occasion at all events he has entered largely on the theological domain. We are very glad that he has done this; because it is simply impossible for the questions he had raised to be satisfactorily discussed, except in close connection with theology. In proportion as a Protestant will take pains to master what may be called the Catholic theology "*de Ecclesiâ*"—in that proportion he will arrive at two conclusions. The first is, that no tendency to ambition or love of power need be postulated as exciting Popes, in order to account for their constant and unremitting action throughout so many centuries in matters primarily temporal. The second is, that the very same principles and habits, which led such Pontiffs as S. Gregory VII. or Boniface VIII. to assume a position of superiority over kings and civil potentates during the ages of faith—those same principles and habits (we say) would lead Popes "in this most unhappy age" to pursue a most different course. The very same principles which animated the Holy See then, animate her equally now: but under the totally changed circumstances of the time, they lead her now to abstain from all political intervention in her own behalf, and to throw her whole weight into the scale of legitimate civil authority.

that the censure is a peremptory command to theologians, preachers, students, and all other whom it concerns, to keep clear of it. But so light is this obligation, that instances frequently occur, when it is successfully maintained by some new writer, that the Pope's Act does not imply what it has seemed to imply, and questions which seemed to be closed, are after a course of years re-opened. In discussions such as these, there is a real exercise of private judgment, and an allowable one; the act of faith, which cannot be superseded or trifled with, being, I repeat, the unreserved acceptance that the thesis in question is heretical, or erroneous in faith, &c., as the Pope or the Church has spoken of it." (p. 121.)

In this paragraph, when F. Newman mentions an "act of faith," it should be remembered that there is a "*fides mediata*" no less than "*fides immediata*," to use F. Franzelin's expression. (See the remarks of that theologian in our number for July, 1871, pp. 263, 4.)

On the other hand, we may take this occasion for saying, that we cannot follow F. Newman in all which he lays down about "a wise and gentle minimizing." The question is of such urgent practical importance to a Catholic writer, that we hope in an early number to treat it in detail with direct reference to F. Newman's remarks.

On no other question of the day do we find ourselves so irreconcilably at issue with F. Newman, as on his view of the Döllingerites (p. 104). But it would be ungracious if we made this our opportunity for speaking our full mind on the subject.

Here Mr. Gladstone concedes all and more than all which we would ourselves demand. He admits (p. 96) that everything which most offends him, whether in the Popes' mediæval claims or in their Vaticanly-defined prerogatives, is amply defended, if Papal Infallibility "can be shown to exist"; if that dogma be really a "superstructure" resting on "a firm, broad, well-ascertained foundation."* This statement is not only fair but more than fair to Catholics. In our view, no sufficient defence of the Holy See's claims could be built on the mere circumstance, that a Pope is infallible when speaking *ex cathedrâ*: the further doctrine is needed, that in those official Acts, whether of teaching or governing, which are not strictly utterances *ex cathedrâ*, a Pope is nevertheless at all times under the Holy Ghost's very special and watchful guidance; that, as F. O'Reilly says in a passage approvingly quoted by F. Newman (p. 124), "a Pope is *continually* guided from above in the government of the Catholic Church."† Still as Mr. Gladstone himself admits that, given the Vatican dogma on infallibility, all the rest would be reasonable enough,—we are only too happy to make this the centre of our theological discussion. And the rather, because Mr. Gladstone has entered into detailed arguments against Papal infallibility; and has given us thereby a means of joining issue with him on this dogma, which he has in no way given us on any other.

Perhaps this will be the best place for noticing a most singular notion, ascribed by Mr. Gladstone to this REVIEW. He says (p. 35) that, according to our expressed opinion, "the Syllabus, whether *ex cathedrâ* or not, is undoubtedly infallible." If our readers will refer to Mr. Gladstone's references (Jan. 1875, pp. 177, 210), they will be even more surprised, than they may have been on first hearing his statement. We never even dreamed of such a notion, as that any Pontifical definition can be infallible without being *ex cathedrâ*; and

* He uses indeed, as is too customary with him, rhetorical exaggerations, implying that Catholics ascribe to Popes "the divine gift of inerrancy" and "the divine attribute of Omnipotence." Nevertheless, he is certainly speaking in the above-quoted passage, not about any *imaginary* dogma of Papal infallibility, but on that which was defined in 1870; because he proceeds to argue that the historical foundation of Papal infallibility alleged by F. Newman is entirely insufficient. Of course the dogma, for which F. Newman alleged historical proof, was the dogma defined by the Council, and no other.

† So the "Month": "If it has pleased God to put His Church in the world for the sanctification of mankind, it is not incredible that He should have empowered her with great prerogatives, and guarded her from their abuse by a mighty and continual protection" (April, p. 481).

we need hardly say that the Bishop of Birmingham, to whom Mr. Gladstone ascribes the same opinion, is as far from holding it as we are. When the Pope teaches *ex cathedrâ*, he teaches infallibly; when he does not teach *ex cathedrâ*, he does not teach infallibly. The tenet invented by Mr. Gladstone was never so much as heard of among children of the Church. What we have now to consider then, are the arguments adduced by him, against the dogma which Catholics since 1870 unanimously maintain.*

That, in assuming the theologian, he has not been able entirely to lay aside the politician,—is shown somewhat amusingly by a passing remark of his in p. 94; where he refers to “the ancient principles of popular election and *control*,” as principles “for which room was found in the Apostolic Church under *its inspired teachers*.” Here is religious Whiggery with a vengeance: even the inspired Apostles, it seems, were to be kept in order by constitutional and popular checks.

However we willingly admit, that he does on the whole write theologically when treating a theological theme; though (excepting vulgar no-Popery fanatics) such prejudiced and one-sided theology has not been written by any other writer we know of, in this nineteenth century. That he does not see conclusive force in the Catholic argument, was of course to be expected: but what can possibly be said on such a statement as the following? “Of the citations in favour of Papal Infallibility which are arrayed by Archbishop Manning in his ‘*Petri Privilegium*,’ I do not perceive” he says, “any earlier than the thirteenth century, which seem so much as *to bear on the question*” (p. 54). Let us look at these citations. The Cardinal does not adduce any from a time previous to S. Leo’s; and we will begin therefore with these. They refer certainly to a period “earlier than the thirteenth century.”

* F. Newman says in his Appendix (p. 154), “It can hardly be doubted that there were those in the Council who were desirous of a stronger definition.” We believe we may say with much confidence, that such was not the fact; but for ourselves we do not see how there *could* have been any such Bishops. As to the “subject” of infallibility, we do not see how words could possibly have been clearer or more decisive. As to the “object,” sphere, extension, of infallibility,—by common consent of all, the question was left for a subsequent period. The Council accordingly contented itself on the latter head with determining, that the Pope’s defining power is co-extensive with that of the Church; and that it can only be exercised in favour of some doctrine which concerns faith or morals (*doctrinam de fide vel moribus*). We never heard of any Catholic, who held that the Pope’s infallibility in teaching extends beyond this.

In their letter to S. Leo, the Fathers of the Council declare that he has preserved for them the Faith, *being set to all as the interpreter of the voice of Blessed Peter* ; “ whence we also, using you as our leader in what is good and profitable, have manifested to the children of the Church the inheritance of truth.”

S. Peter Chrysologus writes to Eutyches, who had asked his judgment on his doctrine : “ In all things I exhort you, honourable brother, that you obediently attend to the things which have been written by the blessed Pope of the city of Rome ; because Blessed Peter in his own See lives and presides, *offering the truth to those that seek it* ” (“ Petri Privilegium ” i. p. 90).

It was with this consciousness of his commission and prerogatives, that S. Leo sent his Dogmatic Letter to the Council of Chalcedon. He peremptorily forbade, in his letter to the Emperor, that the doctrine of faith should be discussed as if it were doubtful. To the Fathers of the Council he wrote : “ Now I am present by my vicars, and in the declaration of the Catholic Faith I am not absent : so that *you cannot be ignorant what we believe by the ancient tradition*, you cannot doubt what is our desire ; wherefore, most dear brethren, let the audacity of disputing against the divinely inspired Faith be altogether rejected, let the vain unbelief of those that err be silenced. *Let it not be allowed to any to defend that which it is not allowed to believe.* By the Letter which we addressed to Bishop Flavian, of blessed memory, it has been most fully and clearly declared what is the pious and sincere confession concerning the mystery of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ ” (pp. 88-9).

We pass to the year 517 and the profession of faith which the Eastern Bishops signed in obedience to Pope Hormisdas.

“ The first act of salvation is to keep rightly the Rule of Faith, and in no way to deviate from the Decrees of the Fathers. And inasmuch as the words of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over, who said, “ Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,” &c. . . . these words are confirmed by their effects, for in the Apostolic See religion has been always preserved without spot.” Then follows a condemnation of heretics and of all in communion with them. “ Wherefore *we receive and approve all the letters of Pope Leo*, and all that he wrote concerning the Christian religion. Therefore, as we have said, *following in all things the Apostolic See, and professing all its decrees*, I hope to be worthy to be in that one communion with you which the Apostolic See enjoins, *in which is the perfect and true solidity of the Christian religion* : promising also that the names of those who are separated from the communion of the Catholic Church, that is, those who are not united in mind to the Apostolic See, shall not be recited in the Holy Mysteries ” (p. 86).

In the year 680 S. Agatho thus wrote to an Œcumenical Council :—

“ Relying upon the protection [of Peter], this, his Apostolic Church, has never deviated from the way of truth in any way of error whatsoever ; and

his [Peter's] authority, as that of the Prince of all the Apostles, the whole Catholic Church of Christ and all the universal Synods always and faithfully have in all things embraced and followed. . . . For this is the rule of the True Faith, which, both in prosperity and adversity, this Apostolic Church of Christ, the Spiritual Mother of our peaceful empire, holds and defends as vital : which Church, by the grace of Almighty God, will never be convicted of erring from the path of apostolic tradition, nor has it ever yielded or been depraved by heretical novelties ; but as it received in the beginning of the Faith from its Founders, the chief of the Apostles of Christ, *it abides untainted to the end, according to the divine promise of our Lord and Saviour Himself, which in the Holy Gospels He uttered to the Prince of His disciples : Peter, Peter, behold, Satan hath desired to sift you as wheat : but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not. And thou, when thou art converted, confirm thy brethren*" (pp. 84, 5).

It was to this that the Fathers answered in acclamation : " Peter hath spoken."

We have quoted enough for our present purpose ; because every one admits, that as centuries advance, the testimonies become more definite and precise. What can be said to a controversialist, who alleges that the passages we have cited do not so much as " bear on the question," (!) of Papal Infallibility ? *

Nay, Mr. Gladstone considers (pp. 96, 7) that Catholics do not even allege any foundation for the dogma, except their private judgment on three texts of Scripture. And he proceeds accordingly to moralize (p. 97) on their " narrow, sterile, wilful textualism," parallel to that which is " the favourite resort of sectaries," and which is " the general character of all license and self-will that lays waste the garden of the Lord." This amazing opinion he grounds on a complete misapprehension of some language used by F. Newman (p. 110), concerning the three texts in question. Now, before we proceed to expose Mr. Gladstone's misunderstanding of F. Newman, we may be allowed to repeat a remark which we made in January. We cannot but think that F. Newman does scanty justice to the full argument for Papal Infallibility ; and that a far greater amount of historical evidence is adducible for that dogma, than he is prepared to admit. But then we also think that the additional evidence is in strictness superfluous ; and that, even in F. Newman's view, the dogma has rested on absolutely impregnable historical ground, ever since

* Mr. Gladstone's unfairness to Cardinal Manning is quite incredible, and would alone suffice to show in how excited a frame of mind he writes. As an appendix to this article, we will print a powerful exposure of these strange misconceptions, which appeared in the " Tablet " of March 19th.

the Definition of 1870 and its consequents. We need hardly say, that we have no claim whatever to speak as interpreters of F. Newman's intention. We are but testifying to the impression produced on our own mind by his language. And in briefly setting forth what we mean, we shall not only be derending F. Newman against Mr. Gladstone, but also setting forth a most essential particular in the Catholic argument, which Protestants continually overlook.

It is manifest on the very surface of history—we are sure F. Newman would say this—that a certain very definite doctrine concerning the Church's constitution was held unanimously by the Fathers. They universally regarded the Church as being, by divine irrevocable appointment, one corporate body, governed by the universal Episcopate. They further universally held, that the united Episcopate has received from God the gift of securely preserving Catholic dogma against all heretical corruption; insomuch that the Church's unity of faith is ever as visible and unmistakable a fact, as her unity of organization. And further again, they universally held that the See of S. Peter had, by divine right, a certain primacy in the Church, whatever the exact nature of that primacy. We have on various occasions drawn out as best we could the general lie of those facts, which so irrefragably establish the doctrine just expressed; but since we last did so, F. Newman has applied himself to the same task, and has accomplished it far more clearly and thoroughly than we could ever have done. We refer to the admirable dissertation in his "*Essays Critical and Historical*" (vol. ii. pp. 90–98).

Mr. Gladstone, of course, does not accept this doctrine. He considers (p. 110) that "the Church of England, of which he is a member, is (as she has never ceased to teach) the ancient lawful Catholic Church of this country"; and of course, if the Anglican communion were part of the Catholic Church, the latter would *not* have received from Christ the gift of indefectible corporate unity. Still, though he does not accept this doctrine, he has nowhere adduced any *arguments* against it, and we here therefore assume it. But let us see what must necessarily follow from its truth. It is certain, we have said, from early history,—and no one holds this fact more firmly than F. Newman—that the Church in communion with Rome has received from Christ the indefectible gift, of securely preserving Catholic dogma against all heretical corruption. But, in this year 1875, the whole body of Bishops in communion with Rome—the whole body of Bishops who, by the common consent of mankind, are called "Catholic"—teach as of faith the dogma of Papal Infallibility. At this present

time therefore, it follows necessarily (in F. Newman's mind) from what is shown on the very surface of ecclesiastical history, that this dogma is truly Catholic, and included in the Deposit. And F. Newman's historical ground then being so impregnable, what can be more inept and irrelevant than Mr. Gladstone's warning, against "narrow, sterile, wilful textualism"?

Undoubtedly, however, F. Newman places the historical evidence, which was adducible for Papal Infallibility before 1870, at a much lower point, than that at which it is placed by the large majority of Catholic theologians. See e.g. pp. 26-28; 106, 7; 110. Now here he is encountered by a certain difficulty. The Church has defined, that Papal Infallibility is not merely a truth, but a *revealed* truth; an integral portion (explicit or implicit) of the Deposit. But, according to universally admitted Catholic principles—F. Newman states these principles very clearly in pp. 116, 7—the Church of later times has no such "inspiration" as the Apostles had; * she receives no direct and cognizable communication from God; and consequently her judgment, that a certain verity is part of the Apostolic Deposit, can only be based, either on direct evidence of what the Apostles taught, or on some kind of ratiocination deducible therefrom. Now, for ourselves, we follow the large majority of Catholic theologians, in holding that there is a superabundance of direct historical evidence for Papal infallibility, quite independently of the Vatican Definition. F. Newman, however, takes a different view. No living man, certainly, has fuller right to an opinion of his own on such a subject; nor do we see that any Catholic has not complete liberty to hold the same: but this view requires him to explain how it is—since the historical evidence was not in itself sufficient—that the Church came to know the Apostolic origin of the dogma. His reply (as we understand him) is substantially this. First, he lays down a principle which, we think, is substantially true and highly important, though (as we have just said) to our mind he somewhat overstates it.

For myself, I would simply confess that no doctrine of the Church can be rigorously proved by historical evidence; but at the same time that no doctrine can be simply disproved by it. Historical evidence reaches a certain way, more or less, towards a proof of the Catholic doctrines; often nearly the whole way; sometimes it goes only so far as to point in their direction;

* In p. 117 F. Newman gives what is perhaps the best illustration we ever saw of the "*assistentia*" given to Popes and Councils. It is a "mere external guardianship," he says; "as a man's Guardian Angel, without enabling him to walk, might on a night journey keep him from pitfalls."

sometimes there is only an absence of evidence for a conclusion contrary to them ; nay, sometimes there is an apparent leaning of the evidence to a contrary conclusion, which has to be explained ;—in all cases there is a margin left for the exercise of faith in the word of the Church. He who believes the dogmas of the Church only because he has reasoned them out of History, is scarcely a Catholic. It is *the Church's use of History* in which the Catholic believes : and she uses other informants also ; Scripture, Tradition, the ecclesiastical sense or *φρόνημα*, and a subtle ratiocinative power, which in its origin is a divine gift. There is nothing of bondage or “renunciation of mental freedom” in this view, any more than in the converts of the Apostles believing what the Apostles might preach to them or teach them out of Scripture (p. 105).

The ratiocination then, by which the Church deduces the conclusion that Papal infallibility was always part of the Deposit, need not be rigorous and logical. There is no need, we say, of this ; because the Church possesses an “ecclesiastical sense” and “subtle ratiocinative power,” which enable her to deduce from revealed premisses—and from premisses directly testified by history—conclusions, that are *but latently* therein contained ; and to decide infallibly on the legitimacy of her own deduction. Now no one, ever so slightly acquainted with F. Newman's writings, will understand him to mean (in p. 110) that there are no revealed premisses and no direct historical evidence whatever, available to this purpose in the present case, except the three texts he mentions. But we do understand him to say—and we are disposed entirely to agree with him—that even if those texts stood alone, they would afford the Church a sufficient foundation, whereon to base the exercise of her infallible judgment. And his argument itself is one out of many instances which might be adduced, as showing how large is the scope which he ascribes to the Church's great prerogative of infallibility, and to the Holy Ghost's agency within her bosom.

It seems to us then, that there are three different exhibitions of gross unfairness in Mr. Gladstone's argument. Firstly, he speaks as though, in F. Newman's view, Catholics have to rest their belief in Papal infallibility on an exercise of private judgment concerning the sense of three certain texts ; whereas (in his view) they rest it of course on their firm belief in the guidance promised and secured for the Church by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, he speaks as though F. Newman confessed that the Definition rests on no solid historical ground ; whereas in F. Newman's view, no less than in that of all other Catholics, its truth, from the moment of its Definition, has rested on historical grounds the most impregnable. Thirdly, Mr. Gladstone's words produce the impression, that Catholics in general

agree with F. Newman, in considering the historical evidence to have been inadequate at an earlier period; whereas the great majority of Catholics by no means agree with F. Newman in this opinion.

The vast majority, then, of Catholic theologians hold a far stronger opinion than F. Newman does, on the amount of historical evidence which, *before* the Vatican Definition, was adducible for the dogma we are defending. Indeed they maintain—and we heartily follow them—that hardly any other historical conclusion can be mentioned, more irrefragably established. It can be no part of our business here to analyze the arguments and citations of such writers as Orsi, Muzzarelli, Ballerini; because Mr. Gladstone has not said one word in reply to them, and does not even seem to have heard of their labours. We will add however, that the series of facts which they adduce is but one *portion* of the historical argument implied by them: an argument which may be stated, as a whole, somewhat as follows. It is manifest on the surface (as we said a few pages back) that, according to the Fathers' unanimous view, the Church is, by divine irrevocable appointment, one corporate body, governed by the Catholic Bishops, and secured by their teaching from all doctrinal corruption. Now if the Bishops were by divine law united, there must have been some divinely appointed centre or bond of union; and if by divine promise they were infallible in their united teaching, that divinely appointed centre of union must itself have been some infallible authority. But there is a large amount of evidence accumulated by these controversialists, tending to show that *the Holy See* is this infallible centre of unity; whereas there is no *other* centre of unity which any one can, with so much as the faintest plausibility, allege as patristically recognized. Therefore it follows as an irrefragable historical conclusion, that the Holy See was appointed from the first as the infallible centre of unity. We set forth this whole argument ourselves in detail as well as we could, during our controversy with Dr. Pusey (July, 1867, pp. 1–15); and (if we may use a legal phrase) we beg here to put those pages in, as part of our case.

It is no necessary part of our business however (as we have said), to draw out here the direct historical argument for Papal infallibility; what *is* an indispensable part of our business, is to answer the various historical or other objections, which have been raised by Mr. Gladstone *against* the dogma in various parts of his treatise. To that task, therefore, we now proceed.

(1.) He alleges (p. 97) “the total ignorance of S. Peter

himself respecting his monarchy": but surely this should have been *shown* and not merely alleged, considering that of course Catholics deny it. Mr. Gladstone should have explained e.g. what was S. Peter's own apprehension of his Christian name, so specially given him by our Lord, and so broadly distinguishing him from the other Apostles.

(2.) "The exercise of the defining office, not by him but by S. James, at the Council of Jerusalem." (ib.) In the article to which we have referred (July, 1867, pp. 20, 21) we have given reasons for entirely denying this. We maintain, that it was S. Peter who uttered the Definition of faith; and that what S. James enunciated was the Apostolic disciplinary Decree.

(3.) "The world-wide commission, specially and directly given to S. Paul." In our number for April, 1867, we discussed this matter at some length. There is no single statement (we said) contained in the Acts or in S. Paul's own Epistles, which even *tends* to be out of harmony with the doctrine, that in the exercise of his Apostolic office S. Paul, like the other Apostles, was dependent on S. Peter.

(4.) In the same article we carefully considered (and in our own humble judgment conclusively refuted) Mr. Gladstone's next argument, founded on "the correction of S. Peter by the Apostle of the Gentiles."

(5.) "The independent action of all the Apostles." As Catholics confidently deny that their action *was* independent, it was for Mr. Gladstone to have shown, and not merely assumed, that the fact was otherwise.

(6.) "The twelve Apostles of the Lamb are spoken of in Scripture as the twelve foundations of the New Jerusalem." No Pope would ever have denied this fact, which is simply irrelevant to Mr. Gladstone's purpose. The passage from the Apocalypse might as plausibly have been quoted to show, that *our Blessed Lord* is not the Church's One Foundation.

(7.) In the next objection we are to consider (pp. 104, 5), Mr. Gladstone lays the foundation of his argument in the statement that, according to the Vatican Definition, one condition of an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement is that it be "addressed to the entire Church." He then proceeds to object, "that the early ages are believed to afford no example whatever of a Papal judgment addressed to the entire Church."

But his preliminary statement is inaccurate. The Vatican Definition does not require, as condition of an *ex cathedrâ* Act, that it be "addressed to the entire Church." What is required is, that the Pope define a doctrine "*to be held by the whole Church*"; or (as F. Newman excellently paraphrases it in p. 115) that he speak "with the purpose of binding every

member of the Church to accept and believe his decision." This was also the very expression used by Cardinal Manning, in the Pastoral which he published before going to Rome for the Council. So again F. Newman speaks in another place (p. 108): "teaching has no sacramental visible signs; it is mainly a question of *intention*." The real question then is, whether or no the early ages afford frequent instances, in which Popes have issued this or that decision, as one which every Catholic is under an obligation of accepting. Now here again we cannot be expected to analyze Orsi's, Muzzarelli's, and Ballerini's treatises: but a quotation from Muzzarelli will be much to the point. The italics are ours:—

My whole argument is founded on two historical facts, which *indubitably* are placed *beyond all controversy*. First fact: It is manifest from ecclesiastical history that even from the earliest age the Roman Pontiffs *often . . . set forth tracts (libellos) and professions of faith to be subscribed by all the Bishops, or issued decrees and constitutions concerning the Faith throughout the whole Church, with a precept of obedience directed to all the Bishops.**

And the following instance, given by Orsi, may stand as representing a large class. Pope Vigilius on one occasion addressed a Letter to the Greek Emperor. In this Letter, after having recited various Letters of his predecessors, S. Leo, S. Hormisdas, S. Agapetus, which had never been placed before any Ecumenical Council, the Pope thus proceeds:—

With regard then to those things which have been defined concerning the Faith by the Fathers of the *four holy Synods*, and by the before-mentioned *Letters of Pope Leo of happy memory*, and the *Constitutions of our venerable predecessors*—condemning, by the authority of the Apostolic See, those who do not follow these in every particular (*per omnia non sequentes*), and who oppose their doctrines—we *anathematize* those who shall have attempted either perversely to dispute or *faithlessly to doubt* concerning the exposition or rectitude of that Faith; and we sever from the unity of the Catholic Faith persons who think against those things concerning the Faith which are contained in the *most holy Synods* of Nicæa, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, and in the above-mentioned *Letters of our predecessor Leo of happy memory*, or all those things which his authority sanctioned (lib. i. c. 19, art. 2).

Nor was this only a claim made by Vigilius: the claim was admitted. Orsi ("de Irreformabili, &c.," l. i. c. 19, art. 2) draws attention to one particular part of Vigilius's "Constitutum." In this the Pontiff quotes a letter, addressed to him

* "De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis," cap. xii. sec. 4.

by the Patriarch of Constantinople and by several Eastern Bishops, promising that they would in all things follow the Letters of S. Leo and the *Constitutions of the Holy See*, whether *as regards faith* or as regards the firm maintenance (firmitate) of the four preceding Councils. And the Emperor also held the same doctrine: for, as Orsi proceeds to point out, another passage from Vigilius's "Constitutum" proves this. Vigilius speaks with approbation of Justinian's having influenced the Bishops to put forth "professions" of faith, whereby they "were shown to adhere to the definitions and judgments of the holy Fathers,* and of the four venerable Councils, and of the Bishops of the *Apostolic See*."

No historical fact then can well be more certain, than that, by Vigilius's time at all events, it was a recognized and customary habit for Pontiffs to put forth certain "definitions," "judgments," "constitutions," concerning the Faith, which claimed from all Catholics absolute and unreserved interior assent. It is perfectly clear that many such then existed; and that an indefinite number were expected for the future. This is surely decisive enough, and there is no need of going further. But F. Newman at all events thinks there is historical proof, that Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Acts were by no means unknown during even the ante-Nicene period. These are his words in his volume of "Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical"; and we italicise one clause:—

It is a great misfortune to us that we have not had preserved to us the dogmatic utterances of the Ante-Nicene Popes. A fragment of one of them remains; and it accidentally contains an assertion, indirect but clear, of the very doctrine we desiderate in certain other writers, the *Eternal Existence of the Son*. It is in Pope Dionysius's notice of some supposed heresy at Alexandria, which over-zealous ecclesiastics had brought before the Holy See. The portion which remains to us of his Letter is written in a tone of authority and decision, *which became an infallible Voice* (p. 252).†

Yet, though all this be so, Mr. Gladstone—as if he had *proved* his point, instead of merely assuming it—triumphs in the following strain:—

* By the "holy Fathers" are here meant the Bishops assembled in Œcumenical Council: as is made clear by a letter presently quoted by Orsi from Justinian, in which he says that he "follows the Constitutions of the holy Fathers, *i. e. the 318 assembled at Nicæa*."

† Some words of F. Newman's in p. 108 have not unnaturally been misunderstood, as though he implied that *ex cathedrâ* judgments were unknown in the seventh century. But in the edition of his "Letter" which he has reprinted in a cheaper form, he has so altered those words as to prevent the possibility of misconception.

But how is it beyond all expression strange that for one thousand three hundred years, or were it but for half one thousand three hundred years, the Church performed her high office, and spread over the nations, without any infallible teaching whatever from the Pope, and then that it should have been reserved for these later ages first to bring into exercise a gift so entirely new, without example in its character, and on the presence or absence of which depends a vital difference in the conditions of Church life ?

The declarations of the Pope *ex cathedra* are to be the sure guide and mainstay of the Church ; and yet she has passed through two-thirds of her existence without once reverting to it ! Nor is this all. For in those earlier ages, the fourth century in particular, were raised and settled those tremendous controversies relating to the God-head, the decision of which was the most arduous work the Church has ever been called to perform in the sphere of thought. This vast work she went through without the infallible utterances of the Pope (p. 105).

It may be interesting to contrast F. Newman's view with Mr. Gladstone's, on the place occupied by Popes in "settling those tremendous controversies" to which Mr. Gladstone here refers. The passages we are about to quote are from the masterly memoir of Theodoret, contained in F. Newman's volume of "Historical Sketches." We italicise a sentence or two :—

What occurred at Ephesus is a scandal to the humble Christian, and was as superfluous as it was blameable. The Church did not initiate the Council, *nor is it at all clear that a Council was then needed.* Cyril had appealed to the Pope against Nestorius ; the Pope in Council had taken the side of Cyril. Then the Pope had written round to the principal Bishops of the East, and they in answer had accepted and given their adherence to the faith of Cyril. Even John, Patriarch of Antioch, the friend of Nestorius, had returned this answer to Pope Celestine. In consequence the Pope had allowed Nestorius just ten days for his recantation, and that interval was long past. In vain had been the entreaties of his own party, urging him to submit to the judgment of the Catholic world. Inclosing letters from the Pope and Cyril, John and the Bishops who acted with him had said, "Read these over carefully ; although the period of ten days is none of the longest, you may do all that is needful in one day, or in a few hours. You ought not to refuse the term, 'Theotocos,' as if it were dangerous. If you agree in sentiment with the Fathers, why should you scruple to avow your sound and right belief ? The whole Church is unsettled with the question." Theodoret, too, who is even said to have actually composed this remonstrance, little as he liked Cyril, speaks in the same sense, in various of his writings and letters. If the votes of Christendom had been taken, there would have been some dissentients from the expedience of adopting the "Theotocos" as a symbol of orthodoxy ; there would have been none from the doctrine which that symbol enforced. Nestorius then, being contumacious, was to be deposed : to Cyril was committed by the Pope the execution of the sentence ; and

there was the end of the whole matter. What was the need of a Council ? and this, I conceive, was Cyril's judgment.

If I may consider this to be St. Cyril's feeling, it will serve to account for his subsequent conduct at Ephesus. "What could a Council do, which had not been done already ? its convocation was a mere act of the civil power ; it would be little better than a form. *What could be stronger than a decision at Rome, followed up by the assent to it of the Catholic world ?* What was there for the Fathers to debate upon ? they would only have to register the conclusions which had already been reached without their meeting" (pp. 347-349).*

(8.) Mr. Gladstone further objects (p. 105), that "at three several times" there were Papal judgments on the Incarnation, which are "*now determined to have been heretical.*" By whom determined ? When ? On what evidence ? By what authority ? No answer.†

(9.) But the historical argument on which Mr. Gladstone insists far more than on any other, is taken from the Council of Constance. He insists on this at a length quite disproportionate to its place in his general plan (pp. 56-61), and evidently thinks that he has given Catholics the hardest possible nut to crack. Indeed, he pronounces his own "demonstration" to be "perfectly rigorous." Now of course we cannot attempt an exhaustive dissertation on the Council of Constance ; but we will meet every one of Mr. Gladstone's points, without a single exception. We heartily concede to him at starting, that the prerogatives of Papal infallibility and Papal supremacy practically stand or fall together ; and that if the latter therefore were overthrown, the former could not stand. This being understood, Mr. Gladstone's objections derived from the Council resolve themselves into two.

First ; Pope Martin V. derived his whole power to confirm from his election to the Papal Chair by the Council. And the Council was competent to elect, because the See was vacant. And the See was vacant, because of the depositions of two rival Popes, and the resignation of the third ; for if the See was truly vacant before, there had been no Pope since the schism in

* Some criticism might justly have been made (we think) on the language used by F. Newman in his first edition, (1) as to the necessity of moral unanimity in Councils, and (2) as to the facts of the Ephesine Council in particular. In his Appendix however (pp. 152-154) he withdraws one statement about the Ephesine Council, and otherwise removes all opening for unfavourable comment.

† We cannot assent to F. Newman's opinion (p. 109) that Honorius's Letter to Sergius is, in its legitimate objective sense, heretical. We argued for the opposite opinion in January 1869 (pp. 185-199), and in April 1870 (pp. 373-380).

1378, which is not supposed by either side. But the power of the Council to vacate the See was in virtue of the principle asserted by the Decree of the Fifth Session. We arrive then at the following dilemma. Either that decree had full validity by the confirmation of the Pope, or Martin the Fifth was not a Pope; the Cardinals made or confirmed by him were not Cardinals, and could not elect validly his successor, Eugenius IV.; so that the Papal succession has failed since an early date in the fifteenth century, or more than four hundred and fifty years ago (pp. 59, 60).

Now, putting aside other objections which might be taken to this airy exposition, we deny entirely that "the power of the Council to vacate the See was in virtue of the principle" which Mr. Gladstone considers to have been asserted by the Decree of the Fifth Session. For our own part indeed we are entirely disposed to follow those many theologians, who think that the vacating of the See was in no sense effected by the action of the Council at all: but on this we will not insist. The extreme and almost incredible unfairness of Mr. Gladstone's argument consists, in his ignoring what was the one central and turning point of the then situation. Let us take an illustrative case. There is no divine promise that some Pope may not become insane. Let us suppose that such a calamity were to befall the Church; that physicians pronounced the malady incurable; and that various ecclesiastical officials thereupon proceeded to take certain necessary steps. Then let us suppose some future Mr. Gladstone to argue, that the Church has now surrendered her dogma of Papal supremacy, because these officials had acted without taking the Pope's orders. Mr. Gladstone's reasoning in the pages before us is as entirely, though perhaps not so flagrantly, unreasonable, as that of his imaginary successor. He is forward in affirming that, on Vatican principles, the Church's constitution is simply monarchical. But a strictly monarchical government is brought to an absolute dead-lock, when no one knows for certain who is monarch. "*Papa dubius Papa nullus.*" In the case of a really doubtful Pope, just as in the case of a hopelessly insane Pope, by absolute necessity there must be some anomalous exercise of authority. It is difficult to see what could have been done better, than that the Episcopate, with whom, when united with their head, Christ has deposited the sovereign authority, should (in the absence of any certain head) come together from all parts of Christendom and provide for the emergency. And Martin V.'s official language after his election implied, we think, that he was on the whole satisfied with what had been done. But no one surely, except so excited and impetuous a thinker as Mr. Gladstone, would

argue that—because the Episcopate has authority to vacate the See and elect a new Pope when no certain Pope exists,—it has therefore the right of disobeying a Pope who *is* certain, and who is acknowledged as such by the whole Church. “The Council,” says Mr. Gladstone (p. 57), “cited three Popes to its bar.” Why it is absolutely indubitable that on Catholic principles there was only one true Pope existing, who *could* be cited. And since it was entirely uncertain which this one true Pope was, the Council “summoned to its bar” no certain and universally recognized Pope whomsoever.

But Mr. Gladstone will rejoin—and this is his second head of argument—that the Council did not in fact base its proceedings on any such foundation as we have suggested; but on a completely different one: its declared principle being, that a Council receives its power immediately from Christ, and that such power is above that of the Pope. Mr. Gladstone adds, that the declarations of the Fourth and Fifth Sessions were indubitably dogmatic, and indubitably confirmed by the Pope; so that on Vatican principles the supremacy of Council over Pope is an infallibly defined dogma.

Now, as to the essential part of this argument, we say there is no more absolutely certain fact in ecclesiastical history, than that Martin V. never defined or confirmed this alleged dogma. But before entering on this, we will give reasons for thinking it far more probable than not, that the Council itself never defined any dogma of the kind.

The essential words of the two declarations on which Mr. Gladstone relies, run as follows. We italicise one or two clauses.

This holy synod of Constance, constituting a general Council *for the extirpation of the present schism*, and for effecting union and reformation of God's Church in head and members, being legitimately assembled in the Holy Ghost to the praise of Almighty God—in order to obtain more securely, richly, and freely the union and reformation of God's Church,—ordains, defines, determines, decrees, and declares as follows:

First of all it declares that, having been legitimately assembled in the Holy Ghost, constituting a general Council, and representing the Catholic Church militant, it possesses immediately from Christ a power which every one, of whatever state or dignity even Papal, is bound to obey *in those things which appertain to the end* and extirpation of the before-named schism, and the general reformation of God's Church in head and members.*

* The common reading is “fidem,” not “finem”; but F. Ramière says (“Contradictions de Mgr. Maret,” p. 68) that the true reading is pretty certainly “finem.” If it be “fidem,” it will appear clearly as we proceed that

Also that whoever, of whatever condition, state, or dignity, even Papal, shall have contumaciously refused to obey the commands, statutes, or ordinances of this holy Synod, or of any other general Council legitimately assembled for fulfilling the afore-mentioned purposes or what appertains to them (*super præmissis seu ad ea pertinentibus factis vel faciendis*), unless he repent, be subjected to condign penance, &c. &c.

Now surely the limitation expressed is almost decisive on the true sense of these declarations. As Dr. Murray well puts it, let us suppose it to be said that the Church has authority over the civil ruler *in spirituals*:—surely the very limitation of the expression implies, that she has *not* authority over him in matters purely temporal. What reason can Mr. Gladstone even imagine, why the Council should have inserted this emphatic limitation, if it had meant to declare purely and simply the supremacy of a Council over a Pope?

Then observe the very curious periphrasis, “one of papal dignity.” Why did not the Council openly say “Pope”? On our interpretation the answer is obvious. There was then no certain Pope: while there were three persons “of Papal dignity”; i. e. who received from their respective followers the obedience given to a Pope.

Then again, as F. Bottalla observes, even as to the three doubtful Popes then existing, the Council strained every nerve to obtain their resignation, and so avoid the necessity of coercive measures. If the Bishops were unwilling, even in a time of schism, to treat even doubtful Popes according to the maxims of the Fourth and Fifth Sessions,—it is incredible that they intended those maxims as applying to the Church in her normal state.

We consider therefore, that the declarations before us were never intended as a doctrinal definition, claiming interior assent from the faithful; but as a manifesto, setting forth the ground on which the Council assumed the authority it was then exercising. They refer, not to my general doctrine, but to the circumstances of a most exceptional crisis. Even so considered, we do not deny that their language is highly exaggerated; for they might be taken even to mean that the Council’s supremacy would continue,—even though some Pope were universally recognized as such,—until the Church’s reformation should be accomplished in head and members. But though no doubt there were those among the assembled Bishops who held this doctrine, we see no reason to

reference is made to the heresies of Wickliffe and Huss, and to any other matters concerning faith which might press, before the Church obtained a certain Pope.

suppose that the Council at large deliberately intended to express it.

At last however Mr. Gladstone frankly admits, that the question we have now been discussing is of no critical importance; he admits that even if these declarations meant what he supposes, they "would not constitute any difficulty for Roman theology" (p. 58). The vital point in controversy is exclusively this: did any Pope ever issue or confirm any definition, teaching the supremacy of a Council over a Pope? Mr. Gladstone alleges that Martin V. did so; whereas we have already said that, to our mind, there is no fact in history more certain, than is the contradictory of Mr. Gladstone's affirmation. We now then proceed to meet him on this decisive issue. He will admit of course, that if Martin V. intended to *teach* this doctrine, he himself *held* it. We ask firstly then, *did* Martin V. comport himself after his election, as subordinate in authority to the Council which was then actually sitting? Dean Milman, as an outsider, may be accounted an impartial witness on this head. What is his language?

The Council felt itself baffled, eluded, fallen under the inextricable dominion of the Pope. The Emperor was conscious that he had sunk to a subordinate position: his majesty was eclipsed.

In Martin V.'s first act . . . its form was not less dictatorial than the substance. It was an act of the Pope, not the Council; it was throughout the Pope who enacted and ordained . . . Whatever he might hereafter concede to the Church in general, or to the separate nations of Christendom, was a boon on his part, not a right on theirs.

Still the Pope claimed and exercised the prerogative of issuing canons for the universal obedience of Christendom, and of giving to Papal decrees the infallible authority of the Gospel of God Himself.—"Latin Christianity," book xiii. chap. 10.

Passing from this general aspect of things to particular facts,—there is an "*argumentum ad hominem*," which, as against Mr. Gladstone, is simply irresistible. To explain this argument, we will make a preliminary remark.

According to the Church's universal usage, when the Pope himself is present at a Council, the definitions are issued in the Pope's name, some such words being added as "*sacro approbante Concilio*." Catholics have always appealed to this fact, as one among innumerable proofs of the Church's traditional doctrine on the relations between Pope and Council. Mr. Gladstone, in his "*Expostulation*," while ignorant of the *fact*, admitted the force of the *argument*. The Vatican Definitions were of course issued in this

very form; and Mr. Gladstone thus enlarges on the theme: "It is necessary," he said (p. 32), "for all who wish to understand *what is the present degradation of the episcopal order*" among Roman Catholics, "to observe" this form of definition. Now will it be credited that Martin V., in confirming the conciliar condemnation of Wickliffe and Huss, used the precise form which Pius IX. used in the Vatican Council, and that this was a fact before Mr. Gladstone's eyes? According to Mr. Gladstone then, so far was Martin V. from regarding the assembled Episcopate as possessing authority over him, that he used a form implying a deplorable "degradation of the Episcopal order."

Apart however from all arguments *ad hominem*, let us consider in its own light the significance of such a form. Surely it implies, that the authority of the Definition comes directly and primarily from the Pope; and that the Bishops, though true judges, are so in subordination to his supreme authority.

Moreover the words used by Martin V., in confirming the Conciliar condemnation of the heretics, are well worthy of attention.

We will and by [our Apostolical] authority decree, that the above-named [conciliary] declarations, definitions, reprobations, commands, inhibitions, statutes, condemnations and sentences have in every respect full force, strength and vigour: and let this Letter of ours fully suffice everywhere to authenticate (probanda) them.

If he recognized the Council as his superior, how would he imagine that anything he could say would give its Definitions greater force than they had already?

A fact of still more unmistakable import is next to be mentioned. On March 10th, 1418, just six weeks before Martin V.'s supposed confirmation of anti-Ultramontane doctrine, certain Polish ambassadors threatened appeal to a future Council, if the Pope would not comply with a certain request of theirs. On this, Martin V. at once, in full Consistory, solemnly condemned the doctrine which such a threat implied. These were his words:—

It is lawful for no man to appeal from the *supreme judge*, that is the Holy See or Roman Pontiff, Vicar of Jesus Christ; nor to reject (declinare) his judgment on causes of faith, which, as being "*majores cause*," are to be referred to him and to the Apostolic See.*

It is not very probable that, only six weeks from this time,

* Bouix, "De Papâ," vol. i p. 528

the Pontiff should have perpetrated such an act of self-stultification, as would be involved in his defining, that the Vicar of Christ is *not* supreme judge; and that the appeal to a Council would be an appeal from the inferior to the superior authority.

But the best refutation of Mr. Gladstone's wild theory will be found in a simple recital of the facts on which he bases it. They are these. On the very last day of the Council,—after the Bishops had been bid to go in peace, and after a preacher had ascended the pulpit to give a farewell exhortation,—the Polish ambassadors already mentioned petitioned that John Falkenberg's book, approving (as they alleged) tyrannicide, might be publicly condemned before the Council should separate. It had already been condemned by the Council's "*deputati in causâ fidei*," and also severally by all the "nations"; but no conciliar decree had passed concerning it. The Pope (for whatever reason) declined to comply with their request; and at the same time, *in answer to that request* (*respondendo ad prædicta*) made the declaration, out of which the Gallicans and Mr. Gladstone have tried to make capital. The declaration runs, that "he willed to hold and inviolably observe and never contradict in any manner all and singular the determinations, conclusions, and decrees made by the Council conciliarly * on matters of faith." "He approves and ratifies the things thus conciliarly done, and not those done otherwise or in some other manner." And he commanded this declaration to be entered on the Acts of the Council. What can be more intelligible than this? The book had been condemned by certain *authorities* connected with the Council, but had not been condemned conciliarly. The Pope then said to the ambassadors: "I refuse your request. I condemn nothing except what has been condemned conciliarly." No request had been made to him by the Council, that he would confirm any definition of theirs concerning the relation of Pope and Council; nor is there the slightest reason to suppose that any question concerning that relation was ever so distantly in his mind. And the above little address of his is what the Gallicans and Mr. Gladstone call an *ex cathedrâ* confirmation of the tenet, that a Council has authority over a Pope!

According to these extraordinary thinkers then, this most vital and momentous definition was a work of accident. When

* Mr. Gladstone (p. 59) strangely translates the word "*conciliariter*" by the phrase "in full assembly." But we do not see that his argument gains by the mistranslation.

the Pope indeed intended to confirm the conciliar condemnation of Wickliffe, Huss, and the rest, he issued a solemn Bull as his instrument in doing so. But as to this indefinitely more serious matter, he left it entirely alone, until the Bishops had been bid go in peace, and the farewell sermon was just beginning; nor would he even then have said a word about it, except for the Polish treatise on tyrannicide. Nay, up to the last (on Mr. Gladstone's theory) Martin V. wonderfully kept his own counsel; for though he was intending to define Gallicanism* *ex cathedrâ*, he did not mention that tenet nor even allude to it. The whole theory rather reminds one of Lord Burleigh's nod, than of anything more serious. Mr. Gladstone must paraphrase the Pope's little speech, in some such way as the following: "By the bye, apropos of tyrannicide, let me condemn Ultramontanism. I take this opportunity, then—not for condemning the tyrannicidal book,—but for defining *sub silentio* that a Pope is subject to a Council. I had not thought of it before; but these ambassadors, with their zeal against tyrannicide, have reminded me of Ultramontanism; and I hereby define Gallicanism *ex cathedrâ*, without so much as naming it or hinting at it ever so distantly." A person who can look this view in the face and accept it, surely puts himself beyond the reach of argument.

After what has been said, it is a very insignificant matter, whether the words used by Martin V. would in themselves have sufficed to cover the Council's early Gallican declarations, had these latter been intended dogmatically. We believe however that they would *not*. In the first place we believe it will be found, that the phrase "*materia fidei*" not unfrequently occurs in the Acts of the Council; and that it is used invariably to express those questions which concern the contemporary heresy, as *distinct* from those which concern the Papacy. Then secondly Catholic theologians lay great stress on an inquiry, which Mr. Gladstone touches very airily: viz., whether the Decrees of the Fourth and Fifth Sessions were in fact passed "*conciliarly*," considering the way in which votes were taken. For our own part (as we have said) we do not think they were ever intended as dogmatical definitions, but exclusively as practical manifestoes on occasion of a most exceptional emergency. And the complete silence, preserved upon them in the Council from the moment of Martin V.'s election, gives (we think) considerable confirmation to our humble opinion.

* We hope our readers will excuse us, if, for convenience sake, we use the words "Gallicanism" and "Ultramontanism," which belong, of course, to a much later period.

There are many other particulars concerning the Council of Constance, on which we have no room to enter, and which all tend to confirm the view we have taken. But we think there is no one argument of Mr. Gladstone's on the subject, which we have not distinctly faced.

(10.) An objection, quite different in kind from any of the preceding, is raised by Mr. Gladstone against the dogma of Papal Infallibility (pp. 106-8) from the existing uncertainty in some cases as to which particular Pontifical Acts are *ex cathedrâ*. He had put forth the same objection in his "Expostulation"; and we answered him in our last number (pp. 189, 190), by denying that any serious inconvenience whatever results from the fact. As he has not noticed our answer—though our article was one of the replies which he has read "with care" (p. 121)—according to the ordinary rules of controversy he should be considered to acquiesce in it. At last, the tree is known by its fruits. The end for which (according to Catholics) God instituted Papal infallibility, was the Church's unity of doctrine;* and it is an undeniable matter of fact, that the Catholics do possess this unity and Protestants do not. "In the Catholic Church," we said in our last number (p. 191), "one definite body of instruction, whether as to dogma or practice, is placed alike before student and peasant—to be apprehended by them of course variously according to their respective mental endowments but nevertheless one and the same—whether they are only seeking to obey God's commandments, or whether they desire to advance interiorly in His love and service." As Mr. Gladstone has "read this with care" and not attempted to contradict it, we may assume that he concedes it. On the other side we will quote Mr. Maskell's obviously true remarks, on the state of Mr. Gladstone's own communion.

Nothing can exceed the interest with which thoughtful men at this time must look upon the fortunes of the Established Church. To the statesman who regards her as a kind of religious police and as a means simply of keeping people in order and obedient to the laws of the realm, the progress of disruption must be a cause of anxiety. So long as the system can be made to hold together, no other which the wit of man has ever invented can be conceived so suitable to the present day. It is more than Proteus-like. The Protestant Church presents not merely any change of countenance which may happen to be wanted at the moment, so as to satisfy or deceive the dis-

* It may be said that some of the Eastern Christian communions possess much unity of doctrine. But what is characteristic of the Catholic Church (as F. Newman has often pointed out) is that she combines unity of doctrine with unremitting theological activity.

contented, but *puts on and flares before the world a dozen faces all at once*. There is scarcely any known form of nominal Christianity which may not suppose, and fairly suppose, that the Establishment reflects its own shape and features. Taking Christianity to mean nothing beyond the mere fact that Jesus Christ taught the world a true religion, *the formularies of the English Church invite the teaching of almost every known heresy*. If this statement be thought too extreme, it must be granted that *they permit both the assertion and the denial of almost every great Christian doctrine*.

[In the Anglican Church] there is no certainty about any doctrine : perhaps the Bible is inspired, perhaps it is not ; perhaps the sacraments convey grace, perhaps it is nonsense to suppose they do ; perhaps the punishment of the wicked will be eternal, perhaps not ; perhaps God the Son is co-eternal with the Father, perhaps not ; perhaps all men "who will be saved" must think in one way only of the Trinity, perhaps not. And so on through the long list of the articles of the Christian Faith.

It is the profound unity of faith above insisted on, for which the Church in communion with S. Peter and his successors has been so conspicuous in every age, including the Apostolic. On the other hand there has probably never been a religious communion so remarkable for the exact opposite, as the English Establishment of this day. Yet it is "the Church of England" in Mr. Gladstone's opinion (p. 110) which is "the ancient lawful Catholic Church of this country." Such is his doctrine on the One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church. It is not sufficient for him that she teaches one doctrine in England and an entirely different one in France or Italy. Even in one country, according to him, she may contain multitudes, who are denounced by each other as traitors to the first elements of Gospel Truth.

So much on Papal infallibility. And as this is the only Catholic dogma against which Mr. Gladstone has expressly argued, we shall assume, for the purpose of our remaining discussion, that the whole doctrine is true which the Roman Catholic Church sets forth, on her own constitution and prerogatives. There are two among these prerogatives which Mr. Gladstone—without attempting to meet the argumentative ground on which they are based—represents nevertheless as specially fraught with danger to society : viz. (1) her authority in certain matters primarily temporal ; and (2) her authority in summoning the secular arm to repress the first starting up of heresy, in an exclusively Catholic country. Before entering however directly on the extent and bearing of these prerogatives, we will make a preliminary remark, emphatically called for by the whole course of his argument.

Let us begin with considering what is the Church's appointed

work in the world, apart altogether from the two prerogatives we have mentioned. F. Newman observes (p. 112),

Our Divine Master might have communicated to us heavenly truths without telling us that they came from Him, as it is commonly thought He has done in the case of heathen nations ; but He willed the Gospel to be a revelation acknowledged and authenticated, to be public, fixed and permanent ; and accordingly, as Catholics hold, He framed a Society of men to be its home, its instrument and its guarantee. The rulers of that Association are the legal trustees, so to say, of the sacred truths which He spoke to the Apostles by word of mouth. As He was leaving them He gave them their great commission, and bade them "teach" their converts all over the earth, "to observe all things whatever He had commanded them" ; and then He added, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world" (p. 112).

The Church then is a society, founded by God for the purpose of (1) securely preserving and (2) diffusing throughout mankind a knowledge of God's Existence, of true morality, and of certain supernatural dogmata bearing most intimately on moral practice. Now the Pope is divinely appointed as monarch of this society. The work then imposed on him by Almighty God is, that he shall to the utmost of his power promote the preservation in their native purity, and the diffusion among individuals and societies, of the high and all-important verities we have mentioned.

This being understood, we say that there cannot be a more groundless and superficial—we had almost said more vulgar and coarse—view of facts, than to suppose that,—because some given Pope is keenly anxious to extend as widely as possible his influence in matters primarily temporal,—he may on that ground be credited as a matter of course with a worldly and ambitious spirit. We are not at the moment referring to the Pope's civil principedom ; though we entirely hold, that this also has been a most important element in Christian civilization. But that to which we directly refer, is such intervention by successive Pontiffs in the political sphere, as has taken place in virtue of their ecclesiastical authority. Now, as a matter of fact, those Popes who have been proverbially most eager in such intervention, have been persons of pre-eminently ascetic and unworldly lives ; S. Gregory VII., Innocent III., and such holy men. And what we wish here to point out is, that this is just what might have been expected ; that any given Pope—in proportion as his heart was concentrated on the fulfilment of his divinely-imposed work—in that very proportion would be desirous of exercising to their fullest extent the prerogatives given him by Christ within the primarily temporal sphere. For consider,

The duty which more than any other is placed on a Pope is, that by his agency the doctrines and morality of the Gospel shall exert the greatest possible dominion over men's consciences and actions, and shall sink as profoundly as possible into their hearts. But comparatively little can be done in this respect by a mere appeal to individual conviction. The characters, habits, practices, beliefs, and tastes of mankind (so far as moulded from without) are mainly formed by social agency, by the pressure of the world around them. He who would with real effectiveness influence a people for good, must influence its recognized laws, habits, maxims of action : in one word, must influence its *politics*. A Pope would ipso facto show gross indifference to his highest duties, who did not earnestly desire to obtain the greatest possible influence in temporals : though of course a holy and wise man will aim at what is practicable, not at what is beyond his reach. As F. Newman says (p. 36) Pius IX. at this moment " would wish to have the place in the political world which his predecessors had " ; not at all because he is worldly and ambitious (how absurd !), but precisely because he is mortified and saintly, and filled with zeal for the flock committed to his care. The unchristian maxims and principles of modern states are among the most powerful impediments, which oppose the individual's growth in piety and unworldliness.

We will take an illustration of our meaning, from what might happen on a small scale even at this day. Let us suppose some religious minister, placed in charge of a large flock, which has hitherto received very little spiritual culture, but which he finds on the whole unanimously and largely accessible to his influence. If he be comparatively lukewarm, he will confine himself to public preaching and praying, and visiting the sick at their homes. But if his heart beat with tender love for those among whom he ministers, he would be miserable were he obliged so to limit his ministrations. Those evils around him which fill him with anguish, have their origin in the *home* ; and find their constant fuel in the daily habits of conversation and of social life. He will feel he has done next to nothing, except so far as he shall have persuaded parents to order their house in a way edifying to their children, and until he shall otherwise have purified the daily social habits of the mass. If he confined himself to the purely spiritual order, he would be a traitor to the spiritual order. He will seek to be the recognized arbiter of their mutual disagreements, the recognized director of their daily life, in order that their temporal arrangements may be such as shall best conduce to their eternal interests. Of course there is one

important flaw in this analogy between the Church and an individual pastor; viz. that the latter, not possessing those special gifts wherewith God has enriched His Church, might be acting, not laudably, but with moral culpability, in assuming responsibilities to which he is unequal. But manifestly this circumstance does not affect the relevance of our illustration; and we may easily make the imaginable (though purely imaginary) supposition, that some pious pastor shall possess such gifts.

Continuing the same illustration, let us add a new feature to the scene. Some entirely heterogeneous element seeks admission into the little society; e.g. some minister of a different denomination is heard of as likely to arrive. Well in the first place the existing pastor puts forth every effort within the limits of lawfulness, in order to protect that religious unity of the population,* which is simply the highest earthly privilege they possess. His flock also, under his direction, use every lawful means for averting the threatened calamity. All however is in vain, and a fundamentally different state of things arises. What ensues? The very same motives, which led him formerly to take an active part in matters primarily temporal, will now lead him to a course precisely opposite. His governance of their social and secular life was, in the earlier state of things, the best guarantee of true peace and harmony; whereas now any such attempt would be a mere signal for bitterness and mutual dissensions. He will no longer therefore attempt in any way to regulate the arrangements of social and secular life; but will confine himself to instructing his own flock on the course to adopt, under those social arrangements which the community shall have sanctioned. He will deeply grieve over the new state of things; but it is a plain matter of eyesight, that he would but aggravate existing evils by any attempt to resume his old position.

The bearing of our little parable is obvious enough. It is no paradox to say, that the very fact of mediæval Popes having been so prodigal of interference in politics, is the best pledge that modern Popes will pursue a course precisely opposite. The fact of earlier Popes having been so devoured with holy zeal, is an earnest of the probability that modern Popes will be animated by the same spirit. And it is a matter of eyesight, that the best way (as regards political intervention) of promoting the interests of society now, is precisely opposite to what was the best way then. The spirit of lawlessness and anarchy

* We need hardly explain, that religious unity is no blessing, except so far as it is unity in *true* religion.

is intrinsically detestable and anti-Christian, and in every age the Holy See has contended earnestly against it. In mediæval times the best protection against this spirit was to be gained, by profound loyalty to the Church in all those innumerable temporal matters, which were connected with faith and morals, and in which the Pope accordingly took part. In these days on the contrary, the Holy See—still engaged in conflict against the same evil—is never weary of inculcating submission to the civil ruler. And we will say confidently without fear of contradiction, that there is no other body of religionists in England, who make it so prominent a part of their religion as Catholics do, to venerate the civil ruler, as being God's minister and vicegerent on earth for purposes of momentous importance whether to men's spiritual or temporal welfare.

Only, the Catholic must in consistency maintain—however distasteful to Mr. Gladstone the avowal may be—that the present state of society, as regards its independence of the Church, is not one of advancement, but on the contrary of deplorable corruption and retrogression.* What temporal government has there been in any age (putting aside that of the Papal States), in which the predominant aims and maxims have been other for any length of time, than most alien from the spirit of Christianity? In the present day, the people are exposed without protection to this malignant influence: but in the far happier circumstances of mediæval Christianity, energetic political interference was ever put forth by the Holy See, in the interests of religion and morality.

Here we are brought across one of Mr. Gladstone's perplexing utterances.

As a rule, the real independence of States and nations depends upon the exclusion of foreign influence proper from their civil affairs. Wherever the spirit of freedom, even if ever so faintly, breathes, it resents and reacts against any intrusion of another people or Power into the circle of its interior concerns, as alike dangerous and disgraceful (p. 84).

If Mr. Gladstone merely means by this that a non-Catholic nation would reasonably find it intolerable that the Holy See should claim over it any supremacy in things primarily temporal

* We do not, of course, mean that there are not many important particulars, in which modern society surpasses mediæval. But we say that the State's de-Catholicization, and consequent independence of the Church in things primarily political, is an unmixed evil; and that it has grievously interfered with the advance of true civilization. We expressed our meaning on this head in some little detail in April, 1865, pp. 492-498.

—nay (for that matter) in things purely spiritual—we entirely endorse the statement. But if this is his meaning, he has expressed it most unfortunately. He seems to say, that however unanimously and profoundly Catholic any given people might be, —still, “if the spirit of freedom ever so faintly breathes” within them, it would “resent and react against” all political intervention of that Church, which they know to be their one divinely appointed teacher in morals. Such a “spirit of freedom” is the very spirit, which impelled Lucifer to rebel against his Creator.

What we have been saying will receive much illustration from various parts of F. Newman’s letter ; especially those two noble chapters, on “the Ancient” and “the Papal” Church, with which our readers by this time are doubtless very familiar. On the one hand he expresses in the strongest terms the obsolescence of the mediæval régime.

One thing, except by an almost miraculous interposition, cannot be ; and that is, a return to the universal religious sentiment, the public opinion of the mediæval time. The Pope himself calls those centuries “the ages of faith.” Such endemic faith may certainly be decreed for some future time ; but, as far as we have the means of judging at present, centuries must run out first. Even in the fourth century the ecclesiastical privileges, claimed on the one hand, granted on the other, came into effect more or less under two conditions, that they were recognized by public law, and that they had the consent of the Christian population. Is there any chance whatever, except by miracles which were not granted then, that the public law and the inhabitants of Europe will allow the Pope that exercise of his rights, which they allowed him as a matter of course in the 11th and 12th centuries ? If the whole world will at once answer No, it is surely inopportune to taunt us with the acts of mediæval Popes in the case of certain princes and nobles, when the sentiment of Europe was radically Papal. How does the past bear upon the present in this matter ? Yet Mr. Gladstone is in earnest alarm, earnest with the earnestness which distinguishes him as a statesman, at the harm which society may receive from the Pope, at a time when the Pope can do nothing (p. 35).

But as regards *principle*, there has been no difference whatever between the Popes’ teaching of any one age or of any other. Mr. Gladstone implies, by his language already quoted concerning Anglicanism, that he holds the tenets commonly called Tractarian. F. Newman then summons him to contemplate the phenomena of that “undivided Church,” to which Tractarians appeal.

Go through the long annals of Church History, century after century, and say, was there ever a time when her Bishops, and notably the Bishop of Rome, were slow to give their testimony in behalf of the moral and revealed

law and to suffer for their obedience to it, or forgot that they had a message to deliver to the world? not the task merely of administering spiritual consolation, or of making the sick-bed easy, or of training up good members of society, and of "serving tables," (though all this was included in their range of duty); but specially and directly to deliver a message to the world, a definite message to high and low, from the world's Maker, whether men would hear or whether they would forbear? The history surely of the Church in all past times, ancient as well as medieval, is the very embodiment of that tradition of Apostolical independence and freedom of speech, which in the eyes of man is her great offence now.

Nay, that independence, I may say, is even one of her Notes or credentials; for where shall we find it except in the Catholic Church? "I spoke of Thy testimonies," says the Psalmist, "even before kings, and I was not ashamed." This verse, I think Dr. Arnold used to say, rose up in judgment against the Anglican Church, in spite of its real excellences. As to the Oriental Churches, every one knows in what bondage they lie, whether they are under the rule of the Czar or of the Sultan. Such is the actual fact that, whereas it is the very mission of Christianity to bear witness to the Creed and Ten Commandments in a world which is averse to them, Rome is now the one faithful representative, and thereby is heir and successor, of that freespoken dauntless Church of old, whose traditions Mr. Gladstone says the said Rome has repudiated (pp. 19, 20).

During the Oxford movement of forty years back, this very circumstance was the one which more than any other impressed F. Newman and his co-labourers. "No one could read the Father and determine to be their disciple, without feeling that Rome, like a faithful steward, had kept in fulness and in vigour what his own communion had let drop" (p. 20).

In truth, as F. Newman points out, the difference between ancient and mediæval times did not turn on any different doctrine concerning the relations of Church and State; but only on this, that the Holy See had become able more and more to exercise that sovereignty over the Episcopate, which from the first had been vested as of right in S. Peter's successors. Now this centralization of authority, which on its theological side was the progressive realization in fact of what had always existed in right—on the political side "was simply necessary for the civilization of Europe" (p. 30). "No one but a master, who was a thousand bishops in himself at once, could have tamed and controlled, as the Pope did, the great and little tyrants of the middle ages" (ib.). And as for the Pope being a tyrant over the individual's sense of right and wrong—which is Mr. Gladstone's standing grievance,—the very opposite is emphatically true.

It is by the universal sense of right and wrong, the consciousness of transgression, the pangs of guilt, and the dread of retribution, as first

principles, deeply lodged in the hearts of men, thus and only thus, that the Pope has gained his footing in the world and achieved his success. It is his claim to come from the Divine Lawgiver, in order to elicit, protect, and enforce those truths which the Lawgiver has sown in our very nature—it is this and this only—that is the explanation of his length of life more than antediluvian (p. 60).*

Nor can anything be more admirable than F. Newman's distinction, between the "liberty of conscience" claimed for themselves by pious Christians, and the "liberty of conscience" clamoured for in this age by the worldly and irreligious.

When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him, in thought and deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their humour, without any thought of God at all. They do not even pretend to go by any moral rule, but they demand what they think is an Englishman's prerogative, to be his own master in all things and to profess what he pleases, asking no one's leave, and accounting priest or preacher, speaker or writer, unutterably impertinent, who dares to say a word against his going to perdition, if he like it, in his own way. Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go to Church, to go to chapel, to boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them. Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will (p. 58).

This magnificent protest,—expressed with a force with which no one but F. Newman could express it,—should be carefully studied again and again in its whole context.

Before concluding this part of our subject, we will make one further remark. Large and copious as is the grace which environs every official act of the Holy See, no one has ever alleged that Popes are infallible in matters of practical prudence. It is abundantly possible therefore, that this or that Pope on this or that occasion may on the one hand have made an unwise use of his divinely given authority, or on the other

* Increased reflection, however, has but increased the doubt which we ventured to express in our last number (p. 213-4), whether F. Newman's "conscience" is precisely synonymous with the "conscientia" of theologians. Moreover, we still demur to his decision, that in cases similar to those mentioned by him in p. 65, disobedience to a Pope's official and deliberate command could be defensible on grounds of "conscience." But we have no space for discussing either question as its importance deserves.

hand have unwisely abstained from using it. And even as to their motives—Popes are not impeccable: nor is the Catholic in any way called on to deny, that occasionally undue love of power on one hand or (a more probable danger) undue love of ease on the other—ambition on one hand or cowardice on the other—may have prompted important Pontifical measures. F. Newman reasonably lays stress on this in various parts of his letter.* But after every reasonable deduction has been made for it, the general statement we have given above remains substantially correct.

Our argument has hitherto proceeded on the implied supposition, that the Holy See possesses the same right of exercising authority over the kingdoms of modern Europe, which she possessed in mediæval times over the several kingdoms of united Catholic Christendom. But here we are brought across what, in some important respects, is the most valuable contribution elicited by the whole controversy. Cardinal Manning maintains that the case is quite otherwise:—

Though a supreme spiritual authority be inherent in the Divine constitution and commission of the Church, its exercise in the world depends on certain moral and material conditions, by which alone its exercise is rendered possible or just (p. 78).

Those who amuse themselves by asking why St. Peter did not depose Nero, will do well to find out whether people are laughing with them or at them. Such questions are useful. They compendiously show that the questioner

* We cannot however always follow him in the particular instances he gives, and some of them indeed surprise us. We will here refer to one in particular, because of its important theological bearing. In p. 63 he says that "Urban VIII. persecuted Galileo"; and in p. 116 he explains this by declaring that the Pope had no power to condemn Copernicanism, "unless the earth's immobility has a necessary connection with some dogmatic truth: which the present bearing of the Holy See towards that philosophy virtually denies." Surely, there is no matter more indubitably within the sphere of Papal infallibility, than one which concerns "the true sense of Scripture," and the question whether some given scientific tenet be or be not reconcilable therewith. Surely it would have been an indubitable violation of Christ's promise, had Urban VIII. been permitted to condemn Copernicanism as anti-scriptural, under the external notes of an *ex cathedrâ* Act. Catholic writers have shown (to our mind) by most conclusive proof, that he did nothing of the kind; and in April, 1870, we argued at some length in the same direction. Nevertheless we cannot admit that the strong measures taken against Galileo savoured at all of "persecution"; for on the contrary, in our view, successive Pontiffs would have grievously failed in their duty, had they *abstained* from taking severe measures against the Copernican theory under then existent circumstances. We gave our reasons for this opinion in July, 1870. No one ever more thoroughly deserved all he got (and much more too) than did Galileo.

does not understand the first principles of his subject. If he will find out why St. Peter neither baptized nor absolved Nero, he will have found out why he did not depose him. Until a Christian world existed, there was no *apta materia* for the supreme judicial power of the Church in temporal things. Therefore St. Paul laid down as a rule of law that he had nothing to do in judging those that were without the unity of the Church.

But when a Christian world came into existence, the civil society of man became subject to the spiritual direction of the Church. So long, however, as individuals only subjected themselves, one by one, to its authority, the conditions necessary for the exercise of its office were not fully present. The Church guided men, one by one, to their eternal end ; but as yet the collective society of nations was not subject to its guidance. It is only when nations and kingdoms become socially subject to the supreme doctrinal and judicial authority of the Church, that the conditions of its exercise are verified. When the senate and people of the Roman Empire were only half Christian, the Church still refrained from acts which would have affected the whole body of the State. When the whole had become Christian, the whole became subject to the Divine Law, of which the Roman Pontiff was the supreme expositor and executive (pp. 82, 83).

The Christian law of faith and morals passed into the public law of Christendom. Then arose the Christian jurisprudence, in which the Roman Pontiff was recognized as the supreme Judge of Princes and of People, with a twofold coercion : spiritual by his own authority, and temporal by the secular arm. These two acted as one. Excommunication and deposition were so united in the jurisprudence of Christendom, that he who pronounced the sentence of excommunication pronounced also the sentence of deposition ; as before the repeal of our Test Acts, if a member of the Church of England became Catholic, or even Nonconformist, he was ipso facto incapable of sitting in Parliament or holding office of State. And by the first of William III. the heir to the Crown, if he become Catholic or marry a Catholic, ipso facto forfeits the succession. Nothing is more certain upon the face of history, and no one has proved more abundantly than Dr. Döllinger, that in every case of deposition as of Philip le Bel, Henry IV. of Germany, Frederick II., and the like, the sentence of the Electors, Princes, States and people, and the public opinion and voice of nations, had already pronounced sentence of rejection upon those tyrants before the Pontiffs pronounced the sentence of excommunication and deposition. It was only by the faith and free will of nations that they became socially subject to this jurisprudence ; it was by their free will that it was maintained in vigour ; and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs (pp. 84, 85).

On a matter of this kind, the writer's special position adds quite singular weight to his words. One who took so prominent a part in the Vatican Council—one who, on the very morrow of his expressing the doctrines we have cited, has been raised to the highest honour which the Supreme Pontiff can confer—carries with him the greatest possible weight, in authentically interpreting the mind of the Holy See. But

apart from this altogether, the Cardinal's arguments and citations have that force, which Mr. Gladstone in vain tries to enervate. These "first two chapters," says the "*Civiltà*," (March 20th, p. 739) "are worthy of great consideration for the manner in which the relations are set forth between the Church and a schismatical state." And our best way of showing their power will be to examine, one by one, Mr. Gladstone's attempted replies.

(1) The Cardinal—as also indeed F. Newman—had laid great stress on Pius IX.'s famous reply to the *Academia* on the deposing power. But in that very speech, replies Mr. Gladstone (p. 72), the Pope declares, not that he *was*, but that he *is* "the supreme judge of Christendom"; and Mr. Gladstone puts this word "*is*" into capitals, that it may have due emphasis. Certainly the Cardinal never thought of denying that the Pope is, by divine right and therefore in every age, "the supreme judge of Christendom"; i.e. the supreme judge over Catholic peoples, in all matters primarily temporal which bear on faith and morality. But then at this period we may truly say that there *is* no "Christendom." It is plain on the surface (to use Mgr. Capel's phrase, quoted by Mr. Gladstone in p. 73) that such a right as we have mentioned must be "in abeyance," so long as there are no Catholic peoples over whom it can be exercised. And no one will say that now there is any nation, which retains (as a nation), or approaches to retaining, that pervasive endemic faith—penetrating to the very core the people's whole moral convictions—which characterized the Europe of the middle ages. M. Périn does not hesitate to say, that the mediæval "peoples lived by the Catholic Faith as the body lives by the soul." What (alas!) can be a greater contrast with this, than the national sentiment of any country whatever in the nineteenth century? We think Mr. Gladstone has done much service in p. 74, by setting forth plainly in Cardinal Manning's words the full Catholic doctrine, which holds where a nation *is* genuinely Catholic. But he seems to forget that, when the Cardinal speaks of "Christian princes," the context shows that he is speaking,—not of King Alfonso or the Austrian Emperor—but of the sovereigns who have reigned in times past over this or that nation, unanimously and profoundly Catholic.

(2) But, argues Mr. Gladstone (pp. 45, 73), the deposing power is asserted by the "*Unam sanctam*," "which is admitted on all hands to be *ex cathedrâ*." Now in the first place we might affirm with undeniable truth, that the deposing power is neither mentioned nor implied in the "*Unam sanctam*." But

we do not wish to insist on this; because we frankly confess that the principles, laid down in that Bull, may not unreasonably be thought to warrant the deposing power as their legitimate consequence. But once more we would beg Mr. Gladstone's attention to one critical fact, on which our own whole controversy with him in this matter hinges. No one can read the "*Unam sanctam*" with any care, and fail to see that Boniface VIII. was exclusively referring to the condition of Christendom amidst which he lived. The Cardinal prints the Bull at length (pp. 182, 4), and we trust our readers will study it. Its very first words sound the key-note of the whole pronouncement: "One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church." The Pope was contemplating civil societies in no other respect, than as integrating (if we may so express ourselves) the Catholic Church; he was contemplating the Christendom of his time, in its corporately organized aspect. What means—he asked himself—has Christ given, in order that the thorough unity of this Christendom may be preserved, against the schismatical aggression and anti-Catholic spirit of such tyrants as Philip le Bel? The answer to this question is set forth in the Bull, and is most intelligible. The Holy See is the divinely appointed centre of unity, for states as for individuals. All alike are to be retained in the fulness of Catholic faith and communion, by submission to the Holy See in all which (in the judgment of that See) concerns faith and morals. We drew out an analysis of the Bull in our last number (p. 206); and we maintain with the utmost confidence, that no syllable of the doctrine therein infallibly defined has any direct bearing whatever on the relations between any existing State and the Holy See. And when we say "no *direct* bearing," what we mean is this. The Bull infallibly defines, how the divinely appointed relation between Church and State would be exhibited *in accordance* with such divine appointment, under the circumstances of that period. It defines neither less nor more than this. Important *inferences* can, no doubt, be drawn from this definition, as regards the legitimate relation between Church and State under *existing* circumstances. But all this is (as we have said) a matter of inference, and is neither directly nor indirectly contained in Boniface VIII.'s enunciation. We should further add, as we stated in our last number, that we can see no reason whatever for regarding the Bull as a definition of *faith*. It condemns implicitly all tenets opposed to its teaching, as theologically *false*; but we can see no reason whatever for thinking, that the Pope intended to condemn those tenets as *heretical*. Infallibility extends, not only to the Deposit, but to such non-re-

truths as are intimately bound up therewith. The Pope defined infallibly then—not that the doctrine which he lays down was actually taught by the Apostles—but only that it was a true *inference* from what they taught, if taken in connection with the circumstances of Boniface VIII.'s time.

Having so far explained our meaning, we may proceed, without fear of misconception, to a further statement. A great deal has been said about a difference of theme which is supposed by some to exist, between the general body of the Bull and its final clause. We submit that there is no such difference at all. The final clause is this: "Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis." And it has been maintained by Mgr. Fessler and others, that this clause enforces the submission of *individuals* to the Roman Pontiff, but not of civil rulers *as such*. Yet the term "humanæ creaturæ" is a singular one; and it seems somewhat spiritless and forced to regard it as a mere synonym for "homini." On the other hand the term occurs in the Vulgate once, and (we believe) only once; and there indisputably it includes "the civil ruler" with very special prominence: "Subjecti igitur estote omni humanæ creaturæ propter Deum; sive regi quasi præcellenti, sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum laudem verò bonorum" (1 Pet. ii. 13, 14).* For ourselves, we should be disposed thus to paraphrase the final clause: "Moreover, we define that the aforesaid principles are of strict obligation; that obedience is due to the Pope by Christ's Law, not only on the part of men as individuals, but on the part of civil rulers as such, according to the exposition hereinbefore set forth." On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that Boniface VIII. was not speaking of *all* civil rulers, who have ever existed or shall ever exist: for no one ever dreamed of his meaning to include such rulers as Nero or, again, Constantine. The whole context shows (as we have argued) that he was speaking exclusively of kings and peoples, as they existed before his eyes; as they would ever exist under the normal condition of Christianity; as they form (in the way in which they then formed) an integral part of the "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church," which he began with commemorating.

It is sometimes objected against this view of the Bull, that Leo X., when confirming it in the Fifth Lateran Council,

* It is only fair, however, to mention such passages as "predicate Evangelium omni creaturæ," Mark xvi. 15; and "Evangelium prædicatum est in universâ creaturâ quæ sub cælo est," Col. i. 23.

explained the words "*omni humanæ creaturæ*" as synonymous with "*omnibus Christi fidelibus*." But no possible linguistic theory can make "*Christi fidelibus*" a verbal version of "*humanæ creaturæ*"; and we must look elsewhere therefore, for an explanation of Leo X.'s language. We would put the matter thus. When Boniface VIII. said that every human creature is, by divine law, subject to the Pope,—he necessarily meant to say, (1) that every human creature is bound to become one of Christ's faithful; and (2) that baptized Christians are subject to the Pope in such or such a way. Quite relevantly therefore did Leo X. confirm the "*Unam sanctam*" as teaching this last-named doctrine.* But this does not touch the question, whether Leo X. speaks of "Christ's faithful" merely as individuals, or inclusively in their capacity of civil functionaries. His words do not, by themselves, at all precisely indicate that he intended the latter: but still less do they decisively indicate the reverse; and the obvious presumption is, that he intended to approve the Bull as a whole. Moreover, *in the very sentence in which he approves it*, he proceeds at once to claim authority over civil magistrates as such. "Forbidding," he says, "in virtue of holy obedience" not only cardinals, patriarchs, &c., but also "dukes, counts, princes, barons, parliaments, *royal officials*, judges, advocates," &c. &c. "to use" the Pragmatic Sanction "in any acts judicial or extrajudicial, or even allege it, or judge according to it . . . or keep it in their houses or other places whether private or *public*," &c. &c. We can see nothing then in Leo X.'s "*Pastor Æternus*," which throws any difficulty in the way of our conclusion on the teaching of the "*Unam sanctam*."

But we must repeat what we said in our last number (p. 202), that no Catholic, as such, is *obliged* to accept the Bull in the sense we have given it. Considering that Mgr. Fessler's treatise on infallibility has been passed by a committee of theologians, and complimented by the Holy Father,—we may not suppose that any position, prominently advocated in his volume, violates any existing Catholic obligation. How far hereafter theologians may be expected to arrive at

* These are Leo X.'s words: "*Et cum de necessitate salutis existat omnes Christi fideles Romano Pontifici subesse, prout divinæ Scripturæ et sanctorum Patrum testimonio edocemur, ac Constitutione fel. mem. Bonifacii Papæ VIII. quæ incipit 'Unam sanctam' declaratur; pro eorundem fidelium animarum salute, ac Romani Pontificis et hujus sanctæ Sedis supremæ auctoritate, et Ecclesiæ sponssæ suæ unitate et potestate, Constitutionem ipsam, sacro approbante Concilio, innovamus et approbamus.*" Observe the word which we have italicised

greater mutual agreement on the true sense of the "Unam sanctam" than is now the case—or whether some authoritative interpretation of it will ever be given—this is a different question.

(3) Mr. Gladstone further objects (p. 17), that Cardinal Manning himself has not disclaimed "the right to persecute where there is the power." Mr. Gladstone must have forgotten many passages, of which we will give one or two samples. In p. 92 the Cardinal refers to "the broad moral law, that faith is an act of the will; and that to force men to profess what they do not believe *is contrary to the law of God*; and that to generate faith by force is morally impossible." In p. 94 he has the following note:—

Our older writers, such as Bellarmine and Suarez, when treating of this subject, had before their eyes a generation of men who all had been in the unity of the faith. Their separation therefore was formal and wilful. Their separation from the unity of the Church did not release their conscience from its jurisdiction. But if Bellarmine and Suarez were living at this day, they would have to treat of a question differing in all its moral conditions. What I have here laid down is founded upon the principles they taught, applied to our times. Cardinal Tarquini, in treating the same matter, has dealt with it as it had been treated here.

And if Mr. Gladstone half suspects that Cardinal Manning here strains a point to meet the exigencies of controversy, we would refer him to F. Liberatore's volume on Church and State. This volume consists of articles originally published in the "Civiltà," which Mr. Gladstone regards doubtless as the very head-quarters of Ultramontane exaggeration. Moreover it is one very conspicuous characteristic of the volume, that the author speaks out with extraordinary plainness and forcibleness, in utter disregard of what many persons might think the impolicy of such a course. Yet he takes care to explain, that the duty of repressing heresy by the secular arm obliges only where Catholic unity actually exists; that "good once lost" may not be "re-acquired by violent means" (p. 52). "The apostolate of the sword," he says elsewhere (p. 73), "was always the prerogative of the Koran, not of the Gospel." We may add that Popes have always acted on this principle. In our number for July, 1869 (p. 222), we quoted a passage, which proves conclusively that Innocent XI. deeply regretted the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the severities which followed; adding that "he could not approve either the motive or the means for those conversions by millions, not one of which was voluntary." And Pius IX., in one of the very documents cited against him by Mr. Gladstone, implies the same

doctrine. We refer to the Allocution "Nunquam certè," delivered on June 22, 1868. Our readers will find it in our number for Oct., 1868, p. 538, note. In this Allocution the Pontiff complains earnestly of a certain "nefarious law," whereby, in parts of Austria *exclusively Catholic* (regionibus Catholicæ religioni unice addictis), liberty of worships and of the press has been introduced: an expression plainly implying, that he would not object to such a law in the case of regions which have lost Catholic unity. On the whole subject, however, we cannot do better than quote a paragraph of Cardinal Manning's, referring primarily to the Italian Government. We italicise one clause:—

The existing state of the law has invaded the liberties and jurisdiction of the Church. It has abolished religious orders and institutions, it has harshly turned out their inmates upon a pittance, which, if paid, would not suffice for food. It has confiscated property, seized upon colleges, abolished theology from the universities, and the Christian doctrine from schools. And all this, be it remembered, not to meet the distracted state of a people who have lost their religious unity, and must be provided with civil marriage and secular education, but in the midst of a population absolutely and universally Catholic. *This, and not what Mr. Gladstone, with a strange want of accuracy, supposes, is what the Syllabus condemns.* It nowhere condemns the civil policy which is necessary for a people hopelessly divided in religion. *For us this may be a necessity. In Italy it is a doctrine of the Doctrinaires.* To force upon the united people of Italy that which is necessary for the divided people of England is a senseless legislation, and a mischievous breaking with the glorious past of Italy (p. 153).

It is true that the Holy See is in the habit of censuring with much severity the modern "liberties;" nor can there be a better specimen of this, than the Brief addressed quite recently by the Holy Father to M. Périn, which will be found in our present number as a "Roman document." But a careful study of the Pope's words will confirm and not invalidate what we have been saying. Those only are rebuked, who regard these liberties (1) as "rights," and (2) as "necessary to the present condition of things and to the march of progress." Now as to the latter—the breaking up of Catholic unity in any country (as Cardinal Manning says is now being done in Italy) is not a progressive step, but deplorably retrogressive. Nor is this statement inconsistent with a full admission, that when so grave a calamity is once finally consummated, the liberties in question (not in the way of prudence only but even of justice) become its necessary consequence. And as to those who are rebuked by Pius IX. for regarding these liberties as "rights"—such a man as the Pope condemns regards

them as the sacred and inalienable rights of mankind. With him (as F. Newman so well puts it) the "right and freedom of conscience" means the right of *dispensing* with conscience and of ignoring God. The Holy Father says in effect, that the principles, which were first invented by the revolutionists of '89, are opposed to the true religion; attribute to man the right of independent self-government; set him free from the divine authority; and open the way to every error and moral corruption. "Such principles," he adds, "can never give to a people true prosperity, progress, and renown." These truths no doubt colour and complete the doctrine so clearly set forth by Cardinal Manning, but they are in no way inconsistent therewith.

To prevent misconception however, we will add one remark. We have said that when a State possesses Catholic unity—as both Italy and Spain did within recent memory—the Holy See always disapproves the enactment of laws which break up this unity. The unity however of which we here speak (even as regards the nations in question) falls indefinitely short of that existing in mediæval times; when high and low alike, educated and uneducated, had their whole moral nature penetrated to the core by Catholicity, and lived (in M. Périn's words) by the Catholic Faith as the soul lives by the body. It is this latter state of things alone, we submit, which would legitimize the Holy See exercising over a nation the authority described in the "*Unam sanctam*."

(4) Mr. Gladstone alleges various instances (pp. 88–91) as cases in which "the Pope has invaded the province of the civil power" within the last twenty years. Of these, several (as he points out) relate to violated concordats; and these at all events need no explanation. Laws adverse to the Church, made in deliberate defiance of engagements contracted with the Holy See, are obviously null and void as regards any obligation on the conscience; though they are, alas! only too effective in their physical result.

As to Mr. Gladstone's other citations, we are quite content to accept the summary which he himself gives of them. He protests against the decision of nullity pronounced by the Pope on laws, permitting liberty of worship in a country which had hitherto enjoyed Catholic unity; on laws, enacting "the suppression of monastic orders and appropriation of their properties"; on laws, enacting "the abolition of the ecclesiastical forum, the secularization of Church property, and the civil permission to members of monastic establishments to withdraw from them." Let us take first the first of these cases. The Church, in accordance with the principles we have been

laying down, may justly exercise far more authority in things primarily temporal over a country which has hitherto preserved Catholic unity, than over others; even though such Catholic unity be indefinitely less in depth and pervasiveness, than that which existed in the middle ages. And we entirely follow the Pope's implied teaching, that laws permitting liberty of worships and of the press in any such country, are *de jure* null and void. But England is not such a country; and here therefore the doctrine has no practical importance. As to Mr. Gladstone's other instances, we could not wish for any which would make more manifest how fundamentally different is the authority now claimed by Pius IX. from that claimed of old e. g. by Boniface VIII. over the Kings of England and France. These Pontifical enactments have without exception been matters of mere self-defence, and in no way extending over the field of politics. Let us consider them a little more particularly, and see whether Mr. Gladstone is the man to censure them.

Firstly, so far as the laws of any country interfere with the free exercise of the Catholic religion, no doubt every Catholic will account them null and void as regards any obligation over the conscience. Let us suppose e. g. that Oliver Cromwell during the Protectorate had, for the pure purpose of suppressing Anglicanism, shut up every college in which that creed was taught. Anglicans might have been coerced into obedience, but would not certainly have recognized those laws as binding on their conscience. Precisely similar in principle is the forcible suppression of monastic orders.

Secondly, as regards ecclesiastical property. Mr. Gladstone—we take for granted—entirely repudiates the modern anti-Christian tenet, which regards the right of property as derived from the State. Put then the outrageously improbable case, that in a fit of political excitement some anti-Christian Parliament confiscated part of his property, because he had taken the lead in opposing the enforcement of purely secular education. Mr. Gladstone would undoubtedly regard such an unjust edict as destitute of all authority for obliging his conscience, and would elude it without scruple whenever he could. It is no very unreasonable proposition on the part of Catholics, that the Church's property is at least as sacred as Mr. Gladstone's. Nor again do Catholics threaten any disturbance in *these islands* by accepting such a proposition; because it is notorious that the Holy See has long ago condoned the English alienation of ecclesiastical property.

Thirdly, the Pope's words in some of these pronouncements may fairly be taken to imply, that no State, even in these

days, has a right to withdraw existing privileges of the Church, without sanction from the Holy See. We heartily accept this doctrine; but what *danger* does it threaten to existing governments?

Perhaps Mr. Gladstone will reply, that he does not allege that any civil *danger* impends from these enactments, but only that they do in fact "invade the province of the civil power." We do not see however how he advances his argument one single step, by merely stating (what we heartily admit) that he differs from Catholics on the extent of the province of the civil power. He does nothing unless he proves, that some *danger or disturbance* is to be apprehended from the Catholic doctrine; and this, we say, he has entirely failed to show in the present case.

(5) Mr. Gladstone in his "Expostulation," according to Cardinal Manning's apprehension of his words (p. 80), had called on Pius IX. to *repudiate* such claims as have been ascribed to him by non-Catholics. The Cardinal replies with obvious effect, that "Pius IX. cannot repudiate powers which his predecessors justly exercised, without implying that their actions were unjust." This answer however, if it stood by itself, would leave open to Mr. Gladstone a retort: "At least," he might say, "let the Pope explain authoritatively what he accounts the due relation between Church and State, *under the present circumstances of Europe*." But such a retort has been precluded in anticipation by the Cardinal's pamphlet. It is evident that no authoritative statement of the kind could be made with any advantage, without maturest care and consideration; and the Cardinal testifies (we have accidentally failed to recover our reference) that, had the Council been able to continue its sittings, it would certainly have put forth some such carefully balanced and well weighed statement. Secular events have suspended its sessions; and Mr. Gladstone must wait a little longer, for the exposition which he not unreasonably desires.

On the whole then,—whereas Cardinal Manning has set forth a strong chain of argument purporting to show how profoundly fallacious is any inference from mediæval times to modern as regards Pontifical intervention in things primarily temporal,—Mr. Gladstone's attempted reply to that argument breaks down at every point. The real truth however is, that Mr. Gladstone's mind is predominantly influenced, not by any notions concerning the past, but by a fixed idea—we had almost said monomania—concerning the present. We refer to his intense persuasion, that recent ecclesiastical acts have been devised, with the purpose of facilitating the Pope's restor-

ation to his temporal principedom. "Are more of these" ex cathedra "utterances," he asks (p. 105), "now begun, in order to sustain the miserable argument for forcing his temporal sovereignty on a people whom nothing but the violence of a foreign army will bring or keep beneath it"? This inquiry is startling enough: but to gauge the full depth of what the "Month" justly calls Mr. Gladstone's "fanaticism" on the subject, the following passage should be studied:

On one point I must strongly insist. In my *Expostulation*, I laid stress upon the charge of an intention, on the part of Vaticanism, to promote the restoration of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, on the first favourable opportunity, by foreign arms, and without reference to the wishes of those who were once his people. From Archbishop Manning downwards, not so much as one of those, who have answered me from his standing-ground, has disavowed this project: many of them have openly professed that they adopt it, and glory in it. The meaning of Monsignor Nardi, in his courteous Reply, written almost from beneath the Papal roof, cannot be mistaken. Thus my main practical accusation is admitted; and the main motive which prompted me is justified (p. 118).

Mgr. Nardi has answered this accusation with great spirit; and we cannot do better than reprint part of an article in the "Tablet" (March 20th), which at once reproduces Mgr. Nardi's reply, and adds further most important reflections of its own:

Mgr. Nardi conclusively and amply contradicts the insinuations and assertions of the author of "Vaticanism." "My answer," he says, "was written in my own house, not in the Vatican, and it was not written at the suggestion of any one else. I detest that evil habit followed by some persons, who every time they advance what is disagreeable or dangerous, cover themselves with the beloved and sacred name of the Pontiff, thus sheltering themselves behind him, to whom they should rather be the shield. I am alone responsible for the words which I wrote." Mgr. Nardi proceeds to say that "those words are precisely the contrary of that which Mr. Gladstone makes him say," and that "if he did not know that Mr. Gladstone was perfectly acquainted with our language, he would suppose he was misunderstood." This severe retort is not left without its justification. Mr. Gladstone had referred to pages 57-62 of Nardi's work. Mgr. Nardi quotes the ipsissima verba of page 58:—"This accusation, that we invite foreign armies to put our country to fire and sword, in order to restore the Pope, has its atrocious and perfidious side, but fortunately the ridiculous is uppermost. Whence, in the name of goodness, are to come these armies, and what expression referring to them can be found in the Allocutions, discourses, and Letters of the Holy Father? Pius IX. suffers, waits, and prays. Mr. Gladstone would have more; he would have the Pope to yield, accept, and abdicate! 'It is easy to conceive,' he writes, 'that his personal benevo-

lence, no less than his feelings as an Italian, must have inclined him individually towards a course so humane ; and I should add, if I might do it without presumption, so prudent.' ('Expostulation,' p. 49.) It would not be prudent, Mr. Gladstone, but scandalous and iniquitous. From one end to the other of the Catholic world would be heard the cry of pain, and I may well add of reproof. "Non potest per Nos cedi quod Nostrum non est"—that is, 'We cannot surrender what is not our own,'—wrote Pius IX. in his famous Encyclical of January 19, 1860, in reply to the perfidious suggestion of Napoleon III. ; and the entire Catholic world applauded this response. These words, Mr. Gladstone, are true, equitable, and not to be retracted." The present attitude of the present Pope is forced upon him. His foes have stripped him of his kingdoms, but have left him his palace. He lives, as a dethroned Sovereign, surrounded by triumphant enemies, who have not yet ejected him from his home. He has been tempted many times to consent to his own spoliation, and surrender in theory the rights of which, practically, he has been deprived. But his uniform reply to these temptations has been "non possumus." It is indeed utterly impossible for the head of Christianity to give his approbation and sanction to robbery and treachery ; or to pronounce that policy to be moral and allowable, which is clearly immoral, and condemned by all laws human and divine. It is one thing, however, for the Pope to refuse reconciliation with wrong ; it is another to solicit foreign intervention for the restoration of his throne. There is nothing, it is true, extraordinary in the circumstance of any temporal sovereign seeking allies or availing himself of the aid of other princes to recover his rightful crown. Nor is there anything immoral in so doing. But be it moral or immoral, Pius IX. entertains no such schemes, nor does he encourage those who, frequent the Vatican to form them for him. There is no nation in Europe, from which the Pope has reason to expect the aid of a foreign army ; and His Holiness has repeatedly declared that his hopes of eventual triumph of the Church are based upon his confidence in God and in God alone. But it does not follow from the absence of foreign intervention that no restoration of the temporal dominion of the Pope is possible. Italy herself may one day or other choose to give back to the Pontiff his sacred patrimony. There is nothing in the past history of Italy to render such an event improbable. No one can unveil the terrible secrets of the future. But few can study the present signs of the times in the Peninsula without feeling that the moral and material conditions of affairs contain no indication or stability of permanence ; and that while one section, and that a diminishing one, of its inhabitants maintains the monarchical cause of Victor Emmanuel, and another section worships Garibaldi and is ripe for Republican revolt, there is yet a much larger proportion of Italians who altogether abstain from identifying themselves either with the party of the King or with that of the revolution, who refuse to take part in elections, and who are awaiting in sadness, yet with confidence in the justice of God, the issue of events.

It is the more astonishing that Mr. Gladstone can retain the notion here so powerfully exposed, because, before writing "Vaticanism," he had studied Cardinal Manning's most

masterly exposition of the Italian question, from p. 141 to p. 154. The view indicated in that passage is so momentous in its practical bearing, that many pages should have been devoted by us to its consideration. Our space unhappily forbids the attempt of even saying a few words on the subject.

But Mr. Gladstone's fanaticism does not even stop here. Not only he ascribes to the Pope the extraordinary projects we have mentioned,—but he gravely maintains, that their promotion was (to say the least) one principal reason in the mind of Pope and Bishops, for the Syllabus and the Vatican Definition. We are actually called on to meet such an allegation as this. Certainly, we shall have very little difficulty in doing so.

As to the Syllabus, the Bishop of Birmingham in particular is very explicit as to its origin. Mr. Gladstone asserts that the Church's recent action must have some very strong reason at bottom, because it has been so violent and aggressive. Rather, replies the Bishop, the acts and words of *anti-Catholics* have been violent and aggressive; and the Church in her own defence has been obliged to unusual frequency of doctrinal definitions. On the one hand she was disturbed by the profoundly unsound German taint, manifesting itself on its native soil in Günther, Frohschammer, and the Munich Congress; and here in the "Home and Foreign," "North British," and "Chronicle" (p. 5). On the other hand there was the unsound French taint, tending either on the one hand to rationalism, or on the other hand to undue distrust of reason. All these errors "it became the sacred duty of the Popes to expose, denounce, and mark with their censure as anti-Christian" (p. 7). Moreover, "the false pleas and the deceptive language by which, under the pretence of freedom, civilization, and progress," revolution and anarchy were being forwarded with such startling rapidity, were to be held before the Christian world in their true light (*ib.*). And these successive pronouncements furnished the materials of the Syllabus.

Since then there was this very strong reason, or rather necessity, for issuing some such utterance as the Syllabus, unless the essential principles of morality and social order were to be left without vindication,—what can be more recklessly gratuitous, than to represent it as principally intended to facilitate the Pope's retention of his civil principedom? No doubt,—among other truths, several of them immeasurably more important,—Pius IX. confirmed in the Syllabus a certain doctrine on his civil principedom, which he had already laid down in six different pronouncements; but

then had he not done so, the Syllabus would not have been true to its promise, of reciting the chief errors of the age which had been condemned by him. But what can be more outrageous than to suggest, that the denial of this doctrine is more prominently censured in the Syllabus, than are atheism, pantheism, rationalism, indifferentism, and the rest? The whole structure of the Syllabus proves the exact contrary.

There is a second argument against Mr. Gladstone's allegation, derivable from the Bishop's treatise. He mentions (p. 8) that in 1867 "the Bishops had given their spontaneous adhesion to the doctrines of the Syllabus, and to the Papal documents from which they were extracted"; he adds (p. 66), that he is referring to the address offered by the assembled Bishops to the Pope, and accepted by him with every expression of pleasure. There can hardly therefore be a more trustworthy reflection of the Holy See's mind as to the main bearing of the Syllabus, than this address; and our readers can study it at length in Cardinal Manning's "*Petri Privilegium*," i. pp. 120-125. If they will do so, they will find that the Pope's civil principedom is hardly (if at all) so much as mentioned therein.

We will not here enlarge on Mr. Gladstone's various misinterpretations of the Syllabus; because his replies thereon to his opponents have been so fully and successfully dealt with in the "*Month*" for April. But there is one question implied by him in various parts of his two pamphlets, which does require an answer. He points to the condemnation of the "modern liberties" which have so constantly been pronounced by successive Popes, whether in the Syllabus or otherwise; such e.g., as is contained in the Holy Father's Letter to M. Périn, which we translate in our present number. To what purpose are these condemnations, he asks in effect, unless the Pope is watching his opportunity to inflict some deadly blow on the "liberties" so condemned? We have frequently answered this very reasonable question; and we may here refer particularly to what we wrote in April, 1872, from p. 288 to p. 292. Here we will briefly say, that the Holy See never speaks against those who admit that these liberties must necessarily be granted at the present time for avoidance of greater evils; nor against those who maintain that, in a country which has lost Catholic unity, they cannot be abolished without actual injustice. But the doctrine that they are men's inalienable right,—or the doctrine that that state of things which necessitates them is an advance (rather than a
 to retrogression) in true social progress—either of these

doctrines tends to produce grave injury on the moral and spiritual character of those who entertain it. It tends to do so, by corrupting their view on the relative importance of things temporal and things eternal, and by overthrowing in them the true apprehension of social and political morality. Are not these reasons enough for the Pope's condemning either doctrine, without supposing that he meditates any political movement?

But if the supposition be entirely unreasonable that the Syllabus was issued for the end which Mr. Gladstone imagines,—the supposition is not less than monstrous, that the *Vatican Definitions* had any such origin. There was certainly no lack of brisk discussion among Catholics, previously to these Definitions: but (putting aside those misbelievers who have now become open apostates) not a hint was to be found on either side, that the relations between Church and State, or the security of the Pope's civil principedom, were ever so distantly mixed up with the question. In no part of his treatise is Cardinal Manning more powerful and impressive, and in none had he more claim to speak with peremptory authority, than in this matter. He thus opens his fifth chapter :

My last proposition is that the motive of the Council of the Vatican for defining the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was not any temporal motive nor was it for temporal ends ; but that the Definition was made in the face of all temporal dangers, in order to guard the divine Deposit of Christianity, and to vindicate the divine certainty of faith.

I have read many things in Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet which are unlike himself, but none seems more so to me than this question, "Why did that Court, with policy for ever in its eye, lodge such formidable demands for power of the vulgar kind in that sphere which is visible, and where hard knocks can undoubtedly be given as well as received?"

Would it not have been more seemly and more dignified if the question had been couched in some such words as these : "Why has the Catholic Church, in a moment of great peril, when a revolution is at the gates of Rome, and the Civil Powers of the world are uniting, not only to forsake it, but even to threaten it with opposition—why has it at such a time, in spite of every inducement of policy, and every motive of interest, and in defiance of every pleading of worldly wisdom, persisted in defining the Infallibility of the Pope—a doctrine which is sure to bring down upon the Church the animosities of all its enemies without, and the conspiracies of all its faithless members within?" Even Mr. Gladstone can see that this was most impolitic. Why, then, will he accuse the Church of always having policy in its eye? By his own confession it is not always so: for he is witness that it is not so in this case. Why, then, would he not say so? (pp. 156, 7).

The Cardinal then proceeds (pp. 158--160) to recite the

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fifteen different reasons, which he had publicly expressed before he left England to attend the Council, for the importance or rather necessity of defining Papal infallibility. Not one of these reasons has the remotest reference to the political sphere in any sense, not even as regards the Pope's civil principedom.

By comparing with each other the Cardinal's and the Bishop of Birmingham's respective treatises, we find a fact authentically stated, which was otherwise indeed notorious. A certain number of Bishops went to the Council, fully persuaded that a definition of Papal infallibility was absolutely necessary; whereas others (perhaps the majority) did not recognize this necessity, until the Council was actually proceeding. The Bishop of Birmingham's account of all this is so important, that in our last number (pp. 210, 211) we printed a long passage of his. The upshot of his statement is as follows. As to the misbelievers of whom he has spoken as occasioning the Syllabus:—"Whatever else they might allow, the infallibility of the authority that condemned them they would not agree to" (p. 5). Consequently, "no sooner did the Pope convoke the General Council, than they took alarm: Whatever good was hoped from it by all staunch Catholics, who received its announcement with joy, these lax professors felt that it boded no good to their designs" (p. 9). Then many of the Bishops, who had not hitherto seen the necessity of a definition, "began to reflect and communicate their reflections to each other" (p. 49). They began to see that if the dogma were not defined in the Council, these pseudo-Catholics would begin to think that it was admitted to be undefinable (ib.); and they further considered that the extraordinary speculative license of contemporary thinkers made it of great moment, that all Catholics should be obliged to believe in the Pope's authority "to smite with irreversible judgment the false doctrines that might lift up their pride in the Church" (p. 50). And the Bishop adds in conclusion (p. 51), "that no political motive or notion of giving political dominion to the Pope ever entered the minds of those to whom we owe the Definition" (p. 51).

We cannot profess ever so distantly to conjecture how it is, that Mr. Gladstone in his reply has abstained from all reference to the irresistible refutations of his theory, given by Cardinal Manning and the Bishop of Birmingham.

From the first however, Mr. Gladstone has expressed greater dislike for the Definition which establishes the Pope's supremacy in governing, even than for that which establishes his infallibility in teaching. Especially he smells a rat, because the said supremacy has been defined to extend, not only over the region of faith and morals, but over that of discipline

and the Church's government. The Cardinal is as much amazed at Mr. Gladstone's suspicions, as every other Catholic has been. "What has this Definition to do," he asks (p. 14), "with civil allegiance?" There is not a syllable which can be twisted or turned into such a meaning. The government of the Church here spoken of is purely and "strictly the spiritual Government of souls." F. Newman has entered into much detail on the matter; more indeed than we can think was needed by so wild a misconception (pp. 44-48): but his treatment of the theme is very masterly. We will quote his concluding paragraph.

Now, why does the Pope speak at this time of regimen and discipline? He tells us, in that portion of the sentence, which, thinking it of no account, Mr. Gladstone has omitted. The Pope tells us that all Catholics should recollect their duty of obedience to him, not only in faith and morals, but in such matters of regimen and discipline as belong to the universal Church, "so that unity with the Roman Pontiff, both of communion and of profession of the same faith being preserved, the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme Shepherd." I consider this passage to be especially aimed at Nationalism: "Recollect," the Pope seems to say, "the Church is one, and that, not only in faith and morals, for schismatics may profess as much as this, but one, wherever it is, all over the world; and not only one but one and the same, bound together by its one regimen and discipline, and by the same regimen and discipline—the same rites, the same sacraments, the same usages, and the same one Pastor; and in these bad times it is necessary for all Catholics to recollect, that this doctrine of the Church's individuality and, as it were, personality, is not a mere received opinion or understanding, which may be entertained or not, as we please, but is a fundamental, necessary truth." This being, speaking under correction, the drift of the passage, I observe that the words "spread throughout the world" or "universal" are so far from turning "discipline and regimen" into what Mr. Gladstone calls a "net," that they contract the range of both of them, not including, as he would have it, "marriage" here, "blasphemy" there, and "poor-relief" in a third country, but noting and specifying that one and the same structure of laws, rites, rules of government, independency, everywhere, of which the Pope himself is the centre and life. And surely this is what every one of us will say with the Pope, who is not an Erastian, and who believes that the Gospel is no mere philosophy thrown upon the world at large, no mere quality of mind and thought, no mere beautiful and deep sentiment or subjective opinion, but a substantive message from above, guarded and preserved in a visible polity (pp. 47, 8).

We have been obliged to write at a far greater length than we could have wished. But we must not conclude without a brief reference (though it shall be very brief) to the civil loyalty of English Catholics. We have already spoken on the

firm and unchangeable character of their allegiance, considering it as they do to be a duty of strict obligation. But it may be asked, are they *well affected* to the English laws and constitution? Do they yield to the English Government a hearty and ungrudging attachment? We say confidently, that there is no class of Englishmen to whom they yield in this respect. It is (we believe) the feeling of them all that—the profound division of religious opinion in England being understood—no religionists could on the whole be treated more justly than they are; and they are accordingly grateful and attached subjects. They suffer certain injustices no doubt, as in the matter of religious ministry in workhouses and prisons: but then they know that such injustices are not so much due to any harsh intention of the Legislature, as to the anti-Catholic prejudice of the people; though they certainly wish that the Legislature might be more plucky in resisting that prejudice. Still, taking matters as a whole, Cardinal Manning e. g. has always been peculiarly outspoken, in commemorating the fairness with which English Catholics are treated. They hardly wish anything better, than that the existing fairness were secure of being continued.

For our own part however we confess—though we do not know how far our opinion is shared by other Catholics—we are very far from trusting its permanence. It is not indeed from Mr. Gladstone, that we apprehend any danger. What we dread is rather that spirit of anti-religious Cæsaro-revolutionism, which seems spreading throughout all classes with frightful rapidity, and which at any moment (we think) some grievous political or social calamity may draw to the surface and raise into activist energy. Whenever that time comes, Mr. Gladstone—or whatever statesman there may be on whom Mr. Gladstone's mantle shall have fallen—will find that it is at last the professors of "Vaticanism," to whom he must look as his most effective allies, in the life-and-death struggle which will ensue.

APPENDIX.

We here add the passage of the "Tablet," to which we have referred in our article, in defence of Cardinal Manning against Mr. Gladstone's most strange (though of course unintentional) misrepresentations. The "Tablet" argues as follows.

Mr. Gladstone (at page 62 of his "Vaticanism") represents the Cardinal as stating that Gallicanism had its origin in 1682. Nevertheless Mr. Gladstone had before his

eyes (at pages 31 and 32 of the Cardinal's pamphlet) the following passages :—

I traced the history of the growth of the opinions adverse to the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff from the Council of Constance to the year 1682, when it was, for the first time, reduced to a formula by an Assembly of French ecclesiastics under the influence of Louis XIV.

Again :

From this evidence it is certain :—

1. That Gallicanism has no warrant in the doctrinal practice or tradition of the Church, either in France or at large, in the thousand years preceding the Council of Constance.

2. That the first traces of Gallicanism are to be found about the time of that Council.

3. That after the Council of Constance they were rapidly and almost altogether effaced from the theology of the Church in France until their revival in 1682.

4. That the Articles of 1682 were conceived by Jansenists, and carried through by political and oppressive means contrary to the sense of the Church in France.

5. That the theological faculties of the Sorbonne, and of France generally, nobly resisted and refused to teach them.

With these examples of inaccuracies before us, it is a little too much to find Mr. Gladstone writing as follows :—

It would be unreasonable to expect from Archbishop Manning greater accuracy in his account of a foreign Church than he has exhibited with regard to the history of the Communion over which he so energetically presides (p. 62).

The inaccuracy is Mr. Gladstone's. And, moreover, the Cardinal has never denied the presence of Gallicans as existing in the Church ; what he denied was that Gallicanism ever existed as a doctrine of the Church, or even as a tolerated doctrine. Would Mr. Gladstone assert that Arianism or Semi-Arianism was a doctrine of the Church or a tolerated opinion by reason of the number of Arians and Semi-Arians who existed in the Church before the Council of Nicæa ? The whole of the Cardinal's argument was occupied with a defence of the Church and its doctrines, without reference to the existence of erroneous opinions in some of its members.

Next, it is hard to imagine what good Mr. Gladstone can propose to himself in the following statement : " I must test " his [the Archbishop's] assertions by one of those appeals " to history, which he has sometimes said are treasons to the " Church " (p. 40). Now it is certain that the Cardi l

has never said any such thing. Fortunately Mr. Gladstone has given us the means of exposing this singular unfairness. He refers to the passages of the Cardinal's works. Why did not Mr. Gladstone quote the passages? We can easily tell. First, because he refers to those that do not exist; and next, because they would have exposed this rhetorical artifice to raise prejudice against the Cardinal. In "*Petri Privilegium*" there is no such statement to be found. In the "*Temporal Mission*" what he says is this: "*To appeal from a Divine authority is both heresy and treason: heresy, because that authority is infallible; treason, because it is supreme.*" It is hard to think that Mr. Gladstone did not perceive this. But his object all through the pamphlet is evidently to gain momentary controversial points by accommodated quotations, or imputed assertions, which have, as in this case, no existence. Such successes are short-lived and their recoil is fatal. All this is not controversy, but misrepresentation.

We now come to the point about the Fourth Council of Constantinople; whether that assembly did or did not recognize the universal jurisdiction of the Holy See. Mr. Gladstone argues that it did not. But that it may be seen whether he is justified in saying so, it is necessary to restate the case.

In the Third Roman Council, held by Pope Nicholas I. in 863, five decrees were published. In the first decree a Synod held at Metz in the same year was condemned, in the second the Archbishops of Treves and Cologne were deposed, and in a fifth decree the judgments of the Apostolic See were upheld under pain of anathema.

The decrees run as follows:—

I.

We adjudge that the Synod lately held under the most pious Emperor Louis in the eleventh indiction in the month of June, in the city of Metz, by bishops, who have anticipated our judgment and rashly violated the ordinances of the Apostolic See, to be now and henceforth and for ever annulled and reckoned with the Robber-Synod of Ephesus, and by our Apostolic authority we pronounce that it is to be condemned in perpetuity, and not to be called a Synod, &c.

II.

Theutgard, Archbishop of Treves, and Primate of the Belgian province, and Gunthar, Archbishop of Cologne, now before us and the Holy Synod, . . . we find in many things to have transgressed the apostolic and canonical ordinances, and impiously to have violated the rule of justice, and adjudge them to be removed from all priestly office. Therefore, by the judgment of the Holy Ghost, and the authority of Blessed Peter, we declare them to be deprived of all episcopal government, &c.

V.

If any one shall despise the doctrine, commands, interdicts, ordinances or decrees, wholesomely published by the Bishop of the Apostolic See in behalf of the Catholic faith, of ecclesiastical discipline, of the correction of the faithful, the emendation of the wicked, or the prevention of present or future evils, let him be anathema. (*Labbe's Councils*, under year 863.)

These decrees might be taken as a sufficient proof that the authority of the Pope in the ninth century was as large in its claims as it is in the nineteenth. There is nothing affirmed by the Vatican Council that is not affirmed by the Third Council of Rome. But to this it is answered that the Council was only Provincial, or at best Occidental, and little more than the Roman Pontiff setting forth his own claims. Now it may be proved that the authority of the Pope as declared in that Canon was not only recognized, but acted upon, by the Fourth Council of Constantinople, which is the Eighth Œcumenical Council.

In order to show this we must give an account first of the Third and Fourth Roman Councils; secondly, of the Fourth Council of Constantinople; thirdly, of the Seventh Letter of Nicolas the First, which was addressed to the Emperor Michael III.; and, lastly, of the action of the Pope in the Fourth Roman Council.

1. As to the Third Roman Council. We have seen that Pope Nicolas, in condemning the Synod of Metz, condemned and deposed Gunthar, Archbishop of Cologne, and Theutgard, Archbishop of Treves, on account of their conduct in the affair of the Emperor Lothair. In the Fourth he condemned and deposed Photius, the intruding Patriarch of Constantinople, together with Gregory, Bishop of Syracuse, who consecrated him; he also suspended all those whom Photius had ordained, and he restored Ignatius to the See of Constantinople. Now it is to be observed that the Synod of Metz was held in June, 863. In the last six months of that year Nicolas held the Third and Fourth Councils of which we have spoken, and a Fifth, in which he restored to his See Rothaldus, Bishop of Soissons, who had been deposed by Hincmar, of Rheims, in a Synod at Silvanectum, now Senlis.

2. The Fourth Council of Constantinople was convened at the instance of Hadrian II., successor of Pope Nicolas, in 869. The first Canon is as follows in the Greek version:—

If we wish to walk in the straight and royal road of Divine justice without offence, the decrees of the Holy Fathers must be followed as ever-burning lights. Wherefore we acknowledge that the ordinances of the Catholic and Apostolic Church received through tradition, both from the holy and famous

Apostles, and from the Orthodox Œcumenical and Provincial Synods, or from any father in God and doctor of the Church, must be kept and observed. For Paul, the great Apostle, expressly bids us to hold fast the traditions which we have received, whether by word or by letter, of the Saints famous in past times (2 Thess. ii. 14). (*Labbe's Councils*, the Eighth Gen. actio x.)

Now it is evident that by this Canon all the rules of Orthodox Councils-General, and Local or Provincial, are accepted and declared to be the law of morals. But the three Roman Councils of 863 were evidently Provincial at least, and were therefore recognized by the Council of Constantinople.

The second Canon expressly accepts the Fourth Roman Council. The words of the Canon are:—

Holding the most blessed Pope Nicolas, and his successor, the most holy Pope Hadrian, as the organ of the Holy Ghost, we define and ordain that everything laid down by them and published by them synodically at different times in the judgment and establishment of the Holy Church of Constantinople, and of its holy patriarch, Ignatius, and in the deposition and condemnation of Photius, should be always observed and maintained, together with the chapters put forth, and that no one of whatsoever rank should dare to despise them. (*Labbe's Councils*, Eighth General, actio x.)

Now it is here to be observed that Nicolas is declared to be “the organ of the Holy Ghost” in all that he did synodically in the deposition of Photius and the restoration of Ignatius.

3. But, thirdly, in order to appreciate the value of the acts of Pope Nicolas, it will be well to take his words in the deposition of Photius and the restoration of Ignatius.

He writes as follows:—

By the authority of Almighty God and the blessed princes of the Apostles Peter and Paul, and of all the saints, and of the six venerable universal Councils, and of the Holy Ghost, let him (Photius) by our judgment be deprived of all the honour and name of the priesthood and stripped of all clerical office, if after knowledge of this punishment, which we believe to be inflicted by Divine Inspiration—since it was without doubt published in unanimity and agreement by the Holy Synod—he shall attempt to preside in the See of Constantinople, or shall hinder our before-mentioned venerable brother and Bishop Ignatius from ruling in peace the Church entrusted to him. (From Letter No. 7 of Pope Nicolas I. to the Emperor Michael, in *Labbe's Councils*.)

Here is an extract from the letter of the Council in recognition of the act of Pope Nicolas:—

Photius after often sending letters and ambassadors to the most blessed Pope Nicolas of old Rome, and choosing and proposing him as his judge, and

urging, according to his own will, without hindrance, all that tended to his own justification and to the condemnation of the most holy Patriarch (Ignatius) was reproved and condemned in every instance, and told to resign the See of Constantinople as being a stranger, the legitimate spouse of that Church being still alive. Being disobedient to the last, he received the anathema from Christ and from the Apostles. . . . Photius, however, anathematized the most blessed Pope Nicolas and all in communion with him, not sparing his high position nor the Church which reaches from end to end. . . .

From the letter of the Council to Pope Hadrian :—

For as that most blessed and truly man of God (Nicolas) from the first defined and proclaimed and as your supreme paternity confirmed and ratified synodically. . . . (*Labbe's Councils*, actio x. A.C. 870.)

4. Fourthly, let us examine the nature of these acts. We have seen that in the Third Council of Rome Nicolas deposed the Archbishops of Cologne and Treves; and in the Fifth he restored Rothaldus to the See of Soissons. The deposition and restoration of a Bishop are among the highest acts of authority. They can be taken only by a superior. It may be said, indeed, that this deposition was only an act by the Patriarch of the West, in a foreign Latin Church; but in the Fourth Council Nicolas deposed Photius, who had intruded himself into the Patriarchate of Constantinople and restored the rightful Patriarch, Ignatius, to his See. Now such acts in the West or in the East are acts of supreme judicial power; proving that the Roman Pontiff not only claimed but had, and by the Council of Constantinople was recognized to have, this supreme *regimen* over all the Church. Pope Nicolas deposed Photius, as Pope Celestine deposed Nestorius, and the Fourth Council of Constantinople recognized this supreme authority of Pope Nicolas by its synodical execution of his sentence, as the Council of Ephesus executed that of Pope Celestine. We can imagine no higher prerogative of government or of *regimen* in the Church than the deposition and restoration of Patriarchs. This act of Pope Nicolas embodied the whole authority declared in the Third Roman Council. And the Fourth Council of Constantinople, in its execution of this sentence, fully recognized the same. The Canon, therefore, is a free evidence and witness that the Roman Pontiff at that time both claimed and exercised, with the recognition of the Oriental Church, the supreme government over the whole Catholic body.

Notices of Books.

[It is with very great regret that we find ourselves obliged by our various heavy engagements of this quarter, to delay the article we had hoped to write on F. Coleridge's "Public Life of our Lord." It is no work, however, of ephemeral interest, but will be more highly appreciated in proportion as it is more carefully studied ; and we hope without fail to offer a few comments on it in our next number.

F. Harper's important volume also—the second of "Peace through the Truth"—has by no means been forgotten. Many other notices of great interest, through want of space, have been held over.]

Contemporary Review, March, 1875. London : Strahan.

THIS number of the "Contemporary" contains Dr. Ward's reply to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen on Necessary Truth. We have appended the article to our present issue.

Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London : Burns & Oates.

THIS very welcome book has added to the joy felt through the Church in England at the elevation of our second Archbishop to the dignity of Cardinal. It is perhaps the most characteristic of his writings, for it expresses the deeper part of the special devotion to the Holy Ghost, which has always marked his individual labour, and his great mission in England. It is the sequel to the volume which he published just after his consecration in 1865 ; and he thus expresses the connection :—

"The former book (on the Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost) was on the special office of the Holy Ghost in the one visible Church, which is the organ of His Divine voice. The present volume deals with the universal office of the Holy Ghost in the souls of men. . . . My belief is that these topics have a special fitness in the nineteenth century. They are the direct antidote both of the heretical spirit which is abroad, and of the unspiritual and worldly mind of so many Christians. The presence of the Holy Ghost in the Church is the source of its infallibility ; the presence of the Holy Ghost in the soul is the source of its sanctification."

We are glad that the practical object aimed at by his Eminence has led him to leave his treatise in the easy form of successive discourses. Their flowing and yet intense and exact language will be intelligible to the simplest readers, and will spread more largely these instructions on the Person of the Holy Ghost; and the dogmatic truths contained in them concerning the soul of man will drop like good seed into many a ready field, instead of being stored in the granary for more studious readers. It will only be possible in the limits of a notice to give a few passages to tempt our readers to taste the rich and various thoughts of so beautiful a book. We will, therefore, only sketch out the plan which it embraces, and quote a few sentences in illustration.

The first two discourses, "Grace the Work of a Person," and "Salvation by Grace," paraphrase and carry home some of the most beautiful truths of cc. 5, 6, and 7 of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, on Justification.

"Since the Fall the Spirit of God has assisted from the beginning every man that has come into the world born of Adam; so that there never yet was any soul which had not sufficient grace, if it had sufficient fidelity to correspond with it, to escape eternal death. Keep ever in mind this great truth; for it is the foundation of the whole doctrine of grace. There are men so narrow as to say that no soul among the heathen can be saved. The perfections of God, the attributes of mercy, love, tenderness, justice, equity, all rise up in array against so dark a theology. The word of God declares, first of all, that the Son of God is the true Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world. . . . There never yet was a soul born into the world that had not the light of reason, and the light of conscience, that is the light of God, shining in the soul. The whole world is the reflection of the presence and of the perfection of God. The reason and the conscience rightly exercised can see and read His existence, His glory, and His Godhead in the works of His hands" (p. 6). . . . "The first Adam, of whom we are born by nature, was constituted in grace, but by sinning fell and died; 'and that which is born of the flesh is flesh.' We are born flesh and blood, and the Holy Ghost is not in us. The second Adam is the Son of God Incarnate, the Fountain and Wellspring of all grace; and in Him the Holy Ghost dwells, and from Him the graces of the Holy Ghost are poured out on us. . . . Because we are the children of the second Adam, His Father is our Father; because we are the sons of God by grace, He is our elder brother. The Holy Ghost dwells in us because He descends from our Head upon all His members" (p. 14).

The body of the book consists of a treatment of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, as the primary workings of the Holy Ghost in the soul, and of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost as "the means of eliciting the operations of grace." There is an introductory discourse to the latter portion, "on the glory of sons." A short passage towards the end of this discourse may serve as a sample of many winning appeals to experience and pictures of real life, which abound throughout this pastoral treatise, and which take away any impression that the mysterious expressions of Holy Scripture about the Holy Ghost need be left to apply only to the Saints.

"He that dwelleth in charity dwelleth in God, and God in him! Here

is the link of gold which binds the soul to God. Keep that link fast, and do not be afraid when the consciousness of your past sins, and of your many temptations, seems to come down upon you, and to overwhelm you as a flood. In those darkest times be sure that if you love God you are still united with Him. It is not when we walk in the brightness of the noonday only that we are united with Him. The purest union with God is when we walk with Him in the darkness, without consolation and without joy; having no other guide; our hand in His hand; going on like children, not knowing whither; but obeying the inspirations of God to do or not to do as He wills; out in the bleak cold sky, with no joy in our prayers and no rest of heart, in constant inward fears, with temptations all around, but always faithful to the guidance of the Spirit of God. 'Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the Sons of God' (p. 163).

Next follow "the Fruits of the Holy Spirit," "the ripe and full product of the vine, of the three great virtues, and the gifts exercised together, producing certain actions in the spiritual life." And the last portion of the main subjects, the Beatitudes, is connected thus:—

"The perfection of the Son of God was not in His active works alone. He was made perfect through suffering. . . . Obedience is perfected in patience. . . . The active perfection is the perfection of the fruits of the Holy Ghost; the passive is the perfection of the Beatitudes. Now the Beatitudes are acts of a more excellent and heroic degree, and in the doing of them the soul is not only preparing itself for its eternal bliss, but it already has a foretaste of its future beatitude" (p. 432).

The concluding discourse enforces the triple motive for an explicit and personal devotion to the Holy Spirit of God, the glory of His Person, the glory of His Office, and our debt of gratitude to Him.

"Ever since your first consciousness—ay, even from your Baptism, when you were unconscious—the Holy Ghost has been within you; all through your growth, in your childhood, in every age, in all your spiritual life the Holy Ghost has been with you, springing up as a fountain of grace. . . . Even if you have fallen from baptismal innocence, it is He that stung your conscience, and brought you back to Himself. . . . The light of the sun, the showers that water the earth, are not so abundant as the graces of the Holy Ghost, as the lights and inspirations which He has poured into our hearts. We have been wasting the grace of God all our life long, and there has been a hand unseen pouring in oil, lest the light of the lamp should die out."

Thus the Cardinal endeavours to leave on the mind two impressions closely related to each other,—the dignity of the individual Christian by grace, and the happy urgency of the devotion to the Holy Spirit if we pretend to know our faith, a devotion calling for adoration and reparation.

It would be easy to add reasons for the fitness of such a book at this moment, by even glancing at the world on which the Church is tossed yet borne along. The ignorant and the malicious are each going their way, more and more unconscious of the nearness of God; and Catholics have not only to escape worldliness, and that pride of mind which is the tyranny of the day, but to stand with a holy self-consciousness, springing

from the presence of the Spirit of freedom within them, prepared so to speak and so to act before men, as to be ready for the judgment of sons who know their heritage.

The Formation of Christendom. Part III. By T. W. ALLIES.
Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer. 1875.

S. AUGUSTINE, as Mr. Allies tells us, looking back on the triumph of Christianity over the combined forces of heathen civilization, declared this victory, which was still fresh in the memory of man, to be the greatest of all miracles. We believe most men who have reflected on the subject will agree with him ; and when we say that the book before us contains an account of the various schools which ruled the minds of educated men external to the Church during the first three centuries of the Christian era, that it exhibits most fully, most accurately, and most clearly their inability to reach the truths which the Christian Church proclaimed, or to effect even in part that transformation of society which the Church effected, this is enough in itself to show our sense of the service which Mr. Allies has rendered at once to historical investigation and to the cause of Christianity. It is evident that work of this kind can be done in a really satisfactory way only by a writer who inherits the Catholic tradition, and understands for that reason the real nature of the faith which overcame the world. But apart from this, Mr. Allies treats his subject in a manner unequalled, so far as we are aware, among the English authors who have preceded him. We do not think, for instance, that any impartial reader would think of comparing Mr. Merivale's lectures on the conversion of the empire to the volume before us ; and we cannot help congratulating the Catholic body that the credit of a labour so fitly chosen and so well executed should belong to them.

We say fitly chosen, and this not only because it is always fitting to draw out the supernatural origin of Christianity as attested by its own history, but also because an inquiry of this sort is pre-eminently opportune at the present moment. The destructive criticism has felt keenly the necessity of explaining the origin and the triumph of Christian teaching. When the authenticity of the Gospels has been denied, and the early records of our Lord's miracles have been swept away, the new critical school know well that their work is but half done. Before Christianity can be explained by natural causes, it is necessary to show, not only that our Lord worked no miracles, but also that the teaching of His Church was no more than the natural result of the religion and the schools of opinion which preceded it. This, for instance, is the task which Baur maps out for himself in the Church history which was meant to sum up all his previous investigations, and to exhibit them as a connected whole. Attempts of the same kind have been made by men of inferior knowledge and ability in England. To such attempts Mr. Allies has supplied a most complete and convincing answer.

He begins this volume with a sketch, brief, but replete with instructive matter, which sets before us the foundation of the Christian Church in Rome, the centre of the heathen world. Next, taking advantage of the most recent investigations, he proves that polytheism had still a strong hold on the mass of the population, and perished not by natural inanition, but by the might of supernatural truth. He goes on to point out that the elements in heathen philosophy most akin to Christianity did not precede but follow it; that they cannot serve to explain the genesis of Christianity, since they flowed from it as the effects of its influence even among those who disowned it. Thus he points out that the later Stoic morality, with its lessons of humanity, of meekness, of forbearance, comes so near to Christian ethics precisely because it arose when the Christian teaching was already making itself felt in society; that these semi-Christian elements appear for the first time, not in Zeno or Cleanthes, but in Seneca, who was in power when S. Paul was undergoing his Roman imprisonment. This theory becomes more convincing as Mr. Allies proceeds to show how those Christian elements in heathen philosophy increase with the increasing power of the Church. They are not, in fact, evidence that Christianity sprang from natural causes, they are the unconscious testimony of philosophy,—a testimony which becomes more and more explicit,—that Christianity is Divine. Stoicism received some elements of Christian morality, but being, as Mr. Allies justly observes, materialist and pantheistic, it rendered piety impossible, and fell behind almost as much as it advanced before the popular Paganism. Plutarch, whose Platonic doctrines made it possible for him to believe in a God and in worship, united the high morality of the Stoic to the ideas of religion. Later still, heathen philosophy felt that Christianity drew men to itself by something more than morality, more even than religion, because it represented the one and the other in the life of a Divine Man. And so Philostratus, the Neo-Pythagorean, wrote a fabulous life of Apollonius of Tyana, a divine man, who was born miraculously, and ascended miraculously into heaven. In short, he met the attraction of the Gospel narrative by an elaborate and spurious imitation. Last of all, the Neo-Platonic school, in the middle of the third century, placed the end of man in union with the godhead, and, content no longer with the natural processes of reason or of moral training, they supposed that God communicated Himself to the soul of man when raised to a state of ecstasy. It is for this reason that S. Augustine speaks of them as the “noblest of philosophers,” as men who “saw afar off, and with dim eye, the heavenly country, though they did not see the way which led to it.” But we ought not to forget that Neo-Platonism is not the genuine product of the Greek mind. It is no instance of what reason can achieve without revelation. It was the last school of speculation which maintained the strife of philosophy against the Church, and it borrowed more largely than any of the preceding systems from the Christian religion, with which it fought so long and so obstinate a battle.

In a concluding chapter, Mr. Allies notes how utterly philosophy, even when it had borrowed so much from revelation, failed to satisfy the

needs of man, how Christianity satisfied the requirements of human nature, and evoked new wants to satisfy them in turn, so that it at once enlarged the capacity of man and replenished these higher capacities which it had bestowed upon him. He dwells upon the impotence of philosophy to renew or to mould men into a society, to affect the popular belief, or to mitigate in any appreciable extent the abominations of a polytheistic idolatry. No philosopher refused to worship the heathen gods; each philosopher made room for the popular religion in his theory; and hence philosophy left the world with a priesthood which did not, and on the assumption of philosophy could not, teach religious truth. It was reserved for a religion which was Divine to teach one truth to the cultivated and to the ignorant. It was that religion only which showed a practical reverence for the truth on which philosophers discoursed, and which endowed the priest who sacrificed to the one true God with power to teach and to rule in His name.

Mr. Allies is no less successful in representing the inability of natural reason to master the truths of the natural order which are in some sense within its grasp. Christianity was a republication of natural religion, though it was infinitely more. It was through the Incarnation that men realized the personality of God, and the fact that men are brethren; through the resurrection of Christ, the first-born of the dead, that they learned a real belief in the immortality of the soul.

We must add that Mr. Allies—and this is the main value of his book—writes not as a controversialist, but as an historian. His statements are full and impartial, as those of a controversialist can scarcely be, and his proof is all the more convincing because it is indirect and subordinate to the history which it is his business to relate. For the same reason, his book suggests thought in many directions. The theologian will be struck by the light which is thrown upon patristic literature by a knowledge of the ideas, and still more perhaps of the phraseology, proper to the later schools of philosophy. No one, we think, will fail to notice the very happy illustrations of the Sacred Scripture, which occur again and again. And finally we will add, and we mean it for very high praise, that after reading Mr. Allies's work through with some care we have not found a single sentence which is not clear and intelligible. He writes clearly because he understands thoroughly; and with this last of many merits we conclude our notice of a book to which a notice of this kind cannot do real justice. We shall be satisfied if we have inclined our readers to study it and to appreciate it for themselves. We have been recommending to them a book which needs no recommendation, because it obviously supplies two desiderata in our English literature. It is the best account we have of Christianity in its relation to heathen philosophy. It is the only history we have worth naming of Greek and Roman philosophy during three most interesting and most eventful centuries; and in the end it must secure the attention of educated men, whatever their own views or sympathies may be.

A few Comments on Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation ; with some Remarks on Vaticanism. By HENRY CANON NEVILLE. London : Pickering.

IT is much to be regretted that Canon Neville came so late into the field with his answer to the "Expostulation," because thereby it has obtained less notice than otherwise must have been the case. Mr. Gladstone simply ignores it, though it came out at least a fortnight before the publication of "Vaticanism."

We may perhaps say that it is the most *business-like* of all the answers to Mr. Gladstone. We mean that,—whereas the other writers have enlarged on this or that particular part of the "Expostulation," and brought out in detail and with effect their own opposite views on that part—Canon Neville alone has simply grappled one by one with Mr. Gladstone's successive statements, and said just so much as was necessary for their refutation. From no other work would an ordinary reader derive so strong a conviction, on Mr. Gladstone's complete incompetency to treat the theme he undertook. Canon Neville has done his work, we may add, with singular neatness and point ; and in no other way can we give our readers so good an idea of his treatise, as by a series of extracts.

For instance, every one remembers Mr. Gladstone's language about the Church having "given up her proud claim of 'semper eadem.'" Canon Neville replies (p. 18) that she has made no

"change in faith and falsification of the Catholic theory of 'semper eadem' : for she does not substitute the doctrine of Papal Infallibility for the *doctrine* of Papal Fallibility—that would be a change in faith ; but she makes Papal Infallibility, which had been always a matter of implicit faith, henceforth a matter of explicit faith ; and renders the *opinion* of Papal Fallibility no longer tenable" (p. 18).

Nor in *practice* has she made any change at all : for, before the Definition,

"the opinion prevailing throughout the Church, and the one according to which the Church *worked*, was that of the Ultramontane school. Errors in faith and morals were condemned, doubtful questions were settled—in one word, the entire teaching function of the Church proceeded—on the principle of Papal Infallibility" (p. 17).

"With the exception of the Gallican period, we have in the whole history of the Church no appeal against the Infallibility of the Pope, although he was uniformly teaching the Church from the very beginning according to that doctrine. Nor, indeed, did the Gallican appeal avail much ; for throughout the entire duration of Gallicanism, from the days of Gerson to the Vatican Council, however strong the talk it held in the schools, it was never able, with all its State influence behind it, to cancel or reform a single *ex cathedrâ* judgment or decree" (pp. 23, 4).

"Antecedently to, and independently of, the Definition of the Vatican Council, we Catholics always held, as of faith, two principles, which without it would work very badly together. We held for the Universal Church inerrancy in belief ; and for the Pope, in virtue of his Primacy, the right of teaching that universal Church. A fallible authority would be but a poor teacher for a Church that could not err" (p. 24).

"In the list of classic Theologians there is not found the name of a single Gallican. As an influential churchman and finished orator, Bossuet occupies some space on that page of French history ; and for his gentleness of spirit, and polished scholarship, and noble docility, Fenelon is a man that his country should be proud of. But neither of them was a name of weight in Catholic schools of Theology. As for the denial of [Papal] Infallibility, it was quite open to the Gallicans to deny it at the time, but a sorry face indeed they were able to put on their argument against it. In their other opinion on the independence, or, as they styled it, the *liberties* of their local Church, they were even more unsuccessful. These were so irreconcilable with the Primacy and Centreship of unity of the Sovereign Pontiff—a doctrine never questioned in the Church—and were so evidently the effusions of a state-ridden Theology, that when we say they were broached by a portion of the Gallican clergy—thirty-four out of one hundred and thirty bishops—in the year 1682, we give nearly their full history. They were talked about and boasted of from time to time, but never received real Theological defence or support. I remember that it was a common exercise of ingenuity with Theological students of thirty years ago to endeavour to reconcile the Gallican liberties with the received doctrine of the Church, in just the same way that in the days of our philosophy we used to harass our brains about the squaring of the circle and the trisection of an angle" (pp. 59, 60).

Mr. Gladstone has talked about what he calls "the old scientific historical school of theology." Canon Neville replies :—

"I have been hearing of Catholic Theological schools since I first took an Ethic treatise in my hands, some thirty years ago ; but the 'old, historic, scientific, and moderate school' is not amongst them. There are the Scotists and the Thomists, the Gallican and the Ultramontane ; and, in the matter of grace, the Augustinians, and the Molinists, and the Congruists ; and in Moral Theology, the Rigorists and the Probabilists, and on ; but the 'old, historic, scientific, and moderate?'—No ; 'non est inventa'" (p. 22).

Here is Canon Neville's language on the "Syllabus" :—

"The teachings of the Syllabus are not 'mere opinions of the Pope himself,' nor pious beliefs 'paternally recommended to the consideration of the faithful.' No, Mr. Gladstone, but *the cordially accepted creed of every son and daughter of the Church*, in the sense in which they emanate from the Pope" (p. 54).

"It is now easy to fix the authoritative character of the condemnation of the Propositions of the Syllabus. It is for each Proposition exactly that which is found recorded against it in the Letter or Allocution to which we are referred. The fact of setting them in order, classifying them, issuing them to the Bishops of the Church, together with the Encyclical, is an indication of the Pope's wish that they should be attended to by the Bishops, and that the members of their flocks should be warned of their erroneous and dangerous nature wherever it may become necessary to do so ; but it does not impart to them any additional condemnation or qualification. In fine, we are bound to hold about them all, that they are *false*, because it is styled a Syllabus of *errors*, and because they are declared to have been *condemned* in Papal Letters or Allocutions. We are bound to hold about each what is taught concerning it in the particular Letter or Allocution to which we are referred, according to the teaching authority of that Letter or Allocution" (p. 81).

Opponents of the Church try to make capital, out of the difference between Catholic authorities as to the precise doctrinal value of the Syllabus. Here is a vivid illustration of the fact, how little these differences amount to. There is not a word, we think, in these two paragraphs, which would not on occasion have been uttered by Mgr. Fessler himself; while for practical purposes what more could be desired?

As to Mr. Gladstone's various perversions of the Syllabus, there is perhaps no writer who has exhibited them in so clear a light as Canon Neville. We only wish he had replied in his Appendix to Mr. Gladstone's attempted defence of those perversions.

Here are some admirable remarks on the famous Decrees of Constance:—

"The action of the Council was in perfect harmony with what we have already written on the Constitution of the Church. Christ's commission is always and unceasingly in force—the *Ecclesia audiens* is never left without an *Ecclesia docens*. Popes will die like other men; and in providing for the succession, delays may happen and difficulties may arise, and the election itself may be disputed or may be uncanonical, for the electors are neither impeccable nor infallible—and a good deal of time must then elapse before mistakes can be corrected, or disputes adjusted—and meantime errors and pernicious doctrines may be making havoc amongst the faithful: it then devolves on the Church teaching to proceed in that form and in that direction in which the Spirit of Truth guides her, until the regular order of things shall be again established" (pp. 60, 61).

In his Appendix, containing various remarks on Mr. Gladstone's "Vaticanism," Canon Neville reviews with much force and at greater length the argument derived by that statesman from the Council of Constance (see pp. 127–134). In the course of this review however, occurs the only passage of the treatise in which we find difficulty. He argues that the "Decrees of Constance were not intended as dogmatic by those who issued them"; and so far we are in entire accordance. But he gives this reason:

"The general rule in the interpretation of Ecumenical Councils is, that the doctrine contained in the Chapters or Decrees is not matter of faith, unless it be repeated in the Canons and declared necessary to be believed under pain of anathema. There appears no reason for using a different interpretation with the Council of Constance" (p. 133).

We would submit to the learned writer with great deference, whether this is not too broad a statement. Two instances of exception, and those important ones, occur to us at once. At Trent—as he is of course well aware—the Council on several occasions expressed most distinctly the definitive character of this or that capitulum, quite irrespectively of any anathematizing canon. Then the Florentine Definition of Papal Prerogatives does not contain any anathematizing canon whatever. No doubt the latter Council used the words "we define"; but the Fathers of Constance used the same word in reference to their own Decree.

On the whole we should have enjoyed a rare treat in studying the very attractive treatise before us; but that the dreariness and weariness of this Glanvill controversy as a whole has incapacitated us from feeling in any one of its constituent parts.

A Reply to Mr. Gladstone's "Vaticanism." By Very Rev. JAMES KAVANAGH, D.D., President of Carlow College. Dublin: Duffy.

IT is very curious to observe, how every successive antagonist of Mr. Gladstone has occupied some special ground of his own, so that not one in their number could have been absent without detriment to the Catholic cause. This, which is true of the rest, is emphatically true of Dr. Kavanagh, who most worthily crowns the list. The particular point which the learned writer has elaborated far more than other writers, is the universality of Christian belief from the earliest times in the Pope's supremacy and infallibility. Cardinal Manning had treated the same theme in his "*Petri Privilegium*": but that treatment was long antecedent to the "*Expostulation*," and it was reserved for Dr. Kavanagh therefore to meet Mr. Gladstone hand to hand on the subject. He has done this with great learning and ability, and our own conviction is entirely with him. The doctrine of development is indubitably true, and has an important place in history and controversy; but to our mind that doctrine has less applicability on this theme, than on many others. In fact, the two dogmata we have mentioned, the Pope's supremacy and infallibility, had undisputed possession—we mean there were no Catholics who held consistently and methodically any different doctrine whatever—until the great schism.

"Gallicanism first appeared when, unhappily, Urban VI. and Clement VII. were rival claimants for the Papal Chair, and in their straits did many things which were not in conformity with ancient discipline. . . . The agitation thus commenced by the clergy in the reign of Charles VI., was cordially seconded by the civil power. The first document in which the Gallican liberties in their crude form were put forth was a royal edict of Charles VI., dated the 7th of May, 1399, which enacts that the Gallican Church should continue to enjoy for the future the liberty, which according to the sacred canons, she had from her foundation" (p. 12).

That particular dogma, defined in 1870, against which Mr. Gladstone most energetically protests,—the Pope's supreme, immediate, and ordinary jurisdiction over the whole Church,—had been the Church's belief from time immemorial:—

"Papal jurisdiction was, at all times, episcopal and immediate in the Universal Church. Of this there is the fullest evidence in Scripture, tradition and Church history. In Chalcedon, Pope Leo is called '*Papam aut Ecclesiæ Universalis episcopum*.' In the letter of the sixth General Council to Pope Agatho, we find, '*Itaque tibi, ut primæ sedis antistiti, Universalis Ecclesiæ quid agendum sit reliquimus*.' In the Council of Lateran, 649, the Pope is called '*Toto orbe apostolico universalem pontificem*.' In 512 the Bishops of the east, writing to Pope Symmachus say, '*Quotidie a sacro doctore tuo Petro doceris oves Christi per totum habitabilem mundum creditas tibi pascere*.' In the fourth Council of Lateran, can. V., '*Disponente Domino supra omnes alias ordinariæ potestatis habere principatum*.' In Florence, '*Traditam esse Romano Pontifici in beato Petro plenam potestatem pascendi regendi et gubernandi ecclesiam Universalem*.' Council of Trent, sess. XIV., cap. VII., '*Unde*

merito pontifices maximi pro supremâ potestate sibi in ecclesiâ universâ traditâ causas aliquas criminum graviore suo potuerunt peculiari iudicio reservare.

"It is useless to urge this point farther. The Pope at all times vindicated to himself, and exercised, the identical jurisdiction which was defined in the Vatican Council: and if any theologian or canonist denied that the jurisdiction of the Pope was supreme, immediate, and ordinary, he was summarily condemned" (pp. 16, 17).

So likewise as to Papal infallibility:—

"Gerson, who was one of the earliest patrons of the doctrine, admits that up to the time of the Council of Constance, all who denied the Infallibility of the Pope, were condemned for heretical tendencies. I quote his words: 'Before the celebration of this holy Council of Constance, this tradition or doctrine so swayed the minds of writers, that the teacher of opposite opinions was either suspected or condemned for heretical tendencies.'

"If the infallibility was not of faith, those who condemned it would not be suspected of heretical tendencies: and yet Mr. Gladstone, to use his own phrase, says it was set up by Leo X. Major, another patron of Gallican opinions, says, 'The opposite doctrine our University of Paris has held since the days of the Council of Constance.' Here is the date of the birth of the Gallican error—'THE DAYS OF THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE'—and but for this error, we probably never would have had the definition of the Vatican Council. The heresy of Arius called forth the voice of the Church in the definition of Nicea. The error of the Gallicans called forth the definition of the Vatican, which but repeats and formulizes the faith of the Universal Church since the days of St. Peter" (pp. 37, 38).

The body of Irish Catholics never departed from the traditional doctrine:—

"The prevalence of the Gallican opinion in Ireland amongst the Bishops at that period, did not express the faith of the people. When Maynooth College was founded, many of its first professors were French priests who were driven from France by the Revolution. They taught this Gallican opinion to the clergymen educated there. In consequence of the persecution, many Irish priests were educated in French colleges, and brought back the erroneous doctrine which then tainted the French Church. But at any period of our history, if you told a pious Irish Catholic layman, that the Pope, the head of the Church of God, Christ's Vicar on earth, could teach heresy to the faithful when speaking as Pope to the Universal Church, Paddy would regard the doctrine as rank heresy, and tell you it smelled strongly of Martin Luther" (pp. 45, 46).

What we have mentioned is perhaps Dr. Kavanagh's most characteristic merit: viz., that he has so ably and distinctly set forth the extremely strong traditional testimony, which can be cited for the Vatican Definition. His treatise has other great excellences also; but before we proceed to commemorate them, we will frankly mention two particulars on which we are less in sympathy with his teaching. Thus his view of "medieval society" (p. 9), is very different from that, which seems to us the true one, and which we have set forth in our own comments on Mr. Gladstone. Dr. Kavanagh thinks, the Church should have aimed exclusively at "sanctifying the world" to the uncongenial function of

ruling it." To us it seems, that she cannot duly sanctify it without in some sense ruling it; and that any given mediæval Pope would have been a traitor to the spiritual order, had he confined his intervention to the purely spiritual order. We may refer to F. Newman's admirable chapter on "the Papal Church," in illustration and defence of what we would say.

Then as regards the Syllabus. The Pope complimented the late F. Schrader for a treatise which he wrote on the Syllabus, and also the late Bishop Fessler for a treatise which incidentally expressed an opinion on the Syllabus. Dr. Kavanagh thinks the former fact of no account (p. 23), but the latter fact of decisive account (p. 36). We think F. Newman's is the more equitable mode of harmonising the two: the Pope, he says, thereby "makes neither" view "dogmatic, but both allowable" (Appendix, p. 146). For our own part however, as we have said in our article on Bishop Fessler, we can see no appreciable practical difference, between that Prelate's view of the Syllabus and the opinion that it was issued *ex cathedrâ*. What is of much more practical importance is a question on which we, for our part, agree with Mgr. Fessler, F. Newman, and Dr. Kavanagh; while we are unable to follow F. Schrader, if Mr. Gladstone (a very large "if") rightly represents him. We hold that propositions are condemned by the Pope in that sense in which the condemned writer employs them; and in our view accordingly,—as regards any proposition condemned in the Syllabus—such condemnation by no means necessarily implies, that the contradictory of that proposition is true in the ordinary sense of words. Dr. Kavanagh has set forth this view distinctly in p. 20; he mentions also, that the number of Pontifically condemned propositions from the time of Leo X. to that of Pius IX. is about seven hundred; and he adds, that these condemnations "form a vast body of Catholic doctrine."

No other writer perhaps has set forth, so clearly as Dr. Kavanagh, the impossibility of the Vatican Definitions having affected the Catholic's civil allegiance. Take Papal infallibility for instance :—

"Before the Vatican Council, the dogmatic decrees of the Pope, to become articles of Catholic faith, required the tacit consent of the Church; since the Council this consent is not necessary: but as Catholics received and obeyed the Papal decrees with equal alacrity before the Vatican Council and subsequently, how can the decree of that Council possibly affect their civil allegiance? This is the sole difference of the defining power before and after the Council. I should be glad to hear Mr. Gladstone show how it can have any practical bearing on the duty of civil allegiance.

"Whether I believe a defined doctrine sanctioned by the consent of the Church, or believe it on the sole authority of the Pope independently of that consent, cannot practically affect my individual conduct. If the defined doctrine is the same, it will affect my civil allegiance in the same manner, whether I believe it on the authority of the Pope alone, or believe it on the authority of the Pope sanctioned by the tacit consent of the Church" (p. 7).

As to Papal supremacy, our author points out with irrefragable completeness (pp. 8-19), that the Popes for centuries have exercised the

very power defined in 1870. If the civil allegiance of Catholics was not thereby affected before, how can it be thereby affected now?

Dr. Kavanagh's style is very attractive indeed, and we wish we had space for more extracts. We will content ourselves with his conclusion, which is extremely important, and bears thinking of again and again.

"Mr. Gladstone sincerely loves human liberty, restrained by Christian morality and elevated by Christian faith. It is strange he does not see that the principle of authority alone can save us from either anarchy or despotism. Constitutionalism, he will say, is our refuge. In its way it is very good, but could it survive the wreck of Christian faith, could it survive the enlightenment and sense of moral obligation which Christian faith diffuses? In a population degraded by ignorance and irreligion, what is constitutionalism but a clumsy instrument of oppression? With the present state of England before him, Mr. Gladstone's faith in constitutionalism must be sadly shaken. He gave political power to the masses, and they used it to return to office their hereditary oppressors. No—without religion and knowledge widely diffused amongst the people, constitutionalism, as the guardian of human liberty, is impossible. If you have knowledge widely diffused without religion, a constitutional government will become a communistic republic or a military despotism. If you have ignorance without religion, constitutionalism will become the parent of absolutism. Constitutionalism cannot be the permanent guardian of liberty, except in a population enlightened and religious; enlightenment and religion, widely diffused among the masses, are impossible without the aid and co-operation of the Catholic Church, which essentially rests on Papal authority.

"Mr. Gladstone then, in assailing the authority of the Pope, is undermining the very foundation of human liberty, and bringing back the world as far as he can to the despotism and rottenness of Paganism. All who study the social problem must see that human liberty must rest on religion and knowledge; without the principle of authority, religion is impossible; and *without religion knowledge but makes men more accomplished in wickedness* and more difficult to govern. The authority of human law is the guardian of social order. The authority of human law rests on the divine, of which God's Church is constituted the legitimate interpreter. The Church speaks by the voice of her divinely constituted head—the POPE OF ROME" (pp. 87, 88).

Our readers will have observed in the "Tablet" of April 24 a brief explanation put forth by Dr. Kavanagh of what he had said on clandestine marriages.

Readings from the Old Testament. By Very Rev. J. G. WENHAM, Canon of Southwark. London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

EVERY Catholic must feel himself indebted to Canon Wenham for the "Readings from the Old Testament," of which the first and second parts are contained in the volume before us. The first part treats of "*The Patriarchs*;" or, the Old Testament History from the beginning to the birth of Moses, i.e. from B.C. 4000 to B.C. 1571, a period of 2433

years." The second part treats of "*The Israelites*; or, history of God's chosen people from the birth of Moses to the end of the Judges, i.e. from B.C. 1571 to 1075, a period of 496 years." Although intended especially for the use of students, this work is acceptable to all, inasmuch as a "knowledge of the Holy Scripture is suitable and useful to the Christian, and expected from the man of education. And when, as at present, the intellect is carefully instructed in many things, it is important that religious knowledge also should be thorough and complete."

It is by no means desirable to put the Bible itself into the hands of the ordinary student. "It is too long and too intricate for him readily to make out a consecutive history. He cannot learn it all, and wants the knowledge of what he may best leave out. Moreover, the difficulties he will continually meet, and which are studiously brought out by modern thinkers, will make him say with the Ethiopian, when Philip the deacon asked him "Understandest thou what thou readest?" "How *can* I, unless some one show me?" "A certain amount both of learning and discretion are needful for reading the Old Testament with profit." "The child must begin by Bible stories, or a manual of Sacred History; but this is not enough for more advanced scholars. They require not only a more complete knowledge of the history than can be obtained from a summary, but, still more, some acquaintance with the beautiful language of the Holy Scripture itself." Canon Wenham has used the English version of the Holy Scriptures which has already been published with ecclesiastical authority, and has illustrated his work with notes from Kenrick and other writers and various maps. Indeed, the more we see of these "Readings from the Old Testament," the more are we convinced that the work has been to its author a labour of love, and is calculated to win its way into every Catholic family where the English language is spoken, and to become the *vade-mecum* of every Priest, Paterfamilias, Student, and Teacher.

The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. New Translation, edited by Rev. MARCUS DODS, D.D. Vol. XI. *Tractates on S. John*, vol. 2. Translated by Rev. JAMES INNES. Vol. XII. *The Anti-Pelagian Works*, vol. 2. Translated by PETER HOLMES, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874.

THE volumes of this excellent and trustworthy translation of S. Augustine continue to appear as rapidly as the trouble and care involved in such an undertaking will allow. Of the two new volumes, one contains the second half of the Discourses on S. John. Of this amazing work, so full of theology, mysticism, morality, and the saint's peculiar eloquence, students know something, the Catholic clergy are familiar with short extracts in the Breviary, and the general reading world has hardly heard. It is scarcely to be expected that the present translation will go very far to make such a book popular. S. Augustine, no do

might be translated so as to read easily, by some master hand who could first understand his thought, and then paraphrase his expression without changing the thought. But the present translation must have been postponed indefinitely if the publishers had waited till they found such a man. The company of translators engaged by Dr. Dods have aimed at fair English and fidelity, and so much they have generally attained. They would be the first to admit that the result is but a feeble and washed-out reproduction of the original. Their work is very valuable all the same. Many of the men who wield enormous influence over middle-class religious opinion, that is to say, the Anglican clergy and the Dissenting ministers of various denominations, in England and in Scotland, who would hardly have taken the trouble to seek out and buy a Latin copy of S. Augustine, will be tempted to place on their shelves these handsome volumes of the English translation. And we have no doubt that, even if they do not study them very profoundly, they will gain many impulses in the right direction; they will feel that Christian teaching and religious living have a history, and cannot be formulated offhand by the Spurgeon or Moody of the hour; they will see, especially, that the great mind of the fourth century thought that the "Church" and the sacramental system were of the very core of Christianity.

Even Catholics, who rightly claim to inherit the faith of S. Augustine, will meet with many things in such a book as the *Tractates on S. John*, which will make them feel what is meant by the "growth" of a living organism like the Church. Take, for instance, the way in which S. Augustine comments on the Passion of Our Lord. It is not too much to say that there is not, in all the one hundred and twenty-four *Tractates*, a single line of what would now pass for "devotion." The following short reflection is all he has to say on the scourging and the crowning with thorns.

"Thus were fulfilled the very things which Christ had foretold of Himself; thus were the martyrs moulded for the endurance of all that their persecutors should be pleased to inflict; thus, by concealing for a time the terror of His power, He commended to us the prior imitation of His patience; thus the kingdom which was not of this world overcame that proud world, not by the ferocity of fighting but by the humility of suffering; and thus the grain of corn that was yet to be multiplied was sown amid the horrors of shame, that it might come to fruition amid the wonders of glory" (p. 495).

In the discourses which cover the account of the Crucifixion, S. Augustine treats at some length of the "hour" at which Jesus was crucified, and of the division of His garments among the executioners, clearing up obscurities in the narrative, reconciling discrepancies, and explaining the mystical sense of the sacred narrative. He dwells, also, on such important matters as the piercing of the side of Jesus, and His burial in a new sepulchre. But the only passage in which there is any apparent warmth is the following, in which he speaks of the carrying of the Cross.

"A grand spectacle! but if it be impiety that is the onlooker, a grand laughing-stock; if piety, a grand mystery; if impiety be the onlooker, a

grand demonstration of ignominy ; if piety, a grand bulwark of faith ; if it is impiety that looketh on, it laughs at the King bearing, in place of His kingly rod, the tree of His punishment ; if it is piety, it sees the king bearing the tree for His own Crucifixion, which He was yet to affix even on the foreheads of kings, exposed to the contemptuous glances of the impious in connection with that wherein the hearts of saints were thereafter to glory" (p. 503).

In the lines here quoted, and in the whole commentary, there is a strong glow as of fire which is covered up ; but the flame never bursts out. It seems to be that the history of the Passion was, in the fourth century, not so much a pious meditation, as an historical fact which only half the world believed. Christian preachers, therefore, spoke of it in terms of polemical argument or in words of explanation ; and when they drew inferences or pointed to conclusions, it was rather to strengthen the proofs of the Christian Church and Sacramental system, or to establish Christian morality, than to inflame private devotion. Warmth of sensible devotion is, doubtless, a great grace ; and it must have been a frequent grace in the times of martyrdom and persecution. But as regards the ordinary, normal Christian life, it seems to be much more common now than in early times ; and it may perhaps be said that the spiritual life has been gradually developing greater sensible devotion during the whole time Christianity has lasted. There are reasons for this ; one is the gradually increasing "sensibility" which civilized nations acquire—a sensibility which develops the softer emotions as the rougher ones die out ; and the other is the increasingly vivid way in which such subjects as the Incarnation and the Passion are analyzed, depicted, and realized, in each succeeding generation. Tender devotion began to get common when the hermits and solitaries taught the world what "meditation" was. The monks and nuns who, in the middle age, wrote down the thoughts of their hours of prayer, gave the Church new pictures and developed a new language. And so, what with the devout analysis of saints, the growing self-consciousness of mankind, the printing-press, and the thousand adjuncts of modern civilization, we have to-day arrived at books and sermons such as S. Augustine never foresaw ; and the grace of God leads men to the heavens by the one kind as by the other. But it is useful and healthy to drink, from time to time, the waters that Augustine struck from the rock in the days when the nations were coming in, and the Church was gathering strength.

It may, perhaps, be fancy, but it seems to us that Mr. Innes has hardly been so careful of good English in these volumes as he might have been. To translate "*famulus*" by "handmaid-relationship" may be necessary, but it is unfortunate. *Fervet ignominia, frigescat invidia* seems to be spoiled by "His ignominy is at the boiling-point, let your ill-will sink to zero." And why does he call the handmaid who challenged S. Peter a "lady's-maid" ? S. Augustine merely says *ancilla* ; and if this servant is qualified at all, she ought to be called a "portress" (*ancilla ostiaria*), classical usage notwithstanding. We had noted a few more instances of the same kind, but it would be ungracious to insist upon them.

Life of S. Paul of the Cross. By the late Hon. and Rev. Father IGNATIUS SPENCER, Passionist. London: Lane & Son. 1875.

IN his preface to the "Life of S. Paul of the Cross," Cardinal Manning says, that "no preface can be needed to introduce to the faithful in England the name and life of a saint, already dear to them for his love of England, and for the labours of his sons among us." "The name of S. Paul of the Cross," as his Eminence further says, "was made familiar to us in England by the venerable Father Dominick, who, on the mountains of Italy, felt his heart burn within him to preach the Passion of Jesus Christ in England, and whose Mission to England came, as he believed, by a special impulse from God." "F. Dominick was chosen by God to bring into the Catholic unity, during his short Apostolate, many of the first fruits of the return to faith in England. How closely the name of S. Paul of the Cross has been thereby linked to the future of our country and people, generations to come will know." In Ireland also, the name of S. Paul is a household word. The children of S. Patrick, ever faithful to Holy Church, revere the 'Holy Fathers,' as they call the sons of S. Paul, and no retreats are ever more diligently followed than those given by the Passionists in Ireland. Cardinal Manning reminds us "that the devotions of the Church are inspirations of the Holy Ghost," and that "this Spirit of Light and Healing has inspired His servants with three devotions to the Personal Love and Sorrows of our Divine Master; namely, the Sacred Heart, the Seven Effusions of the Most Precious Blood, and the Five Sacred Wounds. Blessed Margaret Mary, the venerable Del Bufalo, and S. Paul of the Cross, have been chosen of God to give to these three mysteries of the Incarnation and Passion of Jesus a distinct form and widespread diffusion. It is not without a Divine guidance that these three devotions should have made their home in England. If England is to be once more convinced that the perfect 'truth as it is in Jesus,' is to be found only in the Catholic Church, it will be by a revived faith in the mission and office of the Holy Ghost. If it is to be persuaded to take up the Cross, and to renounce the world which now reigns over our people, it will be by the love and power of the Passion of Jesus. The English people still believe that the Son of God 'came into this world to save sinners,' and that He died for them one by one. . . . It is this that S. Paul of the Cross holds up once more to a people who already believe it, but who, through a singular craft of Satan, are beguiled to turn away from the Church of Jesus Christ, lest it should lead them to forget His Divine Presence and to dishonour his Redeeming Blood. This is a masterpiece of deceit which, for three hundred years, has so held the eyes of our people that, while they have Him by their side, they do not recognize His presence or His voice. It is to dispel this spiritual illusion that S. Paul of the Cross comes into England with *Jesu Christi Passio* upon his heart. They who really love it, will listen. They who listen will know that the redeeming power of the Most Precious Blood, the love of the Sacred Heart, the generosity of His bitter Passion,

the full sovereign forgiveness of every contrite heart, is preached by none so as it is preached by the humblest Catholic priest; and that the Catholic Church alone can say, in all the fulness of its meaning: 'With Christ I am nailed to the Cross.' After S. Paul and his brother John Baptist had been ordained by His Holiness Pope Benedict XIII., they spent some time at S. Gallicano with their patron Cardinal Corradini, who became convinced that "God called Paul another way, and intended to employ him in other works for His glory; and so, wise and enlightened as he was, he made a sacrifice with goodwill to the designs of God, of the love which he had for the two brothers and of the spiritual benefit which the hospital received from them. He obtained for them from Pope Clement XII. a brief by which the title of Hospitality by which they had been ordained, was commuted into that of the Holy Missions, and he then gave them leave to return to their beloved solitude at Mount Argentaro. They found the hermitage of the Annunciation in the occupation of others; and so, with the permission of the Bishop of Soana, they fixed their abode in another, under the title of S. Antonio. They had not been long here, before several subjects came to take the habit of the rising Institute. Their life at S. Antonio is thus described by a lay brother:—"The hermitage," he says, "consisted of a little church and two rooms, one above the other. In the upper room, all slept on little sacks of straw, raised upon boards above the brick floor, each of these beds being divided from its neighbour by a curtain of cloth. At midnight we used to rise and go into the church, where the fathers recited Matins, and we lay brothers said the Rosary and other prayers. After Matins all together made an hour of mental prayer, at the end of which, four times a week, we took the discipline. After choir those who wished returned again to rest; others were employed in study or some other good occupation. In the morning they got up again before light, and went into the church to say Prime and Tierce; after which came another hour of mental prayer. The priest then said Mass. When they had made their thanksgiving they remained some time in the lower room reading or writing; then they took their writings with them, and went each by himself into the wood, while we lay brothers remained employed at home in various ways, working in a little garden that we had, making up faggots, and cooking a few vegetables in a little shed opposite the door of the hermitage, which served us for a kitchen. About an hour before noon, all returned to the hermitage, and went into church for Sext and None. Then we went to dinner. This consisted of pieces of bread, of all sorts, begged as alms, a little wine with plenty of water, some broth made of vegetables, and a little plate of salt or fresh fish, given us for charity. After the meal we remained a little time together for recreation, and then each one again took his writings with him, and went to study in the wood by himself, after first reciting Vespers. About an hour before sunset they returned to say Compline, after which we all spent an hour in mental prayer, and then said the Rosary. In winter they had another hour's study, after which came collation, for we fasted every day excepting festivals. On Easter-day, Whit Sunday, Christmas-day, and other great

solemnities of the year, they sang Mass and Vespers, and on those days we had eggs and white meats In fine, the life which F. Paul led made him look like an angel in human form, a most austere penitent, a saint." "To the great sorrow of the blessed founder, his first disciples forsook him, some after a few months, others at a later period. With some of them the reason for this was their want of generosity and constancy, with others that their health would not endure a life of such solitude and self-denial"; however, God sent him "other companions of a higher stamp." The first Retreat of the Congregation was founded at Orbetello, with the consent of Cardinal Altieri, Abbot of S. Vincent and S. Anastasius, and for twelve years they laboured in this and the neighbouring dioceses with great fruit. Our limited space will not allow us to give the details of the wonderful miracles with which S. Paul of the Cross was favoured in his various missions, especially at Orbetello, in the conversion of heretics, &c. ; for these details we are obliged to refer our readers to this most interesting and remarkable life, which overflows with miraculous events. We cannot, however, refrain from referring to S. Paul's love for England, and his desire for her conversion to the faith of her forefathers, a love and desire so deeply shared by F. Dominick, F. Ignatius, and all his sons who are now labouring in the English Missions. "There is no telling how many tears he shed, how many sighs he breathed out to Heaven, how many prayers he put up to God, for the return of England to the Catholic Church. Often he used to say, with great feeling : '*Ah, England, England, let us pray for England!* I could not help doing it even if I wished ; for as soon as I begin to pray, that unhappy kingdom comes before me. It is now fifty years that I have been praying for the conversion of England. I do it every morning in the Holy Mass. What may be God's intentions concerning that kingdom I know not ; perhaps He will yet have mercy on it, and the day will come when He will by His goodness bring it to the true faith. Well, let us pray for this blessing, and leave it in God's hands."

One day, when he was ill, the infirmarian came into his room, and found him as in an ecstasy ; he had to shake him three times at least before he came to himself. He then exclaimed, "Oh, where was I just now ? I was in spirit in England, considering its great martyrs of times past, and praying God for that kingdom." It pleased God in part to console His servant ; it being recorded that one morning, after celebrating Mass, and praying for the conversion of the English, he said, with great joy : "Oh, what have I seen ? my religious in England !" and he was not mistaken, for one of his children, Father Dominick of the Mother of God, a religious distinguished for learning, virtue, and zeal, who inherited the spirit of his blessed father, continued for twenty-seven years, praying and making others pray for the conversion of that island, ardently desiring to go there to labour and die in so holy a cause. He told one of his fellow-religious, who was a student of theology under his direction, that this desire consumed him, and that the Blessed Virgin, in a vision, had consoled him with the assurance that his desires would one day be gratified. "After all those years of prayers and desires, he went to Eng-

land in the year 1841, under circumstances which seemed almost miraculous. For the space of about eight years he laboured with immense zeal, reconciled to Holy Church a number of Protestants, and among them several persons of the first rank for learning and consideration. He founded there three houses, and thus England became one of the provinces of our Institute. His name became famous in that kingdom among Catholics, who all looked on him as a man of apostolic character and a holy religious. In the midst of his labours—in the year 1849—it pleased God to call him to his eternal reward, after having realized in his person, at least, what the blessed founder had seen in spirit, that is, his children labouring with success for the return of that nation to the bosom of the Church.” The devotion of S. Paul of the Cross to the Passion of Jesus Christ and the Most Holy Eucharist was indeed remarkable, and this spirit seems to pervade the whole of his congregation. His advice to all was to begin the day “with meditating a quarter of an hour every morning, before you leave your room, or at least to make some reflections on Jesus Christ in His Passion; and you will see that being thus penetrated, first one day, then another, with such thoughts as these—a God scourged! a God crowned with thorns! a God nailed to the cross! you will sin no more; nay, you will become saints. By means of these reflections,” he would add, “I have converted the most obstinate sinners, bandits, and all sorts, who, coming afterwards again [to confession, such was the change of their life, that I did not find matter for absolution, because they had been regular in meditating on the Passion of Jesus Christ, as I had recommended to them.” After fifty years spent in giving Missions, Father Paul died in 1775, and was canonized in 1864.

Stories of the Saints for Children. Vol. 2. By M. F. S.
London: Washbourne. 1875.

THESE “Stories of the Saints” will doubtless be pleasant and instructive recreation for children. The legends are well selected; though we miss one or two with which we were familiar in former days. The authoress seems to have placed the open conversion of S. Alexandra at a more recent date than its actual occurrence. She appears to have attributed it to the destruction of the idols in the temple of Apollo by S. George, rather than acknowledging the fact of the Empress having been long, not, as she says, a concealed Christian, but an acknowledged believer in Christianity. S. Alexandra, on witnessing this miracle of the destruction of the idols, AGAIN confessed her faith, and was martyred by order of Diocletian. The sketches of the lives of S. Roch, the benefactor of Plaisance; of S. Zita, the humble servant girl, the patroness of Lucca; of S. Walburga and S. Winefride, dear to every English girl who loves her religion, and is guided by its holy precepts,—will be read with delight by every child.

Correspondence.

THE BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM'S REPLY TO MR. GLADSTONE.

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

SIR,—In your kind notice of my reply to Mr. Gladstone's *Expostulation* there are two inferences drawn from my words which, as they were not in my mind, I know you will have the goodness to let me rectify.

1. When I say that "other errors, milder but dangerous, sprang as remnants of De la Mennais's teaching at a later period," I do not refer to any "school of Montalembert"; I do not even mention his name. I refer to the school of Traditionalists. I expressly say of De la Mennais, that "his distinguished followers left him to stand alone in his resistance." Montalembert's line was not theological, but political.

2. You say "the Bishop is very express on the authority of the Syllabus," &c. And in reviewing Dr. Newman's letter, you say of the Syllabus: "For ourselves we have always held what the Bishop of Birmingham expresses; that it is certainly an *ex-cathedra* pronouncement." But what I do say, neither more nor less, is this: At p. 8 I say the Bishops assembled at Rome, in their joint address, solemnly accepted the doctrines of the Pontiff, and I give the passage from their address. At p. 66, treating of the Syllabus expressly, I speak of its propositions as *embodied* from the Papal documents, and as thus embodied from the Papal documents confirmed by the Bishops who had promulgated the documents themselves. But I say nothing about *ex-cathedra* in connection with the Syllabus. What I say is that "the letter of Cardinal Antonelli simply authenticates them."

I have always considered those propositions as deriving their force from the documents from which they are extracted, and their sense from the context of the originals. Since I wrote my pamphlet I find that Bishop Fessler, in his reply to Dr. Schulte, takes the same view.

Wishing you every blessing,—I remain, Sir, your faithful servant in Christ,

BIRMINGHAM, Feb. 1, 1875.

✠ W. B. ULLATHORNE.

[We regret profoundly that we so seriously misunderstood the Bishop on the two matters to which he refers. We make the best reparation in our power by printing his letter.]

THE SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN STATES.

[It is of course quite impossible for us as a general rule to publish reasoned replies to our articles. But in beginning our article of last October on "The Sovereignty in Modern States," we expressed our sense that our

views might give pain "to many most excellent Catholics," and added that "we would give every possible attention to whatever they might urge against us." Under these circumstances we have great pleasure in inserting the letter which here follows. We may possibly give a few words of reply in our next number.]

SIR,—Since you have been so good as to allow me to address to you some remarks by way of criticism on the article in your last October number, entitled "The Sovereignty in Modern States," &c., I cannot do better than begin by stating that there is much in the article with which I quite agree. I need hardly say that I agree with the doctrine that there is no one form of civil government more than another expressly authorized by God. For myself, I greatly prefer a kingly government, but I believe that every government, when once legitimately constituted, enjoys the Divine sanction. As regards the origin of civil government, not being myself a theologian, I cannot venture to dispute what you state to be the universal opinion of Catholic theologians—that sovereignty does not come immediately from God, but through the people. I had thought that some theologians held the contrary opinion. I do not however know that this is a question of any great practical importance, since all hold that, in whatever way civil sovereignty was originally conferred, the people are bound to submit to it. With great deference to those who know so much more than myself in these matters, I would nevertheless state my own impression—that sovereignty simply grew out of the old patriarchal system of government by a gradual process of development. The father of a family, according to the natural law impressed by God on the heart of man, governed his children, and the powerful and wealthy father gathered round him not only his own but also other families, his dependents and servants, and their children: so he became a great patriarch, and the chief of a tribe, as we see exemplified in Holy Scripture in the case of Abraham. As the population increased, or as circumstances called for it, certain chiefs would probably choose one among their number to be their supreme chief, or this latter might by the force of arms, or by his practical sagacity, or by his superior wealth, or in other ways, compel or induce the others to submit to him; and here you at once have the primitive king. I imagine that republics arose later, and in their first commencement were either a reaction against the excessive strain of the king's or chief's power, or else an outburst of that rebellious spirit, so dear to corrupt human nature; whichever way you please to view it. Furthermore, I admit the main thesis of your article (though perhaps not for the same reasons that you give), which is that the Count de Chambord cannot claim the throne of France as being his by indefeasible right. I should have been delighted to see him proclaimed king, and I pity the blindness of the majority of the French people who could not see what was for their good; but I do not think that he has an absolute right to the crown, considering all the existent circumstances. Whether Charles X. was justly deposed or not (about which I will hereafter say something), in the first place the event occurred nearly forty-five years ago, and the generation who perpetrated the deed have fully passed away, and, in fact, according to the common calculation of thirty

years for a generation, the time of one generation and a half has elapsed ; the Count de Chambord never was himself king (*de facto*), and was indeed a child at the time of the revolution ; besides all which, it appears to me that France is an utterly disorganized country, one in which the old landmarks have been thrown down, and the whole fabric of society upset ; and in such a country it is not easy to say what is strictly right or wrong, or whether any legitimate authority, in the rigid sense of the word, exists at all. So if I had had the honour of being one of the Count de Chambord's advisers, I should have recommended him to waive any claim on the ground of indefeasible legitimate right, to say nothing whatever about the colour of his flag, but, on the other hand, to insist on being a real king, if he was made king at all, and not a mere puppet, registering the orders of his ministers, in a so-called constitutional monarchy. The Count de Chambord has done otherwise, and I fear he has lost the crown of France—a much more grievous loss to the nation than to himself.

Thus you will perceive that I in many respects agree with your article ; but there are one or two points on which I widely differ from it. And I will first take what you say about the Government of England, and return afterwards to the question of legitimacy in France. You say that "it would be talking like a baby to say in serious argument that the monarch is sovereign [in Great Britain] : no, the sovereignty is manifestly vested in Monarch, Lords, and Commons," &c. Also you say, "In popular language, no doubt, the Queen is often called Sovereign ; but to press this fact in argument would be to build science on a pun." Now I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I feel bound to say that, so far as I do in any degree understand the constitution of my native country, the thing strikes me quite differently. The Queen is not merely sovereign in popular parlance, but she is legally and constitutionally termed so. The Oath of Allegiance in England is not sworn (as in some Continental states), to a charter or a constitution, but to the king or queen. The subject who takes it, swears "true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors," &c. And, again, to illustrate the use of the word *sovereign*, every jurymen sworn in a court of justice in a case of felony takes the oath as follows : "You shall well and truly try and true deliverance make between our *Sovereign Lady* the Queen and the prisoners at the bar, whom you shall have in charge," &c. And the witnesses are sworn in the same way : "The evidence that you shall give before the Court and Jury sworn between our *Sovereign Lady* the Queen and the prisoners at the bar, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Then look at the terms in which Acts of Parliament are worded ; they all run in some such language as this : "Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's [or King's] Most Excellent Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled, that," &c.

It is curious that during the recent discussion about the Vatican Decrees, raised by Mr. Gladstone, a writer in the "Times," who (being apparently a lawyer) might have known better, made an objection to the Decrees of the Council on the ground of their being promulgated by the Pope speaking in his own person, though "*Sacrosancto approbante Concilio*." He seemed to

be ignorant of the fact that Acts of Parliament in England run in the terms which I have quoted,—an almost exactly parallel case.

In a periodical which stands so high in point of learning as the *DUBLIN REVIEW*, we surely do not expect to find the popular fallacy that the three Estates of the Realm are the Queen, Lords, and Commons. You of course do not hold this common but erroneous notion ; yet your language (if I may venture to say so) looks strangely like it, so much so as to be easily liable to misinterpretation. The three Estates of the Realm known to the English Constitution are the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons, and these, when assembled in Parliament, are the great Constitutional Council of the Sovereign.

In the hypothetical case you put of a future king attempting to govern illegally by force, it appears to me that, however wrong he might be, he *could* be no rebel ; the king can do no *legal* wrong, though the persons who act illegally by his orders are no doubt responsible. In practice it could not happen ; for not only are the taxes, and the purposes to which they are to be applied, in great measure voted annually, so that the machinery of Government could not be carried on unless Parliament were sitting, but not even could military violence be used to enforce the payment of illegal imposts, for the Mutiny Act (on which the existence of the army as an organized body is founded) is also voted annually, and renewed from year to year. In fact, the House of Commons have usurped *practically* the sovereignty, which strictly speaking they delegate to a body, unknown to the old English Constitution, which is called the Cabinet ; and the successive sovereigns have latterly acquiesced in the arrangement : but if ever there arose in England a vigorous king, determined to assert his rights, and that from the moment he ascended the throne, he might work a great change without doing a single unlawful act.

But as regards France, it is possible enough that your doctrine is in great measure true. If the oath of allegiance were taken to the Charter and not to the king, that alone makes a vast difference. I have not studied the Charter given by Louis XVIII., and so I cannot speak on this subject with confidence. My main point, on which I join issue with you, is the English Constitution ; but even in France I think it might fairly be urged in favour of Charles X., that though he did wrong, he did not do such grave wrong as to deserve deposition. As regards the press laws, there can surely be little doubt of this ; but as regards the altering the elective franchise for the Lower House, that of course is a more serious affair. But supposing he did ever so grave wrong, who judged and deposed him ? Was it not the Parisian mob ? and were they his legal judges ? It may be said that after the revolution was over, the Chambers recognized Louis Philippe as king, and the country acquiesced ; but the *people* as a body were not consulted, and there was nothing by way of a *plébiscite*, such as the Bonapartes delight in. So I should raise the question whether (supposing Charles X. to have been ever so wrong) he (Charles) was legitimately deposed, or Louis Philippe legitimately chosen king.

Did the Pope, however, give his sanction and approval to the revolution of July, 1830 ? I greatly doubt it. From your own showing, the Pope

pronounced no opinion about it either way ; the question put to him was whether it was lawful to take the oath of allegiance under the new state of affairs, and he decided that it was so, and also that the new king might be prayed for at Mass in the usual way. The Pope might well have said to himself, "Here is a question of French constitutional right, by no means easy to decide : the thing is doubtful, and therefore, without entering into the question whether Charles X. violated the Charter in so gross a way as to merit deposition by force of arms, I will merely answer the question as to the intrinsic lawfulness of the oath, and the lawfulness of the prayer at Mass, and other such relations as the bishops may have with the *de facto* government." Observe, if the revolution had been a clear and manifest revolt against an undoubted right, the Pope would not have acted thus ; but in a doubtful case, might he not well be supposed to do so ? Be it observed also, that the Pope does not direct the bishops to take the oath, he only says they may lawfully do so. I submit, then, that it may fairly be concluded that the Pope gave no judgment as to the right or wrong in the matter of the new régime in France, but merely one as to the permissibility of the acts about which he was questioned. I have, however, already stated that on other grounds I agree with you the Count de Chambord has no indefeasible title, as of right, to the throne, while we all agree as to the blindness and folly of the bulk of the French nation in refusing to submit voluntarily to such a king as Henri V. would be.

There is yet one point connected with the French question on which I must beg leave to differ from you. You seem to think that the fact of Pius VII. crowning Napoleon I. settles the doubt as to his ever having been the legitimate sovereign, and that all good Catholics ought to bow to it as a Papal decision to that effect. I am simply amazed at such an opinion. I thought no theologian, however extreme his views, held that the Pope was infallible in matters of personal conduct or policy : and indeed, over and above this, it is a question whether Pope Pius VII. was altogether a free agent at the time, and whether he did not himself afterwards regret his compliance with Napoleon's wishes. It has nothing to do with our present discussion, but as a matter of strict literal fact, I believe the Pope never put the crown on the emperor's head, but Napoleon prevented him from doing so by putting it on himself.

So much, then, for the French part of the question, as to which, you will observe, that I speak with very great diffidence ; my main point of argument with you being about the English constitution, with regard to which I hope with some confidence that I am right. You will have perceived that I am no enthusiastic admirer of what is called, but *miscalled*, constitutional government ; such government is not in accordance with the old constitution of England, and it has grown up in evil days, since the time when James II. (however great and grievous his faults may have been) was dethroned for the one crime of attempting to raise out of her existing state of degradation the Catholic Church in England. But whatever may be thought of so-called constitutional government in England, the copies of it that Continental countries have tried to make have been generally much worse, and I presume that it was mainly of these latter that Lord Robert Montagu was thinking when he wrote the words which you have quoted in your note.

You will not be surprised by my adding that I cordially go along with you in your remarks upon the Pope's civil principedom—that is, in all matters of principle—for on some points of detail, with which I do not propose to trouble you, I might have something to say.

And now, Sir, I must bring my letter to a close, and must in doing so offer you my best thanks for your courtesy in allowing me space for its insertion.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

W. P.

ROMAN DOCUMENT.

TO CHARLES PERIN, Professor of the Catholic University at Louvain.

Pius IX., Pope.

Dear Son, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

At this time, when civil society persuades itself that the progress of civilization which it considers itself to have attained demands that it should be directed, constituted, and governed by itself, without any assistance from God or the religion instituted by God ; when it thus prepares its own ruin by destroying the very basis of social life ; you most opportunely remind it, in your beautiful work on the “*Laws of Christian Society*,” that religion and human society emanate from the same Author ; that the law of justice is one and eternal ; that this one law has been instituted for men united in society, as well as taken individually ; that it is by obedience to this law that nations must attain order, prosperity, and every kind of progress.

Your work was indeed difficult, and it has required severe labour. But you had resources for its accomplishment in the special sciences which you have so long taught with so much success ; also in the strength, perspicacity, and accuracy of your mind ; and especially in your religious faith, your firmness which no difficulty conquers, your love of justice, and your absolute obedience to the laws of the Church, and to the teaching of this Chair of Truth.

Although we have only had time to read a small portion of your two volumes, we have found reason to praise the honesty and frankness with which you have set forth, explained, and defended true principles ; with which you condemn all that in secular laws varies from these principles ; and with which you teach how, if circumstances require it, we may tolerate deviations from the rule, when they have been introduced to avoid greater evils, without however raising them to the dignity of rights, since there can be no right in opposition to the eternal laws of justice.

Would to God that these truths had been understood by those, who boast that they are Catholics, although obstinately adhering to liberty of conscience, liberty of worship, liberty of the press, and to other liberties of the same kind, promulgated and decreed at the close of the last century by the Revolutionists, and constantly condemned by the Church ; by those

(we say) who adhere to these liberties, not only in such sense that they can be tolerated, but in such sense that they can be considered as rights, that they must be favoured and defended as necessary to the present condition of things, and to the march of progress ; as if all that is opposed to true religion, all that gives self-government to man, all that frees him from Divine authority, all that opens the way to every error, could give to peoples prosperity, progress, and renown.

If these men had not placed their own private judgment above the teachings of the Church ; if they had not, perhaps unwittingly, offered a friendly hand to those who hate alike religious and civil authority ; if they had not thus divided the united forces of the Catholic family ;—the audacious machinations of revolutionists would have been restrained, and we should not now fear the subversion of all order.

Although we have nothing to hope for from these men who will not listen to the Church, your work will nevertheless furnish weapons to those who follow sound teaching ; it may enlighten those who are hesitating, raise up and confirm those who are wavering. As for yourself, who, despising the seduction of patronage and the contradiction of adverse opinions, have boldly written in defence of the truth,—you cannot fail to receive from God the reward which you merit.

We pray Him to enrich you with His gifts. We desire that the Apostolic blessing, which we bestow on you, dear son, with great affection and as a mark of our paternal benevolence, be to you a presage of these Divine favours.

Pius IX., Pope.

Given at Rome, February 1, 1875.

Of Our Pontificate the 29th year.

[We have translated this Brief from the French translation on the cover of the "Etudes Religieuses" of March, 1875.]

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